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JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice.

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VOL. IV.

OCTOBER, 1893, JANUARY, APRIL, AND JULY, 1894.

Philadelphia: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 118 S. Twelfth St.
London: SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., Paternoster Square.
Paris: FÉLIX ALCAN. Berlin: SPEYER & PETERS.

1894.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

OCTOBER, 1893.

MY STATION AND ITS DUTIES.*

In taking this opportunity, which your committee has given me, of addressing the London Ethical Society, in the honorable but gravely responsible position of their president, I have thought that I could best fulfil the duties of my station by laying before you one or two difficulties which have occurred to my mind, in thinking how we are to realize the declared aims of our society on the basis of its declared principles. I hope, indeed, not merely to put forward difficulties, but to offer at least a partial solution of them; but I am conscious that it is easier to raise questions than to settle them, and that there is a danger lest the effect of my remarks may be to repel some minds from the study that we are combined to promote. Still, after anxious thought, I have determined to face this danger. For I do not think we ought to conceal from ourselves that the task we have proposed to our society is one of which the complete accomplishment is likely to be very difficult. Indeed, were it otherwise, it would hardly have been left for us to accomplish.

I will begin by explaining that the difficulties of which I am to speak only affect a part of the aims and work of our society; there is another part—and a most important part—

* An address delivered to the London Ethical Society on April 23, 1893.

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which they do not affect. The first and most comprehensive of the aims that we have stated is

"to assist individual and social efforts after right living."

Now, what are the obstacles to right living? Why does not each of us completely fulfil the duties of his station?

First, I put aside such obstacles as may seem to lie in external circumstances and material conditions. I do not mean that such circumstances and conditions may not *cause* the gravest hinderances to right living, which a society like ours should make the most earnest efforts to remove. But important as it is to diminish these hinderances, it is no less important for an ethical society to lay stress on the old truth, —sometimes apt to be overlooked in ardent efforts for economic improvement,—that it is possible to act rightly under any material conditions. On this point, I need hardly say that there is an overwhelming agreement among moralists. The ancient thinkers went too far, no doubt, in saying that a perfectly wise and good man would be perfectly happy in the extremest tortures. We moderns cannot go so far as that; but we must still maintain, as a cardinal and essential ethical truth, that a perfectly wise and good man could behave rightly even under these painful conditions. In short, the immediate obstacles to right conduct, however they may be *caused*, lie in our minds and hearts, not in our circumstances.

Looking closer at these obstacles, we find that they lie partly in the state of our intellect, partly in the state of our desires and will. Partly we know our duty imperfectly, partly our motives for acting up to what we know are not strong enough to prevail over our inclination to do something else. The two kinds of obstacles are essentially different, and must be dealt with by different methods; each method has its own problems, and the problems require very different treatment. In what I am to say to-day, I shall treat mainly of the intellectual obstacles, —the imperfection of knowledge. But before I proceed to this, I will illustrate the manner in which the two obstacles are combined by recalling an anecdote from the early history

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of ethics. It is told of Socrates that he once met a professional teacher of Wisdom, who informed him that he had discovered the true definition of Justice. "Indeed," said Socrates, "that is a splendid discovery. Now we shall have no more contests in the law-courts, and nations will not have to go to war any more. Every one will have his rights and there will be no more wrongs."

Now, the first impression that this remark makes on us is that Socrates is speaking ironically, as no doubt he partly is. We know that men and nations continually commit injustice knowingly; we remember the old fable of the wolf and the lamb,—where the wolf pleads his own cause, and then pronounces and immediately executes sentence of capital punishment on the weaker animal,—and we surmise that the practical result of this famous debate would not have been altered by our supplying the wolf with the clearest possible formula of justice; the argument might have been cut short, but it would have been all the same in the end to the lamb.

But let us look at the matter again, and we shall see that the master's meaning is not entirely ironical. Let us suppose that our notion of justice suddenly became so clear that in every conflict that is now going on between individuals and classes and nations, every instructed person could at once see what justice required with the same absolute certainty and exactness as a mathematician can now see the answer to a problem in arithmetic; so that if might anywhere overbore right, it would have to be mere naked brutal force, without a rag of moral excuse to hide its nakedness; suppose this, and I think we see at once that though all the injustice in the world would not come to an end,—since there is a good deal of the wolf still left in man,—yet undoubtedly there would be much less injustice; we should still want policemen and soldiers, but we should have much less occasion for their services.

Now, let us make a different supposition: let us suppose the state of our knowledge about justice unchanged, but all the obstacles on the side of motive removed; let us suppose that men's ideas of their rights are still as confused and conflicting

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as they are now, but that every one is filled with a predominant desire to realize justice strong enough to prevail over every opposing inclination. Here again we must admit that we should not thus get rid of injustice altogether. I am afraid that it would still be true, as the poet says, that

> New and old, disastrous feud,
> Must ever shock like armed foes,

and we might have serious and even sanguinary conflicts between nations and parties, conscientiously inscribing on their banners conflicting principles of Right. But though unintentional injustice of the gravest kind might still be done, what a relief it would be to humanity to have got rid of all intended wrong; and how much nobler, less exasperating, more chivalrous would be the conflicts that still had to go on, if each combatant knew that his adversary was fighting with perfect rectitude of purpose.

I have laid stress on this comparison of imaginary improvements because I think that those who are earnestly concerned for the moral amelioration of themselves and others, are often apt to attend too exclusively to one or other of the two sets of obstacles that I have distinguished. They are either impressed with the evils of moral ignorance, and think that if any one really *knew* what the good life was, he must live it; or, what is more common, they are too exclusively occupied with the defects of desire and will, and inclined to say that any one knows his duty well enough if he would only act up to his knowledge. Now, I hope we shall agree that an ethical society worthy of the name must aim at removing both kinds of defects; success in both endeavors is necessary for the complete accomplishment of our task; but as success in either is difficult, it may encourage us somewhat to think how much would be gained by success in only one of these endeavors, even if the other is supposed to fail altogether. In the education of the young and in the practical work of our society the aim of developing the motives to right action, of intensifying the desire for the good life, must always be prominent. This endeavor has its own difficulties

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and dangers of failure, and I do not propose to deal with them to-day. But before I pass on to my special subject,—the other endeavors of removing the defects of moral knowledge, —may I say one thing, out of my observation of human life, as to the endeavor I leave on one side. Though the gift of inspiring enthusiasm for duty and virtue is like other gifts, very unequally distributed among well-meaning persons, I do not believe that any one who has himself an ardent love of goodness ever failed entirely to communicate it to others. He may fail in his particular aims, he may use ill-devised methods, meet with inexplicable disappointments, make mistakes which cause him bitter regret; but we shall find that after all, though the methods may have failed, the man has succeeded; somewhere, somehow, in some valuable degree, he has—if I may use an old classical image—handed on the torch of his own ardor to others who will run the race for the prize of virtue.

We are agreed, then, that much may be done if we simply take the current ideal of what is right and earnestly endeavor to develop a desire to realize it in ourselves and others. But this is not the whole of our aim. We are conscious of defects in this current ideal, and it is impossible for us really to care for it and at the same time to sit down content with these defects. Hence we state it as our second aim

"to free the current ideal of what is right from all that is merely traditional and self-contradictory, and thus to widen and perfect it."

With this view we invite all our members

"to assist in constructing a Theory or Science of Right, which, starting with the reality and validity of moral distinctions, shall explain their mental and social origin, and connect them in a logical system of thought."

It is to the difficulties involved in the task thus defined that my thoughts have chiefly turned in meditating what I was to say to you to-day.

I think that no instructed person can regard it as other than arduous. Speaking broadly, what we propose to do is what ancient thinkers had been trying to do for many centuries, before the Christian churches monopolized the work of moral-

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izing mankind in this quarter of the globe; and it is also what a long line of modern thinkers have been trying to do for several centuries more, since independent ethical thought revived in Europe, after the long mediæval period of submission to ecclesiastical authority.

Yet the phrase we use—"assist in constructing"—implies that after all these efforts the construction yet remains to be effected. We must, then, hardly be surprised if we do not find it easy.

Still there is a Greek proverb that says "the fine things are difficult," and I by no means wish to say a word to dissuade any one from devoting his energies to so noble a cause, especially since a large part of my own life has been spent in working for this end.

And in order that I may be as little discouraging as possible, I will begin with a difficulty which seems to me sufficiently important to be worth discussing, but which I hope to be able to remove completely.

At first sight it might seem as if the task that we have undertaken—the task of "explaining the mental and social origin of moral distinctions, and connecting them in a logical system of thought"—was one that could only be carried out by experts,—*i.e.*, by persons who have gone through a thorough training in psychology, sociology, and logic,—in short, by philosophers. But the plan on which our society has been framed—and I believe the same is true of all other ethical societies which have been founded—invites the co-operation of all thoughtful persons who sympathize with its principles and aims, whether they are experts in psychology and sociology or not. And if our movement succeeds, the element of non-experts is evidently likely largely to outnumber the experts, unless the philosophers of the community shall increase in number more than is to be expected, or perhaps even desired.

The difficulty then arises, can this unphilosophic majority really aid in the task of constructing a Theory of Right which shall eliminate error and contradiction from current morality, reduce all valid moral perceptions and judgments to

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their elements or first principles, and present them as connected in a logical system of thought? Ought we not, at least, to divide and distribute our task more clearly and thoroughly? Does not our invitation at present seem to hand over a work of intellectual construction, requiring the highest gifts and the completest training, to persons who are not, and who cannot be expected to become, duly qualified for the work? Will not these untrained builders build with untempered mortar?"

I have stated this difficulty plainly, because I at first felt it strongly myself, and therefore think that others may have felt it. But reflection convinced me that if the ethical societies have been right—and I hope experience will show that they have been right—in undertaking the noble but arduous task they have proposed to themselves, they have also been right in adopting the broad and comprehensive basis which they adopted. The work cannot be done by philosophers alone: because alone they are not likely to have the requisite knowledge of facts; and because their moral judgment on any particular question of duty, even supposing them to have obtained all available information as to the particular facts of the case, is not to be trusted, unless it is aided, checked, and controlled by the moral judgment of persons with less philosophy but more special experience.

First, as I say, the philosopher's knowledge is likely to be inadequate for the accomplishment of our aim. Our aim is to frame an ideal of the good life for humanity as a whole, and not only for some particular section; and to do this satisfactorily and completely we must have adequate knowledge of the conditions of this life in all the bewildering complexity and variety in which it is actually being lived. This necessity is imposed on us by the modern ethical ideal which our Western civilization owes to Christianity: we cannot any longer decline—as Aristotle would have declined—to work out an ideal of good life for mechanics and tradesmen, because such persons are incapable of virtue to any extent worth considering. But if we are to frame an ideal of good life for all, and to show how a unity of moral spirit and principle may manifest itself through the diversity of actions and forbear-

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ances, efforts and endurances, which the diversity of social functions renders necessary,—we can only do this by a comprehensive and varied knowledge of the actual opportunities and limitations, the actual needs and temptations, the actually constraining customs and habits, desires and fears, of all the different species of that "general man" who, as Browning says, "receives life in parts to live in a whole." And this knowledge a philosopher—whose personal experience is often very limited—cannot adequately attain unless he earnestly avails himself of opportunities of learning from the experience of men of other callings.

But, secondly, even supposing him to have used these opportunities to the full, the philosopher's practical judgment on particular problems of duty is liable to be untrustworthy, unless it is aided and controlled by the practical judgment of others who are not philosophers. This may seem to some a paradox: it may be thought that so far as a philosopher has a sound general theory of right, he must be able to apply it to determine the duties of any particular station in life, if he has taken due pains to inform himself as to that station and its circumstances. And this would doubtless be true if his information could be made complete; but this it cannot be. He can only learn from others the facts which they have consciously observed and remembered; but there is an important element in the experience of themselves and their predecessors—the continuous experience of social generations—which finds no place in any statement of facts or reasoned forecast of consequences that they could furnish; it is only represented in their judgments as to what ought to be done and aimed at. Hence it is a common observation that the judgments of practical men as to what ought to be done in particular circumstances are often far sounder than the reasons they give for them; the judgments represent the result of experience unconsciously as well as consciously imbibed; the reasons have to be drawn from that more limited part of experience which has been the subject of conscious observation, information, and memory. This is why a moral philosopher, in my opinion, should always study with reverent care and patience what I am accustomed

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to call the Morality of Common Sense. By this I do not mean the morality "of the world,"—*i.e.*, the moral notions and judgments of the persons who have no serious concern about their moral duty,—who are always perhaps in a majority. Such persons, indeed, have a morality, and it is better than their actions; they approve rules which they do not carry out and admire virtues which they do not imitate. Still, taking the morality of the worldly at its best, it would be wasted labor to try to construct it into a consistent system of thought; what there is in it of wisdom and truth is too much intermixed with a baser element, resulting from want of singleness of heart and aim in those whose thought it represents. What the worldly really want—if I may speak of the world that I know—is not simply to realize the good life in virtue of its supreme work to humanity, but to realize it as much as they can while keeping terms with all their appetites and passions, their sordid interests and vulgar ambitions. The morality that they work out in different ages and countries and different sections of society, under the influence of this spirit of compromise, is not without interest for the historian and the sociologist; but it was not to this mixed stuff that I just now referred when I said that the moral philosopher should study with reverent and patient care the Morality of Common Sense. I referred to the moral judgments—and especially the spontaneous unreflected judgments on particular cases, which are sometimes called moral intuitions—of those persons, to be found in all walks and stations of life, whose earnest and predominant aim is to do their duty; of whom it may be said that

> "Though they slip and fall,
> They do not blind their souls with clay,"

but after each lapse and failure recover and renew their rectitude of purpose and their sense of the supreme value of goodness. Such persons are to be found, not alone or chiefly in hermitages and retreats,—if there are still any hermitages and retreats,—but in the thick and heat of the struggle of active life, in all stations and ranks, in the churches and outside the churches. It is to them we have appealed for aid

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and sympathy in the great task that we have undertaken; and it is to their judgments on the duties of their station, in whatever station they may be found, that the moral philosopher should, as I have said, give reverent attention, in order that he may be aided and controlled by them in his theoretical construction of the Science of Right.

Perhaps some of my audience may think that in what I have just been saying I have been laboring the wrong point; that it needs no argument to show that the moral philosopher, if he tries to work out a reasoned theory of duty in which all the particular duties of particular stations may find their places in one harmonious and coherent system, cannot dispense with the aid and guidance of the special moral experience of practical men; but that what requires to be proved is rather that the practical man, who desires earnestly to know and fulfil the particular duties of his particular station, has any need of the philosopher. And certainly I must admit that there is a wide-spread opinion, supported by moralists of great repute, that he has hardly any such need; that, as Butler says, "any plain honest man in almost any circumstances, if, before he engages in any course of action, he asks himself, 'Is this I am going about right, or is it wrong?' would answer the question agreeably to truth and virtue." Or if it be granted that such a plain honest man has any need of philosophers, it is said to be only to protect him against other philosophers; it is because there are bad philosophers—what we call sophists—about, endeavoring to undermine and confuse the plain man's naturally clear notions of duty, that there has come to be some need of right-minded thinkers to expose the sophistries and dispel the confusions. It is held in short, that if any assistance can be obtained from the moral philosopher by a plain man who is making serious efforts after right living, it is not the positive kind of assistance which a physician gives to those who consult him for rules of diet, but a merely negative assistance, such as the policeman gives who warns suspicious characters off the premises.

This view is so often put forward that I cannot but infer that it is really very widely entertained, and that it corre-

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sponds to the moral experience of many persons; that many plain honest men really do think that they always know what their duty is,—at any rate, if they take care not to confuse their moral sense by bad philosophy. In my opinion such persons are, to some extent, under an illusion, and that they really know less than they think. But whether I could convince them of this, or whether, if I could convince them, it would be really for their advantage, are questions which I need not now consider, because I think it hardly likely that such persons have joined our ethical society in any considerable numbers. For to practical men of this stamp the construction of a theory or science of right must seem a work of purely speculative interest, having no particular value whatever; a work, therefore, which persons who have not studied psychology or sociology had better leave to those who profess these subjects. It is not to plain men of this type that our appeal is made, but rather to those whose reflection has made them aware that in their individual efforts after right living they have often to grope and stumble along an imperfectly-lighted path; whose experience has shown them uncertainty, confusion, and contradiction in the current ideal of what is right, and has thus led them to surmise that it may be liable to limitation and imperfection, even when it appears clear and definite. Practical men of this stamp will recognize that the effort to construct a theory of Right is not a matter of mere speculative interest, but of the deepest practical import; and they will no more try to dispense with the aid of philosophy than the moral philosopher—if he knows his own limitations—will try to dispense with the aid of moral common sense.

Well, may I say that here is one difficulty removed? But I am afraid that removing it only brings another into view. We have seen how and why philosophers are to co-operate with earnest and thoughtful persons who are not philosophers in constructing an ethical system: but the discussion has made it evident that the main business of construction and explanation—on the basis of psychology and sociology—must be thrown on the philosophers; and then the question arises, how are they to co-operate among themselves? The reason why the work

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remains to be done lies in the fundamental disagreement that has hitherto existed among philosophers as to the principles and method of ethical construction; and so long as this disagreement continues, how is co-operation possible? Well, I think it may be said on the hopeful side, that there is more willingness now to co-operate than there has been in other times not very remote. Fundamental disagreements on principles and methods can only be removed by systematic controversy; but it was difficult to conduct philosophical controversy in a spirit of mutual aid and co-operation, so long as philosophers had the bad habit of arguing in as exasperated a tone as if each had suffered a personal injury through the publication of views opposed to his own. This bad habit has now nearly passed away, and a glance at the names of our committee will show that moralists of the most diverse philosophical schools are willing to combine in the work of an ethical society. But this willingness does not altogether remove the difficulty, or rather it removes it as regards a part of our aims, but not as regards another part. It is easy to see how philosophers of diverse schools may, by sympathetic efforts at mutual understanding and interpenetration of ideas, assist each other in constructing a theory or science of right; but even under these favorable conditions the labor of this construction is likely to be long, and how, in the mean time,—so long as their fundamental disagreements are unremoved,—can they effectually combine to assist individual and social efforts after right living? So long as they are not agreed on the ultimate end of action,—so long as one holds it to be Moral Perfection, another "general happiness," another "efficiency of the social organism,"—how can any counsels they may combine to give, as to the right way of living so as best to realize the end, be other than discordant and bewildering to those who seek their counsels? The difficulty would be avoided if all the philosophers of the Ethical Society belonged to the same school, for then they could assist those who were not philosophers by reasoned deductions from the accepted principles of the school. They would have to admit that other philosophers held fundamentally different principles, but they would explain to their hear-

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ers that the other philosophers were wrong. But, then, if our movement flourished and was found to meet a social need, these other philosophers would be led to form ethical societies of their own. The non-philosophic members of the different societies could not be thoroughly competent judges of the philosophical disputes; but loyalty and *esprit de corps* would lead them to stand firmly by their respective philosophers; and the result must be that any assistance rendered by these competing ethical societies to individual and social efforts after right living, would be hampered by the grave drawbacks of sectarian rivalries and conflicts. In short, it seemed to me that the ethical movement was in a dilemma; if each school had its own ethical society, it incurred the dangers of sectarianism; if different schools combined to work in the same society, it incurred the danger of a bewildering discord of counsels.

Well, here again, I think our society has adopted the right course in accepting the difficulty that attaches to combined efforts; and I think that if this difficulty is contemplated fairly and considerately, though we cannot completely remove it, we can find a provisional solution of it sufficient for practical purposes.

I find this solution in the consoling fact, which the great majority of moralists of all schools have not failed to recognize, that there is much greater agreement among thoughtful persons on the question what a good life is, than on the question, why it is good. When they are trying to define the ultimate end of right actions, the conceptions they respectively apply seem to be so widely divergent that the utmost efforts of mutual criticism seem hardly sufficient to enable them even to understand each other. But when, from the effort to define the ultimate end of right conduct, we pass to discuss right conduct itself, whether viewed on its inner or its outer side,—the spirit in which a good life is to be lived, the habits of thought and feeling that it requires, the external manifestations of this inner rectitude in the performance of duty and the realization of virtue,—then the disagreement is reduced to a surprising extent. I do not say that it becomes insig-

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nificant,—that there is no important difference of opinion among philosophers as to the details and particulars of morality. Were this so, the task of an ethical society would be less arduous than I have felt bound to represent it; but it is at any rate not sufficient to prevent a broad, substantial agreement as to the practical ideal of a good life. And I think that philosophers of the most diverse schools may combine on the basis of this broad and general agreement—with each other and with earnest and thoughtful persons who are not philosophers—in their practical ideals; and letting their fundamental differences on ultimate principles drop into the background, may hopefully co-operate in efforts to realize the second of our aims,—to free this current ideal from all that is merely traditional and self-contradictory, and thus to widen and perfect it.

But I am afraid you will think that our task, as I conceive it, is like the climbing of a mountain of which the peaks are hidden one after another behind lower peaks; for when one difficulty is surmounted it brings another into view. We have agreed that our business is to "free the current ideal of what is right from all that is merely traditional;" but we are also agreed—it is one of our express principles—that the good life "is to be realized by accepting and acting in the spirit of such common obligations as are enjoined by the relationships of family and society." But when we look closer at these common obligations, we find that they are actually determined by tradition and custom to so great an extent that if we subtracted the traditional element it would be very difficult to say what the spirit of the obligation was. This is not perhaps clear at first sight, because the moral tradition, familiar to us from childhood upward, blends itself so completely with our conception of the facts that it seems to the unreflecting mind to arise out of them naturally and inevitably; but if we take any such common obligation and compare the different conceptions of it as we find them in different ages and countries, the large space occupied by the traditional element becomes clear through the great range of its variations. Take, for instance, the family relations. As we trace these down the

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stream of time we see them undergoing remarkable changes both in extent and content. The mutual claims of kindred more remote than the descendants of the same parents or grandparents, which in primitive times are strong and important, become feeble and evanescent as civilization goes on; while within the narrower circle, within which the tie still remains strong, the element of authority on the one hand and of obedience on the other—authority of husbands over wives and parents over children—is subject to a similar, though not an equal, diminution; on the other hand, the interference of the state in the domestic control and provision for children's welfare, which was at first left entirely to parents, is a marked feature of recent social progress. During the whole of this process of historic change the recognized mutual obligations of members of the family have been determined by the actual state of tradition at any given time; when, then, from this historic survey we turn to scrutinize our own ideal of family duty, how are we to tell how much of it belongs to mere tradition, which the river of progress will sweep away, and how much belongs to the indestructible conditions of the well-being of life, propagated as human life must be propagated? And the same may be said when we pass from domestic to social and political relations: what social classes owe to each other, according to our commonly accepted ideal of morality, depends on traditions which result from a gradual development, are going through a process of change, and are actually assailed by doubts and controversies often of a deep and far-reaching kind; how can we find in this moving, though slowly moving, mass of traditional rules and sentiments, which is the element in which our outward moral life is necessarily lived, any stable foundation on which to build, and to invite others to build, the structure of a good life? And yet, on the other hand, we have pledged ourselves not to acquiesce in "mere tradition," when recognized as such,—for which, indeed, we can hardly feel or inspire any enthusiasm.

Of this difficulty there is, I think, no complete solution possible, until our task of constructing a theory or science of

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Right has been satisfactorily accomplished; but a provisional and partial solution is possible, and with that I will now briefly conclude,—

First, in considering difficulties of detail, we must never lose sight of the relation of different parts of morality to other parts and to the whole. If we find anywhere an inconsistency between one part and another, an arbitrary inequality in the treatment of human beings, an arbitrary preference of some to others,—*e.g.*, if to take a simple case we find that we cannot really distinguish what we have judged legitimate for us to do to others from what we have judged illegitimate for others to do to us,—then in this inconsistency we may find a sure sign of error and need of change in our ethical view. Secondly, we should never lose grasp of the importance of that rectitude of purpose, that mental attitude and habit of devotion to universal good, which constitutes the core and centre of the good life. Whatever else shifts, as life and thought changes, this central element is stable and its moral value indestructible; and it not only consoles us to rest on this certitude when practical doubts and perplexities assail us, but it may sometimes afford a solution of these doubts. It is, indeed, a dangerous error, to hold that it does not matter what we do, so long as we do it in the right spirit; but though a dangerous error, it is still only an exaggeration of the truth; for there are many cases where it really does not matter very much to ourselves or to others which of two alternative courses we adopt, so long as we take whichever we do take in a spirit of sincere devotion to the general good, and carry it through in the manner and mood of thought and feeling which belong to this spirit.

Further, we may make this old and abstract conception of the general good more full and definite by combining it with the more modern conception of society as an organism: in which each individual worker in any trade or profession is to be regarded as a member of an organ, having his share of responsibility for the action of this organ. We shall thus recognize that the right condition of any such organ depends on the service it renders to the whole organism; so that if

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the accepted moral rules and sentiments of any such social class are seen to tend to the benefit of the part at the expense of the whole, they stand condemned. It does not follow that the rules should be at once set aside—as this might cause a greater evil in the way of disappointment and disturbance—but we must recognize the need of change and begin the process. Similarly, if we find that elements of human good, such as knowledge and art, important in the life of the whole, are not sufficiently recognized in our current moral ideal, the same principle will require us to enlarge and extend this ideal to admit them.

And if it be said that after all is done, the moral ideal of our age, however purged of inconsistencies and inspired and expanded by a steady self-devotion to the most comprehensive notion of good that we can form, is still imperfect and mutable, and that it must be expected to undergo, in the future, transformations now unforeseen, it yet need not painfully disturb us that the best of our possessions should be thus subject to the inexorable conditions of mundane existence. It need not hinder us from cherishing and holding to the best we have, so long as it remains the best. Life is essentially change, and the good life must be essentially life; it is enough if it contain unchanged amid the change that aspiration after the best life, which is itself a chief source and spring of change.

HENRY SIDGWICK.

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND.

WHAT JUSTIFIES PRIVATE PROPERTY?*

WHAT is it that authorizes a person to say of anything with a clear conscience, "This is mine"? The thought is sure at times to press in on the consciousness, "What gives me the right to what I possess?" It is not an issue that pertains exclusively to one element of human society. Strictly speaking we cannot divide the world into a "possessing and a non-

* An address read before the Ethical Society of St. Louis, April, 1893.

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possessing class." We all own something, although it may be only a very small amount and not be for very long. Whether it be a laborer who is paid his wages on Saturday night, or the stockholder who receives his dividends at regular periods in the year, they each for the time-being will say of the money or coupons in their hands, "This is mine."

But if they think at all they must have some conviction in mind, which satisfies them of the justice of their claim. The individual who draws a salary, whether as an office clerk or as a bank president, whether as a clergyman or as the head of some vast corporation, will now and then raise the question, "Where does this salary come from? Why is it mine? To what extent is it right for me to dispose of it as I please?" It is for each and all of us, irrespective of our condition in life, to answer the query as to what justifies us in speaking of anything as "my property." At this point economics forms a part of the science of ethics, and ethics of the science of economics.

The issue is before the world. But the solution is not at hand. Men are writing about it. But there is no clear unanimity of opinion with reference to the subject. It would be idle for any one individual to attempt to settle the question on his own judgment. Society comes to an agreement on vital problems of that kind, only by a long, slow process of mental disturbance and agitation. One fact, however, is very plain: people are *thinking* about it as they have never done before.

Human nature is becoming more refined. It is not only more sensitive to pain and pleasure; it not only responds more quickly to beauty of form and color, and music; but it has a more delicate conscience. Its peace of mind is more easily disturbed. Men are troubled in thought over this question of property. They believe they are right in possessing it, and yet they are uncomfortable about it. It may be said to people of wealth, "You are not justified in owning so much. You ought to give it up in part or altogether." On the other hand, the wage-earners who may be almost at starvation conditions in some of the cities of Europe, might say to the more prosperous wage-earners in America, "You ought to

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divide with us. Is it right that you should receive more than we do? Surely we labor as hard as yourselves." The more prosperous workingman and the still more fortunate men with private incomes, do not feel that they are altogether in the wrong in refusing to "divide." And yet it kindles a sense of discomfort in their minds.

We can appreciate how important the subject has become at the present day, by observing what a variety of scruples prevail on the one issue as to *what kind of property a man would be unwilling to possess or would hesitate to claim as his own.* Undoubtedly there may be individuals—as in the case of the proprietors of the gambling hells at Monte Carlo, or in the exceptional examples of depravity in our commercial world—who would be wholly destitute of any feeling in the matter. If such instances do exist, they are not to be classed as a part of human society. Their natural place would be in the jungle with the tigers. Most men, however, would draw the line somewhere. Their peace of mind would be disturbed if they knew that their property was of a certain kind, however secure they might feel themselves in keeping it. But when they come to specify *what* kind, they are often wide asunder. They may not agree at all in their particular scruples.

We know of men, like Ruskin, who would refuse to take interest on money. They may believe in private property; but if it were that one special form they would not say, "This is mine." Then, on the other hand, there are conscientious persons who would be quite ready to receive money or wealth in the form of interest, but who would not think themselves justified in owning land. They look upon that form of ownership as a crime against society. There is also a class who would not like to hold wealth acquired through speculation, although they would be only too ready to possess it if it came as the legitimate profits of a manufacturing business. Still others would be quite content to own property gained through speculation in stocks and bonds, but who would be troubled in mind if it came through speculation in the necessaries of life. Some persons, too, would be disturbed to receive their

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wealth as the direct owners or managers of certain forms of business; but they would have no anxiety in drawing wages or salary from such firms, or at knowing that their income may exist as the interest on the bonds of such companies. Many a person may hold his property with equanimity, although it has indirectly come through a community whose prosperity depends very largely on forms of trade of which he would emphatically disapprove. There is also a great variety of scruples with reference to wealth received by inheritance. Men may be conscious that a part of the property which has come to them in that form, was acquired through methods which they would not be willing to use themselves. But they are ready to say, with composure, "This is mine," of wealth gained through questionable methods by those who have gone before them,—while they would not be at peace with themselves, if they had acquired it by such means through their own efforts.

But the scruples do exist, and they are growing in force and influence,—although it is painful to reflect that in spite of ourselves each man's scruples are liable to pertain to just those forms of property which he does not happen to possess. This element of responsibility for the kind of property we may hold or receive, certainly opens up a sphere of ethics which as yet has only been imperfectly explored. There are persons with a most refined conscience, who do not seem to have thought of the matter at all. And yet the majority of persons will at times have a sense of compunction on that one issue as to what justifies them in their private possessions. They would like to be clear in their own minds on the subject. We cannot look at those less fortunate than ourselves without a sense of uneasiness. And for every living person there is always some other person lower in the scale than himself, to whom he can look as a being less well off than himself. From the top to the bottom of society this feeling of compunction may exist. It is not that we feel ourselves entirely in the wrong solely because we are more fortunate than others. But there is a lurking sense of wrong somewhere. There is a kind of uneasiness of the *race-conscience*

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which we have to account for, in reference to this whole subject of property.

What a contrast there would be on this subject between our own age and the times before the birth of philosophy! I do not suppose that the prehistoric mind ever raised the question what justified it in saying "This is mine." If the brute could think, it would not use its thoughts in that way. The uncivilized races of men in close proximity with the brute creation, probably did not have twinges of conscience when they took what they wanted. It is not to be assumed that they had fine scruples as to the way they got their possessions. Beyond any doubt in the earliest stages of human development "Might made Right!" That is to say, in prehistoric times "Might" was the one basis of security in possessions, because there was practically no sense of Right. And now because that sense has been appearing in the human consciousness, another power assists in giving security to those things in reference to which we say, "These are mine." Might, at the present day, is not the only protective agency. If the Supreme Power were to take away at the present moment all the lurking sense of justice out of the human consciousness, leaving us in other respects with our present institutions complete, then within a generation or a century I venture to say we should be back in the condition of the savage races of Africa. It is not simply through law or custom, not chiefly through a respect for authority, not through dread of the police or the penitentiary, that society in our day is held together. It means that a positive change has taken place in the course of ages, that a new kind of force has been appearing; although this has by no means as yet altogether suspended the place of "might" or the authority of custom and law. But it does convey a different thought to us now, when we say "This is mine," or "That is thine," from what it did to prehistoric mankind.

Civilization begins when the epoch has been reached at which men, besides asserting "This is mine," come also to say, "That is thine." The tiger, if it could think and speak, as it clutches and holds its victim, might say and believe,

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"This is mine;" but there would be no sense of the other idea, "That is thine," when it wanted the victim of another tiger. In the jungles there is an assertion of might, there is individuality; but there is no sense of justice.

What a change has come about in the very idea or *meaning* of private property since it first became established in history! The very conception of it is different from what it was a century or ten or twenty centuries ago. At one time the privilege of ownership implied the right to do with a thing exactly as a man pleased. He might consume it, waste it, preserve it, throw it away, destroy it, do anything whatsoever with it. That was law; that was right; that was justice. The conception appears to have applied to almost every kind of private property. A man could deal in that way with his cattle, his slaves, and his family. There was at first only one slight qualification. He could do all this, he had the right of use and abuse *within the limits of law.* But that one qualification, so trifling at first in the earlier stages of society, was destined practically to transform the very idea of property.

If we were to retain the old conception, the thing itself could scarcely be said to exist as an institution; there would be no private property. We would need to find a new term to describe the present situation. Restrictions came first with reference to the family. A man was the owner of his children, but he was not to be allowed to take their lives. And then as to his slaves; he might abuse or maltreat them, but their lives were to be sacred. That, however, was only the beginning of the limitations. They cover an ever wider and wider field. The absolute ownership of land is taken away. If the community or the state required it, they could appropriate it, although for a compensation. But complete right of "use and abuse" in the case of land no longer existed. It ceased by the establishment of the law of "eminent domain." Yet it might be assumed that other forms of personal property were exempt from these qualifications. A man can spend his wealth as he pleases, save it, waste it, destroy it, give it away. But when he comes to die, the restriction then occurs; absolute ownership ceases. Whether he desires to do so or not,

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he must leave a part of his wealth to his family. Another portion is taken by certain States as an "inheritance tax." The limitations to the "right of bequest" removes another feature of absolute possession.

The restrictions on the privileges of ownership are introduced even in the most common daily affairs. We do not seem able to treat anything quite as "our own." We say that a man "possesses" a horse. It is "his property." He has bought it and paid for it. Can he deal with it as he pleases? What if he pleases to abuse the animal? A Humane Society, much to our satisfaction, interferes and brings him under the penalty of the law. And so it is that a man cannot claim absolute ownership over his children; he does not have full liberty with the very brutes which have been in his possession; he cannot give away his property at death according to his pleasure; he cannot retain the very ground or land he lives upon, if the public requires it; he may even be called upon to give up all he owns, if it is needed to save the existence of the state or the nation.

We recognize the contrast most fully by reflecting on the most significant of all the qualifications. When the law was put upon the statute books making attempt at suicide a crime, private property as the idea was understood in earlier times, was practically extinguished. If a man cannot do as he pleases with his own life, if the ownership of one's own person is subject to qualification, then surely the very conception of ownership is undergoing a transformation. We are either reverting to a still earlier notion, or else a new theory is gradually coming into supremacy. But it is plain that private property does not find its justification in the *idea* of property itself.

What a change, too, has taken place in the very *condition* of property as we trace it back to the first stages of human society! We say so positively at the present day of what we possess, "This is mine," that it is difficult for us to conceive how men could ever have taken any other attitude. It appears to be one of the fundamental instincts of the human race. And yet it seems now to be pretty generally accepted among economists, that a supposition of that kind would be altogether

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contrary to the facts of history. Closer investigation has shown that private property has not always existed as an institution. It was the *tribe*, the *clan*, which first said, "This is mine."

It was not the individual but society, which first asserted the principle of ownership. We are forced to recognize that communal possession was the preliminary stage in the evolution of property. Private ownership came as a later step in the long series of changes, by which the human race has developed into its present condition. We only need to quote the words of Sir Henry Maine:

> "We at length know something concerning the beginnings of the great institution of property in land. The collective ownership of the soil by groups of men either in fact united by blood-relationship, or believing or assuming that they are so united, is now entitled to take rank as an ascertained primitive phenomenon, once universally characterizing those communities of mankind between whose civilization and our own there is any distinct connection or analogy."

We must remember that in primitive times land was practically the only kind of permanent property. They knew nothing in those days of stocks and bonds, large corporations, or private business enterprises. The ownership of the soil included the ownership of all existing wealth. It was the community which said, "This is mine." Individual possession can scarcely be said to have existed at the earliest dawn of civilization. "Ancient law knows next to nothing of *individuals*," says Maine.

Private property cannot therefore claim for its justification that it has always existed as an institution. It is a long, long step from those prehistoric conditions of communal possession, to the day when we accept it as a first principle of our common law that "everything must have an owner." The steps have been traversed, nevertheless. Human nature may be the same in its fundamental characteristics. But it is now living under a new and widely-different kind of civilization.

It is most impressive to observe how institutions will alter, and yet society be all unconscious of the process while it is going on. Men do not think much about it. Generations come and go. Conditions on the outside appear to continue

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about the same. Here and there little changes occur. But they may not be reflected upon at the time. Men act according to the needs of the moment. A legislature may pass what seems a trifling law, to meet some special emergency. A ruling authority issues some unimportant enactment. Little notice may be taken of it. And yet that enactment or law may have established a new precedent or principle, which is ultimately to lead to the transformation of long-established institutions. We look back over the lapse of years and centuries, and discover at last what a tremendous change has occurred. It was all so slow or so silent as to attract almost no attention. But the difference in the end amounts to something like a revolution.

And so it has been with the institution of private property. By a long, slow process extending over hundreds and thousands of years, the whole conception of property has gone through a transformation. We no longer grant absolute right irrespective of conditions and circumstances. We would not allow a man even to spend his own money as he pleased, if it should involve inevitable moral deterioration. If, for example, the opium-habit were to rapidly increase, a law would perhaps be introduced making the use of opium a punishable offence, unless some other method could be found to check the evil.

This attitude of mind with reference to the privileges of ownership, is not that of any one body of men. We act on the new principle without thinking about it. It is the tacitly accepted stand-point of our customs, laws, and institutions. The revolution has been gradually taking place by a process of evolution. I am seeking to trace the tendencies of thought on this subject and not to offer a solution of my own.

When we raise the issue "What justifies private property?" we must adopt all these conditions and qualifications, before we seek an answer to the problem. Private ownership does still exist, and is the recognized institution of the civilized world. But it is quite a different institution in many of its aspects from what it was, hundreds or thousands of years ago.

It might at first be supposed that we could justify private ownership, by observing how it came, as a principle, to exist

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and be established. Many a person who was not acquainted with the facts of history, would probably take it for granted that a very large share of the property in the world had passed into private possession as the reward of personal labor. Wealth is mostly created by that means. Did it not come into the condition of individual ownership because society recognized the right of man to claim for himself the fruits of his own exertions? Unfortunately, investigation has proven precisely the contrary. As we trace the course of events back through the centuries, it becomes clear that private property had its origin in another way. It came through violence and aggression. Men took what they could get and kept it as long as they could. It was *appropriation by the strongest* which probably first established the principle of individual ownership. This appears to be accepted now as a fact of history by the best students who have explored the subject. We quote the words of so cautious and conservative a writer as John Stuart Mill:

"Private property, as an institution, did not owe its origin to any of these considerations of utility which plead for the maintenance of it when established. Enough is known of rude ages, both from history and from analogous states of society in our own time, to show that tribunals (which always precede laws) were originally established, not to determine rights, but to repress violence and terminate quarrels. With this object chiefly in view, they naturally enough gave legal effect to first occupancy, by treating as the aggressor the person who first commenced violence by turning or by attempting to turn another out of possession."

Is not that practically the stand-point of the tribunals of our own age as well? The law of the land does not settle or determine absolute right to titles of property. Its plea is not to the ultimate sense of ideal justice. The basis of its statutes and decisions is "undisturbed possession for a certain period of years." If a man has held or occupied the property for a given length of time, he is given the title. The law does not undertake to deal with the question how the ownership may have been acquired many hundreds of years ago. It sets a limit of time, beyond which it cannot interfere. And so its principle is that of "occupation," and not "absolute justification."

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Is not a vast proportion of existing wealth involved in that kind of an origin? We are all more or less implicated. When, for example, the immigrant comes to America from the less prosperous conditions of Europe, relatively to him the residents of the new world hold the wealth and resources of their country through previous occupation or appropriation. He arrives empty-handed. He might say, "If I had been born in this land, or if my ancestors had been the ones to come over and seize it, I might now be the owner of some of the wealth which is all in your possession."

And so, too, the laborer at work at some declining trade for wages that will scarcely keep him alive, in the cities of Vienna or Madrid, could say to his fellow-laborers across the Atlantic, who were receiving two or three times as much per day in the United States, "It is not simply your greater skill which gives you so much larger remuneration. It is because the natural resources of your country furnish more wealth to be distributed. It is not merely your labor which makes you more prosperous than we are. It is also because you occupy a richer land and share in the appropriation of a more bountiful portion of nature." But, on the other hand, it can be asserted that, relatively to the less fortunate people of Asia, the European also holds the wealth of his country by the same accident of occupation or appropriation. The Americans are claiming their continent on a like principle, in refusing admission to the Chinese.

The origin of private property makes a sombre page in human history. We all, to a greater or less degree, are involved in the occurrences of the past. We can never assert positively of any portion of wealth, "Just this part came into private ownership solely as the honest fruits of labor, and that portion wholly through aggression and violence." We may reap the benefits of the sins of others and never be conscious of it. It is quite certain that the present condition of affairs does not rest on a basis of ideal justice. It is equally positive that we cannot justify the private ownership of wealth through the causes of its first establishment as an institution.

It is not strange, therefore, that one of the first answers to

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the problem which have been given, should have been altogether negative. It has been asserted that private property is utterly without justification. Proudhon, in France, enunciated his famous doctrine in the terse cry, "What is property? Property is robbery!" It was to be expected that, in the process of change, some minds would leap to the opposite conclusion and assume that there could be no justification for any form of ownership. But as yet the world for the most still accepts the principle of private property. Even the ideal of socialism retains it in a modified way, as Schaeffle, of Vienna, has pointed out in his little treatise on that subject. The issue for us is to *make it square with our sense of justice.*

But there is another theory which still has a powerful hold upon many thoughtful people. It finds expression in a number of different ways. It goes with the reverence for fixed institutions. "Private property has existed so long that it *must* be right," men seem to think. They assume for that reason that it was established by divine intelligence. It has come by the law of nature, through the process of evolution. If accident or fortune had anything to do with it, then it was the same accident or fortune that rules the earth or the universe. They claim the right of ownership to other property on the same principle that they assert ownership to the muscles of their body, the capacities of their brain, the qualities of their soul. They believe it to be an institution of nature, and so an institution of God.

It is, however, in substance the same as the other standpoint,—the right of occupation. It is the basis of *law* with reference to property. But it is after all a most unsatisfactory position. Any institution could seek justification by that means, provided it had existed long enough. Human slavery undoubtedly survived much longer than otherwise would have been the case, because it supported itself by that plea. No criterion has ever been agreed upon which should determine just how long a custom must exist, in order to be regarded as an institution of nature. Many an evil has been able to perpetuate itself because it was mistakenly assumed to have been established by the will of Providence. It is always

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a perilous step for any man to venture to interpret the plans of the Supreme Mind or the "intentions of nature." The Divine Will builds and unbuilds through human agency, especially in reference to human institutions.

There is one theory, however, which does seem to rest directly on human instinct for its support. It is that which asserts ownership to the *product of one's own labor*. "What I have made is mine," a man says to himself. He is not disposed to argue the question. His position looks impregnable. It appears to come as a first principle of his very being. He clings to the work of his hands almost as he clings to life itself. He cannot at first conceive that his stand-point requires justification. "What I produce is my property," answers human nature.

Philosophy itself has given the highest sanction to this theory. We need only to recall the words of Locke, the great English writer of the seventeenth century. In explicit language he says, speaking of the basis of private ownership,—

"The labor of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his. It is very easy to conceive without any difficulty how labor could at first begin a title of property in the common things of nature."

Others have made it the basis of their social ideals. It is felt that we identify ourselves with what we produce, so that it seems to become a part of ourselves. When we surrender it, it is almost as if we were surrendering a portion of our life-blood. Human instinct does appear to come to the support of the man who claims the right to keep for himself what is the direct outcome of his own labor. What we make or do is a part of the self which makes it. It comes of my being; it receives the stamp of my mind; it is the offspring of my energy; it is mine. Labor makes property. And so, it is argued, labor justifies private property.

Undoubtedly through all ages this will be a favorite plea. It was rooted in human nature before it appeared in ethics, economics, or social philosophy.

And the plea can be accepted, provided there goes with it the assertion of another instinct, which, however, introduces a

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most important qualification. Along with the demand of the self which claims the right of ownership to the product of its own labor, stands another exaction of the conscience and of the consciousness; and that is, that we pay back to others the help they have given us in making it possible for us to do our work and secure ourselves in our possessions. If a man has loaned me a part of the fruits of his labor so that I can work to better advantage; or if indirectly through his aid I am able to accomplish more; does not the same instinct of justice within me require that I remunerate him in proportion to the help he has given me? In other words, private property is justified to such an extent that we are entitled to claim as absolutely our own, the product of our own labor, *after we have paid back what we owe to others.* But that one condition alters the whole stand-point. When can we ever say that we have fully settled that account? What we owe by written contract is but a very small portion of our indebtedness. Surely no honest man would repudiate his unwritten obligations merely because they could not be enforced by law. The same instinctive human nature which asserts its claim to the fruits of its own labor, holds up before us those unwritten claims, and says in peremptory tones, "Pay what thou owest."

Who can tell how much he would have left to call his own, after he had met those obligations? What man can assume positively of any object that it is altogether the result of his own work unaided by the labor of others? Would any of us assume, when thinking of the father and mother who have sacrificed so much for our own welfare, that we have paid off the debt we owe them? Have we returned to them the share which they contributed out of the products of their labor in order that we might become able to do our work in the world? As a man looks in the face of those parents, can he ever say with perfect assurance of any object, "This is absolutely mine, because I alone have made it, and I owe no man anything"? What person could feel satisfied that he had made full return to the community where he has lived and worked and made his way? Does he fancy that he has balanced the account by paying his share of the taxes? Was there nothing else in the

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bond? Then why would it not have gone as well with him in some uncivilized community in the heart of Africa? Is he not indirectly reaping the benefit of the labor of thousands of others now living, as well as of the labors of still other thousands who have done their work there and passed away? Can we determine precisely when we are no longer in debt to the country or nation by whose existence *we* exist? These various forms of obligation are not mere sentiments which we can settle through feelings of gratitude. They represent just so many different forms in which we have shared the fruits of other people's labor and so been able to reap the fruits of our own labor. We are conscious that we could not settle the account if we should try. To the fathers and mothers, to the friends and kindred, to the community, the city, and the nation we must acknowledge a debt that we can never pay.

If we admit that we owe something to all those living and dead, the product of whose work has aided us in doing our work, what is there left as the fruit of our labor of which we can individually say, "I alone have made it, and hence it is mine"? Labor would give title to private property if only we could first pay off that infinite array of obligations which we owe to our fellow-men and to the race to which we belong. But under the existing circumstances it is not the most satisfactory kind of a title.

It brings us back to our first query. Men are conscious of all these difficulties. They recognize these many qualifications. They may not be able to reason the matter out clearly. The whole subject appears full of confusion. The more they think about it the less do they see their way to enlightenment. And yet in spite of their perplexity the great majority do not feel themselves entirely in the wrong in saying "This is mine" of what they regard as their private property.

But there is one aspect of this whole subject which we have not yet introduced. Another word is more and more coming to the lips of statesmen and economists. It is *expediency*. Idealism shrinks from any such consideration. We do not want that kind of a principle at the basis of our social structure. It reduces us to a level with the brute creation. And

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yet we cannot overlook the plain facts. The human race must live. It will adopt those institutions which are most liable to preserve and perpetuate its existence, irrespective of all abstract ideals of justice. We cannot avoid that conclusion. It is according to the fundamental laws of history. The attempt to act contrary to it, would be like attempting to move the earth out of its orbit. Whoever attacks individual ownership of wealth, must show that there is a substitute for it which will serve equally well in securing the means of subsistence for the human race. Mankind could not live, unless there were a powerful incentive on the part of some individuals to the accumulation of property. Most men like to "live as they go."

Private property exists and survives as an institution first and supremely *because it makes provision for the necessities of existence for human society.* That is its economic basis. It has seemed to furnish the best incentive for a production of wealth, which should be adequate in amount to keep the race of man alive and permit of its growth and expansion. Whether this will always be the case is another question. Human nature may change. Institutions, however, which would be ideally the most perfect in coming centuries, might prove very unsatisfactory under present conditions. An agent stronger than even our idealism will still hold sway. And that is the struggle on the part of human society for its own life and preservation. That is the factor which in the long run must determine all economic institutions. On this issue we are at the mercy of grim necessity.

The ablest minds appear to be abandoning the search after a principle of absolute justification for private property. We might quote from leading authorities in England, Germany, and America. They admit its defects. They do not claim that it is ideally perfect. One after another they rest it on a basis of expediency. "What have you to offer that is better?" would be their proposition. We may be most reluctant to concede to their position. And yet we are driven to admit, that on this whole subject the first right to answer belongs to political economy.

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Does it leave us, then, without any principle of justification for private property? Must we view our entire social fabric simply as a compromise with necessity? Expediency seems a poor substitute for justice.

Human opinion, however, is drifting in the direction of another stand-point which may still justify this institution. It is the conviction that private ownership as a principle of right exists by the tacit consent of all human society. This may be the clue to the whole problem. If the view is correct it would leave the present social structure with a basis of justification. It would also account for the circumstance that people do cling so tenaciously to the fact of individual ownership of some kind, in face of all the scruples brought to bear against it.

The world does seem to give this tacit consent, although men may not be always conscious of it. The vast majority say and *feel* with reference to one thing or another, "This is mine." But if they have that feeling towards any object, whatever it may be, they have accepted the *principle* of individual ownership. The person who clings with a sense of possession to the smallest coin in his pocket, has voluntarily given adhesion to one of the great institutions of our present civilization. It is because that sense of possession in some form or another prevails so universally in the individual consciousness, that private property may be said to have received the sanction of human civilized society.

Law and philosophy both indirectly seem to make it an elemental supposition, that mankind *as a race* is the ultimate earthly owner of all existing wealth. It is to the organized brotherhood of our fellows everywhere that we owe what we are. We call it sometimes "society," at other times the "state" or the "nation." Whatever agent may be its nearest representative, will necessarily act by its right and authority. We cannot be said to own anything absolutely by "one's own right." If it were not for this "state" or "society" as an organized brotherhood, men could not live for a day. We depend on its labors in order to be able to reap the fruits of our own labors. Without its protection we could not hold our property for an hour. It alone makes private ownership

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possible, because it alone secures us in that form of ownership. It therefore creates and grants the right, and so gives the basis of justification.

We hold all that we possess *as a trust.* That is the position which the ablest minds of to-day appear to be taking on this subject of property. We are each and all acting as stewards for human society. What belongs to us is not ours to do with altogether as we please. But it is our private wealth to be used in the service of that mankind by whose aid and assistance it has come to us and by whose sanction we call it "ours." Any person who disposes of it without keeping that fact in mind, is proving himself unworthy of possessing property.

We are doing nothing more nor less in this attitude than reverting to the original religious sanction. It is the same in thought, although different in language. Men have been accustomed to say that they looked upon their possessions as intrusted to them by God. Everything was to be used in the service of that Being. "Why?" Because it was to that Power they owed their existence and the means by which they had acquired their wealth. But that conviction has influence upon us only when interpreted with more definite meaning. It is mankind which has been made here on earth, the agent or representative of the Author of the Universe.

Human society is the direct and immediate source to which we owe the privileges of life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the possession of property. We receive our opportunities, our capacities, the resources of existence, the strength to labor, even our very being, from the whole race of man to which we belong,—the fathers and brothers now living, and the vast infinite multitude who have gone to their rest. Through their efforts, their work, and their sacrifices, we are where we are at our present stage of civilization. What we possess and what we earn is to be held and used in trust for that brotherhood. It is by first acknowledging our stewardship to humanity, that we confess it in a higher sense to the Supreme Being.

Again we must call attention to the fact, that this is not

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the view or attitude of any one set of men. I am seeking to trace the common tendencies of modern thought in reference to property. It is a stand-point which exhibits itself in a great variety of ways. It forms the basis of private conduct, of the acts of legislatures, and of the teachings of writers on ethics and economics. Wundt, of Leipsic, one of the greatest minds in Germany, says, for example, "Only that kind of property is morally justified which is used for moral purposes. Whatever idle or wasteful use of property exists, by throwing it away for selfish purposes, without any consideration for the welfare of society, is immoral." We quote likewise the words of one of the leading economists of the world, Roscher, of Berlin, who asserts explicitly, "With every kind of property must go a corresponding duty. There is no kind of property that could exist and be used irrespective of the welfare of human society." What more definite language could we ask for, and from two of the ablest and most conservative men in Europe? We can also recognize the use of the same principle in the legislation of the parliament in London.

The most striking form in which this attitude of mind towards property has begun to display itself, is in reference to the matter of bequest. We can see at this point that it has even acquired a hold on the popular consciousness. Why is it that so many men, when they retire from earth, wish to leave some portion of their possessions to the good of public institutions, to the service of the great brotherhood of mankind, instead of devoting it all to their immediate family? Is it not a tacit recognition on their part of a state of indebtedness towards their fellow-men? Do they not confess by such an act, a sense of stewardship towards humanity? Is it not a faint effort to pay off *something* of that obligation? If they bequeath the greater part of their property to those who are nearest to them, they justify it on the ground that that would be the truest manner in which to execute their trust. But they wish to confess their debt to mankind by at least making some gift to the outside world. The custom is becoming general even among people of quite small means. The man who dies leaving only a few hundred dollars, desires to have

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a little of it go to an asylum for the blind, to an educational institution, or to the Church. We can recognize also the same spirit among certain men at the present day, who do not feel quite at liberty to spend *all* the wealth which has fallen to them by inheritance. It is their private property. And yet somehow they are conscious that it has come to them as a kind of trust, which they should hand down in part to future generations. There is an element of moral opprobrium which especially attaches to the extravagant use of inherited wealth. It is thus we see indications of this principle of the stewardship of property, beginning more and more in a variety of ways to dominate public opinion.

Human society appears, therefore, to be moving towards a solution of the problem. It cannot appeal to the reverence for fixed institutions, as a basis for private property. We do not settle the question by asserting that it was established by the laws of nature or the will of God. We cannot say that it has always existed, and therefore will necessarily survive. We may not even support it on the supposition that a man is entitled to the fruits of his own labor. But it does find better justification than mere expediency. We can believe that it is right to own property because it is sanctioned by the original owner of all wealth,—human society itself. It is thus that we begin to bridge the chasm which seemed to exist between conflicting sentiments of justice. We are still left to battle in mind over all those special scruples as to the ownership of particular kinds of property. Ethical science has in this its first proposition only made a beginning in dealing with the great problem. But until this one issue is settled the whole subject will be in a state of confusion.

A man can still justify himself in refusing to "divide" at the arbitrary demand of another. He may answer, "It is not through you alone that I have been able to acquire these possessions. Your labor has not been the only factor. I hold this, not in trust for you individually, but for all human society. When that authority demands it and will use it justly, I stand ready to give it up. What you yourself possess, though it be only one small coin, is held by the same principle of right.

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You, too, when the ideal condition of affairs has arrived, may be called upon to cut that coin in two and share it with the brother who is lower in the scale of being, or less happy and fortunate than yourself. But until that time comes, we each remain the executors of our respective trusts." We are speaking, of course, only with reference to the abstract principle which justifies the *idea* of private property, and not as to the question how the wealth may have come into one's possession. In that regard each case would have to be judged by itself. We have been using the term "wealth," also, in the economic sense, whether existing as wages, income, or capital.

It might seem at first thought as if this stand-point to which human opinion was drifting, would offer a very insecure basis for private property. Personally I am inclined to take the other view. The institution is far more liable to survive if this attitude of mind rapidly becomes universal. A revolution would occur on this one issue only as a violent reaction, because men refuse to recognize their stewardship as the owners of wealth. What the iconoclast especially desires is that men may show themselves defiantly selfish and regardless of their responsibilities to society. It gives him the basis of his appeal for an overthrow. He is able to say, "This is what private property leads to." Civilization, however, is naturally conservative. If people do show an honest and conscientious desire to be true to their trust, it will be a long, long time before the revolution takes place. Under such conditions the changes would come gradually. Modifications of the principle might be introduced. But the most radical measures will not be tried, unless there is a clear and hopeless misuse of the trust on the part of the present owner.

Under any circumstances an institution can only continue to live for the reason that it is rooted in the convictions and sentiments of the great majority. It is because the wage-earner says down in his heart "This is mine" of what is paid him on Saturday night, that the capitalist is secure in thinking "This is mine" of the income from his investments. They both accept the *idea* of private ownership. Change that sentiment and there will be a revolution. But sentiments of that

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kind are most conservative. It requires a violent shock to overthrow them, if they have been long in existence. And so it is often said that if the present civilization were suddenly demolished, society would tend to revive with many of the same institutions. Up to the present time the sense of ownership appears rooted in human nature itself; and that is why the principle of private property dominates our civilization. But if there is an abuse of their trust on the part of the owners of wealth, that will certainly menace the principle.

We cannot prophesy that an institution of this kind will continue throughout all eternity. The same agent which called it into existence, may ultimately change it or remove it altogether. The power rests where it has always held its seat, in the hearts and wills of the people. As Friedrich Paulsen, one of the leading and most conservative writers on ethics in Europe, aptly remarks, "If it is true that expediency supports us in our private property, if it is true that we hold it by the consent of society as a trust for the race, the same expediency may finally demand that we surrender it, the same society may withdraw its consent and ask that the trust be used otherwise." But a change of that kind never comes suddenly. If it should occur, men would not wake up one morning and discover a revolution. They would only recognize it by comparing one century with another.

It is true, in discussing what justifies private ownership, we have not gone very far into the problem of property. Ethical science, like economics, is often very unsatisfactory when it attempts to deal with the burning questions of the day. It has a great deal to say about abstract principles; but on practical issues it is slow to help us out of our difficulties. We almost wish it would leave the cloud-land of speculation for awhile and come down to our every-day life. The human nature which has been becoming more refined in its scruples may by and by harden again, unless it finds some method for interpreting those scruples. The conscience of to-day is remarkably sensitive about some things and singularly callous about others. It appeals for enlightenment to the science of ethics.

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It is to be hoped that ethics will respond to the appeal. The unusual sensitiveness which is manifest in reference to the element of right and wrong in the ownership of property, ought not to be allowed to die away. The best and clearest minds of the present time should give it their closest attention. The principle of the stewardship of wealth must receive a *definite meaning*. We do not recognize it simply by feeling it to be true, but by acting up to it. The main issue is still before us when we ask how to apply the principle. How can men show that they regard what they possess as a trust for human society? Should they hold it, spend it, or give it away? They have to determine what it implies to be an executor of a trust. They themselves are a part of this same organized society. Can they honestly and conscientiously devote a large portion of what is in their lands, to their own uses? Ought they rather distribute it in giving labor to others? Men are groping about for an answer. But it is most encouraging that they care for an answer at all. Even a spasmodic recognition of the principle is of some value.

I have only ventured to suggest the first introductory thought to this great subject. It may seem a dry and barren topic to the idealist. There is something so materialistic about the very idea of property. It appears to contaminate the people who deal with it. Refined natures shrink from the touch of it. And yet by the higher methods used in reference to it we can mark both the ethical and religious progress of mankind. It is of the earth, earthy; but when we say "thine" and "mine" in speaking of it, we make it the temple of ideal forces which are to shape the higher destinies of the world.

We can but hope that writers on ethics will realize more and more the importance of this whole subject. A vast field for the most searching investigation lies before us. The higher life of the race of man hangs in the balance. As yet human society has only just begun to grasp the first principle. Even that, however, is a great deal.

We can still say, "This is mine." But, just as men have been accustomed to look upward and add, "to be used in Thy service because Thou hast given it to me,"—so also, as they

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look *outward* over the race of men to which they belong, while thinking "This is mine," they whisper solemnly, addressing now, on the other hand, that vast human brotherhood, "*to be used in thy service because thou hast given it to me.*" From this attitude we can still justify private property.

W. L. SHELDON.

ST. LOUIS.

THE EFFECTS OF HIS OCCUPATION UPON THE PHYSICIAN.

WHAT influence, if any, is exerted upon the mental faculties and moral qualities of members of the medical profession by the special education which they have received, and the peculiar nature of their work? This is the question to which an answer is requested by the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, and it is one which it is much easier to ask than to reply to. It has, however, been answered, more or less directly, by many physicians, in the form of orations, eulogies, and valedictory addresses; and, from one point of view, there is nothing to be said in addition to what is contained in "The Man as Doctor," by Dr. E. W. Emerson, and in "The Conduct of the Medical Life," by Dr. Weir Mitchell. In this paper, therefore, physicians will find no new ideas. The body of men constituting what the world in general knows as "the medical profession" is by no means a homogeneous one in any respect, physically, mentally, or morally, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make any general statement as to the characteristics of this body to which it would not be easy to find exceptions, not merely as to individuals, but as to groups of individuals. The general practitioner or family doctor is subjected to influences, and has interests, which are somewhat different from those which affect the specialist, the investigator and teacher, or the medical official; and while opportunity and circumstance have no doubt much to do in determining to which of these careers a medical man finally devotes himself, yet his own personal characteristics, tastes,

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and ambitions also exercise a powerful effect upon his choice. The subject may be conveniently divided into the effects produced by the study of medicine prior to entering upon practice, and those due to continued practice after graduation.

At the present time the influence which the study of medicine, prior to the taking of the degree of Doctor of Medicine, exerts upon the mental and moral character of those who engage in it, is much less peculiar and special than it was in former times. This is due in part to a marked rise in the standards of medical education, but chiefly to the change which has occurred in the education and modes of thinking of the public at large.

Taken as a whole, the young men who now begin the study of medicine have a better preliminary education, are more intent on their work, and have better manners and habits than had the students of forty or fifty years ago.

The most important fact in this connection is that the great majority of fairly educated people of the present day are more or less familiar with the views of scientific and philosophical thinkers upon certain main ethical and religious questions,—questions which in general outline, though not in details, are much the same as those which have occupied the minds of the best thinkers of the race for at least two thousand years,—and while many do not agree with the conclusions, tacit or expressed, which may be said to represent the prevailing opinion of the present day, yet they are by no means so horrified by these conclusions, or so angry with those who hold them, as they would be if these ideas were less well known to them.

But the conclusions of modern science and philosophy upon ethical and religious matters are in many respects those of the best educated and most independent discoverers and thinkers among medical men of former times, and this fact is largely due to the educational influence which has been exerted upon the great majority of teachers and writers of all schools, and of all professions, by the workers in the biological sciences during the present century, and especially during the last forty years. In almost every issue of the daily press men now read statements and comments which

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would have caused more or less trouble to their authors an hundred years ago, on the ground of their supposed irreligious tendency. There is no general demand at present that a day of fasting and prayer be set apart in view of a threatened epidemic; and a person afflicted with insanity or epilepsy is not looked upon as an example of special punishment by Divine power for some sin, known or unknown. All this, however, was precisely the state of mind of physicians in former times. About two thousand years ago some unknown Greek physician, educated in the school of Hippocrates, wrote a treatise on "The Sacred Disease," that is to say, on epilepsy, in which he begins as follows:

> "It appears to me to be no more divine nor more sacred than other diseases, but has a natural cause from which it originates like other affections. . . . And they who first referred this disease to the gods appear to me to have been just such persons as the conjurors, purificators, mountebanks, and charlatans now are, who give themselves out as being very religious, and as knowing more than other people."

We may be sure that such teaching as this was not popular among the priests of Æsculapius, nor among those who believed in demoniacal possession, and it is easy to understand how the very old proverb "*Ubi tres medici, duo athei*," arose and met with general acceptance. In the first sentence of the "Religio Medici," Sir Thomas Browne refers to this as "the general scandal of my profession," and goes on to say that this, with the natural course of his studies and the indifference of his behavior and discourse in matters of religion, neither violently defending nor opposing, are "circumstances that might persuade the world I have no religion at all," which, however, he denies, and says, "I am of that reformed new cast religion wherein I dislike nothing but the name."

The young man of the present generation who is well prepared to begin a special course of medical study, has already had experience of the doubts and questionings which in Browne's time came later, and, in part, as the result of such study; and will discuss the questions of the existence of the devil as a distinct personage, or of the verbal inspiration of

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Scripture, or of the evolution of man, without any idea that in so doing he is guilty of irreverence or impiety.

Those who in past times have devoted themselves to the ethics of their fellow-men, and to the annunciation and interpretation of the views and wishes of the Ruler of the Universe with regard to human conduct and human affairs, including the clerical profession of all churches and creeds, have always been doubtful about the orthodoxy of the medical profession; and this is probably due in part to the fact that from at least four hundred years before the birth of Christ physicians have had a code of ethics of their own, the precepts of which are independent of any particular form of religious belief or mode of worship. This code, as embodied in what is known as the Hippocratic oath, is as follows:

"I swear by Apollo the physician, and Æsculapius, and Health, and All-heal, and all the gods and goddesses, that, according to my ability and judgment, I will keep this Oath and this stipulation—to reckon him who taught me this Art equally dear to me as my parents, to share my substance with him, and relieve his necessities, if required; to look upon his offspring on the same footing as my own brothers, and to teach them this Art, if they shall wish to learn it, without fee or stipulation; and that by precept, lecture, and every other mode of instruction, I will impart a knowledge of the Art to my own sons and those of my teachers, and to disciples bound by a stipulation and oath according to the law of medicine, but to none others. I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion. With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practise my Art. I will not cut persons laboring under the stone, but will leave this to be done by men who are practitioners of this work. Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption; and, further, from the seduction of females or males, of freemen and slaves. Whatever, in connection with my professional practice or not in connection with it, I see or hear in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret. While I continue to keep this Oath unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the Art, respected by all men in all times! But should I trespass and violate this Oath, may the reverse be my lot!"

It will be seen that this is a series of promises which may be made by a man of any, or of no, religion, and that it contains no reference to any form of worship, to a future state of

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existence, or to what we usually include under the term "supernatural." It is true that it invokes the gods as witnesses, and failure in business as a penalty, but it cannot be said to rest upon any divine sanction, or to be more than a formal distinct promise to do, or to refrain from doing, certain things. The feature of it which the author or authors evidently considered most essential was the formation of a special guild or body of men, bound to each other as a brotherhood, and having certain secrets which were not to be communicated to others.

For the rest, the production of an abortion, the performance of an operation of lithotomy, and the divulging of information with regard to patients, are placed on an equal footing as things not to be done.

This primitive code of ethics, the first of all those which have been established for men engaged in any particular occupation, has been expanded greatly within the last hundred years by the adoption of the principle: do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you; but with the understanding that by "others" is meant especially "other physicians."

The word "profession," as applied to medicine, refers to the existence of a body of men who profess, or publicly claim, that they have special knowledge, the result of which, in the shape of advice and, in some cases, of manual skill, they offer to the public. It is understood that the relations which a professional man holds to his clients, to his professional brethren, and to the public at large, are somewhat different from those which exist among laborers, mechanics, and tradesmen. Some of the requirements based upon these relations,—such as the really having the special knowledge and skill claimed, and the obligation of secrecy as regards the affairs of his clients,—are truly ethical; others are merely matters of custom and manners, and pertain to etiquette rather than to ethics.

For example, it is a fundamental principle of professional etiquette that it is improper to ask the public or individuals to give one employment, except in so far as such a request is implied in a simple notice, giving name, profession, and office-hours. As I have said elsewhere,—

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"The ordinary forms of business competition, by advertising the qualities of one's wares, or cheap prices, or by calling attention to superior results obtained, are not permitted to the professional man, so far as the public is concerned. He not only may, but should, publish accounts of his work when this involves anything new and useful to his profession, because this is for their benefit; but such publication should be made in a professional journal, and not in the daily press, because in the latter it would be practically an advertisement."

There is nothing essentially immoral or unethical in advertising, so long as the truth is adhered to; but when a physician subscribes to, and agrees to abide by, the regulations of a certain code which, among other things, forbids such advertising, it then becomes unethical to break such agreement. This is the reason why codes are framed;—in order to exercise a certain amount of compulsion upon those who subscribe to them. Obedience to such a code becomes a habit, and produces a disposition to consider all the prescriptions of the code as being in themselves ethical, or resting on ethical grounds; and that any man who acts otherwise is acting wrongly and unethically, although he has never subscribed to the code, and is not bound by it. Many physicians gradually come to consider their code of medical etiquette as a sort of formula of religious faith, and are almost as much shocked at propositions to change or to abandon any part of it as they would be at a suggestion to change the ten commandments, and perhaps it is well, upon the whole, that this should be the case.

The occupation of a physician in general practice influences his habits in several ways. I will specify but a few. First, it tends to make him cautious in the use of intoxicating drinks. Not only are the evil effects of excessive use of alcoholic fluids brought to his notice almost daily, but he knows that it is never safe for him to drink enough to cloud his judgment or to affect his speech or gait. He never knows but that he may be called the next moment to see an important case, and he does know that even a suspicion that he is under the influence of alcohol when thus called upon will seriously injure his business. In the second place, his work cultivates the habit of self-sacrifice. However much he may try to adjust his daily round to suit his own convenience, he must

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continually obey calls which seriously interfere not only with his pleasures and social enjoyments, but with his comfort, and sometimes with his health. He must turn out from his comfortable bed on cold and rainy nights; he must miss his meals; he must give up the little excursion which he had planned; he cannot plead a headache, or a cold, or weariness, as a sufficient excuse for declining to obey a call from one of his patients.

This self-sacrifice becomes habitual; he does not question, and doubt, and hesitate as to whether he might or might not properly refuse, but under ordinary circumstances simply obeys—and it does not even occur to him that there is anything specially praiseworthy in his doing so.

It is a common idea that the practice of medicine tends to blunt the feelings—to make one less sympathetic with suffering, and also to induce a comparatively low view of human nature—owing to the many weaknesses, immoralities, and even crimes with which the physician necessarily becomes acquainted. It is true that the physician knows of many private skeletons carefully closeted, the existence of which the world does not suspect, and in this respect he is like a priest; but he also becomes acquainted with much self-sacrifice, devotion to duty, and love which is stronger than death, which are equally unknown to the public, and upon the whole I do not think that his work tends to the atrophy of his emotional faculties, although it may sometimes lead to their exercise in somewhat special directions. He sees many cases in which what most people call vicious and even criminal manifestations appear to him to be largely due to physical abnormity or disease, cases of periodical drunkenness, of reckless licentiousness, of weakness of will-power, of morbid conscientiousness, and the like, for the evil tendencies and results of which he can hardly hold the persons mentally and morally responsible. It becomes natural to him to consider such manifestations with less aversion, and to be less severe in his condemnation of the individuals in whom they appear, than most people are inclined to do; in other words, he becomes more charitable in his interpretation of motives.

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The physician is called upon sometimes to decide very difficult problems in the matter of giving truthful answers to the questions which are asked of him. In a certain number of cases the great majority of, if not all, physicians will decide that it is their duty to give a false answer, or at all events to give a false impression,—either for the purpose of avoiding the immediate danger to the life of the patient which a true statement to him might produce, or for the purpose of preserving secret certain information of which he has come into possession in the course of his professional work. I do not think that this tends to lower his standard of accuracy and truthfulness in other matters; but it does tend to make him more independent of the literal verbalism of a creed, and more ready to rely on his own judgment in certain ethical matters. On the other hand, much of the work of a physician tends to make him critically accurate in the observing and noting of phenomena, and in the application of remedies. The use of apparatus for counting, weighing, and measuring, which will give results independent of the personal equation of the user, is one of the characteristics of modern medicine. The doctor does not ask whether the patient has fever, but "what is his temperature?"

This habit of precision and accuracy is increased by the necessity for punctuality in the daily work of a busy physician. His appointments with his patients and with the physicians whom he is to meet in consultation must be kept if he is to succeed, and his time must be portioned by minutes.

The fact that physicians serve the poor without pay, exercises a very considerable influence upon the development of their moral character. Undoubtedly much of this service in the earlier part of a physician's life is given for the sake of the experience which he thus obtains, but it is also true that the doing of this makes it a habit, and, as Dr. Weir Mitchell says,—

"The virtues which grow to be thoughtlessly habitual are none the less virtues. We tell the truth, are honest, are just, or punctual because the qualities in question have grown to be a part of us. At last they exact no effort, involve no indecision, and above all, no self-praise."

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The study and practice of medicine do not necessarily make a man virtuous, or honest, or a gentleman; in a few cases, as shown by the records of the courts, the special knowledge and opportunities of the physician may have led men to commit crimes which they would not have attempted if they had not been medical men,—but, fortunately, such cases are very rare.

In the great majority of cases the special influence of the medical life of the present day is to broaden the views of the man who lives it, to make him independent in judgment;—rather sceptical as to the occurrence of the millennium in the near future;—quite incredulous as to the truth of the maxim that "all men are born free and equal;"—more inclined to consider and perform the immediate evident duty of the day and hour which lies just before him than to reflections upon the errors of other men;—free from morbid fear of death, and of that which comes after death;—and none the less a believer in the existence of a Supreme Being and in the fundamental principles of religion although he may not consider them capable of scientific demonstration.

JOHN S. BILLINGS.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL.

IN a remarkable paper on "Moral Deficiencies as determining Intellectual Functions," published in the July number of this JOURNAL, the learned author has made a very interesting contribution to that famous discussion which was begun, according to a very respectable tradition, in the Garden of Eden, and which, in much more recent times, was continued in the incomparable conversation between Mephistopheles and the student in "Faust." Every thoughtful consideration of so interesting and momentous a question is welcome, and no reader can doubt the thoughtfulness, and in many ways the instructiveness, of the admirably candid and fearless essay referred to. In attempting, as I shall here do, to explain some of the

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relations between moral and intellectual development from a point of view not wholly identical with that of the author of this former paper, I shall do best to give my argument as little as possible the directly controversial form. Something of controversy will indeed creep into these paragraphs; but the matter at issue is in fact too real and tragic to warrant very much of the weighing of the accuracy or adequacy of this or of that individual phrase which one may chance to find in the speech of one's conscientious fellow-student. Our words easily differ, and may even be open to grave misunderstandings,—never more so than when we write on the intricate relations which obtain between moral defect and intellectual skill. It is easy therefore to misinterpret or to misuse another's expressions upon such subjects; and this fact, while it certainly seriously increases the responsibility of any one who feels called upon to give public utterance to his views as to such delicate problems, makes doubtless only the more unprofitable too detailed a controversy over words that have once been uttered. It is, after all, the cause involved that is here of moment. For the problem of the relations between moral deficiencies and intellectual ability is indeed so complex as to make only too possible expressions of opinion that, by reason of the difficulty of the subject, may easily prove to be erroneous, and that, by reason of the practical moment of the issue in question, may in consequence easily cause the judicious to grieve.

Meanwhile, of the reality of the issue itself there can be no doubt. The words rendered, *Eritis sicut Deus, scientes bonum et malum*, were felt by the author of the original tale to embody a paradoxical truth that, for us who come after him, has only grown more wealthy in its paradoxes as time has gone on. As for the part later played, in the discussion, by Mephistopheles, in the passage just referred to, the significance of these as of other utterances of Faust's tempter lies just in the fact that they contain, in all their cruel irony, an aspect of the real truth. Moral goodness, as an attainment, is doubtless something very different from innocence. And attained goodness is only won through a conflict with the forces of

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evil, which involves a pretty deep knowledge of evil. But knowledge of evil, in us men (and for excellent "psycho-physical" reasons, too), frequently leads to sin, and very commonly does so, in any given individual, before it actually leads the individual himself to the possible goodness that lies for him beyond and above this knowledge of evil. Therefore, on the way that leads the triumphant towards the goal of attained goodness, there will be found many who pause by the way, and who are content, after their fashion, with this or that sort of knowledge of evil, and with the sin in which, in their cases, this knowledge has actually involved them. Among these numerous wayfarers, moreover, there will be found many in whom such knowledge is a very marked feature of their whole mental life. Some of them, accordingly, will be very clever and ingenious persons, and will owe much of their wit to their lack of innocence. As against the innocent,—the dwellers, as it were, in Eden,—these knowing sinners can always assert that there is something more advanced,—more Godlike, in fact, as the serpent said,—in their wisdom, than in the ignorance of those who cannot conceive of sin. And thus insight and moral defect will come to have that frequent actual association, which the writer of the paper here referred to has noticed as a fact in the life of the world, and which is, in truth, the source of so serious a tragedy in human life. For it is precisely this association which often helps to make evil so keenly attractive in the eyes of the young and curious. But if one examines more closely, one finds that the paradox of the serpent is but one special case of an universal paradox of all human consciousness. And it is only necessary to state this paradox in its extremest form to deprive it of half its susceptibility to misunderstanding. There will, of course, indeed, always remain a great number of perplexing special problems in this as in all regions of our life; but at least we shall no longer be misled in our principles of judgment, when once we have grasped the deepest source of the difficulty. The common mistake, in dealing with all such matters, is the half-truth, and it was just in the half-truth that the wisdom of the original

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serpent consisted. Even so, however, to point out in succession now this, now that case where an intellectual advance results from some particular moral deficiency, may be to any extent confusing and disheartening. To discover, however, a principle so universal that it would determine *a priori* the existence of many such paradoxical cases in any moral world, even the best, so soon as that world were conceived as more than one of transparently empty innocence,—this is an undertaking worthy of the serious moralist; and, properly set forth, such an undertaking can be in no wise either confusing to the little ones, or disheartening to the earnestly-minded. And, after all, why should science, in its cool regard for truth, need to be disheartening when the truth happens to be inspiring, or choose to be confusing in order to prove itself to be dispassionate?

As a fact I find, since writing the body of what follows, that the author of the essay here in question actually recognizes, in its universality, precisely that principle which I am about to expound afresh, and has elsewhere,* in the already published first volume of his treatise on ethics, discussed in a general and significant way the close relation which exists between the ethical worth of the individual and the presence of evil tendencies and temptations in his consciousness. Little or nothing of what I here write will therefore seem new to him, and therefore it is indeed better that I avoid the controversial tone. But in the essay now in question, on the "Moral Deficiencies," our author has written as if he had forgotten or chosen to neglect his own former discussion. This his former discussion itself, moreover, has but just come into my own hands, and the following essay, written before I had seen the first volume of the "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," must therefore be regarded as, on the whole, far less a reply than an independent contribution to our topic. Where what I shall here say agrees, then, with our author's former chapter, in his published "Einleitung,"—the chapter on "Verdienst

* See "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," by Georg Simmel. Berlin, 1892, vol. i., 3tes Kapitel, on "Sittliches Verdienst und Schuld."

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und Schuld,"—I shall only be supplementing his more recent essay by the thoughts presented in his previous publication. Where my own views run altogether counter to his, the contrast may still be of service.

I.

It is an old observation, which recent research only makes more impressive and concrete, that all organic processes involve a certain balance of opposing forces, and that, in particular, there is in all of them such an union of conflicting tendencies as is, for instance, expressed by saying that the phenomena of physical life involve at every instant, as a part of themselves, all the essential phenomena of the death of tissues. As I read, at the moment, in the current journals, I come upon two very recent expressions of this now fairly commonplace fact. In an article on "The Nerve-Cell," * by a well-known English expert, I find, in an argument upon the functions of nerve-fibres, the words, "Since the chemical processes which accompany death of living tissue appear to be very similar to the chemical processes which accompany activity, as is seen, for example, in the case of muscle, it is very possible," etc.; but the rest of the argument concerns us not here. Meanwhile, a paper in the *Revue Philosophique*, on the movements of lower and higher organisms,† contains, in the author's summary of some recent discussions of the chemical processes at the basis of such movements, the statement, "Nothing more resembles the phenomena of the irritation (of living tissues) than those of death; and it was a stroke of genius in Claude Bernard to insist as much as he did on the truth that every function of life is a function of organic death; that in every movement of man and of the animals 'the active substance of the muscle is destroyed and burned,' just as the brain, in thinking, is consumed; and in a word, that life is death (*La vie c'est la mort*)."

* "The Nerve-Cell Considered as the Basis of Neurology," by Professor Schafer. *Brain*, 1893, Parts LXI. and LXII., p. 156.

† "Origine et Nature du Mouvement Organique," by J. Soury. *Revue Philosophique* for July, 1893; see, in particular, p. 55.

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Now, here is mentioned an union of opposing tendencies in one of the best-known and most-frequently studied of organic processes. I need not for the moment insist upon the true analogy, which some at first sight would think a strained one, between these objective physical phenomena and certain others which are observable in the subjective world, among the activities of consciousness. Of that genuine analogy I shall indeed speak in a moment. But just now I shall confine myself to the mere interpretation of phrases. And here, for the first, what it concerns us to note is that there does appear, in the account of the vital processes, a necessity of stating their nature in essentially paradoxical terms, and that yet nobody is likely, in this region, to fall a prey to certain apparently easy misunderstandings of the meaning of the phrases used. *La vie c'est la mort:* it is not hard, in the light of the concrete facts of the metabolism of tissues, as the biologists explain them to us, to understand the significant half-truth, the apt paradox, of such an expression. But suppose that some one began to draw conclusions as to the implication of these words if taken in too abstract a sense. Suppose that one passed from the processes to the products. Suppose that he said, "If the processes of life are essentially processes of death, surely it follows, then, that all live things are, as such, dead things." This consequence would no longer be a happy paradox, a half-truth. It would be nonsense. The process is an union of balanced but opposing tendencies. But the product cannot be expressed in merely negative or in indifferent terms. Living involves, yes, as it were, at every step, consists, in dying; but life is utterly different from death.

Well, without insisting just yet on the reality of the analogy as such, without dwelling on anything but the parallelism of the phrases, suppose that we do find, in our conscious life, processes whose nature has to be expressed in a paradoxical language similar to the one thus occasionally used in biology. Shall we let this necessity deceive us? Shall we be so neglectful of the complications of truth as to seem to forget that you may have to affirm of a process what would be nonsense if affirmed of the product, or if so affirmed as to confuse

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product and process? To become morally wise, for instance (if moral wisdom involves an understanding of moral issues), involves becoming acquainted with impurity. Shall we accordingly say, "All the morally wise, as such, are impure?" Or, taking another view of the case, shall we conceive the "moral man" just as a product, in whom, by definition, there is to be no evil, and shall we then say, "The moral man lacks the physical experience which gives the immoral one so thorough a comprehension of the immorality of others?" * Surely such views are confusions. It is as if we either said, on the one hand, "The live tissue must lack all the essential characters by which either dead or dying tissues resemble one another;" or, on the contrary, "All the living tissues, as such, are dead." No, if the matter is merely one of comprehending phrases, we need not even take the physiological processes as our basis for illustrating this sort of confusion. If we are determined to confuse a process with either a stage or an outcome of a process, regarded as something fixed and stationary, we may as well turn Eleatics at once. Surely (for so, in substance, argued Zeno), the flying arrow, whenever it moves, *is* somewhere. But *somewhere* means a place,—yes, *one* place. And so, as of old, "the flying arrow rests,"—rest precisely as all the live things are dead, and precisely as the morally wise man remains essentially impure. For the process of wisely conceiving the moral truth involves as a moment the "psycho-physical" impurity of thinking evil; and the process of the arrow's flight involves of necessity that the arrow should be somewhere in order that it may fly. As a fact, however, the arrow that rests in its place does *not* move, the tissue that *merely* disintegrates is dead, and it is the thought that *dwells* in impurity, that is impure,—not the thought that comprehends impurity only to overcome it.†

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* The latter, though not the former, of these supposed assertions is an actual quotation (from p. 491) of the article that has suggested the present one.

† Here again it is well to say that these words were written before I had seen the "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," where, vol. i., p. 268, the contrast between "*ruhende Qualität*" and "*Prozess*" is admirably applied to the very case

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But I indeed am not content thus merely to dwell upon the analogies of phrase involved in the similarity between our current accounts of biological and of moral processes. I insist upon the actual and enlightening analogy of the two sorts of processes themselves. In so far as the life of a conscious being runs parallel to the biological processes of his organism, it is not surprising that just such a balancing of opposing tendencies, just such a unity of conflicting activities, just such a Heraclitean *καλλίστη ἁρμονία ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων*, as is everywhere found on the physiological side, should be represented in our consciousness in more ways than one. For the just mentioned relation of the death and the activity of tissues is but a single case of the presence of this union of opposing tendencies on the physiological side; and more complex instances of such union, instances that reach the grade of the co-operation of antagonist muscles in a voluntary movement, are already pretty obviously represented in consciousness. We are well aware that we give complex voluntary movements precision by "holding ourselves back." We know that true freedom of action is inseparable from elements of self-restraint and of self-control. We consciously rejoice in ruling ourselves. We are aware, in general, that our will, in every organized form, involves a consciousness of opposing tendencies,—a consciousness which very obviously has not only this its conscious aspect, but its whole psycho-physical embodiment and expression. And from this point of view we get already a general notion of the true analogy that connects, in the one world of life, the most complex organic functions,—those to which our consciousness corresponds, with those simpler physical processes which characterize all life, and which make the union of contrary tendencies so familiar an affair throughout the organic realm. It is therefore more, then, than an analogy of phrases, it is a real resemblance of type, which makes the lesson gained from a general

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now before us. It is strange that the essay on "Moral Deficiencies" seems so much to have neglected this aspect.

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survey of such organic activities useful when we turn to a study of the facts of consciousness.

But this resulting lesson, so far, is, that if I am talking of something conceived as the product or outcome of an organic process,—such a product as "a live organism," or "a good man," or "virtue," or "intellect,"—I must not be surprised to find, in the process of which this product is not merely the result but the embodiment (the ἐνέργεια, in Aristotle's sense), factors which, taken by themselves, are distinctly opposed in their character to the positive but highly abstract definition that the product, if conceived merely as something finished and at rest, would necessarily possess. Just as in the living and active tissue I find, as an essential factor of its activity, that going on which, *if it were alone*, would mean death, just as in the voluntary movement I find that stimulation of the antagonist muscles going on which, *if it were alone*, would mean an utter defeat of the intended movement, just as every important nervous stimulation seems to involve, as part of itself, the excitation of processes that tend to inhibit it, so, too, I must expect to find in all forms of the higher life, and, in particular, of the moral life, a similar complexity of structure. And I do find, as a part of moral excellence, be it of whatever grade you will, that there are tendencies present which, *if they were alone*, would be the very opposite and the destruction of every such excellence. And this must be the case, not because of the weakness of man, but because of the organic dignity and consequent complexity of virtue; and not because the moral world is a mere maze of perplexing confusions, but because the very principle of every organic life is the combination in harmony of opposing tendencies.*

II.

And now, in the next place, for some illustrations (drawn directly from the moral world itself) of the way in which this

* Here again I have to go over ground which the aforesaid 3tes Kapitel of the first volume of the "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft" has on the whole admirably treated, while the essay on the "Moral Deficiencies" has strangely neglected the same considerations.

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union of opposing tendencies works in that region. Then we shall be able to apply our result to some of the special problems suggested by our author.

It is of the essence of moral goodness that positively good deeds should be the result of what we call choice,—that is, that morality should be a matter not of fate, but of consciousness. There is no virtue in digesting wholesome food when I am in sound health and have once eaten it. There may be virtue in choosing, against momentary appetite, a wholesome food instead of a tempting but pernicious dainty. But if the moral processes are thus processes of conscious choice, it follows that every such choice involves a knowing of something *against* which one chooses, as well as something in favor of which one decides. But that against which one chooses is necessarily a motive, an interest, a solicitation, a temptation. For the moral choice is an inner one; the rejected alternative is not an outer enemy, but an internal "spring of action" (to use Dr. Martineau's phrase). If so, then of necessity every distinctly moral choice involves the previous presence of a certain tendency to choose the wrong. Yes, moral choice is essentially a condemnation of the rejected motive, as well as an approval of the accepted motive. Otherwise it could be no moral choice. A being possessed of but one motive could have no conscience. But if this be so, then the consciousness of every moment of moral choice involves, also, a consciousness—a confession, if you will—of the presence in the chooser of that which he himself regards as evil. He not only coldly knows, he includes, he possesses, he is beset with some evil motive; and, nevertheless, he conquers it. This is involved in the very formal definition of a moral act. You might as well try to define the king without his subjects, or the master without his servant, or the captor without his captive or his prize, as to define a moral deed without the presence in the agent of some evil motive. The case, then, is here quite parallel to the case of the relation of life and death in the functions of the active tissues. Once define a given man as moral in respect of any one given deliberate act of choice, and then, indeed, you can no longer without

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contradiction conceive him as failing to possess at least *one* significant psychical experience of evil,—namely, the experience of precisely that evil motive which he has then and there deliberately rejected as evil. Had he not first known that evil motive, and known it as verily his own, he certainly could not have deliberately chosen against it. Or am I moral because I choose not to act on the motives that I can only abstractly conceive, as possible and remote temptations, which attract others and not me? If so, how vast my morality! Like the moralizing schoolmaster in Hegel's "Philosophy of History," who is represented as warning his class against the ambitious passions of the great men of history, I can place my virtues above those of Alexander, for, unlike that glory-seeking man of blood, I have no ambitious desire to conquer Asia, or to overthrow Darius, but I leave all nations to fare as God pleases.* This sort of virtue is indeed cheap, and "moral" men in this sense are as plenty as are the weaklings; while if one points out that we possess *such* virtues not in so far as we comprehend life, and are skilful, but in so far as we are limited, and ignorant of life, and unskilful, I have no objection to offer to such an argument. Only the virtues of Hegel's schoolmaster are simply not virtues *in actu*, and one cannot even be sure that they are virtues *in potentia* until the virtuous schoolmaster has proved by his deeds his capacity for self-conquest. Put the schoolmaster in Alexander's place, and what will he do with Darius and with Asia? Who can tell? Nay, he himself cannot tell, and that is just why he is here ignorant *both* of the temptations of Alexander, and of the virtues that Alexander might have possessed, but perhaps did not possess. Here, then, ignorance conditions not only the lack of temptation, but the entire absence of the corresponding virtues as well.

Hegel skilfully said, "*Die Tugend ist nicht ohne Kampf;*

* Hegel, "Werke," IX. p. 40: Woraus sogleich folgt dass er, der Schulmeister, ein vortrefflicherer Mensch sey, als jene (Caesar u. Alexander) weil er solche Leidenschaften nicht besässe, und den Beweis dadurch gebe, dass er Asien nicht erobere, den Darius, Porus, nicht besiege, sondern freilich wohl lebe, aber auch leben lasse.

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sie ist vielmehr der höchste, vollendete kampf." * "Virtue is not without strife, but is rather the highest, the fulfilled strife." But forgetting this perfectly obvious consideration, people often so ignore the element of conflict in the process, while they think only of the assumed perfection of the product, that when some one suggests, in the interest of the "intellectual functions," how an insight into life must involve a knowledge of evil, people at once assume that the washed-out soul of the colorless and inane person whom they have imagined as the model good man cannot possess such knowledge, and thereupon they lament the sad conflict which seems to result between the interest of virtue and those of the insight into life. As a fact, however, the whole case stands thus: The good man as such is neither an innocent nor an inane person, but a knowing, a warm-blooded, a passionate servant of the good. Meanwhile, neither virtue nor knowledge exists *in abstracto* among us men. There exists always some concrete virtue, which shows itself in good choices in favor of this or of this good, as against that or some other evil, end, or motive. And as to knowing, it too is no abstraction, but there exists always some concrete knowledge, which is knowledge of this or of that thing. We therefore, to be sure, cannot compare the virtuous man in the abstract with the knowing man in the abstract, to see whether the two concepts can be made to agree. Doubtless many stupid men, meanwhile, have some virtues, and many of the base are clever. Nobody, moreover, has all virtues, or all knowledge. The only possible comparison is therefore between two men as to a particular virtue, either in exercise or *in potentia*, or between the same men as to the knowledge of a particular thing. Well, this being so, let it be a question of the actual and conscious exercise, in a deliberate and not in a merely accidental way, of a given virtue, as concretely applied

* "Logik," "Werke," IV. p. 63. I venture to refer to my own discussion of this general topic, and to my statement of Hegel's view of it, in my "Spirit of Modern Philosophy," p. 210, *sq.*, and in my "Religious Aspect of Philosophy," pp. 452–459.

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to a given case. Let one man choose the positive exercise of that virtue; let another, with equal deliberation, wilfully reject it. Which now of these two is just then the more knowing as to the motives involved in this virtue? I say that, so far as we have yet defined the case, there is no difference in intellectual capacity defined as between the two. Both know the good and the ill involved. For neither could consciously choose unless he in some measure knew both the good and the ill. The good man knows the ill, and is aware of the temptation to do it; otherwise his "virtuous" act would be a matter of blind health, like his digestion, or of mere lack of interest, like his present avoidance of any wicked ambition to conquer Asia. He knows the rejected ill, he is tempted, and he deliberately resists and overcomes the temptation (whether with or without free will I decide not here). The other also knows, but chooses the ill. Which is so far the more knowing? The virtuous man can surely say, "Show me thy knowledge without thy virtue, and I will show thee my knowledge *by* my virtue. For by knowing the ill and the good it is that I choose the good with open eyes." Of the later knowledge which for the sinner alone, not for the good man, results from the consequences of this sin, I shall speak hereafter.

Doubtless one may indeed still insist that, unless by the actual assertion of a freedom of indeterminate choice, the foregoing precise equality of knowledge between these two men cannot in the end be maintained. Well, be it so. I am, as I have said, not here arguing the free-will issue. Admit, if you please, that there must be a difference of motive between the two, and therefore a difference of knowledge; the question will then once more arise, Which of them is, at the moment of choice, the *more* knowing? For the same reasons as before, both of them alike must at least in some genuine measure know both of the motives between which they choose. Else there is mere blind prevalence of interest without any clear deliberation. Shall one say, as to the different degrees of knowledge now subsisting, It is the chooser of the good who knows not the full allurements of the other's temptation? Or shall one say, It is the sinner who is blind to those mani-

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fold excellencies whose presence to consciousness determines the good man's choice? Here, if anything, the chances are largely in favor of the greater knowledge of the virtuous chooser, since in general strong temptations are comparatively elemental, while the reasons in favor of goodness are in nature usually complex and abstract. A mere boy can have a full sense of many temptations to vice; it takes reflection to see fully all the reasons why vice is intolerable. But herewith, as soon as one admits differences of knowledge, as between these two, one enters afresh the realm of the indeterminate. My object was only to show that in order to have the same choice presented, in its essential features, to two agents, one virtuous, one vicious in his decision, it is necessary to have essentially the same motives, and so the same elements of knowledge present in both cases. What further differences of knowledge there may be is indeed a matter of accident; but the chances are at least even that the good chooser is more knowing than the sinner.

But if this is so whenever an individual case of comparison is taken up, how far, then, extends the possible growth, in insight into life, of those agents who grow in active virtue; and how does their possible collective insight compare with that of the sinners concerning mere temptations? If every active virtue involves a knowledge of evil in order to be a conquest over evil,—the presence of temptation in order that the active virtue may be a victory over temptation,—then what insight into life is there that will not somewhere form part of the insight, and so of the virtue, of some virtuous agent? No, it would seem that there is no insight into life that is alien from every possible virtue, and that no sinner can say to *all* the good, "I comprehend temptations that no one of all of you can possibly understand." For had the sinner not only possessed his temptation, but won the victory over it, he would now be, with reference to that temptation alone, surely no less than he is, in insight or in being, and he would then have stood among the virtuous, where even now there may well stand some one who has been tempted in all points as he was, but who is, in this matter, without sin. I still postpone, to be sure,

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a discussion of the knowledge that the sinner gets from the consequences of his sin,—from the experiences that follow upon it.

This view of the nature of virtue is, however, indeed apparently open to one or two more or less plausible objections, which it may be well still to mention.

"If this view of virtue is right," some imaginary objector may say, "then it must follow that a good man is good merely in proportion to the number and the gravity of his resisted temptations. But if so, then a man who should be constantly tempted to murder his mother, to steal church property, to be a cannibal, and to kidnap and eat children, and who nobly resisted all these temptations, would be a more virtuous man than one who was never thus tempted, but who lived without friction the devoted life of a philanthropist, and of a public servant, always loyal and charitable of heart. As this result is absurd, it follows that virtue indeed implies, as the author of the essay here in question asserts, a certain ignorance of evil motives."

This objection is obvious, but trivial. No one would be deceived by the parallel assertion in case of the organic processes before referred to. Life involves disintegration of tissue, and so constant death, always counteracted, indeed, by the processes of tissue-building. The more life, and the more activity of tissue,—the more disintegration, and the more building up. And so, for instance, in a warm-blooded animal, a more rapid dying process goes on than in a cold-blooded animal. It does not follow that, in a given organism, the life would grow in general vigor if disintegrating processes at random were set up, and were then just counteracted, in the struggles of a pathological condition, by the upbuilding processes that preserved the life. The death-process is not alien from my physical life, but is a part of it. The more active the life that I get, the more dying will be going on in my tissues. But the simple converse of this proposition very surely does not follow. I do not necessarily produce more life by introducing more death into my tissues. What is clear is, that if some disintegrating disease is present in my

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tissues, *then* I get life, if at all, by conquering this pathological disintegration. But without just that form of disintegration, I might, indeed, have a higher life.

Just so it is too with the process of virtue. Any actively virtuous man can say, at the moments of deliberate exercise of virtue, "My virtue involves as one of its elements temptation to evil. Hence in doing good I know evil." Hence, again, the proposition that in so far as one is virtuous one is ignorant of evil is *simpliciter* false. Ignorance of a given evil may be *per accidens* a condition of a given virtue, but every active virtue involves some knowledge of evil. On the other hand no sinner can say, "My knowledge of temptation depends upon my viciousness, and if I had been good at the moment of choice in respect of the deeds wherein now I am evil, I should *ipso facto* have diminished my intelligence, in acquiring my virtues, since I should then have failed to know these temptations." For here the answer is simply, The assertion is again false. You could have known these temptations just as truly if you had resisted them. You would then have no less insight as to temptation, but much more virtue as to life. But these things being granted, it may well be that some virtues are better worth knowing than other virtues, just as some life is more vigorous than other life; so that virtues whose knowledge involves the knowing and resisting of pathological temptations may be far less interesting, both to the afflicted sufferer from the pathological enemy, and to the lover of conscious or of moral life in general, than are other active virtues, based upon the conquest over more normal temptations. Meanwhile, there can be no doubt whatever of the moral excellence of the man who, being burdened with a distinctly pathological temptation, nobly resists it, just as there can be no doubt that he loses no intellectual skill or insight, but rather cultivates both, by resisting his temptation. But since, unfortunately, the burdened man as much lacks knowledge of the normal life as the normal man fails to comprehend the depths of abnormality, the real problem here is, Which of these two sorts of knowledge of life is most worth having? And this question is in no respect

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any longer a question of the relative value for the intellect of virtue and of vice, but it is a question of the relative value for the intellect of two sorts of knowledge, whereof one is normal, the other unhealthy, but whereof both alike may involve either virtue if a temptation is known and conquered, or vice, if the temptation is known and preferred.

For the rest, the kindly and public-spirited philanthropist of our example is indeed as virtuous as his weak and burdened, but still triumphant though abnormally-tempted brother, only in case the philanthropist really struggles as seriously as the latter with his own much more elevated, but none the less genuine moral problems and temptations. And the moral order actually demands of him that he shall do so. He has more talents; from him, then, more moral life is required. He may think that he finds in himself only kindliness; but if he looks sharply as he goes, he will ere long find in himself sloth, or pride, or self-complacency, not to speak of a horde of more elemental if still normal passions. If he contends with these and with their outcome, he will get as rich an experience of the evils of his own world as his weaker brother gets of the evils of his. In general, then, it is here not our virtue that is responsible for our ignorance, but rather our inevitable ignorance of life that limits the scope of our virtues. The healthy man cannot have the virtues of the sick man, or the pathologically burdened soul the sort of goodness that distinguishes the genius in holy living; not, however, because virtue means ignorance of life, but because the naturally limited insight into life which each man possesses limits his possible virtues. But within his limits, the more any given man knows of life the more chance he has to be virtuous, if he chooses to be so.

Another objection, and a common one, to the foregoing view of virtue has reference to the influence of training upon the exercise of active virtues. The virtuous man of Aristotle's original definition is such not merely by reason of his acts, but by reason of the attained character that, in the long run, he earns by his acts. The habitual and successful resistance of any given type of temptations involves, of necessity, the

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gradual elimination of at least those special temptations. The cultivation of active virtues leads towards a virtuous perfection of disposition in which just these active virtues no longer have to be cultivated. In so far it is indeed true that the aim of the good man is to acquire an ignorance of certain evils which he now knows only too well. If he actively exercises virtue only in the presence of an actual knowledge of evil motives present in himself he aims, nevertheless, at the ultimate attainment of a state in which these evil motives will no longer have meaning for him. In this fashion, then, it would seem that the attainment of holiness is, in some sense, the attainment of ignorance; and so once more the argument of our author would receive a certain confirmation, and the price of possessing certain "intellectual functions" would be the retaining of certain "moral deficiencies."

Once more, however, the general biological analogies will aid us in comprehending the true sense of the facts here brought before us. The question is now the familiar one as to the relation of habit and consciousness.* I am not conscious of the detailed execution of what is so completely an habitual function of my organism that I accomplish this function swiftly and without hesitancy. I am conscious in general only of my relatively hesitant functions in so far as they are hesitant. This, again, is a psychological commonplace. On the other hand, the more by practice I exercise my consciousness of a given process, and so perfect any now hesitant function, the more I tend to bring its execution below the level of my consciousness. In this sense, to be sure, we find another paradox—and one of a most familiar and characteristic sort—in the life of the highest organisms. Consciousness, namely, is working, as it were, on all levels, in the direction of its own extinction, in so far as it is a consciousness of just this unfamiliar object; very much as the living tissues are constantly busy in compassing their own death, precisely in so far as they are tissues with just this energy becoming

* In this aspect this question is interestingly discussed in the "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," vol. i. p. 227, *et seq.*

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free in their processes. I am conscious of a given function, and so of the objects to which this function is related, because the function is relatively novel, is imperfectly learned, is not thoroughly habitual. But it is precisely this unfamiliarity of the function and of its object that is unsatisfactory to me. I try to perfect my mastery over this function and to render its objects perfectly familiar. I train the function until it is smooth-running, facile, free from hesitancy, and so until it is no longer an object of consciousness. I now ignore both the function and its familiar objects. This I am everywhere tending to do, precisely in so far as I engage in any special business of consciousness. I am conscious of the syntax of a foreign tongue while I am learning that tongue; but the object of my conscious toil is to learn the language so well that I shall forget its syntax and speak its sentences with absolutely unreflective fluency.

But now, on the other hand, although consciousness thus, as it were, aims to compass, on every stage, and in each of its special functions, its own extinction, still, all of us who love insight talk of consciousness as being an end in itself, and are conscious that we want not less, but more of it. Our general aim as conscious beings is opposed, in this paradoxical way, to each and every one of the special aims of our own consciousness, in so far as the latter is a process whereby the unfamiliar is rendered familiar, and is so gradually brought below the level of consciousness, while our general aim as conscious beings is not to get less, but more, concrete insight, and so more consciousness.

Here again, *La vie c'est la mort.* "Die to live" is a philosophical motto that Professor Edward Caird loves to repeat in his writings, and has repeated until for my part I confess that I have grown very weary of the set phrase, as I have found that eminent thinker employing it. But though it may be important to vary the phrase, as, with the aid of M. Soury, I have here tried to do, Professor Caird is unquestionably right as to the substance of the thing. Consciousness, like living tissue, loves to feed on its own process of endless self-extinction. And the way in which it thus feeds is obvious enough. When

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I have no longer to be conscious of the syntax of the new language I shall have acquired a new organic power,—namely, the power to be conscious of the relatively new and unfamiliar things that I shall want to say in that language. The more numerous the familiar and so unconscious habits that I have come to possess, the more capacity I have acquired to adjust myself to complex novel situations, and so to have, in general, more consciousness. As for the paradox of the whole situation, it is also a case of the general paradox of the will, as noted by Schopenhauer. The will wants to live. But life means specific desires, and each specific desire longing, as it does, for the possession of its object, really longs for the quenching of its restless fires in the dark Lethe of a fulfilment that means its extinction as this desire. The will, then, in longing for life longs for that which in every concrete manifestation, as this specific desire, it longs to see extinguished. Schopenhauer's paradox is but the expression, in conscious terms, of the essence of all those organic processes to which our consciousness runs parallel, and of which it is a very inadequate expression. As for Schopenhauer's pessimistic comment on this essential restlessness of the inner world, the discussion of that belongs elsewhere. Restlessness does not, as a fact, mean misery, and a wise joy in the genuine paradoxes of life is of the essence of the highest reason.

There is, then, nothing peculiar about the problem involved in the case of the growth of the virtuous man towards a perfection wherein he ceases to be conscious, both of his former defects and of the active virtues whereby he overcame these defects. Above all, the problem is in no wise one of an opposition between "moral deficiencies" and "intellectual functions." Such as it is, the paradox applies equally, and for the same reasons, to the intellectual and to the moral functions. The one sort has here no advantage over the other. The intellectual skill involved in any stage of our human consciousness, in aiming at its own perfection in the form of the acquisition of finished, habitual, intelligent functions, aims at what, as a fact, when attained, will involve its own extinction as this particular conscious activity. Just so, any growing and active

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virtue aims at its own extinction, as this particular virtue, by means of the establishment of virtuous habits that will render the exercise of this conscious virtue no longer necessary or even possible. But virtue thus no more aims at its own extinction in general than intellectual skill aims at its own general abolition, or than Schopenhauer's will, in longing for fulfilment, ceases in general the desire to live. *This* must pass, —this desire—this stage of growing intellect or goodness; but there is more that is desirable, there is more virtue, just as there is more wit, beyond. This is the universal rule of conscious life. *Die Leidenschaft flieht, die Liebe muss bleiben.* When I have so well learned this virtue as no longer consciously to possess it, but to be possessed by it as by a mere instinct, well, then, indeed my active moral goodness will indeed cease as to this matter; but, on the other hand, I shall consciously be able to possess far more, and more complex active virtues, than ever, for I shall have more powers, and so be able to undertake harder tasks to go on new quests, and to fight stronger moral enemies. When I shall have mastered my present intellectual puzzles, and accordingly shall have forgotten their details in the possession of unhesitating and unconscious functions, I shall then be able to possess not less but more consciousness; for I shall have more unconscious functions upon which to build new insights.

The parallelism of virtue and of intellect in respect of the "deficiencies" thus involved in progress is here perfect. Whatever happens to the one happens to the other. Learning is based upon forgetting, conscious power upon unconscious habit, the new life upon the extinction of the immediate presence of the old. "Moral deficiency," if regarded as a lower state in a progressive growth, involves "intellectual functions" only in the same sense as that in which intellectual deficiency itself involves such present intellectual functions.

It is, then, one sign of intellectual power, just as it is one sign of moral power, to have forgotten, as well as to have remembered, many things. Such "deficiencies" are necessary moments of our human perfection. To a vain young man, full of the learning freshly acquired at school, the old and

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erudite scholar may often justly say, "Yes, you indeed have many things in mind that I now ignore; but see, I have myself forgotten far more than you ever knew." Even so, a persistent sinner, vaunting his present knowledge of temptation as against the state of the virtuous man who has outgrown and learned to ignore the movings that are still clearly present to the consciousness of the sinner, may say, "I know life; for I know these temptations, and you are no longer aware of them." But a by-stander, considering the life of the virtuous man, and seeing in him the hero of many past conflicts, may retort, "Ay, but he has forgotten because he has transcended more temptations than you ever knew." Which "deficiency" is the preferable one?

To sum up, then: The knowledge and presence of evil form, in very manifold and complex ways, a moment in the consciousness and in the life of goodness. And this must be so. It is no confusing chance puzzle of the moral world; it is a necessary result of the very essence of all life, which is everywhere an union of opposing elements. The knowledge of this fact is not disheartening, but inspiring; since all the seriousness of the moral world depends upon it. As to the relation of "deficiencies" and "functions," so far as we have yet seen, the close parallelism of the intellectual and moral processes, as well as their intimate interdependence, taken together with the general nature of life just insisted upon, renders this relation extremely, and yet very intelligibly, intimate on both sides. First, in both the intellectual and the moral life, every "function," of necessity, depends, in the lives of us human individuals, upon a corresponding "deficiency." We think in order to grow wiser, and therefore all our thinking is due to relative ignorance. We choose the right in order to avoid the tempting wrong; and therefore all moral functions depend upon present moral imperfections. Meanwhile, as to the cross-relation of moral deficiency and intellectual function, the rule holds that, since active goodness involves knowledge of temptation, the morally deficient have herein no essential intellectual advantage over the doers of good. As to the ignorance or intellectual deficiency of the

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being higher in the scale of life as against the being lower in the scale and burdened with temptations unknown to the higher being, it here follows (1) that the "deficiency" of knowledge in question is shared by both beings, in so far as neither fully understands the other; (2) that in neither case does this deficiency of knowledge as to the other being, or possession of knowledge as to one's own moral office and temptations, determine by itself either any moral excellence or any moral defect, since either of the two beings is doing active moral work not in so far as he is by nature high or low in the scale, but in so far as he rightly deals with his own temptations. We call the higher being more virtuous, when he does well, not because being ignorant of baser temptations he fails to resist them, but because his virtues, when once they exist, seem to us as a part of a normal and more finished life better worth knowing than his fellows'. As to moral progress, that does indeed involve a transcending, and so a forgetting, of earlier and simpler virtues; but here moral progress is simply parallel to all intellectual progress.

In general, then, intellectual functions seem to involve moral deficiencies in precisely the same sense as that in which moral functions themselves involve moral deficiencies, and as that in which intellectual functions also involve intellectual deficiencies, every function in our life involving the presence of its own antagonist, and being successful in so far as its antagonist comes to form an organic moment in its own process, instead of being in its turn the triumphant and absorbing factor. But, on the other hand, it does not follow that you can produce a given function, intellectual or moral, by simply introducing the corresponding antagonist or deficiency into a given organic process. All active virtue implies temptation; but it does not thence follow that by increasing temptation you increase virtue, or that you remain virtuous by nursing your temptation in order to resist it. Change and progress play the same part here that they do elsewhere in the great drama of life. And if living is constant dying, it does not follow that the more death there is the more life there will be.

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III.

So much for the main principles involved in our present issue. But now let the question be no longer of principles, but of cases. Moral deficiency shall be essentially involved in certain intellectual functions, or shall determine the latter. When?—First, for so it may appear, whenever the comprehension of certain forms of evil itself involves such a participation in the evil as amounts to sin. But when does this take place? "The task of understanding," so one answers, certain "elementary passions of the human soul is very difficult from the height of official station, as well as in the normal and correct life led by many scholars;" and so "undeniably this is a point in which a theoretical knowledge gains depth from an experience of comparative immorality, either present or past."

In judging of such assertions one's first reply is, *Distinguo.* The "elementary passions" of the human soul are indeed the most common source of sin; but they are not themselves sins in so far as they are elementary passions, but in so far as, in a given context of life, they are persistently preferred despite the fact that they prove to be incapable of organization, or destructive of existent rational good order. They are evil, in other words, in so far as they are anarchical, fighting against an already established organism, and not in so far as they are "elementary." It is *in a context* that they become temptations; and the sinfulness of an "elementary passion" always depends on its relations to the other interests of life. It is as related to such a context that a virtuous man finds what would be an innocent accident of his organization a solicitation to evil. Experience of passion of the "elementary" in life is therefore as such never a sin. The fault of a man is not that he has elementary passions, but that he cannot make out what to do with them, or do it when he has made it out.

In saying this I speak simply the voice of the wholesome consciousness, of the Greek as of the modern man, as against any merely superstitious asceticism which condemns some natural impulses as essentially diabolical. The wise man

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does not regret the elementary impulses of his temperament as such, whatever these impulses may be. What he does regret is that they are so ill reduced to order, so poorly trained to an objectively significant service. Even the "pathological temptations" before referred to are pathological not by reason of the elementary impulses involved, but by reason of the union of such impulses into complex groups of motives hostile to the general peace of society, and to the whole rational system of a man's inner life.

It is not needful to waste here many words over this matter, which has been endlessly discussed. Hatred is a fairly "elementary" passion. Shall one call it essentially a bad "spring of action" because it is necessarily "malicious." On the contrary, if we find superstitious men in the world who let cobras multiply because of a superstitious kindliness, we shall wish that these men had more hatred of snakes as well as less superstition. All depends upon where and when and what you hate,—in other words, upon the context of your passion. If hatred in battle makes given soldiers fight better against the enemies of their country, then surely, if patriotism is a virtue, this virtue may demand, for these men, the cultivation of precisely such hatred. For the rest, just those passions of humanity which, under certain conditions, appear as the grossest, the fiercest, the basest, are notoriously the passions upon whose organized cultivation, and upon whose subtle influence when once they are cultivated, the whole social structure and its most sacred relations depend.

It would be the saddest of cant, then, to say that a good man, as such, can have no experiences of the truly "elementary passions,"—even the most elementary and vigorous. The fact that many moralists are and have been bloodless creatures, who have written about life without themselves possessing any temperament to speak of, is a lamentable historical accident, due in no wise to the nature of philosophy, but rather to those economic conditions of the thinker's profession which have driven many persons to turn would-be philosophers because they have failed in other walks of life to prove themselves capable men. With the author who has inspired this

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paper I regret this accidental ill-fortune of philosophy. The philosophical thinker, the moralist above all, should first be a man of experience in a wide range of elementary human life. And the great heroes of ethical speculation (yes, even a man of the gentleness of a Kant) are never without indications in their works that they have really and deeply experienced at least some part of our human nature. But now this does not mean that the thinker needs to be a sinner above other men in order to be wise. Elements are one thing. The organization of life is another. It is not necessary to experience many forms of chaos in order to understand good order.

But is not sin, too, an experience? And can the good man possess that experience? We have said, in our discussion of principles, that temptation to evil is an essential element in every exercise of active virtue. But a conquered temptation, although an evil, which is conquered by the good man just because it is an evil, is still no sin. Sin proper, however, is another experience, and is *ipso facto* no part of the experience of the good man as such, just as an active disease is no part of the life of a healthy organism. Here indeed is the body of death from which the good man, as such, longs to be delivered altogether. His resisted temptation is part of his life,—the death in life of which before we spoke. But his sin is no element of his good life.

And yet, since sin forms so large a part of human life, and is vastly more than temptation, and since the endless consequences of sin, remorse, all the arts of concealment, all the ingenuity of effort to repair,—the rejoicing, too, of the froward in their frowardness,—the fierce sense of freedom of which our own Hawthorne tells in the "Marble Faun" as an experience that follows upon a crime,—the long and perplexingly fascinating agony of the consciousness of a life of sin,—the revelry and the fruitless later repentance of the Faust of the original story,—the contrition of David,—the conversion of the dying thief on the cross,—the raptures of a saved Mary Magdalene:—since all these and countless other human experiences flow not from resisted temptation, but from actual sin, were we then not one-sided in our discussion of principles, where we limited

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ourselves to the study of temptation, and said that the sinner knows no more of the motives of sin (which are the temptations) than does the good man, equally tempted, who resists and conquers the temptation? That as an one-sided view of life may be true. But temptation is but a small part of the sinner's experience. It is consequence that he knows, and herein consists his intellectual opportunity. Here, indeed, is a "moral deficiency" very positively conditioning an "intellectual function." In Hell and in Purgatory they do thus know what must needs be wholly unknown to the angels, and but ill-conceived by the saints, excepting as the saints remember the long life in sin from which some of them escaped. This being true, can one (to use still the convenient allegorical fictions),—can one, as a moralist, comprehend the world of human life, unless he has lived awhile in Hell and in Purgatory, as well as among the good? What sort of moralist is, then, one who has had little or no experience of sin?

The first answer is so obvious that I wonder that any one should miss it. Such moral deficiencies do indeed determine certain intellectual functions, but precisely as they also determine certain moral functions. And the way in which they determine the latter is very enlightening as to the significance of the whole controversy.

Sins, I say, are possible conditions, not only of a deep intellectual knowledge of certain very common and momentous human experiences, but are conditions also of certain extraordinarily heroic moral deeds. Nobody has harder moral work to do than many a sinner who has repented. Nobody, therefore, can show us, on occasion, a more brilliant example of active virtue than he may learn to do. The outcast on account of a crime sometimes has a peculiarly good opportunity to become at one great stroke a saint. The thing has occasionally taken place; for the shock of the consequences of crime has sometimes been enough to shatter the habits of a sinful career in one moment of conversion. Apart from sudden conversion, which is rare, the most serious moral tasks of many men are furnished to them by the office of building up by their newly-acquired virtues what their former way-

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wardness has destroyed.* And in this way, indeed, the wrath of man is sometimes taught to praise the good.

But surely the fact that certain peculiarly great opportunities for virtue in the way of reform and of making atonement are furnished to the sinner by his own past crimes,—opportunities which those of the virtuous who should never have swerved from the right could not get,—this fact, I say, does not at all tend to confuse us as to the nature of sin and of virtue. Sin, when past, furnishes especial opportunities for future virtue. But one who desires virtue will not think that he shows thus his desire for virtue by first sinning that grace may abound. When we once have sinned, our exceptional opportunities to atone may encourage us to begin afresh with zest the moral task. But whoever sins under pretence of seeking hereby for this exceptional opportunity to get a new and higher virtue by means of his intended repentance, such a man does not deceive us by his pretences. He is a liar, and the truth is not in him. He sins because he wants to sin, not because he wants any new moral function to be determined by his previous moral deficiency, and until he learns not to lie he will remain deficient and without further function.

I say that this very familiar determination of future moral opportunities and excellencies by past misdeeds shows, first of all, that here, as earlier in our discussion, the dependence of function upon deficiency holds within the moral sphere itself precisely as much as in the comparison of moral with intellectual function and deficiency, so that the case is one of an universal problem of life, and not merely one of certain specific oppositions between moral and intellectual interests. I say, also, that the reason for this dependence of the opportunity for new goodness upon past sin is obvious enough, and the outcome in so far not at all misleading.

But now, further, just as the moral function depends on the

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* A brilliant literary example of moral recovery and of the heroic rebuilding of a shattered life one finds depicted in Sinkiewicz's remarkable romance, "The Deluge," recently translated from the Polish by Mr. Curtin. Kmita, the hero of this romance, is a magnificent instance for the moralist.

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previous moral deficiency, precisely, and only, in so far as one does not remain in the deficiency, but transcends it, so (as I think that experience will show) it is not our mere dwelling in sin that ever enlarges our deeper insight into life so much as it is our looking back upon our sin, and representing it in precisely the light which makes it appear as sin, and so as rationally condemned, that enables us to read the intellectual lesson of the sinful experience itself. Regarding the matter, then, for the moment, solely as an "intellectual function," it is Macbeth after the murder, or in his latest monologues, who sees the truth of his case as it is. It is Dostojevsky's hero in "Crime and Punishment," just before he gives himself up to the police, whose eyes are truly open. This is the lesson of countless works of art in which the moral tragedy is portrayed. However coolly planned beforehand, the crime is still relatively blind. The still cooler and far deeper intellectual insight of later moments lifts the criminal above himself. He reads now the lesson of his case; but he reads only to condemn. His intellectual function is itself, if his eyes get opened, the beginning of a moral function.

Moreover, this not only often is but always must needs be the case. If the right is, as it is, not the object of superstitious dogma, but of science and of reason, and is known to be the right as soon as one clearly sees the situation, then a true intellectual insight into sin means a condemnation of it, and one has not the true "intellectual function" until one has really begun to transcend the "moral deficiency." After all, the freest act of sinful choice doubtless involves a certain deliberate ignorance of the reasons in favor of the good, which itself involves intellectual defect. If so, however, the relation of the "moral deficiency" to the "intellectual function" is precisely like the just noticed relation of any moral deficiency to the often very noble moral functions that may be founded upon it. The latter relation is inspiring when we have sinned, because it shows us the way out. But the expectation of getting this "far off interest" of crime, of plucking this flower that blooms in hell, attracts of itself nobody into crime; and whoever says that he commits crime with any

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such noble purpose in view is, I repeat, a liar. But just so, whoever pretended to choose sin for the sake of that possible sin-transcending insight, would be but pretending.

For the reasons now explained, it is also clear that wilful sinners, who have not learned to repent, are on the whole, as respects the cultivation of intellectual functions, far less instructive to themselves than they are to the intellect of any observant student of human nature who, not being slave to their sin, has leisure to study their varied experience, and temperament enough to interpret life with respectable skill when he sees it. The sinners whose eyes are finally opened have transcended their "deficiency." The relatively blind, who are still slaves to their sin, are in many ways an open book to the wiser among their fellows. And it is indeed true that it is the right and the duty of every moralist to learn, with due prudence, but without foolish timidity, whatever he really needs to know of the disorders of the moral world, from an observation—not cynical but humane—of the records of sinful experience in his fellows. Thus indeed their deficiency may very directly and usefully condition his function. And he will learn of life while learning also how to help the sinners themselves towards virtue.

But now shall we descend from these matters to mere trivialities? Shall we illustrate the relations of function and deficiency elsewhere? Shall we seriously inquire whether a successful liar is not naturally a more skilful person than a mere blunt speaker of the truth? Shall we reason that a liar, like the skilful hero in a fairy tale, or like Odysseus with the Cyclops, must hold at least two ideas at once in his head, while his giant or other dupe thinks of but one at a time. Well, if these things must be argued, it is indeed an old notion, precisely as old as those fairy tales whose heroes are liars, that lying is a peculiarly clever business, and is so precisely for the reason that obviously guided the authors of the fairy tales,—namely, because it is so much more skilful to think two ideas at a time than one idea. But surely the civilized man, for whom truth, whether legal, commercial, political, or moral, has now grown to be so complex an affair, has transcended

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such trivialities. In all the more serious practical affairs of our modern lives, we wholly exhaust our stock of ingenuity in trying even to think the truth as it is, and fail at that. We may lie all we choose, and may even succeed as liars, but we shall get no more cleverness thereby than would be at all events needed to think or to say even the blunt truth in its nakedest simplicity. We no longer live in a world where there is question of stupid giants with one idea, and clever heroes with two at a time. The honest man's wits are all needed in order to meet even the demands of honesty. For the rest, if a liar needs cleverness to think his supposed two ideas, as in the fairy tale, what would an honest man need who must learn to defeat the liar? Surely he would have to think of the truth, and also of the liar's false idea, and finally of the proper plan for meeting the liar's falsehood and for bringing it to naught without lying himself: in sum, then, at least three ideas to the liar's two. But herewith such trifling computations may as well cease. Not thus are moral deficiencies, as such, at all peculiar in being sources of some sorts of intellectual ability. There is no possible degree of cleverness or of ingenuity that is not sadly needed in our complex world for every good cause whose undertakings are serious. "Altruism," so called, needs from its servants every skill that they can devote to the service of society.

But surely there still remain—do there not?—vast regions of knowledge which it is unholy for any given individual to tread upon. And to enter these fields would therefore involve "intellectual function," and still also true "moral deficiency;" or would it not? Yes, indeed, it is as easy as you please, and as trivial, to mention, in case of any of us, any number of such forbidden regions. My neighbor has left his house unguarded, his desk unlocked. It would greatly amuse my curiosity to read his diary, his love-letters, his other confidential documents. And yet I may not do so. Why? Because the intellect is somehow mysteriously opposed in its interests to the conscience? No: but for the simple reason that this would be theft. This knowledge is not mine. These secrets are his property, like his purse, save in being more sacred. Here the

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mystery of the relation between ignorance and virtue is merely that of the existence of any private rights whatever. As his money is good for what it can buy, but is not mine to spend, so his knowledge is here a good thing to have, but it is not for me to purloin. But now, under the category thus illustrated, countless types of actually forbidden knowledge fall, of knowledge, however, that is forbidden not because the intellect ought as such to be limited in its scope, but because a man must keep to his own, and in a world where men live together possession has to be private, and therefore exclusive. My neighbor's house, his land, his affairs,—anything that is his,—I must not steal or covet. If this limitation involves not only respect for material property, but for countless, and often nameless privacies of his inner and outer life, then it is not the rights of the intellect that are at stake, but the rights of the person.

On the other hand, as to the rights of the intellect itself, knowledge, *as such*, we must maintain, is always an innocent, and frequently a holy possession. Its moral limitations, its perils, its implied sinfulness, these always belong to it *per accidens*, and with respect to specific conditions and individuals. There is no knowledge whatever to which somebody may not conceivably have a right. That not everybody may, without sin, possess a given sort, or degree, or fact of knowledge, depends always upon specific and perfectly comprehensible conditions relating to this sort, or degree, or fact. I may not seek to know another's secret by stealth; I may not seek to know the results of a sin by myself deliberately sinning; I may not seek to add to my present burdens a temptation that I have not now, and that, when I get it, may prove corrupting to me. But, on the other hand, the man whose secret this is may be blessed in knowing it. The man who has sinned may gain inspiration for reform from coolly considering the very heart and the essence of his sin, that he may find in its fruits the seeds of coming virtue. The man who has the temptation, by facing it, and so by knowing its secret, may win control over it, and may thereby use his opportunity for holiness. When in progress I abandon one knowledge for another, I do

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so because the other is more of a knowledge. And thus it is never my business as a moral being to shun knowledge as knowledge, but always it is my task to get wisdom as wisdom, and then to use it in the cause of the right.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A PHASE OF MODERN EPICUREANISM.

LOOKING over a certain periodical not many months ago, I chanced upon the following paragraphs:

"We have forgotten the true significance of the word 'virtue,' nowadays. We call that man virtuous who has no vices. Following the argument to its logical conclusion, we are compelled to the assumption that the most virtuous thing in nature is an oyster. His life is chaste and pure. He is a strict water-drinker. He never enjoys himself; and he never (so long as he lives) gives a moment's pleasure to any other living thing. He would appear to be the ideal, according to a certain noisy section of the community, of what a Christian should be. It is quite in keeping with the sort of talk and writing that is prevalent just now, to imagine an oyster lecturing a lion on the subject of morality. . . . An oyster has no evil passions, and a lion has many; but is it, therefore, so very certain that the oyster is the nobler animal?

"The truth is, we extra-righteous folk have got into a wrong way of estimating our frailer fellow-men and fellow-women. . . . We have abolished virtue, and for it substituted a lot of miserable little affectations which we call 'virtues.' If a man is a teetotaller and belongs to a purity league, we say he is a good man. He may be a narrow-minded, narrow-hearted, narrow-souled libel on a man, selfish and hard and cruel and weak,—a man with no more real worth in him than there is in a Brummagen idol. What matter! He has no vices—what we call vices—and therefore he is a good man.

"Can we be quite sure that our present list of virtues and vices is the only possible correct and complete one? Is the kindly, unselfish, generous, big-hearted man necessarily a villain because he does not always succeed in suppressing his natural instincts, and the evil-speaking, evil-thinking, bitter-hearted, mean-souled man a saint because he has none?"

The array of opposed adjectives is certainly overwhelming; and granted that the man who "does not always succeed in repressing his natural instincts" is "kindly, unselfish, generous, and big-hearted," while the man who does not give way to passion is both an abnormal being, destitute of capacity in this direction, and, moreover, "evil-speaking, evil-thinking, bitter-

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hearted, and mean-souled," then there are assuredly few of us who would term the former "a villain" and the latter "a saint." But the premises thus conceded do not correspond invariably to actuality; the incontinent man is not necessarily or uniformly the possessor of all admirable attributes in other directions, nor, on the other hand, is the continent man always the representative of all the evils and meannesses of disposition. Neither is the former necessarily the man who gives the most pleasure to others.

Not only in the action of men, but also in their theories of action, two widely-differing tendencies manifest themselves as noticeable extremes which are linked together by numberless intermediate degrees, the whole forming what may be regarded as a graduated series. The two extremes of the chain were represented, among the Greek philosophers, by the opposed schools of Stoicism and Epicureanism, the former of which continually directed attention to the rigid bounds set by duty and natural law, the latter of which had, as its central idea, the avoidance of pain due to the hard pressure of law. The one school laid emphasis upon harmony with general principles derived from without, the other school directed its effort to the inner harmony of the individual with himself. That the central ideas of the two schools coincide theoretically in contemplation of the human ideal is true, as it is also true that they may coincide practically, in a certain sense and degree, in the case of the man who finds his own pleasure in the realization of the highest moral ideal known to him. But the principles are, in general, in themselves opposed, and were ordinarily regarded by the Greeks as opposed. The attempt to read into the Epicurean idea a coincidence with the central Stoic principle, partly the result of our not yet outgrown tendency to over-estimate everything Greek, and partly the outcome of a natural disinclination to admit the flaws in what we find in many respects admirable, is a mistaken one.

It is possible for the subordination to outer general conditions which we term law to be even further emphasized than it was among the Stoic philosophers. The more the final end of morality—general welfare—is lost sight of, and rules of

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conduct come to be followed merely from the motive of obedience to authority, divine or human, or out of regard for convention, the more the law itself, as such, tends to attain supreme importance. In this case, the privative or prohibitory character of the law comes to the fore, the happiness of the individual, as part of the general welfare, is no longer considered, the distinction between selfish and legitimate pleasure is lost, and one fixed and unprogressive pattern forms and deforms all, until life loses its chief desirableness. Then, as a new generation develops, the natural originality and masterfulness of youth tend to loosen or entirely cast off the chains of an irksome tradition for which no reason is given, and in the hard and regardless stringency of which a moral lack is felt.

But there is another opposition to the law, which comes not from a radical, but from a strongly conservative faction. With human progress, moral law changes in extent and intent, spreading its circle to include wider and wider classes of acts, and authorizing the application of moral judgment to more and more minute details and complex relations of conduct. This process of advancement is opposed by large classes of conformers to the older moral law. To these classes belong many persons with whom there is an habitual conformity to an average standard regarded as a badge of "respectability," or "good society;" though a similar resistance is doubtless offered by many also to whom the older code has become really inward. By these moral conservatives the newer and higher code is looked upon as an entrenchment on rights long conceded.

Again, in opposition to the moral lingerers, another class arises. The social forces which tend to progress impeded, prevented, and turned back upon themselves, acquire at last, at some points, a concentration of energy which manifests itself at every opportunity of escapement, in vigorous manner. It is the moral inertia of some classes which creates the vehemence of the opposite class, who are termed by their opponents of the same age "fanatics," and "moral faddists," though they may become the heroes of the next age. At points

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where the opposition between the conservative and the progressive ideas is too extreme, so that no ground of compromise can be found, there arises a tendency to excessive emphasis of the law in asceticism, the form in which the protest of the few against the debauchery of the many has expressed itself in many ages. The tendency has been particularly marked where nations of a higher civilization, possessing a more advanced code of morals and finer inherited instincts, have come into close contact with less civilized peoples.

There are thus two forms of emphasis laid upon the moral law as such, the one by tradition and the other by progress; the two are different and should be distinguished.

The temperament of the man who fulfils the average standard of the class in which he chiefly moves—the man who cares too much for the opinion of his fellows to run counter to the standard of the majority, but who makes no effort to further advancement except as carried forward by acceptance of a higher standard on the part of the majority—may possess a certain æsthetic character, a self-harmony often lacking in the leader of the moral van, as it is likely to be lacking in other pioneers. The man who fulfils the average standard of his class is at ease with his immediate surroundings and at ease with himself. Moreover, the question of modern Epicureanism is, in this country at least, complicated by the fact that it represents the pendulum-recoil of younger thought from the hard system of Puritanism, which latter, if it was in the beginning a progressive revolt from the license of the times, became in the end an oppressive dogmatism of tradition. In independent thought, the question obtrudes itself whether the position which permits unrestrained self-indulgence within the bounds of self-interest is, after all, much worse than the opposite extreme of view, which looks askance at all pleasure as such, and permits it only by tolerance.

But the question is not one of better, but of the possible best. To admit that the prohibition of enjoyment as such is a mistake is not necessarily to admit that there are no moral bounds, even beyond those of self-regard, which define legitimate pleasure.

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I have said that there may be a certain admirable grace of character in the Epicurean, who keeps within the bounds set by the average of his class, and so is in harmony with those with whom he chiefly comes in contact. But when we are asked to contemplate the spectacle of the man who fails to control his appetites and who is, nevertheless, "kindly, unselfish, generous, and big-hearted," we may inquire in what relations and towards whom, whether towards all classes, he is thus "kindly, unselfish, generous, and big-hearted."

Not a long period of time has elapsed since it was thought, in England, the act of a gentleman occasionally to exceed the limits of moderation in drink. The hero of the older novelists frequently retired to rest only with considerable assistance from his friends or his valet, and was supposed to lose nothing in the estimation of the reader by so doing. On the contrary, to society of that date the man who insisted on moderation was but a sour, uncompanionable fellow. At a time when the majority overdrank, his temperance must have rendered him obnoxious, especially to those in whom self-doubt was stirred by its implication of criticism. If he went as far as actual verbal criticism, his rebukes were assuredly looked upon by the men criticised as gratuitous impertinence, perhaps, too, as pharisaical assumption, and certainly as evidence of a total lack of generous feeling towards the inconsiderable frailties of his fellow-men. Social progress has bettered, though not yet, by any means, wholly corrected opinion in this regard, either in England or in the United States. Of late years, the limits of the realm of ethics have been still further expanding to include another province of conduct earlier regarded as outside the sphere of social condemnation,—as matter for the judgment and will of the individual (that is, of the individual male) only. This province comprises the relations of the sexes. And in this case, too, the man who does not always control his instincts may appear the most agreeable of companions to those of his own sex and class, and to those of the other sex who are protected by his conventional code; but the mediæval cavalier, whom also those of his time and class doubtless regarded as a very

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charming fellow, did not more carelessly override vassal and slave than this modern cavalier some classes of his fellow-beings. The world is slow in recognizing the claims of non-influential classes, and especially of those untaught classes who have learned no art of self-analysis and self-expression, and so are silent under the injustices they suffer. Thus it happens that the oft scarcely self-comprehended misery, or the animalism worse than misery, of the thousands whom society yearly devotes to sexual sacrifice, creates as little sympathy as did, among the ancient Mexicans, those other human sacrifices on the altars of Huitzilopochtli. It is, of course, easy enough to dismiss the objectors to the older sexual code as "unco guid" and the virtues of self-control as "miserable little affectations." So, too, the bolder form of human sacrifice was doubtless looked upon by the ancestors of our so-called civilized races, among whom it was once common enough, as necessary and justifiable, while objectors to it, on the other hand, were doubtless regarded as weak and effeminate-souled individuals, incapable of the great heart and great deeds of manly men. Each age, while it holds up hands of holy horror at the deeds of former ages, inclines to regard its own customs with complacent satisfaction. Nevertheless, the human degradation and pain connected with sexual license are not hidden from us, if we have ears to hear and eyes to see.

Æsthetic grace or inner harmony of character is in itself desirable. It is, in fact, an element of the ideal character, which is a character both at harmony in itself, that is, in its different desires and instincts, and at harmony with the highest moral law representing the general welfare. The ideally virtuous man is virtuous without that hard constraint which attaches to the not yet perfect character at war in its different attributes; he is what a German friend of mine would term "der schöne Mensch," the man in whose character, moral principle and the beauty of harmonious attributes become coincident, in whom the ethical is not merely predominant, but dominant.

However, this last form of definition reveals the defect of a harmony that signifies moral inertia. In itself desirable, har-

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mony yet cannot be preferred, from an ethical point of view, where it exists merely as easy-going conformity to an unprogressive moral average. Even some singularity of zeal, some unprepossessing energy, is better than æsthetic sloth. It is for this reason that, in comparing Stoicism with Epicureanism, we must give preference to the former. In its principle of individual subjection to the moral law of general welfare lies the condition of progress, since only by such subjection can that modification of habit and instinct take place which constitutes the advancement of character in the direction of a state of general social harmony and general happiness. Epicureanism, as such, must, on the contrary, always remain egoism; and only the accidents of conditions—accidents of environments and of individual tendencies, through which immoral action may involve greater pleasure than moral—determine whether that egoism shall or shall not constitute a narrow selfishness.

I said, at the opening of this essay, that, granted the extreme premises assumed in the long array of opposing adjectives mustered by the author whose paragraphs we are considering, one could not well refuse his conclusions regarding the inapplicability of the equally extreme terms "saint" and "villain." Our argument has hitherto examined to what extent the premises are actually admissible in any general sense, and, proceeding on this ground, has up to this point assumed, in the type of moral lingerer considered, a certain sensibility of temperament, which leads to conformity with an average code. It has regarded him as a representative of Epicureanism in its better sense,—an Epicureanism which lends attributes of grace and companionability, and restrains by what may be termed a standard of moral taste. On the other hand, we have regarded the representative of self-control as devoid of this grace and companionability. The possibilities which we have thus admitted as possibilities arise, in one direction, from the fact that the man who is especially companionable naturally feels a strong inclination to follow the standard which will give him most companionship,—that is, the standard of the majority,—except as his love of fellowship is dominated

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by stronger motives of principle. That a strong instinct of association may thus exist, dominated by principle, is a fact; and so we have yet to add that a strict code of morals is perfectly compatible with the most lovable temperament; as also that it is equally true that not by any means all who fail to control their appetites are representatives of a finer Epicureanism. The latter may, on the contrary, be of the most "evil-speaking, evil-thinking, bitter-hearted" class, may be "narrow-minded, narrow-hearted, narrow-souled, selfish and hard and cruel and weak." Want of self-contol in sexual matters certainly involves selfishness, and, too, in its complex social results, cruelty.

I wish to emphasize these last points especially, because the paragraphs quoted give me, as I believe they must give all who read them, the impression that the author is inclined to the opinion that the man whose appetites are not always under control is rather the more manly man, and likely to be the more genial and generally admirable. I infer this not merely from the very extreme character of the adjectives with which he shows favor to the incontinent, and disfavor to the continent man, but also and more especially from his designation of temperance and sexual purity as "miserable little affectations," and from his analogy of the lion and the oyster.

As regards this point of view, I may here repeat what I have said elsewhere more in detail,* namely, that as society progresses, the emotions of men are gradually moulded to higher types, just as animal forms are gradually moulded into higher species; but that this does not in the least imply that emotional capacity is lessened in force with social progress. Most men of so-called civilized societies are able to restrain themselves, in anger, from homicide, but this fact does not signify that they are less manly or less capable of emotion than their savage ancestors of the period when murder was common and unrebuked. The Australian savage wooes his bride with a club, and our European ancestors may once have ex-

* "A Review of Evolutional Ethics," Part II., Chapters VI. and IX. (Macmillan & Co., 1893).

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pressed their emotions towards the other sex in a similar manner; but though social evolution has led to the establishment of other ideals of courtship, yet it would be difficult to maintain that the human lover has developed in the direction of the oyster. On the contrary: the history of the whole of evolution is the history of the growth of more complex conditions, and the emotion of the civilized lover has gained, in its process of refinement, through a many-sided addition of intellectual modes and motives which the savage does not possess. If this is true of the whole past course of adjustment to higher ideals, it must be true, also, of the present and future continuation of that adjustment. The easy-going sensualist may be, indeed, a veritable oyster in comparison with the lover whose passion, hemmed by moral refinement from lower expression, finds vent, at last, in a channel to which a thousand streams of emotion unknown to the more primitive stand-point, converge. The fact of a progressive alteration of even fundamental instincts, though it is a necessary implication involved in the general law of evolution, is not sufficiently realized. As higher species are evolved from lower, so higher forms of instinct arise out of lower. If it is not always true of individual cases, it is true in the long run, that the man who fails to control himself sexually in accordance with the welfare of others represents the inferior type. He is one degree nearer the savage, and his emotion is of a more primitive character; but it is not necessarily stronger. This is particularly true because of the intimate connection which love between the sexes necessarily attains, in the course of social evolution, with the other desires and aspirations that are evolved with it,—the intellectual and moral desires and aspirations by the development of which the progress of mankind is chiefly marked.

C. M. Williams.

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DISCUSSION

ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM "MOTIVE," AND ON THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MOTIVES.

IN the two admirable and (as teachers of philosophy will gratefully acknowledge) most useful manuals on Ethics by Mr. J. H. Muirhead and Mr. J. S. Mackenzie, I notice a certain agreement in what seems to me an unfortunate and mistaken use of the term "motive."

Mr. Muirhead writes as follows ("Elements of Ethics," p. 56):

"For whatever else a motive is, it is agreed by all that it is equivalent to an end or aim representing something that is to be realized, —*e.g.*, a future pleasure to ourselves, a good to others, or a truth to be discovered, not something that is already realized as is the feeling in question [viz., the feeling of pleasure in the thought of a future pleasure, etc.]. This may be otherwise expressed by saying that, while feeling as an element in desire may be said to be the efficient cause of action, a motive is universally admitted to be a final cause."

Mr. Mackenzie, who in a foot-note refers to this page of Mr. Muirhead's book, gives the following account of the meaning of motive ("A Manual of Ethics," pp. 37, 38):

"The term 'motive' is not less ambiguous than 'intention.' The motive means, of course, what *moves* us or *causes* us to act in a particular way. Now, there is an ambiguity in the term 'cause.' A cause may be either efficient or final. The efficient cause of a man's movements, for instance, is the action of certain nerves, muscles, etc.; the final cause is the desire of reaching a certain destination or producing a certain result. There is a similar ambiguity in the use of the term 'motive.' A motive may be understood to mean that which *impels* or that which *induces* us to act in a particular way. . . . The motive [in the second and 'more correct sense'] that which induces us to act, is the thought of a desirable end" (*cf.* p. 231, note 5).

Now, of course, any writer on technical subjects—and ethics treated scientifically is a technical subject—requires to give to terms greater precision than belongs to them in ordinary use, and is at liberty to give his own meanings to ordinary terms, provided he does so explicitly. But, in the first place, it is at

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least very inexpedient to use terms in a way that deviates too much from their ordinary literary use, especially in subjects of such concrete interest as ethics. Now, it seems to me very inexpedient to limit the term motive to the final cause, or even to regard it as less correctly applied to the efficient cause; for the efficient cause is the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, the beginning or source of *movement.* As a matter of etymology and of history (for it is from Aristotle that we derive this distinction between efficient and final causes), and also as a matter of general literary and popular usage, motive is the efficient cause of voluntary action. It is true that sometimes (most certainly not "universally") motive is used for the end or object of action,—*e.g.*, when Bancroft writes (I am quoting from the *Century Dictionary*, *s. v.*), "The conversion of the heathen was the motive to the settlement." But in such an expression are we not aware of a certain looseness, or at least abbreviation, of language? "The *desire or wish* to convert the heathen was the motive" would be the more strictly accurate manner of expressing the idea. When we speak of a person's motives we generally mean the feelings which influence his conduct, and not simply the ends or objects of his action, apart from their mental existence as constituting the content of his feelings,—*e.g.*, we talk of a person acting from motives of ambition, of envy, of religious sentiment, etc.,—all such motives being feelings and not ends.

But, secondly, the error in the statements of Mr. Muirhead and Mr. Mackenzie seems to me to lie deeper than in a preference for the less usual and less accurate over the more usual and more accurate meaning of the term. It affects the conception of causality as applied to human conduct. Mr. Mackenzie says, "The efficient cause of a man's movements is the action of certain nerves, muscles," etc. Now, the action of certain nerves may, indeed, be described as the efficient cause of a man's movements; but the action of certain muscles is just these movements themselves, in their physical aspect. If we are considering a man's movements not merely as physical events, but, ethically, as part of his "conduct," it would be more correct to say that the action of certain nerves

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and muscles was the *material* cause of his movements. The efficient cause of conduct must be sought by psychological and not by physiological investigation, except in so far as physiological conditions are, through their effect on the feelings, the indirect cause of voluntary acts. To say, as Mr. Mackenzie does, that "the final cause is the *desire* of reaching," etc., seems to me an inaccurate and certainly an un-Aristotelian use of the term. The final cause is the end or object of action: the end *as desired* may be the efficient cause.* In the famous phrase (*Met.*, 1072, b. 3) applied to God (Reason —the pure ἐνέργεια), Aristotle says, "κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον,"—*i.e.*, the ultimate formal and final cause acts as an efficient cause only by being the object of desire. And in perfect accordance with this is the language of *Ethics*, vi. 2, § 5, διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐδὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική. By διάνοια πρακτική Aristotle goes on to explain that he means ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς or ὄρεξις διανοητική. That is to say, he holds that intellect alone can never be an efficient cause, but only intellect directed to an end, and such intellect must be intellect mixed with appetite. The "thought of a desirable end" is not a motive, it does not move to action, unless it stimulates my desires.

Mr. Mackenzie, by speaking of a desire for an end as itself a final cause, escapes the difficulty of making a final cause as such explain voluntary action. Mr. Muirhead defines motive as the "idea of the object which, through congruity with the character of the self, moves the will." Under the phrase "congruity with the character of the self" may be concealed the element of appetite or feeling which seems to be indispensable in motive; but it is not clearly indicated.

If I may pronounce on the "motive" which "induced" both Mr. Muirhead and Mr. Mackenzie to adopt their statements respecting motives, I should say that it was a desire to bring out forcibly the point on which Professor T. H. Green insisted in his treatment of the will,—the distinction, namely, between motive on the one side and mere animal appetite or

* I should perhaps remind my readers that the only "causes" recognized by modern "empirical" logic are the "efficient" and the "material."

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impulse on the other. Motive always implies a conception of an end, it is true; but a motive is not a conception of an end apart from desire. Green himself, though his language may occasionally give some countenance to the exaggeration (as it appears to me) of Mr. Muirhead and Mr. Mackenzie, is careful to say ("Prolegomena to Ethics," § 91, p. 96), "The motive to every imputable act for which the agent is conscious on reflection that he is answerable, is a *desire* for personal good in some form or other." Whatever else a motive is, it is a desire,—*i.e.*, a feeling. When a desire or appetite becomes the motive of a rational being it is transmuted in character, but the element of desire is still there. I hold with Aristotle that no *idea* of an end, apart from desire, can ever be a motive: *διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ.*

It seems to me very important for those who hold by "idealist" ethics to avoid exaggeration on this matter: otherwise they give countenance to the contempt with which the ordinary utilitarian is apt to treat their theories, as ignoring the psychology of volition. Mr. S. Alexander seems to me to countenance an error of a different kind. In his very interesting article on "Character and Conduct" in the July number of this JOURNAL, he seems to go farther even than J. S. Mill in depreciating the ethical significance of motives. "Mill," he says, in a foot-note on p. 471, "is not quite accurate when he says, in a well-known passage of his 'Utilitarianism,' that a man's motive is important for judging character, but not for judging conduct. He should have said disposition or temperament, though the context shows he has in mind the distinction [between character and disposition]." The passage in Mill occurs in a foot-note on p. 27 of his "Utilitarianism" (4th edition): "The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention,—that is, upon what the agent *wills to do.* But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act makes none in the morality: though it makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or bad habitual disposition,—a bent of character from which useful, or from which hurtful actions are likely to arise."

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Mill seems to me quite right (he is certainly quite in accordance with Aristotle as well as with ordinary usage) in identifying "character" with "*habitual* disposition." Character is certainly much more than natural (inherited) temperament; but that natural temperament is part of the material out of which character is formed, and that habit becomes a sort of "second nature," Mr. Alexander would, I fancy, be among the last to deny. When we speak of a person acting from motives of ambition, of religious sentiment, of family affection, etc., these motives are only in part due to temperament or disposition, in any sense in which that can be distinguished from character: in all cases they are largely due to the character which the man has formed,—*i.e.*, the course of conduct he has habitually followed. So that Mill seems right in saying that motives throw light on character. As to Mill's denial that they should affect our judgment of acts, may I make the following suggestion towards obviating the apparent contradiction involved in his abstract distinction between "act" and "agent"? After all, we can in an intelligible sense speak of a *good* man doing a *wrong* action from *good* motives. When we are pronouncing an ethical judgment on an act, we are generally considering *an act of such a kind*,—the act in its general aspects; for that is all that, as a rule, we are able to consider. A man saves another's life: we call it a good action, meaning that acts of such a kind are acts of which we approve. A man kills another: we call it a bad action, meaning that acts of such a kind are acts of which we disapprove. It may happen in a particular case that a man may save a life owing to meaner motives (*e.g.*, hope of reward) than those which lead another man—say, a sincere and disinterested patriot—to kill a tyrant. Motives being identical with the spirit in which an act is done are, it seems to me, ideally, the true subject of moral judgment; but, in practice, it is well to confess that motives could be known in their fulness only to an omniscient judge, and for human beings it is wiser on the whole to pronounce judgment on acts in their general aspect. The individual cannot know even his own motives adequately. In the long run, but only in the long run and on the whole,

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good motives cannot bring forth bad (*i.e.*, socially mischievous) acts; and when we judge the character and the motives, we are inferring the nature of the tree from its habitual fruits. But we may err in very many cases; and it is certainly better to *discuss* the right and wrong of acts, where we can directly apply a measure and a standard,—viz., their effects on social well-being. The discussion of motives, apart from the acts in which they are apt to issue, is too likely to end in appeals to vague and unanalyzed "intuitive" standards. In the case of legislation it is absolutely necessary to deal with acts (the connection between English utilitarianism and theories of legislation will suggest itself). A system of legislation can consider only kinds of acts: a system of ethics cannot practically deal with concrete particular acts in their whole real context of motive and occasion,—it can only point out that the moral judgment, ideally, deals with such concrete particular acts. A system of ethics may very well, however, deal with kinds of character and consequently with kinds of motives. Thus, political law says "*Do this:*" moral law, when it comes to be differentiated from political law, takes the higher form, a form which does not admit of exceptions, "*Be this.*" The motive is, ideally, the subject of moral judgments, just because it is the feeling of a real individual on some definite occasion, and not an objective end capable of being expressed in general terms and approved or condemned in an abstract code.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

JESUS COLLEGE, OXFORD.

"ON HUMAN MARRIAGE"—A REPLY TO DR. C. N. STARCKE.

IF I desire to say a few words in reply to Dr. Starcke, it is not, of course, because he has criticised my "History of Human Marriage," but because he has brought against me an accusation for which there is not the slightest shadow of foundation.

Dr. Starcke says that he has felt a kind of obligation, however unpleasant, publicly to announce that his own opinion of

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the scientific value of my book differs widely from that of Mr. Alfred R. Wallace. His aim is to show that what is new in the book is not true, and, especially, that what is true is not new. He wishes to demonstrate that I have not mentioned his name often enough, and that I have fashioned my hypothesis after his without "openly and honestly" invoking his authority. It is two years since I sent a copy of "Human Marriage" to Dr. Starcke, and if he now, after so long an interval,* exposes my dishonesty to the public, the reason, I suppose, is that nobody else has done it before him. Not one of my numerous critics has alluded to the matter, or has even mentioned Dr. Starcke's name in connection with my work, although I know that several of them were perfectly well acquainted with his book on "The Primitive Family."

Dr. Starcke, in his own opinion, has in this book so thoroughly disproved the hypothesis of promiscuity that later writers on the subject have nothing to do but to repeat his conclusions. He has shown—not only endeavored to show† —how the custom of tracing descent by the mother's line originated. He has, as he modestly says, won the victory over Mr. Morgan so completely that another writer "might spare himself the trouble of detailed studies," though it is permissible to use the results by honestly appealing to the authority of the victor. It is indeed lamentable that such merits have not been duly acknowledged, and surprising that Dr. Starcke should himself be the first to call attention to the neglect of his achievements.

Dr. Starcke seems never to have suspected that if I do not refer to his book so often as he would have liked, the explanation may be that I do not hold the same high opinion of it as he does himself. We agree in thinking that there is no

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* Dr. Starcke's article "On Human Marriage" was received in March, 1892, with a request that it be inserted in the April number in place of an article by him on "Conscience" previously sent. The request came too late for the change to be made and the article "On Human Marriage" was returned to him, but was received again, and finally published at his earnest request in the July number, 1893.—MANAGING EDITOR.

† *Cf.* INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, July number, p. 455.

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truth in the hypothesis of promiscuity; but the ways in which he and I have dealt with the problem are so different that it did not occur to me that any talk of plagiarism would be even possible. Dr. Starcke's method is nothing if not critical. He gives—as in the chapter on the "Nomenclatures," of which he seems to be most proud—a long account of an hypothesis proposed by somebody else. He tells us what other people have said against this hypothesis, and is then so anxious to criticise even the critics that the reader entirely loses the thread. Finally, he suddenly starts a theory of his own, and, instead of adducing evidence, he says he now flatters himself that he has given the correct interpretation.* I quite understand why Dr. Starcke has adopted this method. As a rule, his collection of facts is too scanty to serve as a basis for trustworthy inductions.

As to my own work, I may say that my chief aim was not to give a summary of other writers' opinions and to criticise their theories, but to lay down the results I had drawn from a comparatively large number of facts. If my conclusions happened to coincide, in certain points, with another writer's unproved statements, this was for me a matter of little consequence. I had conceived the whole plan of my work, and written the larger part of it, before I had ever heard Dr. Starcke's name. And I now "openly and honestly" confess that I owe to Dr. Starcke absolutely nothing but what I have acknowledged, and that, when I have mentioned his name, I have done it, in most cases, merely for politeness' sake.

Even in the point with regard to which Dr. Starcke considers my dishonesty to be at its height—in the criticism of Mr. Morgan's views—he himself admits that my arguments differ from his own. For he affirms that the victory never could have been achieved by the arguments I have advanced, whereas it had already been won by his own arguments. As regards the question of descent by the mother's line, Dr. Starcke complains that I quote him only "here and there

* "The Primitive Family," p. 207.

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upon minor points." I have said, "As to the rules of succession, Dr. Starcke has set forth the hypothesis that they are dependent on local connections, those persons being each other's heirs who dwell together in one place."* I always thought that this was the point on which Dr. Starcke laid particular stress, and now he tells me that it is only a "minor" point. I should be very glad to know which, then, are the "major" points. His ideas are presented in so confused a style that it is sometimes not very easy to make out what they really are. Dr. Starcke has no doubt said many times that there is a connection between *Ambelanak* marriage and descent by the mother, but the chief evidence has been adduced by Dr. Tylor, who has found, by means of his statistical method, that, whilst the number of coincidences between peoples among whom the husband lives with the wife's family and peoples among whom the maternal system prevails, is proportionally large, the full maternal system never appears among peoples whose exclusive custom is for the husband to take his wife to his own house. I have quoted this very important fact (pp. 109 *seq.*) and added another,—which is my own "discovery,"—that where both customs (the woman receiving her husband in her own hut, and the man taking his wife to his) occur side by side among the same people, descent in the former cases is traced through the mother, in the latter through the father. These facts—not Dr. Starcke's repeated assurances—are the real evidence which we have for the connection in question.

Dr. Starcke is very anxious to find points of resemblance between his own book and mine. Thus he says that I define marriage "almost in the same way" as he has done. For me, "marriage is nothing else than a more or less durable connection between male and female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring."† For him, "in its widest sense, marriage is only a connection between man and woman which is of more than momentary

* "History of Human Marriage," p. 110.

† Ibid., p. 19 *seq.*

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duration, and as long as it endures they seek for subsistence in common."* He thinks that I have laid too much stress on the birth of the offspring, and does not see that this very point makes our definitions essentially different. Both of us have in the definition of the word indicated the cause to which we ascribe the origin of marriage. I think that it is for the benefit of the young that male and female continue to live together, and that the tie which joins them is an instinct developed through the powerful influence of natural selection. Dr. Starcke, on the other hand, is of opinion that a man connected himself with a woman in order that she might keep house for him and rear children, which were of great service to the father. He especially insists upon the fact that the man wished to have a cook, and, if I understand him rightly, considers the discovery of the use of fire to be the fundamental cause from which the institution of marriage has sprung.† Yet Dr. Starcke is so kind as to think that even I "would have recognized that marriage is essentially an economical institution," if I "had gone a little deeper into the study of its various forms."‡

On the whole, Dr. Starcke does not like my appealing to instincts in order to explain social institutions. I do not—and he might at the same time have said, Mr. Wallace does not—understand what instinct really means. "Strictly speaking," he remarks, "only reflex action can be regarded as instinctive. The province of instinct is abandoned as soon as emotions arise in the individual which constitute motives for his action." Then, Dr. Starcke has altered his views since the time—long ago, as he likes to say—when he wrote his "Primitive Family," for there (p. 9.) he speaks, for instance, of

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* "The Primitive Family," p. 13.

† Ibid., p. 257.

‡ Professor Lujo Brentano, who has based a considerable part of the first chapter of his "Volkswirthschaftslehre" on my book, has understood me better than Dr. Starcke. He says, "Aus ihr [der Familie] geht zünachst die Ehe hervor; denn, wie Westermarck gezeigt hat: die Ehe wurzelt in der Familie und nicht die Familie in der Ehe. Die letztere besteht mit Rücksicht auf die Zungen." ("Zeitschrift für Social- und Wirthschaftsgeschichte," vol. i. p. 148.)

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"social instincts." Dr. Starcke seems to be no great believer in that poetical side of human nature which operates in innocent unconsciousness. When a man prefers a pretty girl to an ugly one, he does not do it from any instinctive feeling. By no means. "The judgment of beauty," says Dr. Starcke, "is . . . determined by a swift consideration of the utility of the object. A house is not thought beautiful when it is unfit to live in; a vault is not beautiful if it seems too massive or too slender for the superimposed weight. A man is only beautiful when his appearance suggests that he is fit to fill the place that belongs to him in society." Dr. Starcke might have carried his interpretation of beauty a little further, and said that, according to modern ideas, a beautiful man is one who has got much money.

Not only is Dr. Starcke angry with me because I have not quoted him more frequently when we agree in our conclusions; he thinks also that I should have criticised those of his hypotheses which are different from my own. Thus, he complains that I have not "at all" examined the hypothesis proposed by him as regards the origin of exogamy and of the prohibitions of intermarriage between near relations. This hypothesis is that the prohibitions of marriage are based upon the legal status which the persons concerned have in the body politic. "A marriage between a mother and son, or between a brother and elder sister, would altogether transform their relations, and the break in the respect due to their elders, the confusions and contradictions which would ensue, would be quite enough to produce an aversion to such marriages. This aversion would be increased by the fact that it was generally impossible to contract such marriages, since the son possesses nothing which he could offer to the father as purchase-money. . . . The connection between a father and daughter is not affected by these circumstances, but it rarely occurs, since a father is unwilling to renounce the advantages of bestowing his daughter in marriage." * According to Dr. Starcke, then, the prohibition of intermarriage between a father and daughter,

* "The Primitive Family," p. 229.

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which occurs as an old survival even in our own law-books, is really due to the narrow intellect of our ancestors. For it was very stupid indeed of that father in olden times not to see that, even if he did not get any purchase-money by marrying his own daughter, he, on the other hand, had nothing to pay for his wife. He was like a peasant who does not eat his own grain because, if he did, he could not get money by selling it to somebody else. The reader, I think, will now understand that I had very good reasons for leaving Dr. Starcke's hypothesis unmentioned.

At the end of his article Dr. Starcke becomes more courteous. My description of the different forms of marriage is written in a "neutral" tone. It is even quite satisfactory as a "popular" account of the main types of marriage, although, "of course," one must not look for an investigation into the manifold variations and singularities within these types. Here again Dr. Starcke finds an agreement in our views. He says that in the concluding chapter of my book the origin of monogamy is attributed to the custom of regarding, in the polygamous family, only one man or woman as the true husband or wife. Then he adds, "In the text this is only mentioned incidentally. I have myself laid great stress on this custom." I am sorry to disturb the pleasure Dr. Starcke says he feels in this agreement, but I have never held that monogamy originated in the way mentioned. On the contrary, I say (p. 508) that "the higher position so generally granted to the *first* married wife in polygynous families seems to indicate in most cases a transition from monogamous to polygynous habits, and not *vice versa*, as has often been suggested." And this, together with the corresponding custom referring to polyandrous families, I have not mentioned only "incidentally," as Dr. Starcke says. I have devoted nearly seven pages in the text to evidential statements.

In the last paragraph Dr. Starcke is even gracious enough to say that I have "collected a mass of material out of which a very useful book might have been compiled." This compliment took me by surprise, as the rest of the article seemed to imply that Dr. Starcke thought it, on the whole, rather

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useless for anybody to write on early marriage after the appearance of his own work on "The Primitive Family."

EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

LONDON.

"MORAL DISTINCTIONS"—AN EXPLANATION.

In reference to the reply of Mr. Muirhead to what he calls my "accusations," may I say in explanation,—

1. That I do not consider the area of conduct affected by moral obligation to be the same as that affected by legal compulsion. I think the former much wider.

2. I think that a man has large duties to his wife and children.

3. When speaking of self-regarding acts as contrasted with other regarding ones, I do not consider that a man's wife and children are himself. It seems to me sophistical to do so.

4. Is not the function of the moralist to observe and build upon distinctions rather than to seek to break them down? Every rule of morals or jurisprudence shades off at its margin, so that you cannot say precisely where it ends; but that does not show that it is not sound. That I am free while a dangerous lunatic is confined depends upon legal rules which cannot be scientifically defined.

NEVILLE TEBBUTT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION. By Professor Edward Caird, LL.D., D.C.L. In two volumes. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons, 1893.

The Gifford Foundation, whatever other results it may yield, has merited the gratitude of this generation through having furnished an occasion for Professor Caird's lectures. The work is an *apology* for religion, and for the Christian religion in particular of a higher strain than has hitherto been heard in English literature. In substance the work represents the ripest fruits of a modern

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idealist philosophy, a philosophy which has shown itself capable of assimilating to the fullest extent the new conceptions with which recent scientific and historical research has armed the investigator of man's nature and destiny. The relatively freer form of exposition appropriate to oral addresses, while it has the disadvantage of excluding more abstract discussion, affords full scope to Professor Caird's remarkable gift of lofty, serious, and rich eloquence. The combination of speculative theory with interpretations of the great historical movements of religious faith,—a combination not arbitrarily imposed, but necessitated by the mode in which the main problem is regarded,—is that best adapted to call forth the full powers of the author; and, let it be said in a word, he has risen to the height of his great argument.

The ground-plan of the lectures is easily apprehended and stated. It involves and rests upon two fundamental conceptions: one, that of the principle of religion as an integral and constituent element in reason or consciousness as such; the other, that of evolution or development as the process of organic change whereby what is the full and true meaning of the principle is realized and manifested. The closer analysis of these fundamental ideas forms the more abstract portion of the work; the study of the exemplification and verification of them in the history of the main types of the world's religions gives to them a more concrete and definite significance. Not, however, that abstract analysis and historical verification are to be absolutely severed, even in treatment. It is part of the best lesson of modern philosophy, a lesson the author enforces, that speculation must not divorce itself from the actual life of the human spirit, and that only in the contents of the movement of thought does reflective analysis lay hold of the form of the idea it seeks to purify from contingent surroundings and express in all its generality. At the same time it is to be said that the intimate union of speculative analysis with historic interpretation has its own dangers, that it may substitute an imperfect and hastily derived *Vorstellung* for a true notion, and that it may readily lead to grave misapprehension of the actual. The *Rechts-philosophie* of Hegel may be fairly adduced as containing more than one signal illustration of the double danger. And he who would find in the Christian faith, for example, the completed realization of the rational principle of religion, may discover, to his cost, that the conception is of doubtful finality, and that the correspondence of historic fact thereto is dependent on a reading of the Christian

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faith as at any time presented which is of more than doubtful historic worth.

Religion as a constituent of human reason the author traces to the necessary presence in consciousness of the idea of God as coexisting and correlated with the equally fundamental ideas of the world and self. The antithesis between *self* and the *world*, in more technical language, between *subject* and *object*, involves and is only possible through consciousness of the unity within which the opposing elements are embraced. Some consciousness of this embracing unity, however inchoate in form, is necessarily present; man can no more rid himself of it than he can get rid of the consciousness of the object or of himself. There is thus for all religions a common *principle* rather than a common *definition;* they are the varied results in which one living germinative force embodies itself. In their relation to this principle religions have their basis of agreement, not in any external features or doctrines which they might possess in common.

It is a necessity of reason which lies under the idea of the absolute unity wherein the counter elements of all experience, the subject and object, man and nature, are viewed in an intelligible relation to one another. On the necessity, indeed, rests the claim of religion to a recognition as an integral and original element of human thought, a recognition wholly independent of the particular form which the fundamental conceptions of the absolute unity may assume. "Every rational being is as such a religious being." Just as "inner" and "outer" in experience, the subject and the object, are known only as related to, yet different from one another, so the synthesis of these two carries with it the presupposition of a third term, higher than either, of whose unity they in their action and reaction are the manifestation.

Accepting for the moment this account of the rational basis of religion, we can readily understand why the author turns at once to the consideration of one characteristic of the absolute unity, a characteristic so abstract that it enters naturally into the more purely philosophical discussions of the idea of God, and at the same time presents itself as operative in even the simplest phases of concrete religious belief. Subject and object as opposed to one another, and so as limiting, determining one another,—outer and inner experience as complexes of related facts, more or less intelligible,—carry with them the mark of finitude. The absolute unity, as opposed to either, is conceived, more or less clearly, as

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the non-finite, the infinite. The author has but little trouble in showing the inadequacy of two main ways in which this important feature has been represented. The infinite is not simply a greater finite, one more term added to the series; nor is it the indeterminate and indeterminable, that of which just nothing can be said. "The infinite itself must be conceived, not merely as that which the finite is not, but as that which includes and explains it; not merely as an indeterminate background of the finite, but as a self-determining principle which manifests itself in all the determinations of the finite without losing its unity with itself." The infinite, in brief, must be thought, not imagined, and the history of religious views is to a large extent the exhibition of the constant conflict between the imperfections of the concrete images and the demands of the fundamental conception they embody, a conflict in and through which the conception itself acquires its full significance.

The author would readily admit that in the idea of the absolute unity, which seems thus to be presupposed in all finite experience, we have, after all, only the abstract form of our problem; and, perhaps he would further admit that the more concrete determination of it just given, as the idea of a principle which unfolds itself in the richness of finitude, is apt to suggest interpreting images that have no justification in the idea itself. The nature of a uniting principle can never be indifferent to the natures of the differing elements united; and if we, for any reason, reduce to the vast characteristic of distinct finites the rich factors of our complex actual experience, we shall correspondingly reduce our conception of the embracing unity to the bare negative that is here rejected. All we can secure is the somewhat cautionary result, that the infinite is neither to be conceived as a *legend* which has no relation to the finite nor as a mere sum of finites. The content of the idea which shall satisfy our demands remains to be determined otherwise, and obviously depends on and must vary with the content assigned to the finites, which are held apart and yet united.

All this is perfectly appreciated by the author, and receives full recognition in his treatment of the idea of evolution or development. "The permanence of the three great limiting ideas by which our whole life, theoretical and practical, is governed does not include the vicissitudes of a long process of development, in which each of them takes into itself the most varied content, and becomes in a sense transformed by assimilating it. But the trans-

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formation is always organic, always held within the limits of the identity of our life; and its last result is therefore only a more adequate consciousness of the meaning and relative value of the ideas by which it was guided and stimulated in all its progress." The religious idea which is rooted in man's consciousness of himself and of the world only acquires definiteness through its own development, and only its last stage clearly shows what was contained in it from the first. The history of religions is just religion progressively defining itself. At every stage the religion is the expression of the fullest conception human reason can form of the unity of its own experience; at every stage, then, it has to submit to the application of the same final test, how far it coheres with man's reason and conscience, how far, that is, it really contains a conception of unity which does reunite the consciousness of himself and of the world that man has reached.

To the idea of evolution the author devotes special attention; and it is natural and necessary he should do so, for on it rests one half, perhaps the most important half, of all his treatment of religion. We cannot think he has been completely successful in clearing it up or in evading the manifold difficulties that beset the application of it; but before indicating the doubts we entertain on these points it is desirable to follow, as briefly as may be, the author's own exposition of the idea, and to see what results it yields in his hands. The conceptions which come forward are all so large and complicated, in many cases are condensations of so much concrete and debatable matter, that it is hard to feel sure of the precise significance attached to them, and equally hard to decide whether difference of opinion from him has real ground or not.

The fundamental features of *development* on which the author lays stress are, first, that nothing arises in it *de novo* which is not in some way performed or anticipated from the beginning,—in other words, a development is the gradual unfolding, becoming explicit of what is already implicit; second, the process of change in the continuous unification of difference; and, thirdly, the successive changes, the increasing richness and complexity brought forward, are so far from being incompatible with the unity and identity of the subject of change that only through them is his own self-identical existence fully realized. If to this there be added a term playing an important part in the author's discussion, viz., *manifestation*, a summary expression of the varied differences and integrations making up the manifold of a developing life, we have

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the abstract outlines of his determination of the notion which finds its best illustration in self-consciousness, and which is applied to the whole history of religions.

In the development of consciousness, whether of self, or world, or God, there is traceable the constant interaction of ideas, dimly appreciated, and with a content that is at first implicit only, and of forms of concrete embodiment, representation, the element of difference. In and through the struggle of these opposing elements the fundamental idea itself acquires new definiteness and depth, and in the light of what is thus gained an interpretation is possible of the more inchoate stages that have preceded. And in the whole evolution, as in each of its partial phases, the same typical movement is exemplified. The history of the development of any one form of consciousness, then, is not to be contrasted with and severed from its philosophical treatment. It is only through the evolution of a principle that the meaning of the principle becomes apparent; it is only in the last most fully developed form of the religious idea that the true significance of that idea can be realized and expressed in the more abstract fashion of speculative philosophy.

The larger part of the author's work is devoted to a broad and luminous sketch of the evolution of religious consciousness or of the idea of God. Proceeding on the ground that the first implicit consciousness of the absolute unity must be embodied in representative forms drawn from the experience of the objective world or of self, and that in time reference to the object precedes consciousness of the object, the author sees in the pre-Christian religions the exemplification of one-sided objectivity and of one-sided subjectivity. The more objective religions, tending to conceive of the absolute unity after the fashion of a natural thing, or, at all events, placing God in special and almost exclusive relation to nature, have as their typical, highest representative the Hellenic mythology. The more subjective, conceiving of God as in especial relation to the inner man, as pre-eminently the *moral* ruler, are best represented historically by the Hebrew religion.

It is not easy to be perfectly satisfied with the broad division thus indicated, and to feel convinced that all the manifold minor characteristics of the various types of religion falling under either category are really in subordination to the more general mark; in a word, one might doubt whether such abstract categories of thought, as *object* and *subject*, are well adapted to serve as instru-

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ments for laying out historic material. What lies beyond all doubt, however, is the attractive and stimulating character of the author's handling of the several portions of his material. Lectures IX. and XI. are peculiarly excellent specimens of his method.

In the fundamental principle of Christianity the author finds the true and final form of the religious consciousness, a reconciliation of the antithesis which in one-sided acceptation had slowly worked itself out in pre-Christian faiths. The Christian idea is that of God as a spirit manifesting himself both in nature and in the inner life of man,—immanent in nature and yet transcending it, and making it a means to the higher life of spirit,—the presupposition, the life and the end of all,—a living God, the inspiring source of and eternal realization of the moral ideal of man. In the Christian religion, the idea of God dimly present in even the simplest phases of conscious life first becomes explicit. There, and there only, has thought attained an adequate representation of that absolute reconciling unity, the constant need for which had been the animating force in all its efforts after completed understanding of experience, after a perfectly harmonious conception of man and his relations to the sum of existence.

The main portion of the author's second volume is devoted to the treatment of the Christian principle as first expressed in the perfect practical idealism of the founder of the Christian faith, and to a consideration of the development which that principle has itself undergone, at first in the universalizing and deepening of it in the Pauline and Johannine theologies, and then through the manner in which it assimilated throughout the Middle Ages the philosophical and social ideas of its surroundings, and lastly in the Reformation and its sequel. It may be that there are in this broad historical sketch some points open to attack. Perhaps it is not possible to make the separation which the author seems to mark, in the case of the teachings of Christ, between the principle or spirit discoverable there and the conceptions through which that spirit was realized by those even who were most animated by it. In other words, it may be doubted whether it is legitimate to free the teachings of Christ so completely from theological conceptions as seems here to be done. One may hesitate a little as to whether light is thrown on the general outline of development within Christianity by the antithesis of subjective and objective. But these minor difficulties do not prevent full appreciation and enjoyment of the rich exposition here given of the gradual unfolding of the

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Christian faith, from its germinal principle down to the form in which, purified and deepened by the conflicts it has gone through, it offers itself as in its simple elements adequate to all the needs of life, and in harmony with the highest, most elaborated results of reflective thought. What was once seized in unreflective fashion, in the vivid intuitions of faith, is in accordance with the more sober, more impersonal utterances of reason. For religion as for philosophy, the meaning of the universe is spiritual. The finitude of man, with the consciousness necessarily accompanying it, of the infinite, all the many contradictions of his theoretical and practical experience, find explanation and reconciliation in the conception of nature and man as the continuous manifestation of a spiritual life, a life, that is, whose nature is seized by us in the ideals we form, of truth and beauty and goodness.

It is not easy to turn from the rich, though chastened eloquence of the words in which the author concludes his argument, and to ask how far it is possible to accept the position he is most of all concerned to enforce, that there is real identity of purport between the philosophical idea and the fundamental elements of the Christian faith.

The essence of the whole argument has been the coincidence between the speculative notion of the ultimate unity of experience as determined by idealist philosophy, and the contents of the highest type of religious faith as historically represented by Christianity,—at all events, when Christianity is purified from certain extraneous adjuncts. From the philosophical point of view, the objective and subjective, nature and man, become rationally interpretable in their reciprocal relations only when conceived as the common manifestations of one spiritual life, which unfolds itself or reveals itself in them, and the character of which is to be discerned, in accordance with the very idea of evolution, only in the highest form of its manifestation, in the moral life of self-conscious mind. On the historical side, Christianity, in the spirit of its doctrine, presents itself as the first fully adequate exposition of a belief reconciling nature and man in the broad conception of a universe spiritual in its significance, a moral government with infinite loving goodness as its principle, a conception which at once satisfies the theoretical demand of intellect and affords an all-comprehensive guidance for practice. There is agreement in that both—philosophical idea and Christian faith—recognize a spiritual life as the ultimate fact in existence, in that both bring together nature

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and humanity by viewing them as the forms in which that life is revealed, in that both accept the highest ideals the human reason is found capable of forming as the most adequate interpretations of the nature of the ultimate principle revealing itself in existence, and, finally, in that both tend, when fully worked out, to an identical determination of man's appropriate attitude towards the ultimate ground of things,—for Christianity as for philosophy, the service of God is the service of man.

The difficulties inherent in this subtle *rapprochement* of philosophy and religion are not diminished, but increased when there is taken into account what the author has further to say of the character of the ultimate spiritual life. Fully recognizing the difficulty raised, he yet connects with the more general notions he has been employing the more special thought of the ultimate unity as a self-conscious, that is, personal being; and he would probably admit that, broadly speaking, in the presence or absence of this feature would be found a crucial test of the agreement or disagreement of historical Christianity with the philosophical idea. The author has not discussed at length this highly important portion of his argument; but he lays some stress on the connection of the view briefly expressed by him with his general treatment of evolution, and it may fairly be connected with what he has to say of Kant's peculiar *subjectivism* in regard to the idea of God, and of the *subjective* synthesis of experience which lies at the basis of the Positivist view of religion. But even were the idea of evolution as employed by him more clear and satisfactory than it seems to us, it is doubtful whether it will support the weight of the conclusion thus rested on it. Perplexing as the notion of *manifestation* is, it becomes all the more difficult when we are called upon to conceive of that which is manifested as an infinite self-conscious personality, distinct from and not only revealing himself to but in the realm of finite spirits and of nature. In the light of this interpretation of the ultimate unity, evolution as the author employs it has no other meaning than that which in the far-back history of speculation was assigned to it by Aristotle, and it ought never to be forgotten that with Aristotle the notion of evolution was but the correlative of a thought which often in the work before us seems likewise to play its part, the thought of a complete, pre-existent plan which was gradually unfolded. It is true that the author, in reference to a special question, has explicitly rejected the view which interprets the future as coming from the present "by the

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unfolding of an already completed life which contains already preformed in it all that it can ever manifest" (ii. 103); but he has allowed himself repeatedly to employ expressions which can with difficulty be cleared from that misconception; and when the idea of evolution is applied, not to the isolated phenomena where its special sense can be secured by due inclusion of the determining conditions, but to the universe as a whole, it seems to us that his exposition leads to precisely the *impasse* before which the late T. H. Green obviously found himself at a stand.

Perhaps one might hazard the conjecture that we are all too apt to interpret hastily the ultimate notion of a unity of experience. It is a purely formal notion, and its further determination is easily biassed by a false or inadequate mode of expressing the opposites, the differents, that are supposed to enter into it. Some of the best work of the author in these lectures is devoted to clearing up the precise nature of the relation that must be assumed between subject and object, and yet at times he seems to proceed on the very abstract antithesis he is most successful in destroying. The synthesis that is sought for is a synthesis in and for thought only. Nothing of its significance is lost, even if on that account it be called subjective; nothing is gained by pressing the need of an objective synthesis which, after all, can only mean a more or less pictorial representation symbolizing the thought involved. There are doubtless defects in Kant's mode of handling the final idea of reason, but they are hardly remedied by seeking for that idea an interpretation that shall give its contents a quasi-objective mode of existence.

We can hardly think, then, that idealistic philosophy has done so much as the author claims for it,—"that it has for the first time furnished us with something like a rational proof" of the Christian faith. That philosophy has still much to do before it can with full assurance rest satisfied that it has "named" the truth of things. And a doubt in this respect extends itself inevitably to the historical treatment which finds throughout the past of religious consciousness a slow but unmistakable development towards a definite form of belief. It is hardly possible that a historical review from such a stand-point should not do, even unwittingly, injustice to the facts themselves. The fundamental antithesis of subjective and objective religions, which the author consistently applies, seems at times misleading. As example let there be taken the place assigned to the Stoic system. It is, we are convinced, nothing but

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the prejudice of a once accepted view of the historical development of philosophy which can induce any critic to find in the Stoic philosophy a representation of the subjective position. So, too, one may doubt whether it is historically sound to treat Protestantism within the limits of the circle of Christian ideas only. It would be, perhaps, more in accordance with the true historic facts to regard it as one pulse of the great movement of human reason to which in some other pronounced phases the name Renascence has been applied. But on these aspects of the historical side of Professor Caird's work it is impossible to speak briefly. Merely to indicate doubt or difference of opinion is of small value, and to treat the matters as they deserve would exceed the bounds of any notice of his book.

R. ADAMSON.

VICTORIA UNIVERSITY, MANCHESTER.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. By Herbert Spencer. Vol. II. London: Williams & Norgate, 1893. Pp. xii., 487.

The larger part of this volume is made up of the discussion of Justice, which forms Part IV. of Mr. Spencer's "Principles," and which was so admirably reviewed by Professor Royce in a former number of this JOURNAL (Vol. II., No. 1, pp. 117–123). Parts V. and VI. ("Negative Beneficence" and "Positive Beneficence") are much shorter and much less substantial, and are indeed, on the whole, very disappointing. In the preface to Volume I. Mr. Spencer stated, with reference to these two parts, that he was especially anxious to be able to complete them, "because, in the absence of them, the divisions already published will leave on nearly all minds a very erroneous impression respecting the general tone of evolutionary ethics. In its full scope, the moral system to be set forth unites sternness with kindness; but thus far attention has been drawn almost wholly to the sternness. Extreme misapprehensions and misstatements have hence resulted." The two parts now for the first time published will no doubt to some extent modify the impression previously conveyed, but not, I think, to such an extent as to alter one's view of the "general tone" of the system. Even in the chapters specially devoted to Beneficence the qualifications seem on the whole more prominent than the positive injunctions; and the latter are often so commonplace in their character that it is open to doubt whether it was worth while to elaborate them in so systematic a form. Mr. Spencer is evi-

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dently himself conscious of the unsatisfactory character of this portion of his work. His satisfaction, he says, in completing these chapters "is somewhat dashed by the thought that these new parts fall short of expectation. The doctrine of evolution has not furnished guidance to the extent I had hoped. Most of the conclusions, drawn empirically, are such as right feelings, enlightened by cultivated intelligence, have already sufficed to establish. Beyond certain general sanctions indirectly referred to in verification, there are only now and then, and more especially in the closing chapters, conclusions evolutionary in origin that are additional to or different from those which are current." Such a frank avowal must to a large extent disarm criticism; and it may be sufficient to say, by way of general characterization, that Mr. Spencer's discussions of particular points in these chapters are always interesting and sensible, often brightly illustrated and strikingly emphasized, seldom profound, and perhaps never showing such balanced judgment and comprehensiveness of view as would alone have made such minutely practical investigations in the highest degree instructive and useful. As it is, the interest is often rather autobiographical than philosophical; suggestive rather of Mr. Spencer's individual likes and dislikes (especially dislikes) than of the absolute imperatives of duty. But with a writer of Mr. Spencer's eminence even autobiography is an important contribution to philosophy; and we have certainly every reason to be grateful to him for the trouble that he has taken in completing his great work.

Probably the point of most general interest in the new part of this book will be found in the sharp discrimination that is drawn (pp. 270–275) between Justice and Beneficence. In a certain sense, no doubt, every one would recognize a broad distinction, and even contrast, between these. Some forms of good may be claimed as rights, and the concession of them enforced by public law; others may be regarded as equitable, and the concession of them encouraged by social opinion; others may be too indefinite and peculiar to be regarded as more than privileges, of which the concession can only be treated as a gratuity. Some would call acts directed to the end of securing goods either of the first or of the second class acts of justice; others might distinguish them as acts of justice and of equity respectively; acts with a view to goods of the third class would generally be regarded as acts of beneficence. An act of beneficence would thus be distinguished from one either of justice or of equity by the fact that no definite claim can be formu-

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lated, and that consequently the cases in which it should be performed and the extent to which it should be carried out are left to the judgment of the individual agent. This distinction seems clear enough. But Mr. Spencer goes a good deal further. He considers that acts of justice and of beneficence are different in kind. Acts of justice are directed towards the end of helping to bring about what may be regarded as the natural outcome of human conduct, helping to reward or punish men according to their deserts; beneficence, on the other hand, seeks to counteract such natural tendencies and to turn them aside in the direction of mercy. It does not seem to me that Mr. Spencer is successful in maintaining this distinction. As Professor Royce has urged (*loc. cit.*, p. 122), justice is not simply a carrying out of natural consequences. It is always an effort to realize an ideal. And the ideal which justice has in view is not fundamentally distinct from that which is aimed at by beneficence. Mr. Spencer is no doubt right in insisting (pp. 274, 275) that "the quality of mercy is not strained," and that there are many acts which would lose all their grace and influence if they were enforced, as acts of justice in the narrower sense are. But I do not think that the distinction can be so sharply drawn as Mr. Spencer supposes. *All* moral actions lose something by being "strained." If there were no law against murder, the sparing of the weak would have an added nobility. If taxes were not wrung from unwilling hands, patriotism and public spirit would have a new glory. If men could cheat with impunity, honesty would shine with fresh lustre. In general, if justice were not enforced, she would more obviously compare, in the language of Aristotle, with the morning and the evening star. But some actions are of such a universal and undisputed utility that the loss sustained by enforcing them is far more than counterbalanced by the gain. Can any rigid line be drawn between those that are of this character and those that may best be left to individual choice? A judicious writer might, no doubt, indicate a variety of considerations which would help us to place actions in the one class or in the other; but to me, at least, it seems evident that any such attempt as that of Mr. Spencer to draw an absolute distinction between them must always be futile.

But indeed, even if Mr. Spencer were successful in enforcing this distinction, would he be justified in the main contention which he rests upon it, that the state must not undertake beneficent activity? It appears to me that this conclusion could be justified only

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if it were shown that the state is capable of enforcing justice. If it can be shown that the state fails to secure justice, may it not endeavor by beneficence to rectify the evil which it has either done or permitted? Common sense seems to answer in the affirmative, and Mr. Spencer does not appear to have proved the negative.

Passing to more detailed matters, there are two special points to which I wish to call attention. The first is what seems to me an astonishing instance of the way in which a vigorous mind may become dominated by the idea of the "economic man." The passage runs thus (p. 271): "If, that the inferior may have benefits which they have not earned, there are taken from the superior benefits which they have earned, *it is manifest* that when this process is carried to the extent of equalizing the positions of the two, *there ceases to be any motive to be superior.* Long before any such extreme is reached, there must result an increasing discouragement of the industrious, who see the surplus products of their industry carried away; and there must result among these better citizens an intensifying dissatisfaction, tending ever towards revolution." The italics are mine. One cannot but be reminded of Mr. Ruskin's earnest request to the Christian reader with reference to a similar sentence in Adam Smith (unfortunately distorted by Mr. Ruskin through severance from its context), "to think within himself what an entirely damned state of soul any human creature must have got into who could read with acceptance such a sentence as this,—much more write it."

The other point to which I wish to refer is more pleasant. Nearly all of what Mr. Spencer says in his chapter on "Relief of the Poor" (Part VI., chapter vii., pp. 376–394) seem to me admirable and impressive. Particularly striking is the way in which he calls attention (pp. 390–92) to the ends that have resulted from the substitution of contract for *status* in the relation between the poor and the rich. Much of what he says here recalls Carlyle's indignant protests against the *nexus* of cash payment; and his suggestions in this connection seem to me to be fraught with wisdom, though he does not appear to have fully realized all the difficulties that are involved. If he had gone a little more deeply into this subject, I cannot but think that it would have led to a considerable modification of his individualism.

J. S. Mackenzie.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

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A MANUAL OF ETHICS, Designed for the Use of Students. By John S. Mackenzie, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Assistant Lecturer on Logic, and Cobden Lecturer on Political Economy in the Owens College, Manchester. London: W. B. Clive & Co., University Correspondence College Press.

This is an admirable text-book. It is characterized throughout by lucidity of arrangement and by clearness and elegance of style. Above all, it is interesting and attractive. The attention of the young student with a turn for philosophy will be caught and detained by it. He will not master it very easily; it would be a bad book if he could. But the necessary exertion will come as the natural response to the intrinsic interest of the study.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I., "The Theory of Morals," discusses abstract ethical principles; Part II. treats of "the concrete moral life to which ethical theory has to be applied." In Part I. the most important and interesting chapters are those on "Duty," "Will and Desire," "Happiness," "Perfection," and the "Freedom of the Will." In the chapter on "Duty," Mr. Mackenzie prepares the way for his own exposition of self-realization as the supreme end of human activity. "There is a sense in which it is a quite complete criterion of the rightness of an action to ask whether it can be consistently carried out." But mere *formal* consistency, as embodied in the Kantian maxim, is no sufficient test. It is not enough that a principle of action is consistent with itself. It must also be "consistent with *the self*,—*i.e.*, with the unity of our lives as a systematic whole." In the succeeding chapter Mr. Mackenzie proceeds to investigate the "nature of the self with which we have to be consistent." His teaching on this point is introduced by the conception of a "Universe of Desire," which is the analogue in the practical sphere of the "universe of discourse" in the theoretical. It corresponds also to the Herbartian "apperceptive systems" and to M. Paulhan's "systematic association." "The universe to which a desire belongs is the universe that is constituted by the totality of what we call a man's *character*, as that character presents itself at the time at which the desire is felt." The process of transition from one universe to another is illustrated by "the old fable of the cat which was transformed into a princess, but returned again to its proper shape on the sudden appearance of a mouse. The sudden change of condition caused her to drop at once from the universe

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of princess to the universe of cat." Proceeding next to treat of conflict of desires, Mr. Mackenzie shows "that the real strength of a desire does not depend on its own individual liveliness or force, but rather on the force of the universe or system to which it belongs." It seems to me that Herbart deserves a reference at this point. The conception of the universe of desire is by no means new. But Mr. Mackenzie deserves the credit of having invented the most satisfactory mode of naming it. It is to be hoped that his terminology will be largely adopted by writers on ethics and psychology.

A provisional answer is now possible to the question, What is the nature of the self with which we are to be consistent? This self is that which seeks and finds satisfaction within the most comprehensive universe of desire. "The wider universe may be regarded as higher or better than the narrower one, since it enables us to maintain a more consistent point of view in our actions." This answer is scarcely satisfactory. Comprehensiveness may be gained at the cost of inner unity. A universe in becoming wider may become less of a *universe* than it was before. We progress towards the ethical ideal only in so far as the integration keeps pace with the differentiation of our practical interests. Of course Mr. Mackenzie is perfectly well aware of this, and perhaps it is implied in what he says. But for the beginner the point requires to be expressly formulated at an early stage.

But what is the highest universe of desire conceivable? At the present day there are two competing answers to this question advocated by leading authorities. According to one, the ultimate ideal is happiness; according to the other it is perfection. Mr. Mackenzie says that it is perfection or self-realization. To attain the ideal would be "to understand completely the world in which we live and our relations to it, and to act constantly in the light of that understanding." Thus, according to Mr. Mackenzie, the highest good for human beings is rational self-development, the attainment of a universe of desire which combines the greatest possible comprehensiveness with the greatest possible unity. Pleasure and pain, according to him, supply at the most merely a kind of index registering the furtherance or hinderance of this process of self-realization. Its value is independent of them, as the working of the internal machinery of a clock is independent of the motion of the hands on the clock face.

We turn with special interest to Chapter VI., which treats of the

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hedonistic point of view in ethics. Mr. Mackenzie starts from the vantage-ground of an intimate acquaintance with the "utilitarian" theory as advocated by its best exponents. After sitting at the feet of Caird he sat at the feet of Sidgwick.* But in no point has the doctrine of his later master shaken his loyal adherence to the faith implanted by the earlier. Sidgwick has taught him much, but has failed to teach him Sidgwickianism. Accordingly he comes forward in this chapter as an uncompromising assailant of all hedonistic theories. His arguments are not new; they are all to be found in the writings of Green, Caird, and others of similar tendency. But he shows a fuller understanding and appreciation of the position of his opponents than is common among the antagonists of utilitarianism. Thus, in favorable contrast to Mr. Muirhead, he recognizes clearly the essential distinction and even the incompatibility of psychological and ethical hedonism.

In estimating the value of his criticism, we must distinguish between two elements of the utilitarian doctrine, which are really separable and independent, though they are commonly regarded as having a vital and indissoluble connection. The first of these is that nothing in the universe possesses ultimate and intrinsic value except agreeable consciousness,—that all other goods are such only because they are capable of being enjoyed. The second is that the highest good must be regarded as the greatest quantity of pleasure,—a quantity theoretically calculable by merely adding together the intensities of successive moments of agreeable consciousness. Now, I agree with Mr. Mackenzie in regarding this purely quantitative view of the *summum bonum* as illegitimate. I agree with him in holding "that the value of the highest happiness depends not on its being the greatest sum . . . but on the nature of the universe within which we habitually live." If I ask, What constitutes my highest happiness? I find that it is not enough to consider quantity of pleasure. I have also to consider to what extent the pleasure is really *mine*,—to what extent it arises out of my own rational self-development in its unity and continuity. Nevertheless, it may still be maintained that in the last resort pleasure alone possesses intrinsic value. Self development apart from feeling—if *per impossibile* we suppose such a thing possible—would on this view have no more worth than mere arithmetical

* If the time order had been inverted, one wonders what the result would have been.

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quantity would have under the same conditions if the utilitarian doctrine were true. A being capable of rational activity but incapable of feeling pleasure or pain may be supposed to have reached the ideal limit of self-realization, so far as there can be a self without feeling; except for this limiting condition it may be supposed to have reached Divine perfection. None the less, it would remain a soulless monster, very inferior to Frankenstein's; its total existence would in point of intrinsic worth or value fall infinitely short of the baby's transient enjoyment of the noise of its rattle.

Mr. Mackenzie says that pleasure is not value, but the "sense of value." But I take it that value has no existence except in so far as it is experienced. If this be so, the "sense of value" must be the sole source of value, and must therefore alone possess intrinsic and ultimate worth. It is noteworthy that this apparently fundamental divergence of view between myself and Mr. Mackenzie does not seem to have any important consequences. In all parts of his work where he is not expressly formulating his criticism of hedonism, I can follow him with as much ease and as full approval as if no disagreement existed between us on this point. The reason is that we both regard the "perfection of conscious life" as the supreme good, and both of us regard this perfection as including in essential union happiness and rational self-development. The only question at issue between us is whether self-realization has any intrinsic worth apart for pleasure, which, as Mackenzie, following Bradley, admits, is the "sense of self-realizedness."* In the chapter on "Perfection," the author successfully maintains, against Spencer and others, the legitimacy and necessity of the teleological point of view in ethics. He might with advantage have shown that even in psychology our mental life cannot receive

* At the end of this chapter Mr. Mackenzie has a psychological note on "Pleasure and Desire," in which he challenges Dr. Sidgwick's doctrine that unsatisfied desires are frequently pleasurable. He urges that pleasure of pursuit is in reality pleasure of progressive attainment. But so long as attainment is merely in *progress*, desire remains unsatisfied, though not dissatisfied, and if the progress meets with no effective or protracted hinderance, the total psychosis is agreeably toned. The essential point, however, is that a large part of the enjoyment in such cases arises out of the fact that attainment is *progressive*. This can be no otherwise expressed than by speaking, in the language of common sense, of the pleasure of pursuit,—of what some one in "Our Mutual Friend" calls the pleasure of the chase. The whole question is admirably treated by Abraham Tucker in Chapter VI. of the "Light of Nature."

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adequate treatment except from this point of view. The stream of consciousness has a current. Our existence as conscious beings is essentially an activity, and activity is process which by its very nature is directed towards an end, and can neither exist nor be conceived apart from this end.

The freedom of the will is extremely well treated, though perhaps not with sufficient fullness. It must also be said that the claim to relative novelty implicitly put forward on behalf of the doctrine of self-determination as opposed to necessarianism can hardly be justified from an historical point of view. Priestley, for instance, was quite aware that the freedom which makes a man responsible consists in the determination of his actions by his character. In arguing against liberty of indifference, he urges that on that hypothesis a free act would be one in which the agent could "claim no property,"—for which, therefore, he could not be responsible.

Part II. is full of good things. Without ever dropping into the sermonizing style, Mr. Mackenzie shows that ethical principles are really capable of useful application to practical life. Perhaps the best chapter is that on the "Inner Life." He there calls attention to a paradox of duty analogous to the familiar paradox of pleasure. "In order to act rightly, a man must interest himself in some object to be accomplished rather than in his own attitude in accomplishing it. Even the wealth of our inner life depends rather on the width of our objective interests than on the intensity of our self-contemplation." Nevertheless, moral self-examination is admitted to be beneficial occasionally. Chapter XIV., on "Moral Pathology," treats of theory of punishment, among other points. I find considerable difficulty in understanding what Mr. Mackenzie says on this subject. Like Hegel he regards punishment as essentially retributive. If a man has done evil "it is reasonable that the evil should return upon himself." There might be some show of reasonableness in this if the evil were thereby prevented from coming on some one else. But this consideration is irrelevant to the retributive theory. It belongs rather to the deterrent and corrective. I confess that I fail to see what can be gained by adding evil to evil,—pain to sin. This of itself is only making matters worse. By such procedure Justice simply makes a fool of herself. Understood in this way, the retributive theory, if it is not inhuman or malevolent, is at least extremely silly. Hegel and Mr. Mackenzie cannot possibly mean

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this. But what else do they mean? Understanding is not assisted by Mr. Mackenzie's emphatic statement that punishment must be recognized as a "vindication of the law." This is true on any theory. The question at issue relates to the analysis of the nature of "vindication." In Chapter XV. the moral progress of the race is considered. On the whole, Mr. Mackenzie is decidedly of opinion that we are morally in advance of the ancients. He quotes largely from Green's comparison of the Greek and the modern conception of virtue as given in the "Prolegomena." For the other side of the question he might have referred to Maudsley's "Body and Will." The work concludes with a discussion of the relation of art to ethics and of ethics to religion.

Mr. Mackenzie's "Manual of Ethics" is not only a very good text-book for beginners. It is also likely to interest the general reader, and it ought not to be neglected even by the specialist. It contains full and valuable references on every important question, and it gives in an appendix at the end of the volume "Hints on further Reading," which ought to prove very useful to the genuine student.

G. F. STOUT.

SOCIALISM AND THE AMERICAN SPIRIT. By Nicholas Paine Gilman. London: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. x., 376.

The reader naturally opens this book with a twofold anticipation. Knowledge of Mr. Gilman's previous work leads him to expect able and solid workmanship; while, on the other hand, the title of the book forbids any expectation of thoroughly scientific treatment. On the whole it seems to me that these anticipations are fully realized in the actual performance. The book contains much that is excellent and suggestive, but does not deal exhaustively with anything. It certainly does not give us the last word either on Socialism or on the American Spirit; but on both it gives many words that were well worth saying. The characterization of the American Spirit appears to me to be particularly interesting; and, so far as I can judge, it is in the main just, though leaning a little to the side of flattery. Whether the account of Socialism is equally just, is a question on which there is likely to be more diversity of opinion.

Mr. Gilman's general point of view may be briefly indicated as follows: Extreme Individualism of the type represented by Mr. Herbert Spencer is palpably absurd, and has never commended

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itself to a practical people like the Americans. Competition has its advantages; but if we are to have free competition, men must at least be prepared for the struggle. Education cannot be left to haphazard. There may be much to be said for what Lowell calls

> "the old Amerikin idee,
> To make a man a man and let him be";

but, if so, the first clause is certainly as important as the second. On the other hand, too much regulation is not desirable; and a freedom-loving people like the Americans is not likely to tolerate it. Legislation, as compared with individual enterprise, has played but a small part in the development of modern society; and it is unreasonable to suppose that it will play the chief part in the future. Voluntary co-operation, and especially such a scheme as that of Industrial Partnership, seems to offer a much more hopeful form of solution for the social problem than any attempt to bring about a compulsory form of collective organization. The social problem, indeed, is a moral rather than an economic problem; and it is chiefly by moral rather than by legislative methods that its solution must be attempted. At the same time there are many directions in which legislative action may be extended, and even some departments of industry that may suitably be taken over by the state. The wisest policy is one neither of individualism nor of socialism, but rather one of opportunism; and it is in this direction that the Anglo-Saxon race, at any rate, has so far tended to move. "What the American social spirit has done for two centuries, it will continue to do. It will give equal rights before the law to every man, an equal education in the public schools to every child, and a refuge to the infirm and incapable. It will clothe the naked and feed the hungry who cannot provide for themselves, and will enlarge the opportunities of work for those who can work. It will hold back the State from no field which the State can cultivate better than private persons, singly or in companies, because of any theory of individualism. It will close no career to lawful enterprise and private talent because of any theory of socialism. It will be content to be opportunist and serve its own time, as it can live only in the present."

All this is sensible enough, and yet one cannot but feel somewhat dissatisfied with it. A wise opportunism is never altogether without guiding principles; and these one rather misses in Mr.

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Gilman's treatment.* I am doubtful whether he fully appreciates the extent of the industrial problem and the difficulty of its solution by mere individual effort or by occasional tinkering on the part of the State. He is optimistic, and does not appear to furnish quite adequate grounds for his optimism. This, however, may be a matter of individual opinion. Of the general sobriety and good sense of the whole treatment there can be no doubt.

On a few special points some criticism may be passed. In some of the earlier pages of his work Mr. Gilman rightly enough protests against the identification of Individualism with selfishness or of Socialism with public spirit; but in doing so I think he rather obscures the fact that Individualism has generally been associated with a belief in the predominance of self-interest as a human motive, while Socialism has been commonly connected with a more generous view. No doubt, however, it is right enough to insist that there is no necessary connection between these things, and that they are frequently found dissociated from one another.

Again, is it correct to say that Anarchism is "the complete antithesis of State Socialism"? It is tempting to regard it in this way; but it should be remembered that the antithesis extends only to the view taken of the action of the State. With respect to industrial organization, the views of Anarchists and Socialists are to a large extent similar. In this sphere at least it is certainly misleading to class Anarchists with Individualists.

When Mr. Gilman says, with reference to economic science (p. 250), that "its undeniable province is the facts and laws of human nature that concern the pursuit and expenditure of wealth," he seems to ignore the hypothetical character of a large part of economic reasoning, and to forget the modifiability of human character.

In his treatment of Profit Sharing, one is surprised not to find

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* It is perhaps unfair to make a criticism of this kind without suggesting an improvement. Mr. Gilman has himself indicated one general principle of State interference, viz., that *education* must be provided by the State. This is a far-reaching principle; for it is hard to say where education ends. Could not another principle be introduced by distinguishing between the *mechanical* and the more purely *personal* aspects of life? The connection between Socialism and Machinery has never been sufficiently worked out. Some valuable hints on this subject were given by Prof. H. C. Adams in a very admirable paper published by him in this JOURNAL some time ago ("An Interpretation of the Social Movements of Our Time"); but the subject awaits further study.

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any reference to the recent criticisms of Mrs. Webb (Miss Beatrice Potter).

One other point. While it is largely true, as Mr. Gilman says on p. 347, that in general "socialism lays little stress upon morals," and that "the emphasis of its advocates is on the material side of life"; while it is perfectly right to stigmatize this as a blunder, and to regard as an "absurdity" the new doctrine "that the want of money is the root of all evil," it is yet most misleading to quote against socialists the statement (from Mr. W. D. Morrison's "Crime and its Causes") that "a mere increase of material prosperity generates as many evils as it destroys." No socialist advocates a *mere* increase of material prosperity: some would even be willing to dispense with a considerable amount of material prosperity.

These passages, and a few others, seem to me to be serious blemishes in a good book. On the other hand, it would be much easier to quote passages with which one can entirely agree, and which are in the highest degree instructive and stimulating. On the whole, the book is one which every student of social questions ought to read. It is always clear and interesting, often vigorous, and nearly always judicious.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

NOTES ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. By J. A. Stewart, M.A., Student and Tutor of Christ Church, Oxford. In Two Volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892. Pp. ix, 539; 475.

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. Translated with an Analysis and Critical Notes. By J. E. C. Welldon, M.A. Head Master of Harrow School. London and New York: Macmillan, 1892. Pp. lxvii, 352.

Such space as can be given here to a notice of the first of the two works named above is quite inadequate to do it justice. Mr. Stewart has brought to his task, besides a trained judgment, an extensive knowledge of Aristotle's writings as a whole and of the literature relative to them, which can be appreciated best by those who know the difficulty of learning even a small portion of them. His work is executed on a different plan from Sir A. Grant's edition, in which the bulk of the commentary is thrown into the form of introductions,—a preferable plan, it would seem, for obtaining a

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clear synopsis of the whole. The notes are of a complete and elaborate character, consisting in some cases of long and able disquisitions designed to interpret Aristotle's philosophy. The student will find here, even when he may not always agree with Mr. Stewart's judgment, ample means for forming a judgment of his own. Younger students will doubtless need the help of a teacher in selecting the more important notes. In particular, some of the longer notes in Book i. may with advantage be left to a second reading. Two valuable features are the following: the notes on each chapter are preceded by a full and careful statement of the argument, and, secondly, references to other works of Aristotle or to commentators are quoted in full. Mr. Stewart is sanguine enough to think that young students will read these quotations, but at any rate they would not look out the references for themselves, and to the older reader, who is also human, such full quotations are of the greatest value.

The success of a collection of notes like this cannot be judged except after continued trial in the work of teaching. Only a few brief remarks are possible here, and none at all on Mr. Stewart's treatment of textual difficulties, such, for instance, as the vexed questions of the text in the intermediate Books v.–vii., of doubtful authorship. Mr. Stewart seems to me happiest when he is explaining Aristotle's philosophical language in the *Ethics* by reference to other parts of his writings; so, for instance, the learned and interesting note on Nature (Book iii. ch. iii.), the careful explanation of the psychology of the will by help of the *De Anima*, or of the various intellectual functions described in Book vi. In interpreting the thought of various passages he is in general terse and distinct; so, for instance, in pointing out the primary ethical significance of Aristotle's doctrine of pleasure, or to take a shorter instance, in the note on involuntary actions in Book iii. Naturally no commentator will please everybody. For instance, I do not find the account of commercial justice in Book v., full as it is, stated very clearly. Mr. Stewart regards it as a species of distributive justice, and the connection is unmistakable and is justified by earlier authority (see a note in the April number of the *Classical Review*). But the connection is not so much contained in Aristotle's own statement as an inference of the reader. There is a real difference between a distribution of government grants, or of taxation, and the distribution which is effected by the play of private interests. In another place (vol. i. p. 418) this justice is treated as corrective, in so far as it keeps exchange fair; but where

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is corrective justice described as putting things in fair relations? Is it not rather the restoration of fair relations which have been violated? Perhaps a few words might have been introduced to indicate that in all these kinds of particular justice the object (as illustrated by the mathematical analysis) is to leave the parties in the same relative position after the act of justice as they were before.

As to Mr. Stewart's treatment of the main ethical ideas, one turns naturally to the notes on Eudæmonia, on the Will, on the Mean, as Theoria, and the like, in which he endeavors to bring out the full philosophical significance of these conceptions. In doing so he is bearing in the mind the needs of those who, like most students of philosophy at Oxford, practically use the *Ethics* as a text-book of moral philosophy. Hence, as I suppose, arises what will strike most persons as a defect, or at least an element of danger, the habit of reading freely into Aristotle ideas, mainly biological ideas, of contemporary philosophy. From the educational point of view this is extremely instructive and fruitful, but it may lead to misconceptions as to Aristotle's historical position. What must be said in defence is that if you are to try and bring home Aristotle's ethics to the mind as a solution of our own problems, then it is these biological ideas which best express to us his way of thinking. Still, these ideas are such as can be thought out of Aristotle, rather than actually stated in his doctrine. In fact, that doctrine resembles the evolutionist doctrine so much, because Aristotle is philosophizing a merely customary system of morals, in which moral observances fit into their places like the parts of an organism. It should at least be pointed out how far Aristotle falls short of the meaning we attach to these ideas; by omitting to do so Mr. Stewart sometimes makes Aristotle's doctrine less simple than it really is. So the idea of the mean leads on inevitably to that of proportion between an act and the social environment of a person, but what it says is that an act gratifies a passion in a mean extent between excess and defect, approved by custom and determined by reason. Again, in dealing with the will and responsibility, Mr. Stewart seems to give Aristotle credit for too much. Thus on p. 228, vol. i., he writes, "Biologically considered, bodily functions differ from moral πράξεις in depending upon structural adaptations of older standing." This is admirably said. But is it Aristotelian? Again, Mr. Stewart's remarks on responsibility seem to me excellent in themselves, but the difficulties discussed by Aristotle

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in Book iii. ch. v. suggest that he was really insensible to considerations which some of his contemporaries realized, much in the same way as he shirked the objections raised in his time to slavery. The wisest man of his age may sometimes be less wise than quite inferior men. However, these remarks are intended only by way of qualifying some of Mr. Stewart's expressions; and it is mainly in the earlier portion of the notes that this questionable language will trouble the reader. The defect is not to be weighed against the merits of a book which achieves the difficult object of being interesting as well as massive.

Simultaneously with Mr. Stewart's new commentary on the Ethics appears a new translation by Mr. Welldon, who has already translated the *Politics* and the *Rhetoric*, and may, it is to be hoped, go on to some of the less popular works. There are already two good translations of the Ethics, the older one of Williams and the later excellent translation of Mr. Peters. Mr. Welldon's translation has great merits. It appears to be accurate, and it certainly makes Aristotle very readable. In this last respect it is probably superior to the older versions.

S. ALEXANDER.

EVOLUTION AND ETHICS. The Romanes Lecture for 1893. By Thomas H. Huxley, F.R.S. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. 57.

Professor Huxley's Romanes Lecture will no doubt be read by every one interested in ethical subjects, and it is consequently needless to give any account of its contents. Its interest lies chiefly in the fact that, though written by one of the most enthusiastic of our biological evolutionists, it entirely repudiates the idea that ethics can be founded on a mere study of the evolutionary process of animal life. "The propounders," he says, "of what are called the 'ethics of evolution,' when the 'evolution of ethics' would usually better express the object of their speculation, adduce a number of more or less interesting facts, and more or less sound arguments in favor of the origin of the moral sentiments, in the same way as other natural phenomena, by a process of evolution. I have little doubt, for my own part, that they are on the right track; but as the immoral sentiments have no less been evolved, there is, so far, as much natural sanction for the one as the other. The thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as the philanthropist. Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good

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and the evil tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before. Some day, I doubt not, we shall arrive at an understanding of the evolution of the æsthetic faculty; but all the understanding in the world will neither increase nor diminish the force of the intuition that this is beautiful and that is ugly." Such a declaration, coming from such a quarter, must be regarded as carrying considerable weight; yet it seems doubtful whether Professor Huxley has sufficiently considered the attempts that have been made by such writers as Mr. L. Stephen and Mr. S. Alexander to find a basis for ethics in the evolutionary process. One would have liked to see some more direct criticism of their efforts. One would have liked also to see some indication of the way in which Professor Huxley himself would establish the validity of moral distinctions. As it is, however, it is important to have this acknowledgment from so eminent an evolutionist, that the question of origin is not quite the same as that of validity. It is needless to say that the lecture is written in a highly vigorous, impressive, and interesting style.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL RELIGION. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Glasgow in 1891. By F. Max Müller, K.M., Foreign Member of the French Institute. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1892. Pp. xxvii, 464.

Following the broad lines sketched out in his Introductory Lecture of 1889, Professor Max Müller here treats the third distinct portion of his subject. In the first series, under the title "Natural Religion," certain more general considerations, relative to the nature of religion as a whole, were elucidated. Secondly, in "Physical Religion," such doctrines and beliefs as might be affiliated to external objects received attention. Here, on the contrary, as the title implies, a transition is effected to a sphere in which a distinctively religious content finds place. By contemplation of the real world, or by contact with certain of its objects, man may, by physical means, arrive at the belief in a Superior Being. But, on account of the limitations incident to the physical sphere, this Being, derived by a species of induction, remains foreign to human nature. The other-worldliness of deity is his chief characteristic in physical religion. God stands over against man just like a cabbage or a cliff. In contradistinction to this,

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anthropological religion is constituted by man's effort to discover the infinite and divine within himself. "Otherwise anthropological religion has nothing to do with anthropology. It is called anthropological simply and solely in order to comprehend under that name all the attempts which have been made to discover something not merely human, then superhuman, then divine and immortal in man. The most interesting parts of this process are the beginning and the end, the first discovery of something different from the body, and the final identification of that something with the divine." The introductory matter is very extended and practically monopolizes the first six lectures. Thereafter, by way of animism, linguistic suggestions, folk-lore connected with death and the disposal of the dead, the author brings us, in the thirteenth and closing lecture, to the divine in the human. The second great article of faith is, "I believe in my own soul and in its divine worship."

From the foregoing analysis it will be apparent to all that those who, like the present writer, had the privilege of hearing the lectures, were charmed by the wealth of illustration at Professor Max Müller's command. But this very opulence has proved a snare. It may certainly have originated such fine passages as that in the fourth lecture headed, "I am that I am." Yet, on the whole, I believe it to be answerable for the very great defect, which, in my opinion, mars Professor Müller's entire scheme. He confines himself to the collection of interesting details; and this work he carries out in masterly fashion. But it is not natural theology. Moreover, when he strives to induce order in the chaos of facts, he adopts a division which, from the point of view of philosophy of religion at least, is wholly indefensible. "Physical" religion cannot be separated from "Anthropological," nor can either be sundered from "Natural" religion, except by false abstractions. And to premise that "Anthropological" religion occupies a sphere distinct from that of "Psychological" (the subject of the final course soon to be published) is the greatest abstraction of all.

R. M. Wenley.

University of Glasgow.

True Morality; or, the Theory and Practice of Neo-Malthusianism. By J. R. Holmes, pp. 144 (Hanney, Wantage), 1892.

As forty pages of this little book are devoted to an illustrated price-list, necessarily inartistic, and most of the remainder to a

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citation of opinions, many of which are valueless, the work is noticed here not for any virtue of its own, but on account of the importance of the problems which it suggests. We must say that the author's fingers do not meet around the difficult questions which he handles, and we find little indication that he appreciates the complexity of the biological and ethical problems. Mr. Holmes seems to be much in earnest, and we agree with him that publicity is useful, but he has, outside his price-list at least, nothing new to say,—nothing to suggest beyond Neo-Malthusian practice, which, helpful as it may be in alleviating present and future misery, is itself fraught with danger. It cannot, we believe, be wisely regarded as more than a very partial solution of the problem of sexual conduct in relation to future generations. It is an ugly *pis-aller*. Yet where people perish for lack of knowledge, "TRUE MORALITY," which can be bought for a penny, may be of more use than wiser works. One can only hope that it may never be a dear pennyworth.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

THE HUMAN AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE DIVINE. By Theodore F. Wright, Ph.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1892. Pp. 271.

Dr. Wright's erudite little treatise, a mine of citations, accompanied by interesting but not startlingly novel expressions of opinion, will be entirely satisfactory, from the theoretical point of view, and despite its broadly conciliatory tone, only to theological readers who are in pretty close sympathy with his own opinions. For the general student of non-theological tastes, the book is, however, a valuable collection of illustrations of certain aspects of those doctrines concerning self-consciousness which have appeared in European philosophy from Socrates to James, and which bear upon the question as to the reality and the significance of the Self. On pages 46–48 is a brief but historically valuable mention of Abraham Tucker's book (London, 1763) on "Man in Quest of Himself." Kant's theory of Self-consciousness is very skilfully indicated in an extremely brief but telling way (pp. 50–57). In fact, Dr. Wright's capacity for brief statement of complex historical matters is the most valuable feature of his book. The tolerance of this whole historical statement is also an excellent feature. The positive doctrine is not novel, and does not wish to seem so. Man is a finite free agent, in intimate but, by God's

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will, relatively independent relations to his creator. He is spiritual; his ego is a unity; he is creative and reactive; his duty lies in the conscious service of God. The lesson of the history of opinion lies in its confirmation of these views. The book shows on every page, however, that the theological apologist for tradition, in respect to these matters, can keep his eyes wide open to appreciate the views of many who differ from him in opinion, and can be a receptive student of philosophy, as well as an apologist. In an age of syntheses and "conciliations," every such book has its place. What we want in philosophy is never the strident voice and the revolutionary "novelty," but the combination of keen criticism, cautious reflection, careful method, deep and vital experience, and conciliatory temper. These, to be sure, are manifold demands. Many different workers are needed to furnish them all. Where a man's philosophical method seems to us, as Dr. Wright's does, very unsatisfactory, we can still thank him when he suggests breadth of view and sympathetic synthesis. Methods deserve, in the long run, a criticism as patient and severe as that which keeps Mr. Williams's * readers so long in suspense,—yes, and severer criticism still. But the philosophical attitude, the spirit of receptive gentleness, is also valuable in its place. Dr. Wright's book gives us, in addition to his erudite citations, little indeed but such an attitude, and that is something which is its own relative justification.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

MORALITY IN DOCTRINE. By William Bright, D.D., Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History, etc. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1892. Pp. xxiv, 351.

A volume of sermons, even when designed to illustrate the proposition that Christian morality must presuppose Christian belief, cannot be regarded as ethically systematic. It is therefore probable that, despite its purpose, Dr. Bright's book is not fraught with special interest to the readers of this journal. No doubt its tone is manly, its learning in a certain kind is wide, and its theme is viewed from points so varied as "Grace and the Will" and "God's Contest with the Soul." But, even thus, it falls short of the comparative impartiality and scientific accuracy which ought to mark

* "Evolutionary Ethics," by C. M. Williams. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Reviewed in the July number, vol. iii. p. 533.

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a work that dwells chiefly upon conduct, even although its sphere be that of "Christian ethics." At the same time these sermons, it must be admitted, subserve a special purpose as compared with others. They will recommend themselves to some minds because they embody a fairly-sustained effort to show that Christian morality depends, if not entirely, at least vitally, upon a special revelation preserved to the ages in a special doctrinal scheme. Too ecclesiastical for the average philosopher, and perhaps too pietistic for the plain man, they nevertheless merit commendation for a consistency and moderation that can hardly be always expected in quarters where "each revealed dogma" is supposed to become "a germ of moral power." R. M. W.

THE LIFE OF JESUS CRITICALLY EXAMINED. By Dr. David Friedrich Strauss. Translated from the Fourth German Edition, by George Eliot. Second Edition, with an Introduction, by Otto Pfleiderer, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co. Pp. xxxviii, 784. Price, 15*s*.

While it is unnecessary at this date to enter upon any detailed review of a work so classical as the "Leben Jesu" of Strauss, Messrs. Sonnenschein's enterprise in reissuing George Eliot's Translation is an event that calls no less for notice than for warm commendation. This epoch-making book was first published in 1835. The future novelist based her rendering on the edition of 1840, and it was published in three volumes by Chapman in 1848, but has long been out of print. The present convenient and cheap issue ought to receive cordial support from all students of speculative theology, ethics, and New Testament criticism, not only for its own sake, but also on account of the Introduction, wholly admirable within its limits, supplied by Dr. Pfleiderer.

The interest of Strauss's criticism is now almost exclusively matter of history. But, viewed thus, a knowledge of its import is absolutely essential to competent understanding of the progress of criticism upon the Gospel narrative since the time of Paulus and the German rationalists. Prior to the "Leben Jesu" the object of criticism had been the elucidation or explanation of the Gospel stories, always on the assumption that they were substantially historical. Miracles and other marvellous events were treated either as imaginative conceptions of enthusiastic contemporaries, or were twisted into semblance of possibility by ingenious interposition of

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natural causes; that is, the Gospels were taken literally, and their moral content was obscured by the attempt to bring their exceptional details into conformity with modern rationalistic ideas. The real point of New Testament investigation, which lies in consideration of the value of the narratives themselves as documentary evidence, was not yet apparent. No doubt certain critics, like Schleiermacher and his school, had assumed that one Gospel (in this case John's) was more credible than the others. It was reserved for Strauss to show that, from this stand-point, all were alike unworthy of credence. His originality, as Dr. Pfleiderer rightly remarks, did not lie in his invention of the "mythical theory," usually associated with his name, but in the rigidly merciless consistency with which the Gospel narratives were examined *in toto* and condemned. "Strauss was hated," as Bauer truly said, "because the spirit of the time was unable to look upon its own portrait, which he held up before it in faithful, clearly-drawn lines. The spirit of this age resists with all its power the proof of its ignorance about a matter of which it has long thought itself certain. Instead of acknowledging what had to be acknowledged, if any progress was to be made, all possible attempts were instituted to create fresh illusions as to the true state of the case, by reviving absolute hypotheses and by theological charlatanism. But a higher certainty as to the truth of the gospel history can be attained in no other way than by acknowledging, on the basis of Strauss's criticism, that our previous knowledge is no knowledge at all."

Strauss rendered an examination of the documents themselves inevitable. The result of this, in the hands of later critics, was a new estimate of the value of the Gospels as histories; and this, in turn, led to those fresh views of the life of Jesus which have reinterpreted the moral significance of his office in the development of the race, and which have induced that ideal construction of his mission now so often termed the rediscovery of Christ by the nineteenth century. It is as impossible to apprehend either the starting-point or scope of this inquiry as it is to determine its essentially positive, rather than negative, import without reference to Strauss. The materials for this indispensable study now brought within the reach of all students deserve and ought to receive the warmest recognition. R. M. W.

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APPEARANCE AND REALITY. By F. H. Bradley, LL.D. London: Sonnenschein & Co., 1893.

DARWIN AND HEGEL, AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. By D. G. Ritchie, M.A. London: Sonnenschein & Co., 1893.

AN OUTLINE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. By W. A. Watt, M.A., LL.B. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1893.

EVOLUTION AND RELIGION. By A. J. Dadson. London: Sonnenschein & Co., 1893.

DRUNKENNESS. By George R. Wilson, M.B., C.M. London: Sonnenschein & Co., 1893.

FRANÇOIS BACON. Par Prof. G. L. Fonsegrive. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1893.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. Bureau of Education. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EDUCATION, 1889–90. Vols. I. and II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893.

ABNORMAL MAN: being essays on Education and Crime and Related Subjects. By Arthur MacDonald. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893.

LES LETTRES ENTRE SOCIÉTÉS HUMAINES ET LEURS PHASES SUCCESSIVES. Par J. Novicow.

DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL. Par E. Durkheim.

L'ANNÉE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Par F. Tilloy.

LA PSYCHOLOGIE DES IDÉE—FORCE. Par A. Fouillée. Paris: Félix Alcan., 2 vols.

DESCARTES. Par A. Fouillée. Paris: Hachette, 1883.

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one or the other of the following addresses:

Prof. E. Boirac, 7 Rue de Berne, Paris.
Prof. G. von Gizycki, Nettelbeckstrasse 24, Berlin, Germany.
J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving St., Cambridge, Mass.

ERRATA.

Page 11, fifth line from top, omit "that they."
Page 59, top line, for "kampf" read "Kampf."
Page 104, seventeenth line from bottom, for "vast" read "bare."
Page 104, twelfth line from bottom, for "legend" read "beyond."
Page 104, third line from bottom, for "include" read "exclude."
Page 105, second line from top, for "our" read "one."
Page 105, ninth line from top, omit first "the."
Page 105, eleventh line from bottom, for "performed" read "preformed."
Page 105, eighth line from bottom, for "in" read "is."

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1894.

THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO JURISPRUDENCE.

THE complete separation of these two sciences, Ethics and Jurisprudence, has been insisted upon, not only with marked emphasis, but with some asperity as well, and in many quarters with undisguised contempt for all who may think otherwise. Thus, Jevons insists that "there can be no such things in social matters as abstract rights, absolute principles, indefeasible laws, unalterable rules, or anything of an eternal or inflexible nature."* And in a similar vein Matthew Arnold professes the following ethical creed: "If it is sound English doctrine that all rights are created by law, and are based on expediency, and are alterable as the public advantage may require, certainly that orthodox doctrine is mine."† And Pollock insists that "he does not see that a jurist is bound to be a moral philosopher more than other men."‡ Such opinions are the popular ones, and the tide has set against any attempt to join together what man has put asunder. Still, we are not satisfied that these writers have spoken the last word upon this subject. While they have emphasized important

* "The State in Relation to Labor," p. 6.

† Lilly, "On Right and Wrong," p. 44.

‡ Pollock, "Essays on Jurisprudence and Ethics," p. 23.

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distinctions in insisting upon the complete separateness of the two spheres of ethics and jurisprudence, they have, nevertheless, failed to penetrate the deep things of these sciences. We would therefore ally ourselves with the protestants in this regard.

We will attempt, in the first place, to define accurately the proper spheres of the two sciences; secondly, to prove that the genesis of law discloses natural limitations of sovereign power which are ethical in their character; thirdly, to indicate the indirect and impalpable influence of existing ethical sentiment in creating, annulling, and reforming law; and, finally, to examine several contributions to the solution of this problem from the sphere of international law.

The necessity of strict definition should be recognized by the moral as well as the political philosopher. No advantage accrues to either by a confused blending of radical differences. Each must preserve its autonomy. Ethics is not a branch of jurisprudence, nor is jurisprudence a branch of ethics. By an exact differentiation, each science conserves its own force and dignity. And, therefore, ethics influences jurisprudence more by bringing to it life and light from without, than by holding an artificial and false position within the jural sphere.

In order that we may not be charged with begging the question at issue in the definition of our terms, we will take the definitions given by Holland, and which are framed in the spirit of Austin, and the general school of analytical jurists. He defines jurisprudence as "the formal science of positive law, *i.e.*, the general rules of external action, enforced by a sovereign authority."* And ethics he defines as "the science of those laws of conduct self-recognized as right, and self-imposed by the free choice of the individual."†

Here the antithesis is between a standard imposed by the sovereign power and an ideal recognized by the individual; also, between the outer act which is the content of the one, and the inner motive which is the exponent of the other.

* Holland, "Jurisprudence," p. 37. † Ibid., p. 25.

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The one depends upon objective authority for its enforcement, the other seeks as its guarantee a subjective support. In the spirit of these distinctions, we find legal right sharply distinguished from moral right,—the former is a claim enforced by sovereign power; the latter is a claim urged upon another or upon society at large, but incapable of external sanction. Moreover, right both legal and moral has always expressed or implied its correlatives,—legal obligation and moral obligation. Three parties are necessary to the existence of a legal right,—the state, the one in whom the right conferred by the state inheres, and the one subject to the correlative obligation which the state imposes. But as regards a moral right, two parties alone are concerned; the third party, the state, is no longer present, and therefore the moral right cannot be enforced.* Its force lies alone in the inherent reasonableness of its demands, and has weight only as it appeals to the conscience of one whose moral judgment recognizes its urgency as an evident duty. Inasmuch as the one possessing a moral claim is powerless to enforce it, the emphasis is placed upon the moral duty rather than upon the moral right, so that actually not two persons, but one alone is to be considered in this matter; and he is the one who recognizes the obligation, for he alone can compel action.

In commenting upon the above distinctions and definitions, we observe that law and morality both refer conduct to a standard,—the one imposed by the sovereign power, the other self-recognized as categorical imperative to the individual will. While the two standards are often distinct, there are cases where they are identical. Let us examine the possible combinations that may arise with the variable factors,—legally right, legally wrong, morally right, and morally wrong.

The two spheres of morality and legality may have no single point of contact. Some acts may have legal significance, but have no moral value one way or the other. The well-known law of the road is entirely devoid of any moral bearing whatsoever. And, on the other hand, I may be

* On this point, see Merkel's "Juristische Encyclopaedie," p. 43.

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obligated morally to relieve certain suffering or distress, and yet the deed in question may be wholly without the sphere of law.

We have also the possible cases of conflict, where an action morally right may be legally wrong, or morally wrong and yet legally right. This is seen in the many historical instances where resistance to law has arisen for conscience' sake, *e.g.*, the refusal to submit to the uniformity acts in England regarding worship.

We have instances also of coincidence where an act is both legally and morally right, or else both legally and morally wrong. "Thou shalt do no murder" is law of the land, and law imposed by the individual conscience. One and the same act, or one and the same person, regarded as author of the act, presents a point in which legal and moral lines meet. From one point of view it has ethical relations; from another it has jural. Here, therefore, is common ground. Many writers have been so intent upon emphasizing the differences between the external and internal aspects of the two sciences, that they overlook this important fact, that in some cases the same standard when viewed as objectively posited is law, but when regarded as subjectively manifest is the moral ideal. Thus the ancient distinction between *mala prohibita* and *mala per se* likewise overlooks the case where the two may be exactly coincident. Bentham, in speaking of the relation of private ethics to the art of legislation, says: "The persons whose happiness these two ought to have in view, as also the persons whose conduct they ought to be occupied in directing, are precisely the same. The very acts they ought to be conversant about are even in a great measure the same." *

Moreover, to emphasize the spheres of ethics and jurisprudence as distinct and separate does not necessitate the negation of all possible relations obtaining between them. Although one science may not be subsumed under the other as species and genus, it does not follow that, while each preserves its proper autonomy, they may not radically influence

* "Principles of Morals and Legislation," vol. ii., p. 239.

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one another; even as the separation of church and state does not diminish but rather increases the play of mutually helpful influences which must ever radiate from a true church and a just state. The spirit of the age insists upon an exact differentiation of all spheres of investigation.* It is true that specialization is the inspiration of the *Zeitgeist*, but there is another spirit of investigation which is not antagonistic to the former, but supplements it. It is the spirit which seeks unity amidst diversity, which explores the depths to discover fundamental resemblances corresponding to surface differences, and which seeks an ultimate synthesis amidst the scattered elements of a rigorous analysis. It is the spirit which strives, as Tennyson puts it, "to reach the law within the law." Such a spirit cannot fail to discover a more intimate relation between ethics and jurisprudence. As Bluntschli says:

"We recognize in the scientific distinction of *Politik* and *Ethik* a great and lasting advance which for the first time renders an independent science of *Politik* possible . . . However, Machiavelli, to whom the merit of this distinction shall not be disputed, has through the indiscreet exaggeration of this distinction, even to the complete separation of *Politik* and *Ethik*, weakened the power of the good among mankind, and has greatly stimulated the tyranny of princes, and radically destroyed all political *Praxis*." †

The two sciences have to do with a wonderfully complex net-work of vital social forces, where minute separation is of the nature of dissection. The dead elements may be correctly estimated and classified, but such a process does not present for observation a living organism. This is the case with jurisprudence regarded merely as a systemization of existent laws, and which takes no note of the mode of their becoming, or of the possibilities of their future modification and growth.

Moreover, the application of law to concrete cases must be wholly within the sphere of positive law. Ethics has no place in its interpretation. What is written is written, and must be so adjudged. Positive law applied to attested facts

* On this point, see Mackenzie's "Introduction to Social Philosophy," p. 41.

† "Lehre vom modernen Staaten," vol. iii., p. 7. What Bluntschli says of *Politik* would apply with equal force to jurisprudence.

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gives the sole method of practical jurisprudence. No ethical factors are to be considered as affecting the results. But, while we may not interpolate ethical factors which will only complicate the problem, still, it is possible that ethical forces may modify the original data of the problem. While law rules supreme in its own sphere, nevertheless its own nature may be susceptible to external influences, some of which are ethical. In early days the patriarch's will was law. Yet the sphere in which that will was operative was not so completely separate, so precisely defined as distinct from all other spheres of activity and interest, that no external forces ever touched the patriarch's head and heart, and so indirectly modified for better or for worse the weal of his little realm. Likewise the sovereign, whether individual or collective, is supreme as positor and executor of law; yet, nevertheless, that sovereignty is not a force operating in a closed sphere, incapable of being influenced by the manifold ethico-social forces which find play about it.

Again, to announce arbitrarily, as do Austin and his school, that right means always a legal right, at once begs the question at issue. It leads to the false inference that all right is originally legal right, and that any other as a moral right must be derived from it; or it ignores the existence of any such thing as a moral right. When Hobbes says that it is nonsense to speak of a law as unjust, he is correct only upon the assumption that unjust is a term co-extensive in meaning with illegal. Even Hobbes acknowledges that a law may be pernicious, though not unjust. If right is always to mean a legal right, though an arbitrary assumption, then it must be adhered to consistently.* He is most inconsistent and illogical who tacitly infers a moral privilege from the possession of a merely legal right. This fallacy underlies the vast majority of cases where questionable practices in commercial relations exist, and where conduct within the pale of the law seems to be the sole desideratum. Ethics as well as jurisprudence enters a plea for clear and consistent usage of terms. There-

* See Green's "Philosophical Works," vol. ii., p. 339.

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fore, if right is to be regarded always as legal right, it is illogical in the extreme to add a plus signification which includes a moral right, or to ignore the moral right by a tacit reduction of the moral factor to zero.

Having these distinctions and definitions in mind, we pass to the consideration of the derivation of law. The analytical jurists hold that all law proceeds from sovereignty. Law, with them, is sovereign power enforced by external sanction. Here they would cease all further inquiry. In their "juristic chemistry," as Von Ihering styles it, they discover a resultant element—sovereignty. But as long as any element is capable of a more ultimate analysis, scientific method demands continued investigation until a final analysis is reached. Their position is true from the point of view of formal law. It is true for the lawyer, but it does not satisfy the political philosopher who is forced to subject sovereignty to a closer examination. What is the warrant for the supremacy assumed by a part over the whole of a community or state? Whence did it arise? What is the guarantee of its permanent sway? Is the supreme power without limitations? These and similar questions force themselves upon one who desires a complete account of the matter. The tendency to cease all investigation of origins as soon as sovereignty is reached may be due, partly, to the excessive specialization of to-day, already noted; or partly on account of the disastrous failure of the French in their governmental experiment founded on the doctrine of natural rights, where "liberty, equality, and fraternity" were prostituted to the cause of wrong rather than right, and created license of evil rather than liberty to realize the good. Such a history would naturally discredit all "natural right" doctrines. Or this tendency may be due in some measure to a growing philosophical distaste for all *a priori* postulates in seeking an ultimate basis for law. Whatever the reasons, the tendency is evident.

There is, however, an historical indication of the felt need of some basis for sovereignty, in the many attempts to fortify the bare concept of sovereignty by some form of an original social contract. All these attempts have failed, but they

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indicate a natural striving to discover a solid foundation upon which sovereignty might stand. It is significant that Hobbes posits a social contract in behalf of absolutism, and Locke urges the same in defence of a liberal government, and Rousseau, in turn, refers to a social contract by which supreme power is ultimately referred to the general will. The latter has worked its logical result—anarchy. That these widely divergent theories should seek a further explanation of sovereignty, indicates an instinctively felt need in this regard. Although these theories have not given a satisfactory solution, being disproved theoretically by Hume and Burke, and practically by the logic of history, still, it does not follow that no solution is possible. The attempts prove the need of a solution; the failure indicates that the solution lies in another direction. It therefore seems that the question raised as to the further analysis of sovereignty is in the line of a natural, and therefore scientific, method of investigation.

In answer to this question, we insist that sovereignty is limited in this respect, that it is not always the absolute creator of law. As Lieber, in his "Political Ethics," says: "The agents of the state may put a stamp on precious metal, but they cannot create value." The existent material which receives the stamp of law is largely custom. It is irrelevant to our discussion whether the sovereign declares directly certain customs to be law, or indirectly ("obliquely") recognizes judicial decisions based on custom to be law, according to Austin's dictum that whatever the sovereign permits is *ipso facto* commanded. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that laws are often declaratory rather than creative.* Bacon tersely expresses this thought: "*Regula enim legem, ut acus nautica polos indicat, non statuit.*"† However, on the other hand, Bentham says that "Government fulfils its office by creating rights."‡ But creating may mean the forming out of nothing, or the forming out of pre-existent material. Bentham would have great

* See Burke, "Popery Laws," Cap. III., 1.

† "Aphorisms," LXXXV.

‡ "Bentham's Works," Bowring's ed., vol. i., p. 301.

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difficulty in proving his proposition if he takes the former meaning; and if he takes the latter, the question is still raised as to the nature of this material. The creation of rights refers us back to certain materials. No one can escape the issue. For our purpose the chief interest is this: have these materials out of which the right is created an ethical substratum? Some customs have no ethical significance, but others have, being the expression of the moral convictions of the community, tribe, family, or state. Savigny says:

"Positive law is derived in every community partly from principles common to mankind and partly from the operation of special agencies."*

Here Savigny recognizes a constant as well as a variable factor in the genesis of law. The variable is the operation of special agencies, as environment, racial or tribal peculiarities, in short, all that Montesquieu has emphasized as determining forces in the development of a state. The constant factor we find in the principles common to mankind. If these principles, therefore, reveal ultimate ethical elements, law at its source has important ethical relations. Professor T. H. Green affirms:

"The establishment of obligations by law or authoritative custom and the gradual recognition of moral duties have not been separate processes. They have gone on together in the history of man. The growth of the institutions by which more complete equality of rights is gradually secured to a wider range of persons, and of those interests in the various forms of social well-being by which will is moralized, have been related to each other as the outer and inner side of the same spiritual development." †

Mr. Freeman acknowledges from the historian's stand-point that "there is at present among civilized nations a general agreement as to what is right and wrong in the conduct of an individual man."‡

And Sohm, from the jurist's point of view, traces law to an "ideal of justice which resides, in the first instance, in the

* Savigny, "Private International Law," p. 6.
† "Philosophical Works," vol. ii., p. 552.
‡ *Princeton Review*, New Series, vol. ii., pp. 642, 643.

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community of a people, and through it in the community of mankind at large, and the ultimate source of which is belief in divine justice." *

Assuming as proved the existence of ethical elements in certain customs, the question suggests itself, How did these ethical elements originate? They certainly did not proceed from that part of man's nature which Mr. Fiske designates as his "brute inheritance." And yet many writers take this as the meaning of natural law, and they refer to Ulpian's definition, "*Jus naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam jus istud non humani generis proprium sed omnium animalium.*" † Professor Huxley had such a definition in mind, no doubt, in his article on "Natural Rights and Political Rights," ‡ where he insists that it is as reasonable to ascribe a natural right to the ferocity of a tiger as to the so-called rights of man. But the rights of man are not deduced from the tiger part of his nature, nor from the consideration of man merely as a self-seeking individual in the struggle for existence. We must consider the facts not only of the animal but of the ethico-intellectual parts of his nature. The ethical judgments are the deliverances of that part of his nature which differentiate man from the tiger and the ape. Regarding him merely as a more highly organized and more completely equipped animal, his rights are coextensive with his strength and his shrewdness. Such an ultra individualism would lead to anarchy. And such a conclusion Huxley reaches logically, but his premises are at fault. Man's nature is social as well as individual; egoistic appetences are correlated with altruistic. "Man is by nature a political animal." Aristotle's doctrine § puts the doctrine of a right emerging out of nature upon its proper basis. Man, as a member of society, naturally and not artificially related, necessitates the rise of correlated rights and duties. *Ubi societas, jus est.* It is

* Sohm, "Institutes of Roman Law," p. 14.
† "Just. Inst.," i., 2.
‡ The *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1890.
§ "Pol.," i. 2, paragraph 9.

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impossible to think of man isolated from his fellows. He is essentially a gregarious animal. *Unus homo, nullus homo.* The association of man with man necessitates a recognition of mutual rights and obligations, bearing and forbearing, which are natural restrictions upon individual self-seeking.* Where this recognition is not fully developed, it is seen in the germ. When the innate principles of equity seem to be contradicted by prevalent practices, they may be still found buried beneath passion and appetite. They may be a force that is neutralized, but nevertheless a force, potential though not actual.

It is generally agreed that the beginning of the state is the family. In the family there naturally arises a recognition of rights and obligations obtaining between parent and child, and between children of common parentage, and even between more distantly related members of a clan holding allegiance to a common chief. The natural solidarity of family life would give rise to a balance of egoistic and altruistic principles which would affect the manifold relations of man in the larger world of the tribe, and of the state. Von Ihering † ridicules such a position, declaring that we might as well affirm that nature had endowed the soul of Adam with the concept of a cooking-pot, or a ship, or a steam-engine, as with the concept of right. There is, however, a vast difference between that which is realized in the sphere of experience and that which is the result of experience. The essential point is this: whether the perfected ethical concept is derived from non-ethical elements. Von Ihering overlooks this distinction.

It would be well at this stage of our discussion to distinguish between a legal personality, so called, and a moral personality. The former phrase is used in a technical sense given to it originally through Roman law. The legal person is such by virtue of possessing certain legal rights. It is not necessarily an individual; it may be a corporation, estate, etc. But antecedent to the legal person, both in time and logical

* See Professor Green, "Philosophical Works," vol. ii., p. 353.
† "Der Zweck im Recht," ii., 112.

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sequence, is the personality which stands for all that man is generically, and out of which rise both rights and obligations. Imagine all law to be annulled; this latter personality would still remain. It is "this personality which gives the capacity for legal rights: it is the foundation from which all abstract formal right arises." * This is Sterling's position in commenting upon Hegel's system.† If there are rights incident to the relations of man as a member of society, we should expect some consensus of judgments among various races of peoples of the world concerning these rights. The probability is largely against any correspondence in their ideas of right and wrong, unless there be some one determining cause producing such correspondence. And we do find substantial agreement regarding fundamental principles, though codes of law differ in their details. As in philology a common root indicates common origin of words, so in law common principles among widely different nationalities indicate one source whence they spring. Grote, in his "Ethical Fragments," ‡ says:

> "The ethical sentiment is natural in the sense of universal, inasmuch as the foundation of it depends upon causes of universal occurrence not peculiar to any one age, or to any one form of society, or to any one particular mode of training. But it is not natural in the sense of simple, uncompounded, an instinctive."

As regards this latter qualification, it seems to be a matter of indifference, for our purpose at least, whether the ethical elements in the common customs be "simple, uncompounded, and instinctive," as the Intuitionalist would insist, or occasioned, as Grote holds, by "causes of universal occurrence, and not peculiar to any age, or to any one form of society, or to any one particular mode of training." In either case we arrive at a certain uniformity concerning fundamental ethical principles; the one affirming the uniformity as prior to and shaping experience, the other as the necessary result of experience.

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* Sterling, "Lectures on the Philosophy of Law," p. 28.

† Professor Green is in full accord with this thought. "Philosophical Works," ii., p. 352.

‡ Page 93.

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A constant factor indicates a constant cause, a somewhat that makes for righteousness, an ultimate ethical force, ever influencing and giving color to custom, and thereby modifying the law which emerges from custom and declared by sovereign power.

If, therefore, custom, as a source of law, has a certain uniform ethical content, it will follow that whatever ethical uniformity there may be in the customs of various peoples, that same ethical uniformity will characterize the laws which spring from these customs. And whatever ethical worth a custom may have possessed, the same worth is conserved when the custom is declared to be law. Sovereignty may add sanction, and clothe with dignity, and entail additional responsibility, but it can never alter the nature of that which is essentially right or wrong. To say that a law is unjust, or, as Bentham would insist, pernicious, is equivalent to affirming that the pernicious elements in the pre-existing custom perdure in their essential nature beneath the guise of a sovereign sanction. Lotze remarks, concerning contracts, that "they are, of course, in our real life, placed under the protection of laws, but these laws could not be called upon to protect them unless some worthy moral element lay within the contracts themselves."*

We would now examine the doctrines of the English and Continental schools of jurisprudence for the purpose of noting certain confirmations, and concessions as well, concerning the proposition which we have advanced. The English school of analytical jurists, already referred to, insist that law as it is limits the entire sphere and scope of jurisprudence. They are not concerned with law as it ought to be. Jurisprudence with them is a system of codification simply, and not the science of general principles. Their study of law has nothing to do with origins; it is the analysis of force, and the power to execute through sanctions. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that while the consideration of law as it ought to be has no place in jurisprudence, still it may

* Lotze, "Practical Philosophy," p. 88.

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very properly be relegated to the science of legislation. Austin, in criticising Ulpian's definition of law, says:

> "Jurisprudence, if it is anything, is the science of law; but Ulpian's definition embraces not only law, but positive morality, and even the test to which both of these are to be referred. It therefore confuses the science of legislation and deontology." *

Our purpose is to show that law in some one of its aspects, at least, has ethical relations; therefore the above concession is significant. It is to us a matter of indifference whether the subject of law as it ought to be is a topic of jurisprudence or of the science of legislation. In either case it holds an important place in the philosophical encyclopædia. Sir Frederick Pollock, in his criticism of Professor Lorimer's "Institutes of Law," acknowledges that these ethical questions may be admissible as belonging to a sort of borderland or penumbra of legal science. So also Sir Henry Maine agrees to the relevancy of these questions in the sphere of the science of legislation, though not in jurisprudence. Indeed, he says that next to a new history of law, what we most require is a new philosophy of law.† Strangely enough, Jevons, while insisting upon the same distinction, interchanges the meaning of the terms legislation and jurisprudence, saying, "There may be a general science of ethics, of economics, of jurisprudence which may assist us in the work of legislation."‡ The point at issue, therefore, seems to be, not the relevancy of ethical considerations, but the proper place to which they shall be referred in the classification of the legal sciences.

A concession of another kind we notice in Austin's "Jurisprudence," where he states that the general rules of morality are laws improperly so called, and yet that the divine commands revealed to man are laws properly so called. But the fact must not be ignored that many rules of morality which Austin disregards totally are themselves coincident with the commands of God; for God's commands may be known,

* Austin, "Jurisprudence," vol. i., p. 223.

† "Early Institutions," p. 342.

‡ "The State in Relation to Labor," p. 9.

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not only by external revelation, but by revelation to man through the very constitution of his nature, and appearing in the universal dictates of conscience. For

> "The truth in God's breast
> Lies trace for trace upon ours impressed:
> Though He so bright and we so dim,
> We are made in His image to witness Him."

Therefore, when Austin acknowledges the influence of the laws of God in giving shape to the laws of the state, he must concede also a certain relation between the laws of the state and the rules of positive morality so far forth as the latter have universal recognition and worth.

Let us now examine briefly the Continental school of Jurists which divides into two, the philosophical and the historical. There is a tendency towards a union of the two—as constituting a truly scientific method.* The former school of jurisprudence traces law to an ultimate *a priori* source. And the disciples of this school avowedly profess a belief in some form of *Naturrecht* as the fundamental basis of law. They are the special targets for criticism and ridicule. And yet they merit a respectful hearing. For the idea of *Naturrecht* is the central idea of German jurisprudence. And the German philosophy cannot certainly be charged with a superficial view of things. This school holds a doctrine diametrically opposed to that of Austin and his followers. They seek an ultimate basis of right prior to sovereignty. The stream must be traced to a source above the point of positive law. Their method is to deduce the actual from the ideal, or, to quote from Trendelenburg, "to deduce the multiplicity of rights from the self-same fount, that they may be exhibited as governed by the unity of an inherent co-ordinating thought." We find in the "Introduction to the Metaphysic of Law" a statement of Kant's that may be fittingly opposed to the attempt to discredit all *a priori* considerations relative to the principles of jurisprudence:

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* See Bluntschli, "Theory of the State," p. 70.

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"What the law in any instance is the jurisconsult can easily tell, but whether it is RIGHT or JUST that it should be so, is what he wants a criterion to determine. But this criterion can only then be found when, abandoning all *a posteriori* principles, he ascends to the sources of reason, and discovers on what all legislation whatsoever can alone be based; in which analysis positive law is doubtless a great help and guide. But laws founded singly on experience are like the mask in the fable—beautiful but hollow." *

The analytical school, however, has received its most searching criticism from the historical school, whose founders are Savigny and Puchta. Their main contention is that the essence of law is not command, that force is not its main nor characteristic feature. They insist that law is a natural growth, being at its various stages the reflex of the common consciousness of the people, and therefore its formation is similar to that of language. Such a position emphatically indicates a process anterior to the command of sovereignty. It is the working of silent forces, the slow but sure growing of the power of truth and of justice in the thoughts and customs of man. For, by a mere process of analysis through simple abstraction, the English school reach the concept, *sovereignty*, stripped of all its attributes save that of force, but in so doing they lose sight of all other attributes. As Sir Henry Maine says:

"They neglect the vast mass of influences which we may call, for shortness, moral, and which perpetually shapes, limits, or forbids the actual direction of the forces of society by its sovereign. . . . Just as it is possible to forget the existence of friction in nature, and the reality of other motives in society except the desire to grow rich, so the pupil of Austin may be tempted to forget that there is more in actual sovereignty than force, and more in laws which are commands of sovereigns than can be got out of them by merely considering them as regulated force. . . . A despot with a disturbed brain is the sole conceivable example of such sovereignty." †

Moreover, there have been a number of organized political societies in the history of mankind, where force as an element of law has been entirely absent, or has been present in a minimum degree. In the Irish courts in early days, the institu-

* Kant, "Metaphysics of Ethics," Third Edition, p. 178.

† "Early Institutions," pp. 359 and 361.

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tions which stood in the place of justice exercised jurisdiction only through the voluntary submission of intending litigants. Spencer, in "The Man *versus* The State," * instances a number of tribes governed by customs without any sanction whatever to enforce them. In Iceland, in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the so-called courts of law had no coercive power whatever. Sir Henry Maine also cites † several examples of kingdoms in India ruled by a sovereign, and yet with no appeal to force.

Again, Von Ihering ‡ acknowledges that while the essence of law is force, yet it does not reach the highest stage in law until the sovereign is obligated as well as the subject. This he calls a bilateral obligation, the special subjugation of the state power to the laws issued by it. This implies a dominion of right and of law superior to the command of the sovereign. He gives us, too, the proper relation which should obtain between right and might in the following beautiful simile:

> "Justice, which in one hand holds the scales in which she weighs the right, carries in the other the sword with which she executes it. The sword without the scales is brute force; the scales without the sword is the impotence of law. The scales and the sword belong together, and the state of the law is perfect only when the power with which justice carries the sword is equalled by the skill with which she holds the scales." §

With these authorities as allies, we would fortify our position that the analytical school are but partial in their analysis and process of abstraction, and are at variance with the facts of history as well as the deductions of a sound philosophy. They overlook the fact that the "Thou shalt" of the sovereign derives its peculiar force from the "I ought" in the heart of the subject. The majority keep the law out of reverence for the law. They overlook the evident truth which Lowell expresses:

> "Before man made us citizens,
> Great Nature made us men."

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* Pp. 90, 91.

† "Early Institutions," chap. ii.

‡ "Der Zweck im Recht," p. 344.

§ "The Struggle for Law," p. 2.

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Is it possible to discover any cause which would naturally lead the English jurists to emphasize the command of sovereignty as sole essence of law? There is in English history an evident "*Tendenz*" towards unlimited sovereignty, growing out of the absolutism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Cromwell and Puritanism were a protest against this; in America the assertion of "inalienable rights" as a declaration of independence was itself a protest against this same absolutism. And to-day the fact that writers of the analytical school sneer at the bare suggestion of "inalienable rights," is more than a mere coincidence. It is the logic of history.

There is another law source, namely, equity. We wish to prove that the very existence of such a concept as that of equity, lying side by side in thought with the concept of law, implies a relation between the two which is of the nature of a contrast. Law as it is is confronted by law as it ought to be. This indicates that there has been a felt need in the minds of men that the former should be supplemented by the latter.

The two historical illustrations of the influence of equity upon law are: the edicts of the Roman prætor and the decisions of the Court of Chancery in England.

The special function of the Roman prætor was, originally, to interpret the existing law, the *jus civile;* the executive power was also in his hands. Later, the office was divided into two separate functions, vested in two different prætors,—the *prætor urbanus* and the *prætor peregrinus.* The latter was concerned with the adjudication of cases in which foreign residents in Rome, or foreigners *in transitu*, were litigants. At once a difficulty arose: a foreigner could not claim legal rights under Roman law, and a Roman could not be obligated by foreign law. Two foreigners could not be tried by the law of the land of either, or by the Roman law. In all such cases purely positive law was not available; the parties in question had no legal status. The prætor peregrinus, therefore, adjudged all such cases according to his own judgment as to the facts and circumstances at issue. Later, it became necessary to have some system, some common principle of reference. Accordingly, the prætors sought to formulate the principles

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of law which were found in the several codes in the various foreign states. Such an induction expressed the common content of the customs of all the Italian States and other foreign powers. This gave a mass of legal principles founded upon customs that were freed from all local and temporal coloring, and, therefore, presenting features of a universal character.

Furthermore, through the influence largely of the Stoic philosophy, the Roman jurists maintained that such a system of principles common to all tribes and peoples, namely, the *jus gentium*, could have but one origin, viz., in the nature and constitution of man as a member of society. This interpretation of prætorian edicts gave them a dignity which they had not before possessed, and they in turn modified the interpretation and application of the *jus civile*, the law applicable to Roman citizens only. Later, the prætorian edicts attained a dignity and validity superior to the *jus civile*. Finally, the two were absorbed into one system of law and codified under Justinian in the *Corpus Juris Civilis*.

Sohm says:

"What was so entirely unique in the achievements of Roman law was simply and solely its masterly treatment of the casuistry of private law,—a treatment which, while discovering the laws of a particular case, revealed, at the same time, both the elements of the case and the principles inherent in these elements, . . . a treatment which had solved the great problem how to reconcile a free equitable discretion with fixed rules, the vindication of the concrete individual intention with the necessary subjection to its immutable, innate law." *

We see in this quotation that Rome's contribution to the historical development of law was something of an "immutable and innate" character, such as Professor Jevons and Sir Frederick Pollock so strenuously exclude from the domain of law proper.

So, also, Morey, in his work on Roman law, declares that the *Corpus Juris Civilis* was the product of a universal system of rights founded upon principles of natural equity.†

Moreover, the legislation of Justinian has affected the juris-

* Sohm, "Institutes of Roman Law," p. 96.
† Morey, "Roman Law," p. 163.

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prudence of all subsequent time, for it was in this form, according to Savigny and Sir Henry Maine, that the Roman law became the common law of Europe. The old *jus gentium*, formulating universal and ultimate rights and obligations, influences directly law as it is to-day. We find this ethical stream taking its rise in the heights of history when the world was young, mingling its currents with another historical stream, that of jurisprudence, whose flow is across the centuries.

Lotze has admirably expressed the same thought:

"It is to be regarded as an historical benefit that the modern world has inherited the Roman science of right. . . . It is not the single proposition about rights, but the science of rights which it produced (and especially in high perfection with respect to private justice) that has been of advantage for the discovery, even under wholly new relations of life, of a justice which corresponded with the nature of these relations themselves, and which was independent of temporary presuppositions of the then prevalent religious and social sentiments." *

In like manner there grew up in England a court of equity, where the lord chancellor, the "Keeper of the King's Conscience," decided cases according to the broad principles of an equitable jurisprudence. By means of injunctions the ordinary procedure of the common law courts was discontinued when it seemed to be working injustice, and a transfer was effected to the equity court. Like the prætorian edicts, the decisions of the lord chancellors became more and more definitely systematized, and at length became incorporated in the statute law of England under the Judicature Act of 1873. It often occurs in England, and America as well, that a given case has no guiding precedent or relevant statute; then the judge's decision must be based upon his individual conception of justice and equity.†

It has been declared judicially that "justice, moral fitness, and public conscience, when applied to a new subject, make common law without precedent." ‡ In Judge Rick's decision

* Lotze, "Practical Philosophy," p. 130.

† See Holland, "Jurisprudence," p. 57.

‡ Millar *v.* Taylor, 4 Burr, 2312, cited by Sir James Stephen in 3 "Hist. Criminal Law," p. 359.

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in the Ann Arbor case, where the Lake Shore Railroad engineers and firemen refused to handle Ann Arbor freight, the following is reported in the New York *Tribune*, April 4, 1893: "Let us apply the general principles of equity which are consistent with every rule of natural law and justice to the facts in the case."

From all this, we draw the following conclusions: the existence of equity courts indicates that there are certain claims of justice which are either opposed to existent law or upon which the law does not touch. Also, the fact of decisions based directly upon right and justice as generally recognized, where there is no precedent, signifies a direct appeal to a universal law which certainly possesses some ethical features. And the fact of equity decisions being incorporated into statute law itself, indicates a transfer of inherently ethical principles into the body of positive law.

We come now to legislation as a source of law. We will indicate two ways in which ethics puts a check upon unlimited legislation: where legislation violates an innate sense of justice on the one hand, and, on the other, where it opposes a legal sanction to duties which should be relegated to the sphere of the individual conscience. The legislator's standpoint is naturally a utilitarian one, looking to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Yet, as Pollock acknowledges, "A public judgment of happiness, expediency, well-being, or whatever else we call it, is, in the nature of human affairs, a rough thing at best."* It needs at all times the controlling influence of established principles. It may not lightly set aside rights that have been generally recognized and felt to be innate. The sphere of rights acknowledged by the state has been growing steadily throughout all history. The limits upon sovereign legislation are Teutonic in their origin. As Montesquieu says: "The germs of parliamentary constitutions are to be found in the forests of Germany." This Teutonic spirit has ever opposed the inalienable rights of personality to the unlimited sway of despotic power. There

* Pollock, "History of the Science of Politics," p. 41.

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has also been a decided protest against paternal government, and the police control of duties which should naturally be left to the free choice of the individual. Ethics here enters a plea for the inviolability of its distinctive sphere. Spencer has valiantly championed this cause against Huxley. The two represent extreme positions, but there is a proper mean between them. A harmonious adjustment will ensue when ethical considerations are allowed at least a respectful hearing in matters of legislation. Legislation is not to usurp the functions of morality, but merely to render possible the conditions under which morality may flourish. Therefore, while *jus* may not be the supreme end of the state, nor the end be considered as alone the legal guarantee of individual freedom, still, these conditions shall not be violated in pursuing as an end public welfare or public safety.

We find that law is extremely sensitive to prevailing public opinion. The historical school has emphasized this. A dead-letter law is a law minus this popular sentiment. This sentiment is not always ethical; but when it is, it is the mightiest force that can move upon the face of society. No law can survive the determined protest of an aroused public, for law, as Savigny puts it, "has its roots in the common consciousness of a nation." * Von Ihering, in his "Struggle for Law," calls attention to the fact that progress in law is attained by a continual conflict between positive law and a feeling of right (*Rechtsgefühl*).† The latter is ever urging law reform. But whenever Von Ihering speaks of rights, he is scrupulously careful to qualify the term by the adjective legal, always using the phrase "legal rights." Yet legal is frequently used by him in the sense of that which ought to be legal rather than that which positive law declares. In one place he speaks of the disastrous influence which "unjust laws" and "bad legal institutions" exercise on the moral power of the nation. And he adds that in the "feeling of legal right" the nation possesses the most fruitful source of its strength. Now, it is

* Savigny, "Private International Law," p. 370.

† "Struggle for Law," p. 11.

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impossible that there should be any antithesis between legal right and law. Hobbes will stand surety for the truth of this statement. Von Ihering, therefore, must mean by legal right that which *ought* to be legal. It is a right, ideally conceived, which law ought to recognize. This is equivalent to an ethical force stimulating legislation. This he acknowledges in the closing paragraph of his work: "Ethics has to tell us what is in harmony with and what contradicts the idea of law." * The idea of law is higher than law. It was the idea of law which incited the barons to demand the Magna Charta at the hands of John. Though its various clauses are found in earlier decrees, yet as positive law they were dead. To revive them had the force of creation anew. That which animated the barons could not have been the dead laws, for they had no life-giving force, but the idea of law in which would be comprehended their instinctively felt rights. It was the idea that the dead law ought to be made alive. It was the idea of law which stimulated the demand for the Petition of Rights in 1628, the Bill of Rights in 1688, the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the Constitution of the United States in 1787, and the Reform Bill of 1832. Whether the idea of vested rights which the sovereign had ignored, or the idea of a natural right never before acknowledged by the sovereign, it was still an idea,—an idea, too, whose force was largely ethical, and whose realization was due to the strength of an ethical sentiment deep-rooted in the heart of humanity, which neither lords temporal nor lords spiritual, neither crown nor Parliament, could withstand.

Antigone's reply to Kreon is an appeal to this feeling of right as opposed to the tyranny of the king:

> "It was not Zeus who heralded these words,
> Nor Justice, helpmeet of the gods below.
> 'Twas they who ratified those other laws,
> And set their record in the human heart.
> Nor do I deem thy heraldings so mighty
> That thou, a mortal man, couldst trample on
> The unwritten and unchanging laws of Heaven.

* "Struggle for Law," p. 129.

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They are not of to-day or yesterday,
But ever live, and no one knows their birth-tide.
These, for the dread of any human anger,
I was not minded to annul, and so
Incur the punishment that heaven exacts." *

We come now to the final portion of this discussion, the relation of ethics to international law. International law has been called the "vanishing point of jurisprudence." That which is true in mathematical relations may obtain here, namely, that in limiting cases there are revealed important facts which in approaching the limits escape observation. The point of view of international law presents law without any sanction whatever. The parties are all sovereign. There is no superior, and therefore no positive law is possible. The appeal in all controversy must be to generally recognized principles of justice and equity.

The history of international law shows its origin in Roman law. A part is derived from treaties and precedents; but over and above this is a considerable remainder called by Vattel the "necessary law of nations." This corresponds to the *jus gentium* of Roman law.

The Greek state recognized certain mutual obligations,† and the Romans adhered to certain formulæ in declaring war, as indicated in their *jus feciale;* and during the Middle Ages the papacy at times exercised international authority; also the Holy Roman Emperor appeared as international arbitrator; and certain rules regarding international trade existed in maritime codes, as the "Consolato del Mare," and the laws of Oléron, of Wisbuy, and of the Hanseatic Towns. Nevertheless, international law received its systematized form originally in the work of Grotius. And Grotius himself was versed in Roman law and imbued with its spirit. The chief idea of Roman law in his writings, and of the publicists after him, was that of the *jus gentium.* While the Romans had not conceived of the *jus gentium* as applying to the relation between independent

* "Antigone," V., 448–458. Translation by Dr. Donaldson.
† See Morey, "Roman Law," pp. 207, 208.

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states, it was nevertheless so interpreted by all early writers on international law.

International law relative to treaties also was founded largely upon the Roman law of contracts, which were derived largely from the *jus gentium*, and were liberally interpreted according to the principles of national equity. We find therefore that international law is largely derived from the *jus gentium* of Roman law, which in turn expressed the common sentiment of mankind in reference to the principles of justice and right.

Also, where there are no treaty rights and no precedents, disputes between nations are often arbitrated by appeal to the principles of national equity. This was urged by Mr. Carter, the United States counsel before the Behring Sea Commission at Paris, and in opposition to the proposition of England's counsel, Sir Charles Russell, who insisted that international law is for all practical purposes a code, and ethics and equity have nothing to do with it.

The common ideas of equity and justice have been applied in recent years to the control and governing power of an immense territory, in which were found 42,608,000 people in 1885, namely, the government of the Congo Free State. This had its rise in the Berlin Conference of 1885. The African International Association had obtained through treaties with four hundred and fifty independent African chiefs rights of sovereignty. This ceded sovereign power rules over a large complex whole composed of small sovereign principalities. The right to make any such cession of sovereignty is confirmed by the opinions of Sir Francis Twiss, of England, and Professor Arntz, the Belgian publicist. The International African Association was first recognized as a government by the United States on April 10, 1884. And in the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 it received formal recognition as the Congo Free State from all the European powers.* A nation was thus born in a day. It came into existence not by conquest, nor hereditary right, but by the sufferance of the great

* Stanley's "Congo," vol. ii., p. 380.

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powers of the world; or, as it was put by one of the presiding officers of the Conference, "The new state owes its birth to the generous aspirations and enlightened initiative of a Prince (*i. e.*, King of the Belgians) respected throughout Europe. It has been devoted from its cradle to the practice of every liberty." *

At the Conference, the avowed policy of the new-born government was indicated as that of the free exercise of all rights of all peoples throughout the length and breadth of that territory. Africans, Germans, English, and Belgians were put upon a footing of equality. Commercial intercourse, rights of water-way, state protection of property and person, were placed upon the broad basis of justice and equity. We behold a nation without a history, without precedents, without traditions, its laws ready-made, and these laws of such a nature that they met with the approval of the great powers of the world, because they represented that which was common to all these several governments. In cases of difficulties arising between the powers regarding Congo matters, they agreed to appeal to the International Congo Commission, which is substantially an International Court of Arbitration. Moreover, the Congo State seeks to establish a higher standard of individual conduct, the abolition of the slave-trade in Africa, the decrease of intemperance, etc. It is a state dedicated to the noble task of developing an ideal citizenship. It is a unique instance in history. It indicates how thoroughly ethical ideas have permeated public policy. It is an index of the common consciousness of nations regarding the claims of justice. One hundred years ago such an undertaking would have been impossible. The time has come in the history of mankind when it is generally recognized that a state possesses certain moral responsibilities. There is a civic as well as an individual conscience. Napoleon could not say to-day, "With the armies of France at my back, I shall be always in the right." The prophecy of the Grand Duke of Weimar concerning Napoleon's empire is more consonant with inter-

* Stanley's "Congo," vol. ii., p. 423.

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national sentiment: "It is unjust; it cannot last." Nor could Charles Augustus of Sweden to-day declare, as he did when he broke the truce of Roskild, "There is always just cause of war as soon as there is found a realm incapable of resisting."

There has been a marked ethical progress in international relations. A national altruism has been developed, to this extent at least, that the claims of another nation are regarded with due consideration whenever founded upon truth and justice. As in private ethics a healthy altruism is corrective of a false egoism, so national altruism should supplement and check a governmental policy of short-sighted egoism. International law, with its common restrictions and concessions, has at least partly realized such an ideal, and it in turn has influenced the spirit of all law. Law is becoming more akin to equity. Punishment is becoming more humane. It has become reformatory as well as penal, in which conception the state has in view an enlarged ethical end, not only the greater good of society, but also the realization of good instead of evil in the criminal as well. Courts of arbitration are settling international disputes rather than the arbitrament of war. Might is no longer synonymous with right. There is a progressive movement in all law, national and international, and the progress is along ethical lines, and it is towards the recognition of a solidarity of mankind, towards that reign of law which is justice and which is peace. After all, Burke's fancy of an ideal state may not be merely a passing dream, but a fact manifoldly realized:

"The state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and the invisible world according to a fixed com-

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pact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appointed place." *

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

PRINCETON COLLEGE.

MORAL SCIENCE AND THE MORAL LIFE.†

WHAT is the relation between Ethics and Morals? This is a question which Ethical Societies are naturally led to ask themselves. When a society is described as an Ethical Society, or as a Society for Ethical Culture, does this mean that such a society intends to study the Science of Ethics, or does it mean rather that it seeks to advance the moral life? Or does it mean both these things? Are these two things naturally connected, or are they not? This is an important question. Different Ethical Societies seem to be answering it in different ways; and, unless some agreement is come to with regard to it, there may be a split in the ethical movement.

I suppose an Ethical Society would most naturally be understood to mean a society for the study of ethical science; and this seems to be the interpretation which some of the English Societies have put upon the term. On the other hand, the American Societies for Ethical Culture appear to be much more distinctly practical in their aims. They seek to improve men's practice much more than to advance their theories. This aim would seem to be more naturally expressed by the term "moral" than by the term "ethical;" unless the Greek word is understood simply as expressing a wider conception of moral life than the Latin one suggests—as including the larger social relations as well as the more purely individual aspects of morality. However this may be, it seems clear that there are, *primâ facie*, two distinct conceptions of the aim of an ethical society; and what I wish now to ask is—How

* Edmund Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France." Clarendon Press, Select Works, edited by Payne, vol. ii., pp. 113, 114.

† Read before the Ethical Congress and Convention of Ethical Societies at Chicago, October 1, 1893.

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are these two conceptions related to one another? Are the views which they represent incompatible with one another? Are they inevitably conjoined together? Or are they simply distinct? The answer which we give to this question must depend on the view that we take with regard to the relation between ethical theory and moral practice.

Now, if we regard the matter historically, we shall find, I think, that theory and practice have always tended to go hand in hand. When the Sophists and Socrates questioned the current Athenian morality, and began to seek about for some more solid foundation for the moral life, they were at once regarded as corrupters of youth. Their theoretical doubts were seen to influence practice. When Plato attempted a more positive theory of morals, he, in like manner, applied it directly to a reconstruction of all the aspects of practical life,—political, religious, artistic, educational, economic. It is needless to refer to the close union of theory and practice among the Stoics, among the Utilitarians and Evolutionists; or to the fact that the recognized head of the Intuitionist school, Bishop Butler, was at once speculator and preacher—a combination that is found again in the present leader of that mode of thought in England—Dr. Martineau. Other instances will readily occur. It may be thought that Aristotle, and perhaps, also, Spinoza and Hegel, constitute exceptions; and to them I may afterwards return. But the general fact can scarcely be doubted that ethical speculation has had in the past, and still continues to have in the present, a most intimate bearing on the practical life. Nay, even if we turn from these great speculative thinkers to the plainest of plain men, we shall find nearly always that the moral life rests on a more or less consciously recognized theoretical basis. It may be a crude basis. It may be merely the belief that certain obligations have been commanded by God or by a civil government. But even such a belief is a theory; and if this theory should ever be exploded, if the authority should come to be regarded as non-existent, or if its validity should be disputed, the whole moral life which rests upon it may come down with a crash.

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Historically, then, there seems to be good ground for believing that ethical theory and moral practice have a close relation to one another. There has, however, in recent times, been a strong tendency to deny this;* and it is this tendency that I wish now to consider. It is a tendency which appears on both sides,—both on the side of theory and on the side of practice. Those who are specially interested in the practical moral life are apt to repudiate ethical theory, and those who are specially interested in ethical theory are apt to insist that their theories have no bearing on practice. It is for these two tendencies that I wish to find the *motif.* Having found that, we may be able to estimate the value of the position to which they lead. We have first to ask, then, why it is that practice repudiates theory, and then why it is that theory repudiates practice.

The former of these two questions is, I think, the more easy to be answered. It is not surprising that those who are specially concerned either with the building up of personal character or with the carrying out of social reforms should look with a little suspicion on "*ein Kerl der speculirt.*" History seems to show that speculation has no limit. If it is not a circle, it is an endless screw. The practical worker, on the other hand, "remembers Lot's wife" and presses forward. He has no patience to wait for the settlement of controversies for which an eternity would seem too short. He refuses to go on crutches because theories are lame. Now, as always, the scholastic is one who has leisure; the practical man runs a race. The one must be a born doubter, the other must not even hesitate. What kinship, then, can there be between them? How can the edifice of strenuous endeavor be built on the sands of shifting opinion? It is, I think, such considerations as these that have weight with those who are specially interested in the more practical side of morals. They are afraid to be drawn into disputations that will paralyze the will; they are afraid that "the native hue of resolution"

* Mr. Bradley, in England, and Mr. Simmel, in Germany, are perhaps the two most conspicuous illustrations of this tendency.

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may be "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought;" and accordingly they stop their ears to the perplexing questions of metaphysics, and walk boldly forward through the darkness, with drawn swords, like Christian through the Valley of the Shadow of Death. They reason like Rob Roy:

> "Said generous Rob, 'What need of books?
> Burn all the statutes and their shelves;
> They stir us up against our kind,
> And worse, against ourselves.
> * * * * * *
> — puzzled, blinded, then we lose
> Distinctions that were plain and few;
> These find I graven on my heart,
> That tells me what to do.'"

Now, I am far from denying a certain justification for this point of view. Certainly Faithful should not enter Doubting Castle. He had better leave it to some Great-Heart to storm for future pilgrims. There is a wise division of labor in all such matters. The practical man will find enough to do; and, if he has any genius for action, he will probably find enough principles to guide him. The human race has not been idle all this while. It has accumulated rules and precedents and examples, till almost the very air we breathe is full of moralizing influences, by which the hearts of men may, with hardly even a thought of what they are doing, mould themselves to virtuous action. Men learn conduct, as they learn language or art, or even as they learn to think, quite as much by almost unconscious inspirations as by definitely taking thought; and for some men, and these often among the greatest, it is best to be content with such learning.

> "One impulse from a vernal wood
> May teach you more of man,
> Of moral evil and of good,
> Than all the sages can."

Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that the sages can teach a good deal. Nay, I am inclined to doubt whether any of

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those impulses would have lain in the "vernal woods" if the sages had not put them there. Not a tree can stir for us now but the thoughts of Plato rustle in its branches. It is the very triumph of ideas to make themselves forgotten, and to become hands and feet. But the best of them serve only for a time. New life-blood must be infused by new thought, or the hands and feet will grow languid. While I admit, then, that men may act well without any conscious theory of conduct, just as they may think well without any conscious doctrines of Logic or Methodology; while I admit, even, that for many men such an unconscious attitude may be "alone complete;" I am yet far from allowing that there can, in the long run, be any good action without thought. The man who does the thinking may be different from the man who catches the inspiration and does the act. The latter may forget the former. He may think that he was taught by the vernal woods or by principles graven on his heart. But I am convinced that in most cases, if you go far enough back, you will in the end come upon a Thinker who whispered it to the woods and carved it on the heart.

I can conceive, however, that some practical persons will still be disposed to rebel against such a doctrine as this. They will say, If conduct is influenced by theory, by which of the theories is it influenced? Was it the Stoics or the Epicureans who gave the woods a voice? Which of the sages, who slandered each other, brought sweetness and light into the world? To any such question I should answer at once, they *all* did. In some ways, any theory of morals is better than none; any one may serve to revivify moral action. There is no genuine theory of morals which has not its roots somewhere in the ideals of human nature; none which does not point higher than custom and conventionality. We are the heirs of the Stoics, and of the Utilitarians, and of the Evolutionists, and of all the rest; and our lives ought to be larger and nobler the more fully we have learned from them all. Not one of them but gives a sting to "*unbedingte Ruh*," and a suggestion of higher achievement. There is not one of them that is not better than our hearts, or than the vernal

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woods, except in so far as our hearts and the vernal woods have caught their inspiration. And this is my answer to those practical persons who repudiate theory. They must either make a theory or plagiarize one. I admit that it is better for some to plagiarize. They could only make *one*, whereas they may plunder a score.

I now pass to the theoretical man. It is not quite so easy to understand why he should want to keep himself apart from practice; and I believe it is only in comparatively recent times that he has had any such desire. Perhaps in olden times there was not the same facility of divorce, and many things lived grumblingly together which have since contrived to separate. But in this particular instance I am inclined to think that what God has joined should not be sundered. Let me try, however, to indicate the reasons which appear to weigh with some modern theorists for their separation between theory and practice.

One reason is perhaps sufficiently obvious. It is natural in some cases to seek to turn the edge of the *odium ethicum* by professing to have no responsibility for the practical consequences of a doctrine. Certainly, the habit of judging men's ethical theories by their supposed results is in general to be deprecated. Perhaps this habit has done more than anything else to repress free thought in England; and it is refreshing when such a writer as Mr. Bradley* bids defiance to this method of prejudice, and boldly insists that he has nothing to do with practical consequences. But this, after all, can only be taken as a warning not to taste unripe fruit. A perfect theory must still in the end approve itself by its works: only we must have patience until we can see its works completely; and perhaps it is in general best that the ethical theorist himself should not be thinking of consequences when he is working out his doctrines. So far as this argument goes, then, it does not point to any real divorce

* "Appearance and Reality," p. 450. On the other hand, I am afraid Mr. Bradley's earlier work, "Ethical Studies," is not free from the defect against which he now protests.

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of theory and practice, but only to a postponement of the day of judgment.

A more weighty reason, and one that has influenced many writers, is derived from a view of the general nature of science. Science, it is said, aims simply at knowledge. The object of our knowledge is in no way affected by our knowledge of it. The moral life, like any other object of study, stands there before us. It is the business of the theorist neither to laugh nor to weep over it, but simply to understand it. He should study the moral life, as he studies circles and triangles, taking the object as he finds it, and not seeking in any way to modify it. Spinoza was perhaps the first writer who definitely insisted on this attitude; and his expression of it has probably had a great influence on subsequent thought. Yet it might not be a bad *argumentum ad hominem* to point out that this is not the way in which the science of Ethics has usually been studied,—if, indeed, it has ever been studied quite in that way at all. That is a fact with regard to morals which those who are so fond of facts ought to consider. They ought to ask themselves why it is that morals have not lent themselves to this mode of study so readily as triangles and circles. In truth, Spinoza himself is his own best critic; for no sooner does he get well into his subject than he flies away into the region of ideals with a freer wing than almost any other of his compeers. If we want an instance of cold aloofness in the treatment of morals, it is rather to Aristotle than to Spinoza that we must turn; and perhaps those who recommend the matter-of-fact method of study have usually Aristotle in their minds. To Aristotle, then, let us go.

What do we find in Aristotle? We find, in the first place, that there is no other writer who more distinctly emphasizes the fact that in Ethics we theorize with a view to practice. But it is not on this point that I wish at present to insist. In order to make my point clear, I must begin by drawing a distinction. There are, I think, two ways of studying morals, which may be conveniently distinguished as moral science and moral philosophy respectively. The one sets itself to

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study the facts of the moral life as it is actually lived among men, and the opinions that men have with regard to it.* It is a science of what is; or rather of what appears. Its watch-word is the Aristotelian δοκεῖ. Moral philosophy, on the other hand, is the science of what ought to be, or rather of what, in the deepest sense, eternally is. Now, both of these are to be found in Aristotle; but the former was perhaps the more characteristic of his habit of mind, and has thus come to be that by which he is better known. He was suspicious of the metaphysical flights of Plato, and liked always to fortify himself with facts and with the opinions of the vulgar. It is thus that we get from him so many sketches of Greek virtues and so many indications of current conceptions, which Plato might have been apt rather to scorn or to chastise. Now, certainly these side-lights of the Aristotelian writings are among their most interesting features. They grow in interest, indeed, as the Aristotelian age recedes. Nevertheless, I venture to describe this as the mortal part of Aristotle,—not absolutely the feet of clay in his work, but certainly not the head of gold. The truly immortal part of him is not his moral science, but his moral philosophy; it is to be found in those passages in which he analyzes the nature of happiness and virtue, passages which are not more Greek than English, in which he rises above the mere facts and opinions of his environment, and dwells in the atmosphere of the universal and the eternal. It is by such passages as these that Aristotle has made his mark in the history of thought. Now, it may be said that even in these passages Aristotle does not preach, that even here he does not directly apply his doctrine to practice. And this is true enough. Yet the conceptions which he there unfolds are in their essence not less prophetic than Plato's Idea of the Good itself; they define for us as genuine and as large an ideal, and one that breaks not less absolutely through the conventionalities of the ordinary moral

* By far the best example of this that is known to me in modern times is Mr. G. Simmel's fascinating "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," of which the concluding volume has just been published.

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life. If, then, Aristotle is to be claimed for the matter-of-fact view of Ethics, it can only be with large qualifications.

But there is still another writer who is sometimes thought to support this view—one whose name carries an authority scarcely, if at all, less than that of Aristotle himself. I mean, of course, Hegel. Nothing, perhaps, has helped more to give countenance to the view that Ethics is concerned with particular facts, like any other positive science, than the reiterated protests of Hegel against the setting up of any mere "Sollen," anything that is merely an ideal of what "ought to be" as opposed to what is. In his actual treatment of Ethics, also, we seem to find a certain conservatism, a tendency to be satisfied with things as they stand, which gives support to the same point of view. Now, there is some ground for thinking that Hegel was fallible like most other men; but certainly the fact that he gave his support to any idea is a strong *primâ facie* argument for its truth. What, then, do we find in Hegel? The protests against a mere "*Sollen*" cannot be denied; neither, on the whole, can the conservatism of his general attitude. Yet when we remember what grew out of Hegel's philosophy—that it was the rock from which Feuerbach, and Lassalle, and Bakunin were hewn—we shall hesitate to regard it as pure conservatism. And when we reflect a little more deeply on the passages with regard to the "*Sollen*," we shall see, I think, that there has been some misinterpretation of their meaning. What is it that Hegel is there protesting against? It is the notion of a mere Ideal in the air—an Ideal, as he says, that is not strong enough to make itself actual. Against this he urges, with reiterated emphasis, that the Rational is the Real, that the true Ideal is, in the end, that by which the Actual is determined. Hence the "ought" is not a *mere* ought; it realizes itself in history; we may see it without us as well as within us. On the other hand, whatever we seem to see without us that is not ideal, is also not in any final sense actual: it carries its own condemnation in its heart. Now, all this may be true without in any way invalidating the position that Ethics is a science of the Ideal. It only means that it is a science of a true Ideal and not of a

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false one. Every true Ideal has a certain actuality: in a sense it is more actual than what we commonly treat as real. It is so even with the ideals of the poet. "The poet never dreams," says Browning:

> "We prose folk do: we miss the proper duct
> For thoughts on things unseen."

So Hegel would insist that the moralist does not dream: he alone has hold of the true reality: for the wages of sin is death, but the gift of the Ideal everlasting life. *Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum.* The heavens shall wax old like a garment; they shall change, but righteousness remaineth. This is what Hegel means when he insists that the Ideal is strong enough to make itself real, and is not a mere dream opposed to the actual. He meant what Carlyle meant when he said that "The soul of the world is just." If, in his antagonism to sentimentalism, he sometimes stated his doctrine in a more objectionable form; and if, in the actual working of it out, he sometimes leaned too much to the side of conservatism; here also, even more emphatically than in the case of Aristotle, I should say that these things represent only the mortal part of Hegel. In the essence of his doctrine he is a supporter of the Ideal not less strenuous than Green himself.

None of these writers, then, I hold, really gives countenance to the matter-of-fact view of Ethics. And, indeed, if we consider the ground on which it rests, we shall find it to be a mere misconception. It rests on the analogy of the positive sciences. But Ethics, in the proper sense, is not one of the positive sciences. It is a part of philosophy.

Now, the mere positive sciences may be said to study facts, and to seek simply knowledge as opposed to practice; but this is merely because the positive sciences are abstract. The positive sciences apply themselves to some small department of things; and they will go fatally astray if they venture to step beyond the limits of what is given to them there.* They

* It is interesting to note, however, that even the particular sciences sometimes show a tendency to revolt against the idea that they are to be bound down to the mere observation of given facts. Thus, it is told of a certain astronomer

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will also go fatally astray if they seek (if, for instance, the political economist seeks) to make a direct practical application of the scrappy pieces of knowledge to which they are confined. But in philosophy this abstract opposition between knowledge and practice does not exist. Philosophy is concrete, and it appeals to the whole nature of man. It is not a pettifogging investigation about soap and ether, beetles and solar systems, and other such trifling concerns; but is occupied with the whole constitution and destiny of mankind, with their infinite hopes and ideals, as well as with their very finite achievements. I am convinced that the recent efforts to treat Ethics as a positive science are in the main a mere concession to the modern spirit. The particular sciences are rampant. Their devotees fancy that they are the people, and wisdom will die with them. And no doubt they are wise in their way. But it is a contemptible surrender on the part of ethical students to bow the knee before such pitiful abstractions.

Such a surrender is almost tragic. But there is, I believe,

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that, on being congratulated by a lady on the pleasure of knowing all about the movements of the planets, he replied, "I know nothing about the movements of the planets. I only know how the planets ought to move, if there are any planets." But this is evidently a paradox. The ideal constructions of the mathematical astronomer are, in the last resort, of scientific interest only in so far as they approximate to the observed facts of the planetary system. The planetary system is the ultimate ideal to which his constructions must conform, not *vice versâ*. Now, this would be the case with Ethics also, if Ethics were simply a positive science. Accordingly, we find that Mr. Simmel, who is perhaps the most consistent adherent of this point of view, maintains ("Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," Vol. II., pp. 281–85) that ethical ideals have no real validity. They are only methods of *symbolizing* the truths of the moral life. They are, in fact, very much on a par with the ideal constructions of the mathematical astronomer. But there is this unfortunate difference. The movements of the planets can be observed as a hard fact. They exist objectively as an ideal for the astronomer to test his constructions by. The moral life, on the other hand, exists (*as moral*) only in the form of more or less conscious efforts to realize those ideals which the ethical philosopher seeks to construct,—*i.e.*, to bring to clear consciousness. If we deny the validity of these ideals, the moral life becomes a chaos. Mr. Simmel is well enough aware of this sceptical result of his position; and it is only his revolt against speculative philosophy that seems to prevent him from modifying his view of Ethics.

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another objection in some men's minds to the treatment of Ethics as a science of the Ideal, which borders rather on the comic side. It is thought that if Ethics is to have a practical bearing, it must be something like the voice of God on Sinai. It must be concerned with the laying down of the ten Commandments, and such things as that; and this would be rather low. Now, I confess I have not quite so lofty a disdain for the ten Commandments and kindred rules of life as some people have. When I find that a man habitually steals and lies and commits adultery, I begin to be suspicious of his morals. Still, I admit that Commandments have to be taken with a grain of salt, and that Ethics would not be good for much if it only laid down these. But why should this be supposed to be the work of Ethics? Can it not be practical without concerning itself with particular rules? When I say that Ethics is practical, I mean merely that it unfolds and analyzes for us the ideal principle of life—an ideal which is indeed forever real, both in the sense that it is the deepest actuality in the nature of man and that it is continually realizing itself in the institutions and habits of social life; but which, though thus forever real, is also forever ideal. It is an "ought to be" that eternally is, an "is" that eternally ought to be. How this "ought" is to apply itself in the particular details of life, is largely a question for individual insight, guided by the long experiment of history. It is not the business of Ethics to lay down particular rules. But the Ideal which it brings to light is that to which all rules have reference, and by which they all must be tried. It is by unfolding this final touchstone that Ethics is practical. This Ideal which it reveals to us, or which it brings to clear consciousness for us, is that which is alone categorical, alone absolutely authoritative in human life. To it all commandments must bow; in it all commandments are absorbed. What is it? How is it to be defined? How is it to be applied? These are the questions to which Ethics must always devote itself. They are not questions of fact: they are questions of that ultimate reality by which facts are judged, in comparison with which all mere facts are but dreams and illusions. They are questions about

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that which truly "is," and which *therefore* ought to be; about that which truly "ought to be," and which *therefore* must be.

This is all that I wish to insist on. In insisting on it, on this occasion, I have aimed sometimes rather at an emphasis that may provoke discussion than at an elaborate exactness of expression. I have consequently made some points more paradoxical than they need be; but I trust the general meaning may be sufficiently clear.

I may sum up the general point of view which I have sought to emphasize in the following brief statements: (1) It is no doubt true that Ethics ought not to be regarded as the Art of Conduct. In any complete sense there is no such art. Casuistry is impossible, except within very narrow limits; and such efforts as those of Mr. Spencer to systematize the particular rules of practical life are capable of only a very moderate degree of success. In any case, it certainly seems desirable to separate the application of science to the actual guidance of life from the pure science itself. (2) The Science of Ethics, as distinguished from the Art of Conduct, may be treated in two ways,—as a pure science or as a branch of philosophy. The former is simply positive and has no direct * practical bearing. The latter may be described as normative, and seeks to define for us the ideals which the Art of Conduct must endeavor to apply; just as Logic † defines the ideals of thought, which are applied in scientific research and in the ordinary business of life. The latter kind of Ethics is what is known as "Moral Philosophy;" and it still seems to be the more interesting and important kind of Ethics, even if we admit (as on the whole we must) that the more purely scien-

* Indirectly, of course, this science, like all sciences, may be used to throw light on practical conduct.

† In a sense, *all* philosophy may be said to be normative. Thus, even Mr. Bradley, in his book on "Appearance and Reality," condemns ordinary experience because it does not conform to the law of self-consistency, which he takes as his supreme metaphysical principle. The peculiarity of Ethics, as contrasted with Metaphysics, is that what it condemns with reference to its supreme Norm is capable of being brought into conformity with that Norm. Its Norm thus becomes practical; whereas the metaphysical Norm merely enables us to say that whatever does not conform to it is unreal.

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tific study of the facts of the moral life has also its own place and value.

In conclusion, I wish to return to the point from which I started, and apply the view of Ethics which has been stated to the work of Ethical Societies. If the relation between theory and practice is so close as I have sought to maintain, it is needless to inquire too strictly whether an Ethical Society should be specially theoretical or specially practical. No doubt the two sides can be distinguished; and, in a world in which division of labor makes labor more effective, it may sometimes be desirable that one society should devote itself more particularly to the one side, and another more particularly to the other. But it appears to me that the two sides can never be entirely separate. A merely theoretical society, calling itself ethical, would probably end in hair-splitting and self-conceit; a merely practical one, in priggishness and fuss. The counsel of perfection is "Give us both!" To the theorists one might say, "Bring forth fruit, and think not to say, We are Hegel's seed." To the practical man one might say, "Justify the faith that is in you."

J. S. MACKENZIE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE SOCIAL MINISTRY OF WEALTH.

IT is the aim of this paper to show that the conquest over nature which has been going on for the past hundred years as manifested in the mechanical devices by which the efficiency of labor is marvellously increased, has placed before the present possibilities of which the past had not the slightest conception, and that it lies within the choice of this generation to say whether or not those possibilities shall be realized. That which makes the present full of hope and promise is the abundance of wealth at its disposal, or, more properly speaking, the efficiency attained by the agencies of production. The secret of wealth is that nature serves gratuitously the

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industrial purposes of men. Yet nature is heedless of moral aims. She serves with equal readiness the ignoble passions and the noble aspirations. It lies wholly with the common people to say whether this marvellous industrial organization, which is the peculiar possession of the nineteenth century, shall be made the means of creating a soul-satisfying civilization, or be dissipated in enervating ostentation or aimless display. The future depends upon the choice which is made in this regard. A crisis, whether in the life of an individual, a nation, or a civilization, is usually a very quiet affair. Men and women come and go unmindful that the critical years of the world's history may be bound up in the routine of their daily conduct. It is to impress this fact, and to suggest the proper bearing of the common people towards this critical period in the development of civilization, that attention is called to a consideration of the social ministry of wealth.

Not only does our subject find nobility in that it touches in this manner the possibilities of the future, it gains dignity also from the relation which it bears to the past. It is the fashion to say that the nineteenth century is given over to material aims, that poetry does not flourish where money abounds, and that ideals are crushed beneath the ponderous wheels of machinery. But such sentiments cannot be entertained by one who perceives that the thread of continuity running through all history is the effort on the part of men to attain freedom, and that industrial development is a necessary step towards that end. The truth is, the material civilization of our day is the means by which the prophecy of the past centuries will, if ever, be fulfilled. It is the third step in the attainment of liberty; and the appreciation of this is sufficiently important to warrant brief reference to the first and second steps in the development of human freedom.

There is no civilization of which we have record in which man stood lower in his own estimation than in the Egyptian. He was in this civilization the slave of his surroundings, and the tyranny which nature exercised over him was intrenched in the superstitious beliefs of the Egyptian people. It was a self-imposed slavery of the mind, a slavery which had no justi-

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fication except ignorance of the character and origin of natural forces. The emancipation from this slavery came with the cosmogony of Moses, which asserted that God created nature, and that man, the highest fruit of creative power, was to control nature. The old Hebrew religion in its essence is a declaration by man of his supremacy over the natural world about him, and in its logical development came to be an assumption by him of his full and complete responsibility, so far as the affairs of this life are concerned, for what shall befall him. It is this principle which has given character to succeeding centuries. It is the vitality of this principle which has gained for Christian people the custodianship of the world's progressive civilization; and it is important to observe, since it gives a clearer notion of our own times by connecting this century with the centuries that are gone, that it is this principle of action, this determination of man to make every condition and every force minister to his own development, which gives unity to our history. A careful study will show that the emancipation of the mind of man from the superstitious regard of natural forces is the first step in the attainment of liberty for the human race.

When, in the thirteenth century, the English serf took advantage of the shifting of customs to assert the right of his own personality, he gained what has proved to be the second step in the attainment of liberty, or, as I prefer to state it, in the creation of those conditions which enable man to realize the promise of his birth. The significance of the liberation of the serf lay in the new point of view which it gained. All the great civilizations of the world up to this time had been based on some phase of formal slavery; that is to say, all recognized a social structure which prescribed the routine of daily conduct for all classes of society. Not even in the dreams of philosophers and prophets was the idea foreshadowed that a condition of universal liberty is essential to greatness, whether of the individual or the nation. Plato based his Republic on slavery, and it was the generally accepted sentiment of Greek philosophy that the misery of millions was justified by the creation of one great man. Now,

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I say that the movement of the Middle Ages in Europe, a movement most perfectly seen in the liberation of the serfs in England, is significant because it changed the point of view. It created a new philosophy of life. It brought the conviction that laws, beliefs, rights, duties, indeed everything which makes up what is termed the social structure, do not hold rightful sway over the destinies of man, but that they are instruments to be used by man to command his own destiny. It was, indeed, a deliverance for man to gain so noble a conception of his own dignity as to regard social institutions as self-imposed restraints for the attainment of his ends. The Reformation which gained religious liberty, and the political revolution which resulted in the establishment of popular government, are but incidents in the emancipation of the mind of man from the slavery of superstitious regard for established institutions. I think I do not place too high an estimate on the thirteenth, the fourteenth, the fifteenth, the sixteenth, the seventeenth, and the first half of the eighteenth century, when I say that the conception which they have bequeathed as a permanent possession to the race will prove to be as far reaching in its results as the Mosaic idea respecting the creation of the world. They both declare that a condition of freedom is the birthright of man.

It was at this juncture in the world's history that those events which mark the nineteenth century as different from any previous age made their appearance. How the matter will be presented by the historian of the future, we, of course, cannot say; but one fact may be stated with a fair degree of assurance. At the close of the seventeenth century the great mass of mankind were still in slavery,—at least, they were not in a condition to realize the ideals of living. It is true, man had asserted his worthiness against the intimidations of nature and his right of personality against the restraints of social structure; but his mind was still a serf to the vulgar necessities of physical existence. Leisure to think, time to enjoy, opportunity to grow,—these are the marks of liberty. But the great body of people retired each night in the dulness and apathy which comes only with exhaustive labor. What could

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this universal right of the individual to develop his own personality avail, though expressed in the cogent language of the eighteenth century philosophy, while nature bestowed her gifts with so niggardly a hand that life was exhausted in the struggle to live? It was essential, for it lay in the logical unfolding of history, that man should be freed from the burden of toil.

This deliverance, or at least the dawn of this deliverance, came with the era of invention and the century of great industries and corporate organizations. From the beginning of industrial life down to the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the genius of invention had lain dormant. Men were content to rely on muscular forces to perform the drudgery of life. Tools, it is true, were in common use, but machinery lay outside the range of ordinary thinking. It was, I believe, the late Dr. Adolf Held, of Bonn University (whose life, unfortunately for the science of economy, was cut short in the vigor of manhood), who first brought clearly into view the difference between a civilization based on tools and one based on machinery. The former, which relies on the physical powers of man, is limited in its attainment to the general fund of nervous endurance; the latter, which relies on the intelligence of man, knows no limit except the possible limit of natural forces. Permit me to dwell for a moment on this thought, for, unless you appreciate the poetry and prophecy which lie in machinery, you will fail to grasp the social and historical meaning of wealth which is the product of machinery. Regarded in its bearing on the great problem of civilization, machinery means the deliverance of man from the necessity of arduous toil in order to attain the means of satisfying a rational existence, and it works this deliverance by bringing under man's direction the boundless forces of nature. It was Moses who made man the peer of nature and gave him the right to dominion over it; it was reserved to the inventors of our own time to enable man to enter into that dominion and to reduce nature to servitude.

Many writers have endeavored to measure the efficiency of machinery as compared with an industrial society based on

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tools, and some of them have done so with a fair degree of success. This, however, has no very direct bearing on our argument. It is the fact of the difference between the two forms of industry, rather than the measure of that difference, which is of importance. The industrial revolution begun in 1760 may not be accomplished as far as results are concerned, but so far as it pertains to the attitude of mind it is an accomplished fact. The new point of view which it has gained is that nature has been taken into the service of man, and, therefore, that man may be relieved from the necessity of arduous and excessive toil. If it be urged that at present machinery is not adequate to produce the means of satisfying the needs of a high conception of life for all men, I may, perhaps, admit the statement. It has, however, nothing to do with my argument. For there is not the slightest indication that the genius of invention is exhausted, and it is quite conceivable that more effective methods than those now practised may be discovered by which to coerce from nature more fruitful service. Such is the ethical mission of science.

For the sake of argument, or rather as a means of discovering our personal obligations in the presence of the opulence which modern industrial methods are placing at our disposal, let it be assumed that the inventor has geared the rays of the sun to the shaft of industry so that power is as free as light. It still remains an open question whether or not this conquest over nature will gain for man the freedom for which his soul longs. Judging from the use that has been made of wealth on the threshold of this era of opulence, it seems doubtful if the passions and petty ambitions of men will permit wealth to fulfil the mission to which it is called by the logic of history. And this brings me to the kernel of what I have to say. The character of civilization built on machinery will be determined not by machinery, but by the purpose of the men and women who compose society. We have not yet proceeded far enough in the era of opulence to permit it to assume a determined and final character. The material of our social structure is yet plastic and may be moulded to fit our desires. It occurs seldom in the history of the world that

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the simple wishing of simple men and women will act as a force in giving direction to a civilization, but such is now the case. Commonly the work of destruction must go before that of construction. At present, however, there is placed in our hands unused material with which to build. What is our plan of architecture? What is our ideal of living? It is for us to say what we desire, and our desires will be accomplished.

Since the revolution which has gained and is gaining for the world these marvellous opportunities is an industrial revolution, it is natural to regard the question just presented from the industrial point of view. Of one fact we may be certain: the ministry of wealth must not be a partial but a universal ministry. It was Duchâtel who said, "Were the benefits of civilization partial and not universal, it would be only a bitter mockery and a cruel injustice." This is true, but in the present instance it is not the whole truth. If labor-saving machinery be used so as to provide absolute leisure for the few rather than to save labor for the many, the overthrow of our civilization will be the inevitable result. In this I speak as an economist and after a critical analysis of the causes and tendencies of commercial crises and commercial depressions. Unless the opulence which comes with the gratuitous service of nature results in the lightening of toil and in raising the standard of living for the mass of mankind, the ability to produce wealth which comes with machinery will be destroyed, because the inducement to produce wealth will be paralyzed. The approximate ideal, therefore, in considering the true ministry of wealth, must be an industrial ideal. It must hold in mind the development of that class called the workers.

Never before has the organic character of society been so clearly manifested. We who are well-to-do cannot be indifferent to the interests of those who are less fortunate, were we so inclined. The great body of workers must be ministered to by wealth in order that we ourselves may enjoy the ministry. *Die Lohnfrage ist eine Culturfrage.* This explains why social and industrial questions claim at present so large a share of thought; for, whatever the ideal of civilization enter-

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tained, it must be realized through a proper adjustment of industrial relations.

I know of but one man who has ever formulated in clear language the ethical ideal of an industrial civilization. In an essay entitled "Art and Socialism," written to show that true Art will never again make her appearance until what he pleases to call "socialism" shall be established, William Morris lays down the following somewhat startling proposition,—startling when regarded in the light of what the life of the laboring class has been in the past. "In the truly organized society," he says, "labor must be pleasant, and nothing should be made by man's labor which is not worth making." Consider for a moment what a stupendous idea is bound up in this simple phrase. Compare the view which it entertains of work with the view which has prevailed throughout the centuries. It is not, you will observe, that man is to be freed from labor, but from *the burden* of labor, and this is to be accomplished by rendering labor pleasant and worthy.

At this point I fancy I hear some incredulous objector expressing himself in language like the following. This is indeed a poet's dream. Why cannot men who deal with problems be practical and conform their views to the facts of life? Work is necessarily bound up with pain. There are many sorts of work that are disagreeable in themselves. In all ages labor has been held a curse. The earliest recorded law of political economy is, "In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread." There is no possible industrial arrangement that can set aside this law; there is no conceivable adjustment that can make work pleasant. Work and pain are synonymous terms, etc., etc., etc.

Such a view respecting labor appears to me to be wholly untrue, or, perhaps better expressed, it finds no reasonable defence in the nature of the case. It is the last of the great superstitions which have enthralled the mind of man, and when its chain is broken, and men have adjusted themselves to the new idea, they will become free indeed. Let us consider for a moment whether work and pain are necessarily bound together. Our argument need not here be arrested

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with a consideration of past industrial relations, for we are talking of the present and of the future. There may have been some excuse in the past for joining labor and pain as companions in thought. But in this century, when the inanimate forces of nature are working gratuitously under man's control, there is no excuse for longer holding to such an error.

Whence came this conception of labor? It was born from the union of a false premise respecting man on the one hand, and a false principle of applying labor on the other. The false premise is that men are naturally unequal; the false principle is that labor is extended to cover all the fresh waking hours of a man's life. The political philosophy of the eighteenth century, which gathered into itself the social development of five hundred years, dispelled the first; the inventions of the nineteenth century show that it is dulness on our part to hold longer to the second. It is because, under existing industrial relations, labor is continued until the last hours of the day are actually painful through weariness of the brain and arm that men see in labor only pain and degradation. Men come to think of all work as they think of the last two or three hours of the day. This is natural. A man rises in the morning refreshed by healthful sleep. His impulse is to do, to act. He has a store of vigor to be set free, and he goes to his accustomed work with pleasure, not reluctantly. During the first four hours he works, not knowing that his will is controlling his muscle. Exercise itself is a pleasure. The four hours following are for him, perhaps, a matter of indifference. His superabundant energy may have been exhausted, but he is not yet weary. For every hour that follows his weariness becomes more and more intense, until at length it is only by conscious effort that his will is able to drag his weary muscles through their appointed task. Ask him when he trudges homeward if his day has been a pleasant one. "No," he will reply; "it has been dull, monotonous, painful. Life is not worth living." He forgets the first hours of the day, and remembers only the last. He asserts of all hours of the day, and all days of the year, and

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all the years of his life, the experience of the twelfth hour of each day. Does he err in judgment? Is he wrong? No; but we are wrong in accepting his testimony, which is that his labor is to him painful, as proof that all labor is necessarily painful. When labor-saving machinery results in saving labor, our idea of labor will be radically changed. It will cease to be considered pain, for the truth will then appear that it is excess of labor which is painful. Wealth will not perform its true ministry until it is so distributed that the necessity of excessive toil shall disappear. Then, and not till then, will the thought that labor and pain are bound together in the constitution of things be remembered among the superstitions of the past. Then, and not till then, will man have entered into the possession of that liberty which is his by nature of his manhood and rendered possible by the service of inventions.

The chief difficulties in discussing questions of such grand proportions as the one now claiming our attention is that they quickly pass beyond what we are accustomed to regard as the range of our own personal influence, and we, consequently, cease to feel any very direct responsibility for what the outcome may be. Or, should it happen that our temperament be of that peculiarly serious cast which renders it imperative for its unfortunate owner to carry the destinies of the world on his puny shoulders, the chances are that, as a result of contemplating the great possibilities of our civilization and the dangers by which it is beset, we shall fall into line with that most disagreeable of all social humbugs—the professional reformer. Now, I should regard it as a misfortune if my emphasis of the wonderful possibilities of the present lead to either of these results; and in order to guard against such a perversion of reason, and at the same time to render our theme practical in its bearings, it may be well, passing over the many difficult and technical problems which beset economists and statesmen, to consider the lesson which this theme has for the simple, cheerful, pure-minded, ordinary folk. For if the common people can be brought to think rightly respecting the ministry of wealth, the intricate social and

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industrial problems will be put quickly into the process of self-solution.

As a starting-point in this personal unfolding of our theme, let us turn to the words of the poet already quoted. He does not, be it remembered, content himself with saying that labor should be pleasant in the doing, but adds that nothing should be made by man's work which is not worth the making, or which must be made by labor degrading to the worker. Consider for a moment this claim by putting it to yourselves. Should work not be worth the doing? Can men enjoy work which is not worth the doing? Can one expect the growth of a noble character, which without doubt is the ultimate end of the ministry of wealth, when all the working-hours of the week are given to labor which has no rational purpose? The dignity of man may be preached from all the pulpits of the land, but mankind can never be brought to appreciate the essential worthiness of life until all have work that is worth the doing, and so manifestly worth the doing that its worthiness may be seen of all.

It may not be easy, imbued as we are with that monstrous idea that the social function of the rich is to eat cake that the poor may find bread, to distinguish between what is worthy and what is unworthy. In general, I should say that work alone is worthy which serves some useful purpose or satisfies some instinct of beauty; and that work is unworthy which ministers to vanity or ostentation, or which feeds personal ambition. If, now, it be true that men may be made worthy by doing worthy things, it is the consumer who stands at the source of influence, and who, by the character of his purchases, determines the character of the industrial organization. It is, therefore, in their capacity as consumers that the common people enter into their dominion of power. For, consider how easy it is to exert a positive influence on the future destiny of the race. All one has to do is to cultivate his own tastes so as to desire those things which are worthy because they are beautiful and useful. The soul grows to be like that upon which it feeds, and by demanding beauty and nobility for itself becomes beautiful and noble. But this is not all.

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Forces are in this manner set in motion which cause others to work upon those things that minister to beauty and nobility, and they, in turn, through the influence of personal contact with the idea embodied in the things upon which they work, grow into a character like that which the purchaser set as a model for his own striving.

Profound ideas are frequently ignored because they are so simple; and it may be this is the fate of the thought I am now endeavoring to present. To enforce this thought by illustration brings us at once into the realm of homely things. When you purchase a gown, do not purchase shoddy, for in so doing you perpetuate the character of shoddy among the workers. When you furnish a house, do not contract with a decorator who is less artistic than yourself, but insist that he come to an appreciation of your finer sense of harmony as regards color and light. Should you desire furniture, do not permit the salesman to influence your purchase unless you are quite sure he is a man of taste, but, having studied the lines and curves which have proved restful to your mothers, your grandmothers, and your great-grandmothers, demand such lines and curves in what you buy.

In short, in all you purchase, remember this, that if you demand worthy things, the men who make them will grow into worthy lives, but if you demand what is unworthy, they will be condemned to wearisome labor in order to gain the means of continuing a life that has no worthy end. Work, then, must be made worthy for the sake of the worker. This is one of the great lessons which a consideration of the true ministry of wealth teaches.

There is, however, another lesson equally simple and equally profound. Let us remind ourselves that the mastery which man has achieved over nature cannot result in a soul-satisfying civilization unless the opportunities which it creates are enjoyed with some fair degree of equality by all members of society. If this be true, it is essential that opportunity to work under favorable conditions should be kept open for all men. It is this thought which lies at the basis of much of the criticism of present society, and which serves as the chief

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complaint of socialists. The instruments of production, they say, are for the purpose of securing the means of satisfying developed wants. This, and this only, is the service of wealth; and when, by virtue of ownership over the instruments of production, the industrial organization is made subservient to ambition, it is perverted to an end for which there is no rational justification. It is not right, assert these critics, that a few men should lie in the path of progress and, like sponges, absorb to themselves all the increments of developing industry. All who have studied socialistic schemes or read socialistic dreams will remember how they provide that, after a man has toiled for a certain number of years, the duties which he performs are made lighter, until finally, in the evening of life, he is freed from all but optional work. I am confident this idea of a social organization has greater merit than the one realized in our present society, according to which a man works the harder the older he grows, until he comes to be simply a working machine; and, as an advocate of the philosophy of individualism against socialism, I am forced to ask if there is no way by which this socialistic idea of leisure with declining years may be realized under the present legal structure of society. It is no reply to say that men are now at liberty to give up work when they have accumulated sufficient for the means of living, for the habit contracted during formative years of life is so strong it cannot be broken. It is in the spirit of the age to overwork.

As the matter appears to me, there is a way by which this ideal may be realized, and, as in the case of worthy work, the influence upon which reliance must be placed is in the keeping of the common people. What the world needs at the present time more than anything else is the development of the amenities and courtesies of life. It is the gospel of beauty rather than the gospel of duty which fits the requirements of our times. If life could be made pleasant, so that business would be an adjunct to living rather than, as in so many cases, living an adjunct to business, the industrial phase of social activity might be confined to its proper place, and wealth become the means of attaining a better civilization. At present,

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men do not work simply to satisfy the requirements of highly developed wants, but to gain and maintain a place of authority in business society. It is not wealth for which men strive, but riches; it is not the desire to satisfy normal wants that serves as the motive to industry, but the ambition to be accounted wealthy. It is this which explains why our marvellous industrial organization has been prostituted to personal ambition rather than to the more rapid elevation of the standard of rational living.

There is but one way by which all this can be changed, and that is by making the desire of a pleasant life supplant the passion of accumulation. When the claims of domestic happiness are so strong, or the charms of social intercourse so fascinating, that they take precedence as motives of conduct over the desire of accumulation, industrial society will take upon itself a new character. Men will no longer continue to accumulate beyond the requirements of rational living, but, having provided for themselves, will step aside and give opportunity to others. This they will do, not from any sense of moral duty, but because they desire to reap the rewards of their labor in the pleasure of living. And so I assert again, it is the gospel of beauty and not of duty which the world needs at present.

It is, of course, impossible, from what has been said, to appreciate in all its bearings so profound a subject as the social ministry of wealth; but it is believed a few thoughts of the humbler sort have been brought into prominence. In the first place, we are enabled by the foregoing analysis to appreciate the true dignity of a business career. It is the inventors, and the men who have a talent for industrial combination, who have laden these times with such marvellous possibilities. It is for us to understand this, and to live such lives that these possibilities may be realized. It is these same men, also, who have created the industrial conditions in which labor may be severed from pain and mankind freed from the drudgery of toil. It is for us to infuse such a spirit into living that the accretion of power brought with machinery can be the heritage of all men. For we must

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not forget that the development of a civilization with a high idea of living is the true ministry of wealth.

More practical in its bearing is the thought that, so interlaced are the industrial relations of modern times, one's character can diffuse itself through one's purchases, and, by directing labor to this or that channel of activity, elevate or degrade the character of the laboring population.

But profounder than all else is the last consideration to which our analysis leads. A new form of slavery seems to be born of modern industry,—the slavery of the business man to the fascination of his business. The evil results of this are manifold. Not only is it misery for the man when at last the competition of younger men drives him from the street where his life has been spent, but so long as business ambition is stronger than any other motive in life, the commercial forces which should distribute wealth and render the benefits of machinery general and equal in the community, cannot work in a normal manner. It is the most serious criticism which one can make on American civilization, that business men cannot retire from business because they have nothing to retire to: they have no interests but business interests, and no passion but the passion of accumulation. Wealth cannot serve as the basis of a soul-satisfying civilization so long as this remains true, and this will remain true until young men and young women are given a taste of the highest pleasures while their characters are yet in a plastic condition. A man of fortune, who desires to exert an enduring influence on his times, can do so by making ample provision for presenting the highest grade of music, drama, and art to the student at any of our great centres of learning.

In the town of Ann Arbor, to use a specific illustration, there gather each year between thirty-three and thirty-four hundred young men and women in pursuit of an education. They come from every State in the Union, but for the most part from the Middle and Western States. They are fired with an ambition to succeed in business or in the professions, but they have slight appreciation of the amenities, courtesies, and social pleasures of life. Many of these young

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men will succeed during the next generation in making their fortunes, but, having made their fortunes, will not know how to occupy their time, except in continuous accumulation. Now, let it be assumed that opportunity be given them during their academic and university career of listening each week to the highest order of music, or of seeing from time to time the best that art can afford. Is it not certain that an avenue of enjoyment would be opened to them which would change the current of their lives? Is it not also certain that they would carry this acquired appreciation of what is truly beautiful to their homes, and so introduce into the western part of the United States a spirit which would ultimately change the character of the American people? I can conceive of no greater opportunity offered a wealthy man to direct the growth of American civilization than the one suggested above. It is by some such means, at least, that the wonderful facilities for the production of wealth which characterize the nineteenth century may be wrested from the service of degrading ambition and made to perform the social function to which the logic of history declares it is called.

HENRY C. ADAMS.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

STATE CREATION OF OLD AGE DISTRESS IN ENGLAND: AN ASPECT OF OLD AGE PENSIONS.

The Question at Issue.—The main question at issue is not one of ways and means, of the amount of taxation which would be necessitated, and of the method of administration required, should a State Endowment of Old Age be created in England. That question of taxation no doubt exists, but it is, after all, of minor importance, because it is in essence merely a question of readjustment. The burden is already borne by the community. Old age is, however inefficiently and unsatisfactorily, endowed at present. The old are main-

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tained without being compelled to do work; for the somewhat sufficient reason that they are unable to do any.

It is the establishing of an endowment which may be accepted as a right, which conveys no implication of humiliation and insult, that is in question. There are, and there have been, such endowments in the history of old age.

There were old age pensions in England, accepted without dishonor, in the time of Edward I. There are old age pensions of a like kind in Russia, existing from time immemorial.

In other words, where, among the European races, the unity of the family persists, and the group, of which the family is a part, retains its hold of the land, the old age pension, the widow pension, the orphan pension, are in vigor. If for no other reason, they would exist as the result of the ordinary rules which forbid murder.

The present problem in England arises from the dissolution of the family, and the separation of the family from access to the land. It is specially acute in England because both processes have gone to further extremes than in other European countries.

It is from this point of view I propose to consider the question of Old Age Pensions. The Royal Commission recently appointed marks the growth of public opinion on the subject, and will no doubt consider the form of appropriate legislation. Many writers, such as Mr. Charles Booth, have ably considered the question in its economic bearings. Others have treated of the manner in which, in Denmark, Germany, and elsewhere, efforts have been made to solve the problem. The historic aspect of the question is worth consideration.

The Action of the State in the Creation of Old Age Distress.— Many of the causes of old age distress in England are modern. All are the outcome of the disintegration of the family and its separation from the land.

It is obvious that in that process of disintegration and separation it is the helpless members of the group who must inevitably encounter the stress of suffering.

I maintain that the redress of the resulting evils is a duty

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binding on the state—a duty of historic justice, as well as of present expediency.

In the interest of the king, the lord, and the trader, the state has shattered the family as an economic entity. In the interest of the king, the lord, and the trader, the state has separated the group from the land. In so far as the action of the state contributed to the freeing of the individual, it was of the highest utility—the evil has been only of excess. In so far as the action of the state separated the group from the land, it was in the main harmful, although temporary benefits served to conceal its ultimate tendency. But, right or wrong, the action throughout has been that of the state, and the state should redress. The community has broken down the natural supports of the weaker members of the minor groups, and it should replace them.

What may be described as the Action of the State.—I do not purpose to maintain that the community of England of to-day is responsible for nothing in the past deeds which it sanctioned but those arising from the action of the legislative and judicial organs of the state. Nor am I to be understood to say that of everything, or even of every law, to be found in English history, these organs are the originators. It is therefore merely to keep on undisputed ground that I purpose to invite attention only to the laws of England emanating from the legislature and the tribunals. No one will deny that for this action in the past the present state is responsible.

Now, what has been the action of the state, so defined, in its bearing on the problem of destitute old age? It may be summarized in the statement, that the state has broken up the land-holding group which enclosed the family, and has broken up the family as an economic unit.

The objects of the state—of the organized community or of its ruling classes—have been various; but the chief results have been the freeing from responsibility of the stronger members of the scattered groups, and the helplessness of the weaker members,—the old, the women, the children.

The State and the Family.—The evolution of modern English law separate from that of Normandy begins with the thir-

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teenth century. Taking this period as our starting-point, we find that the family then existed in England with exceedingly strict rights of succession and maintenance binding its members. These duties rested in much on the Canon Law, not less rigorous in this respect than the French Code; that is to say, the conceptions of mutual duty.

Now, it would lead me too far afield to endeavor here to trace successive modifications of these ideas. What was directly changed by the state was not the ideas, but the power to carry them into effect.

In the thirteenth century, in England, the rights of the family over the property of the individual, and his duty to provide for the helpless members of his immediate kindred, were indefeasible by law. In the nineteenth century these rights have disappeared. How has that transformation been effected?

1. Abrogation of Family Rights: Primogeniture.

In the twelfth century, as Glanville shows us, nearly all the land of England was distributable on the death of the holder equally among his sons. In the thirteenth century we find from Bracton that the itinerant judges of the king have practically trampled out this custom, and have introduced, as applicable to ordinary tenures, the law of primogeniture. This latter "insolent privilege" applied originally only to military tenures dating from William the Norman. It was unknown to the Anglo-Saxons; and the custom of Kent now exists as a survival of freer times, and a living protest against the robbery of the younger members of the family. The pernicious influence of primogeniture, a true heritage of mediæval barbarism, and a constant example of triumphant injustice, persists in full vigor at this moment.

2. Abrogation of Family Rights: Disposition of Property during Life.

In tracing the growth of the power of the holder to deal with property of which he was the titular owner, legal historians usually confine their attention to pointing out the increasing liberty of the individual, and alleged incidental advantages to trade. They leave out of sight the most important result,—the extinction of the rights of his dependents in his own family.

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The settled policy of the king and his judges, and afterwards of the Parliament, was for centuries to enable the individual to dispose of his property, and so destroy the rights of his family. Goods were of minor importance at first, so the ordinary law of the market was applicable to them without any serious inroad on family rights. But the right to dispose of land was practically introduced for the bulk of land-holders by an ordinance of Edward I., called the statute "Quia Emptores," issued at the end of the thirteenth century. This policy was continued by the statutes Merchant and Staple in the following century, allowing the pledging of lands: the origin in England of a vast system of loans on mortgage. The culmination was reached by a statute of Elizabeth, two centuries later, actually allowing an individual to sell lands which he had already settled in discharge of family claims—whenever the settlement is made after marriage. This complete defiance of all ideas of distributive justice was in force when this paper was written, and has only been abrogated in the year 1893.

3. Abrogation of Family Rights: Disposition of Property by Will.

The history of the Law of Wills in England is a similar record of the destruction of the rights of the family. No doubt the law of primogeniture and the barbarous rule as to illegitimacy gave license of testation some appearance of usefulness; as testation enabled the holder to distribute his land more equitably than the law. A like cause, indeed, produced in the Roman law the original testament. But as regards other property than freehold land, the innovation was productive of little but evil from the first; and as regards all property —land and goods—the power became an instrument of widespread injustice. The vindictive, the vainglorious, the superstitious testator was enabled to defy justice by a posthumous robbery of those who naturally depended on his succession.

It would be tedious to trace in detail the gradually increasing license of testation. Before the Reformation, as regards lands, it depended on a system of secret trusts enforced by the ecclesiastical Chancellors. Under Henry VIII.

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the power was made statutory, although limited in extent. Under the Stuarts it was still further extended. Few except lawyers realize that as regards lands it was not completed, and that, too, in a most dangerous feature, until the present century. It was not until 1833 that the Dower Act abolished the widow's compulsory share of her husband's freehold lands, strictly speaking, indefeasible by creditors or husband; although for centuries conveyancers had vied with each other in framing instruments to defeat her claim by legal chicane. As regards other lands than freehold, and as regards goods, family claims reduced to those of the widow and children were indefeasible until the last century in all England and Wales, except portions of the province of Canterbury. Statutes of Queen Anne and George II. completed this part of family spoliation. It is a fact to be remembered that when Anne came to the throne every English child and English wife in London and in the province of York had the same indefeasible right to provision for maintenance as is now possessed by the wife and child in Scotland.

4. Abrogation of Family Rights: the Trader preferred to the Family.

We now come to a darker phase of the destruction of the rights of the family. The power of free disposition by the individual in life or at death, in accordance with his own wishes, was, after all, in a time when family ties were strong, less likely to do practical injustice than in later days, when these ties became attenuated. The real blow which License of Testation dealt at the helpless dependents consists in its denial to them of any legal right to the property of the individual; and, as a consequence, the subjection of that property to the power of the creditor.

A stream of parliamentary and judicial enactments subjected the property of the individual to his creditors' claims. It is, however, startling to reflect that it was not until the present reign that no reservation whatever was made of the rights of his dependents. Goods were always seizable, but in early times were of trivial importance—the chief property was land. The traders' king, Edward I., in his ordinance

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styled the statute of Elegit, conferred on creditors power at their election to seize half a debtor's lands. A statute of Victoria enables them to seize all.

The statute of Elizabeth, already referred to, rendered void in favor of creditors settlements of property in discharge of family claims, classing these as "voluntary," that is, without consideration to support their validity in law. This was an extreme step; but the climax was reached in preferring the usurer to the child by the imposition on wage-earners and property holders, although non-traders, of the international commercial law of bankruptcy, properly confined to traders in Continental countries. The present reign is again signalized by the completion of this invasion of family rights. The settlement on helpless dependents is ruthlessly disregarded—in the case of wife or child, if made after marriage; in the case of other dependents, whenever made.

The power of the creditor has been enormously increased by the revolution in recent times in the relative value of property classed as real and that classed as personal. More than all, it has been rendered of tenfold rigor by the absence of any general custom of settling property as a family provision—the custom in England being confined to the rich. Dr. Kenny, in his interesting work on this branch of the law, points out that in England the rich took care to contract themselves out of law; and that every marriage settlement is at once a protest against the law, and a security for its permanence as regards the poor.

The State and the Manor: Separation of the Family from the Land.—The origin of the manor is one of the burning questions of the history of institutions. Fustel de Coulanges, Seebohm, and others trace it to the villa of the Roman proprietor in Britain or Gaul, with its serfs in the prædial slaves, and its freeholders in the *coloni adscriptitii glebæ*, who were free and citizens. Sir Henry Maine and the German school find its origin in the free, self-governing Teutonic village community. On which side of the controversy the truth lies, it is unnecessary here to consider—apart from the fact that, as in other controversies, the truth may be on both sides. What is

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important to note is that in its actual working in the thirteenth century the manor in England provided secure sustenance for every one born on the soil. Under no possible circumstances, short of general famine, could poverty arise to the aged, the child, or the woman, and be treated as a crime. The dissolution of the manor is therefore the beginning of the causes which have produced the modern problem,—the distress of the helpless members of the family. It also produced that gigantic portent which looms over all modern English history, —the presence of a class of laborers, constituting the bulk of the community, with no access to the land guaranteed by law.

The causes of the dissolution of the manor may be summed up in one phrase: The state broke up the manor. The process begins with the termination of the thirteenth century. The king, the lord, and the trader played the same part in the dissolution of the agricultural community as for centuries they played in the progressive disruption of the family. The tax on wool, granted to Edward I. by the community of merchants, is the key to the disintegration of the manor and the separation of the people from the land. It shows how the interest of the king, the lord, and the trader converged to a focus. The king, then the sole legislator, facilitated the operations of trade as furnishing to him the readiest and least troublesome source of revenue. Therefore, in the forcible language of More's "Utopia," "sheep devoured men." As the king and the trader wanted wool, the lord met the demand by turning the common lands of the manor into sheep farms, evicting the villeins through fraud and chicane and by encouraging the "emancipation" of his co-villagers. As the trader wanted security, the king permitted the individual member of the agricultural community to extinguish the rights of his family by selling or pledging his land. Worse than all, as the usurer wanted exaction of his bond, the king allowed the creditor of the individual to seize half the lands which belonged to the family.

The action of the state—of the king as sole legislator, of his dependent judges, and, later, of Parliament—has been in

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part described in considering its effect on the family. The power of the individual to alienate his family's lands by sale was rendered general by the ordinance of Edward I. called the statute "Quia Emptores." The statutes Merchant and Staple (similar ordinances) instituted pledging of lands. The ordinance styled the statute of Elegit took the fatal step of allowing the creditor to seize half the lands of the member of the agricultural community. Any one of these measures was certain to end in the disintegration of the manor, as may be seen from consideration of an Indian example. The Indian village community, which survived for thousands of years the ravages of merciless invaders, is at this moment being torn to pieces by the Anglo-Indian law of debt.

The confiscation of the common lands by the lords of manors begins with the statute of Merton, of Henry III., and was unchecked until the year of grace 1893. It is needless to say that the existence of an agricultural community depends on its possession of common lands for pasture. To deprive the community of a part of its commons is the beginning of a slow death. To deprive it of the whole is summary execution. The eviction of villeins from their lands was facilitated by the possession by the lords of the court rolls, which unfortunately were the sole title-deeds of the villeins; and by the comparative ease with which ignorant peasants could be entrapped into technical misdeeds which gave occasion to the lord to declare the lands forfeited to him.

That thoroughly misappreciated measure of the lords, aided by the king's itinerant judges—the so-called "emancipation" of the villeins in the fourteenth century—completed the destruction of the manor. If the villein, on his "emancipation," had been left in possession of his share of the manorial lands with his forced labor commuted to rent, the measure, though of doubtful ultimate advantage, might have had some show of justice. But, on the contrary, the villein was encouraged to flee from the manor. "In favorem libertatis," judges facilitated his being deprived of his land. Towns and traders wanted urban laborers, and helped to prevent the "emancipated" villein from seeing that his liberty was expropriation.

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Dr. Stubbs shows clearly that the measure was regarded by judges and lords as one in the interests of the lords.

The State and the Successors of the Manor: the Copyholders: the Yeomen. Separation of the Family from the Land.—The successors of the agricultural community in the ownership of the land were, besides the lords, the copyholders and the yeomen.

The copyholders were those villeins who still retained their membership of the manor, it having been found in some cases impracticable either to confiscate their lands or to drive them into "emancipation." This class, however, continued from the thirteenth century to the present day to be diminished by the same forces which broke up the manor—the enclosure of commons, the forfeiture of their holdings through ingenious technicalities, the seizures for debt, the power of alienation and sale; all aided by the law of primogeniture, which tended to consolidate holdings, and the system of land tenure devised by the judges, which necessitated skilled legal assistance, attainable only by the rich.

Finally, in our own day, the transformation of these holdings in villein tenure is complete. The law of the market, operating on them for centuries, has rendered copyhold tenure only one of the modes of holding landed property, and not, as in early times, a tenure possible only to those who cultivated the soil.

The yeomen, free farmers, not members of any manor, at first shared with the lords much of the spoil which arose from the destruction of the manors. Owning their land as freeholders, they constituted a large and important class, with access to the land guaranteed by law. Their disappearance has been truly described as a great unnoticed English revolution. Even as late as 1790 there were one hundred and sixty thousand yeomen peasant proprietors, constituting with their families one-seventh of the population of England. In 1890 they had disappeared. The action of the state, as already described, was the cause of their extinction.

The confiscation of the common lands, one of the chief causes, has gone on to the present day. Between 1710 and

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1843 no less than 7,660,000 acres of common lands, amounting to one-third of the cultivable area of England, were enclosed by lords of manors under powers conferred by successive Acts of Parliament. State-enacted seizure for debt, judge-made primogeniture, judge-made land tenure, all had the same operation on the yeomen's holdings as on those of the copyholders.

The State and the Landless Laborer: Separation of the Family from Capital.—The ultimate tendency of the separation of the "emancipated" villein from the land was not clearly perceivable at first. The scarcity of labor, arising from causes such as the Black Death of 1349, raised the standard of comfort among the "Free Laborers" to a very high pitch; and the fifteenth century ended before that prosperity came to a complete termination.

Nevertheless, the interference of the state never ceased, and was always exerted, from first to last, to depress the condition of the laborers, and to separate the family of the landless from capital. Two great classes of labor are to be considered—the agricultural "free" laborers, that is to say, the emancipated villeins who remained in the country, and the urban laborers, the artificers of the towns, chiefly recruited from the villeins who fled from the manors. The international system of guilds of artificers (composed of masters and workmen) appears to have been adopted in England in the thirteenth century, contemporaneously with the rise of trade and the growth of the towns, steadily favored by the policy of the king.

1. The State suppresses combinations of Labor, and fixes Wages.

The year 1350 marks the beginning of a continuous course of state interference with combinations of laborers which has lasted to our own day. The first statute of laborers of Edward III. was intended to prevent workers obtaining higher wages after the Black Death. That is to say, the villein must be taught that he was "emancipated" for the benefit of his lord; he must not make use of his liberty to benefit himself. The regulation of agricultural labor was primarily the object

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of the statute; but the power of the artificers—as apart from their masters—to combine was also struck at; and a long series of statutes, consolidated under Elizabeth, fixed the rate of wages.

Laborers were forced by imprisonment to accept wages so fixed. It is a curious fact, of which political economists who deprecate state interference with the capitalist should take note, that under these very statutes wages were fixed by magistrates in the second decade of the nineteenth century.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the whole guild system—which to some extent enabled artificers, in conjunction with their masters, to control the supply of labor, and so keep up wages—was undermined, and finally destroyed, by the judges, who, by a restrictive interpretation of the statute of apprentices, passed in the reign of Elizabeth, enabled the regulations of the system to be evaded.

The interference of the state with combinations of workers has continued to the present day. The rise of the trade unions dates from the judicial destruction of the trade guilds in the last century. Since then the judges have repeatedly held trade unions to be illegal conspiracies, as being "in restraint of trade." Recent statutes have given a qualified legality to the unions.

2. The State lowers Wages by Vagrant Acts and Poor Law.

The effect of the statutes of laborers in lowering wages was intensified to an extraordinary degree by the vagrant acts for the "relief" of the poor, passed on the suppression of the monasteries. Making poverty a punishable crime of course forces the laborer to accept any wage he can get.

An Act of Edward VI. revived in fact and in name the status of slavery in England; providing that so-called "vagrants" of either sex should be adjudged the chattel slaves—liable to be flogged, sold, and left by will—of any one willing to take them.

That policy is by no means discontinued. In 1893 poverty is a punishable crime in England. The punishment is imprisonment for such time as the offence is persisted in,—usually in all cases, necessarily in the case of the feeble, for life.

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3. The State lowers Wages by altering the incidence of Taxation.

In the seventeenth century the state deliberately altered the incidence of taxation, and placed it on the shoulders of the landless laborer, instead of, as under the feudal system, on that of the owners of land. This policy is not earlier than the Commonwealth. Up to that time, with few exceptions other than the tax on wool, the burden of expenditure, national and local, and particularly that of the military defence of the country, rested with the landowners. The system of modern state finance begins with the statute of tenures of Charles II., sanctioning the relief of landholders from military burdens introduced under the Commonwealth. That system has ever since tended more and more to place all burdens on necessaries consumed by the landless laborers, and so to separate their families from capital.

The State and the Helpless: Suppression by the State of Endowments for the Sick and Disabled, and for the Aged, the Widow, and the Orphan.—The economy of the English state under the manorial system provided for the accidental breakdown of the family organization, and for its occasional inability to meet the stress of inevitable accident, as disease to individuals, or of partial failure of crops, or like calamities affecting a wider area. In the sixteenth century, the state—through the king, Henry VIII., and his subservient Parliament—deliberately suppressed these provisions of a humaner age.

The misappropriation of the lands of the monasteries to private uses was one of the heaviest blows dealt by the state at the helpless members of the community. The lands were undoubtedly administered by the monasteries as a provision against calamity—a national pension and accident fund for all the community of England. The excuses made by modern economists for this flagrant spoliation of the poor amount in substance to nothing more than the quite irrelevant statement that the monasteries did not constitute an economical medium for administering the fund, and that the system entailed incidental disadvantages. These observations would be very

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appropriate if the state had simply secularized the lands, while retaining their public dedication. Whether or not it was true, as was alleged, that the undeserving received relief, one thing was certain—that the deserving were not refused; and the function of the state to provide against unmerited calamity was discharged as one of the highest duties to "God's poor," and not as a branch of the penal administration. Aid was given and received as a right, and neither the giver nor the receiver dreamt of it as a degradation.

This policy of plunder was aggravated in its results by the confiscation by the same Parliament of the lands of the trade guilds, on the pretext that some minor portion of the revenue was usually devoted to "superstitious uses." Even the hardiest "economist" has not ventured a word of palliation for this plundering of the landless laborer.

The very hour that marked these confiscations signalized the beginning of the barbarous code of vagrant acts and poor law.

The State's Duty of Reparation.—The conclusion to which these considerations lead us is, that the state in England has by its direct action struck away the props of the weaker members of the community. By shattering the family as an economic whole, it has deprived them of their claims on the stronger members of the family group. By separating the family from the land, it has deprived the stronger members of their power to discharge their duties to the weaker. A duty lies on the modern state—on the organized community of England—to make reparation; a duty not of charity but of justice.

The state should either replace the old or substitute a new support. The only new one possible is the state. The only old one which can be restored is the family. Those who are convinced of the inherent danger to liberty of any avoidable increase of the administration of the state, and convinced of the truth that individual liberty is the condition of progress and civilization, will advocate the restoration of the family.

It is, indeed, true that the restoration of the mutual duties of the family in their economic relations is only half of the

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measures necessary to be taken to restore the balance of justice. Access to the land must also, in one form or another, be secured. As to this latter duty of historic justice, it is, however, fortunately unnecessary to argue here. Able and enthusiastic advocates have rendered the task superfluous. This, however, cannot be said as to the policy of restoring the solidarity of the family.

The Economic Solidarity of the Family.—The ignoring of the pivotal importance of strengthening the family relations is a phenomenon which is purely English, and purely modern English. It is not Scottish or Continental. As has been shown, it is not traceable in the policy of the founders of the Commonwealth. The reign of Victoria has, in fact, marked its culmination.

Not, indeed, that there is any articulate denial. The fact is, that current English opinion has placed the importance of the solidarity of the family in the category of those truths so well known that they can safely be neglected. It is a case of oblivion rather than denial.

But the effect is none the less marked in actual opinion. An English student of comparative legislation is usually unprepared to find how close are family ties on the Continent of Europe, as evidenced—though the evidence falls short of the reality—by the civil and criminal codes. The reciprocal rights and duties of parent and child, and of ascendant and descendant, in France, appear to him to be extraordinary in their definiteness. They are mutually obliged, if they have the means, to support each other. They cannot in life or at death convey their property to stranger individuals, or to so-called charities. The English student's surprise becomes greater at finding, for instance, that the Italian civil code gives the sister a right to maintenance by her brother; but it becomes amazement at finding that the father-in-law and the son-in-law are under similar obligations. Failing to realize the corporate existence of the family in France, English newspapers cannot find words to express their sense of the unreason of identifying a President with the acts of his son-in-law; American judges overflow with indignation at a French court decreeing maintenance

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against a wealthy father-in-law, and actually refuse to enforce the decree as "contrary to public policy."

Yet the truth is that the economic solidarity of the family, as the basis of the civilization of the European race, is not merely recognized as an axiom of legislation by all the states of the family of nations within the code of international law, but is the basis of the common law of England, and rested beneath all the historic achievements of the English people.

The oblivion by the English mind in later days of the importance of this fundamental relation is attributable to many causes. As the chief is to be mentioned the fact, noted by Dr. Kenny, that the rich took care to contract themselves out of the law,—that is to say, the class which mainly forms and directs public opinion on legislation. The interests, ever growing, of trade had, as has been shown, a like tendency. Democratic haste, which identified family duties with anti-social family exclusiveness rather than mutual helpfulness, contributed; as did English sturdiness and self-reliance, which disliked the tension of subordination, as well as the enervation springing from leaning on others, forgetting that a feeling proper enough for the strong becomes inappropriate when applied to the weaker by sex or age. Again, the separation of the family from the land destroyed in many millions of cases the power of discharging duties of mutual help. Many other causes, religious and social, mental and physical, contributed; among the latest of which is to be enumerated the socialist movement, which is instinctively and of necessity opposed to any strengthening of family claims,—wishing to see the family merged in the state.

For practical statesmen it is enough to be reminded that the modern European family in all states of the European race the world over, the natural group following defined lines of male descent, with organized internal subordination to male leadership, with duties of mutual aid, is the primal cell of our whole social system—the system of that commonwealth of states, the inheritors of European civilization. The only alternative is barbaric practice unveiled, or veiled under socialistic sophistries, which proceed from a misapplication of

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the American doctrine of equality down to Thibetan gynæocracy.

But as the institution of the European family is ignorantly attacked, let us remember, once again, that—as a secure protection for the weak; as the tribunal which rewards qualities incapable of appreciation by the rude scales of the state; as the organization which confides government to the fit test; as the guarantee at once of the free growth of the individual, of the continuity of European civilization, and of European leadership of the human race—its importance is vital.

Notwithstanding the oblivion of the importance of the economic side of these vital truths to which English law bears witness, there are most significant indications of awakening. The English-speaking people who form the law of the United States of America appear at last to realize the injustice of the judicial imposition of the law of the market on the helpless dependents of the non-trader. They now practically recognize that the right of the wife and child is to be preferred to that of the usurer. The homestead exemption laws, following the enlightened laws of Pennsylvania and other States on the *beneficium competentiæ* of the debtor, mark the beginning of the reaction. The restoration of the economic solidarity of the family must be the end.

Application of the Principle—Solidarity of the Family.—The restoration which seems to be required is the restoration of the principle that the family is an economic unit with duties of mutual assistance. The indefeasible succession of the family—the compulsory division of all property of the individual on his death—has, it is true, its advantages. It would at least have prevented the growth of such gigantic fortunes as now threaten the civil liberty of the citizen of the United States, where the bulk of the wealth of the country is possessed by a mere handful of men. But it has obvious disadvantages, which need not here be dwelt upon.

The application of the principle which is attended by fewest drawbacks would seem to be that suggested by Mill—a limitation of the claim to a competency instead of a proportional share.

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Should it become necessary, as seems probable, for the protection of the institution of private property, to set bounds on accumulation in the hands of a few, that object can be better attained, as Mill shows, by fixing a limit to the amount obtainable by gift or inheritance, rather than by a system of compulsory division within the family.

Old Age Pensions.—As a concrete measure, therefore, what is to be said on the policy of state endowment of old age? The answer to that question I have endeavored to give in the foregoing pages. It can only be regarded as a state duty of historic reparation.

It will be obvious, however, that if the more far-seeing policy of restoration be adopted,—restoration of the unity of the family; restoration of access to the land,—the state endowment of old age, though demanding a large allocation of the public revenue in the immediate present, while the present disorganization exists, would gradually become of less and less importance, until finally, as a permanent institution, it would remain merely as a state security against the breakdown of the organization of the family.

It will also be clear that the measure, though just and useful, is no complete remedy of itself, and fails to strike at the root of the causes of old-age distress in England.

But the fact that the measure may not be permanently required, and that it cannot be all-sufficing, renders it none the less urgent. Old age having been despoiled should be endowed; it is a duty of historic reparation.

"Laissez faire," as a policy, comes too late and too soon.

M. J. FARRELLY.

MIDDLE TEMPLE, LONDON.

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ITALY AND THE PAPACY.

THE story is related that during the early stages of the reconstructive period in Italy, an English statesman remarked to an Italian minister, "I consider it impossible for a nation to exist without a pronounced religious basis," and that the latter answered, "We Italians are going to try the experiment." This is an instance in which the saying, *se non è vero, è ben trovato*, applies. Both assertions depict with startling vividness the difficult and knotty nature of the relations between Italy and the papacy, and the superficial manner in which we Italians are accustomed to treat them.

It cannot be denied that special, almost unique, conditions confront us when we consider the religious situation in Italy, —conditions such as are met with in no other Catholic country. In Italy, Catholicism had its grand historic centre. Rome was the seat of the papacy, and, besides being the spiritual metropolis of the Christian world, it was also the temporal capital of the ecclesiastical states. For this reason papal Catholicism has assumed such characteristic shape that in many respects no one would compare it with Catholicism as it exists in France, for example, and still less with Catholicism as it flourishes in Germany and the United States,—nations at bottom evangelical and Protestant. These are the causes that contribute to render the relations between Italy and the papacy a complex problem. This problem has two aspects: one political and historical, and the other spiritual and moral; and it is one of the most pressing and perplexing problems that have arisen during the new life of the nation.

It is now more than a quarter of a century since this problem presented itself. Nowadays we live so fast, and the current of events is so rapid and impetuous, that it gives us no pause. For this reason a quarter of a century might seem a *longum ævi spatium;* it is, at any rate, a sufficiently long time to ask ourselves in what manner we Italians have decided to attempt the solution of the problem.

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To attempt to give an answer to this question may not seem out of place in a journal of this kind. The subject we are considering does not relate exclusively to Italian conditions, for it treats not only of the present and future of the Italian people, but also of the future of the papacy. Is it not true, besides, that the existence of all Christian nations is so closely interwoven that the vicissitudes and fate of one react on the other? Hence, the religious and political condition of Italy cannot but be a subject of international interest.

I.

It is not rare to hear it said in Italy, or even to read in the most widely circulated journals, that the dissension with the papacy is due to a single cause,—the struggle for the possession of temporal power. It is further believed that the question might easily and promptly be settled if Rome were removed from the power of the Pope. Does not this fashion of solving the problem remind one of the ostrich that hides its head under its wing and then imagines itself unseen by the hunter? Our problem is not a new one. It began by logical necessity on the very day when the Italians first entered Rome as victors, and it remains the same, with precisely the same sharply defined features. In fact, from that day on, the supreme directing thought of the Vatican policy has been a single one,—to reconquer Rome and regain temporal power; and, in order to succeed in this aim, nothing has been left untried. The fiery and choleric complaints of Pius IX., which agree so well with his impetuous and demonstrative Italian nature, subject alike to sudden enthusiasm and to fiery outbursts of passion, his successor has not in the least contradicted. He has certainly followed on the whole the same path; and, besides, by carrying out his policy in a calm and calculating manner, he has given it a more serious character and produced a deeper impression. Thus, however briefly we consider the conduct of Leo XIII., from his first Encyclical of August, 1878, up to his last speech before the Consistory, we see at once the inner and central motive of his policy. We find it conceived with subtlety and jesuitical foresight, but no less with wonderful

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objectivity and great adjustment of means to ends, entirely worthy of the secular tradition of the Roman Curia. He has endeavored to reconcile the papacy with as many nations as possible, though they be heretical and schismatic; to gain and regain, even at the cost of humiliation and dishonorable transactions, their sympathies and their good graces, in order to make use of all of this influence to the injury of Italy and the benefit of the Church. And the fact is that the results have partly corresponded to the desires of the Pope.

One of the most noteworthy points of this policy was the attitude of the Pope towards republicanism in France, causing the great majority of the French people to entertain a friendly disposition towards the Vatican, at least politically. But indicative of far greater importance is the spectacle of the German Emperor coquetting with the Vatican, and the submissive and servile attitude of Germany, even of the Protestants, towards the papacy. Seen in this light, the visits of William II. to Leo XIII., together with concessions and condescensions resembling farces and carnival performances, are none the less significant as displaying the conciliatory and submissive spirit of him who has lent himself to such an attitude. What a contrast with the time when Bismarck, the great Chancellor, exclaimed before the Reichstag (April 20, 1875), "The Church is now the Pope. The Pope is the enemy of the Gospel. The Pope is the enemy of the State and of Germany." At that time it would have been absurd to prophesy so extreme a change in the attitude of Germany towards the papal court; and to-day, when such a prophecy has been made true, does it not seem on the part of Germany like a denial of Luther and the Reformation, and of all the spiritual and moral movements which have sprung from the Reformation? How is it possible for any one to forget that the religious principle of Germany is the most absolute and substantial negation of the very title and claim of the papacy; and that, on the other hand, the papal principle is the most ardent and irreconcilable enemy of Germany, and that the papacy cannot rest in peace until it is able to defeat the spirit and destroy the culture of this adversary?

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Whatever the cause may be of this forgetfulness (which gives rise to the supposition that the ethical and political intuitions of the Germans are nowadays characterized by a great deal of incoherency, which is perhaps opportunistic but really sceptical as well), the fact that it has become a reality should serve us Italians as a useful warning, and lead us to reflect on the unstability and uncertainty of human affairs. To be sure, we have now the Triple Alliance; thanks to which the Catholic world seems to respect us in the possession of Rome. But can we expect the Triple Alliance to last forever?

It would certainly be folly to overlook the possibilities of a political problem that is gradually growing more menacing. We must acknowledge not only that the problem exists, but also the fact that the present historic conditions of Europe allow the Pope to undo Italy, and do not prevent the papacy from concentrating its whole power on a plan of this kind; and if we are asked what the future may bring, it is not easy to answer. Rome is not a city that can be taken by cannon-shot. Rome is a system, a faith, a religion. Against the intrigues and dangers at home and abroad of a religion, there is safety only in religion. And who can with any certainty affirm that, unexpected events being given, a revolution may not occur in the views and ideas of the world concerning the temporal power and the possession of Rome? And in this case, as the multitude with us are Catholics and disposed in their hearts to bow to the Holy Father and to adore him, it is difficult to foretell how we can derive the material power, and, more difficult still, the moral force sufficient to resist the pretensions of the Catholics and to sustain our own rights. It would be an entirely different matter if by a decided change in religious convictions the popular conscience should become seriously estranged from its veneration for and faith in papal authority. This would put a barrier to the encroachments of the papacy. But there would still remain the difficulty implied in coming to terms with the papacy and in giving it the respect due to it as a universal institution.

It would certainly be a great mistake to believe that the

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papacy could be actually destroyed by violence, or that it is destined to disappear from the face of the earth. The roots from whence it derives its power of conservation are far more deep and indestructible than is generally supposed. The conception of Christianity belonging to the papal church, based on objective authority and tradition, seems destined to perpetuate itself as a necessary dialectic counterpoise to the view of personal freedom and individual responsibility, which is characteristic of the evangelical church. Nevertheless, this does not imply that any one has the right to prevent us from arranging our ecclesiastical organism according to the inspiration and need of our inner life, nor that it is not precisely the way to render our historic and ideal right to a new unified national existence respectable and respected in the eyes of the Catholic world.

Why not confess it? The papacy is truly the most substantial and imposing power in the new Italy, and the Pope is the most important man among us. Be it for good or for ill, he still remains the personification of a religious principle, of an order that is a complexus of divine and imperishable ideas.

And to this we have, until now, been able to oppose only negative indifferentism and an inorganic and dissolving liberalism. And this fact, too, must not be left out of account, that while the Pope goes to work with an ardent and indefatigable spirit, we, on the other hand, abstain from taking the active part we ought to take, and remain idly by, allowing events to take their own course. Such being the position,—on one side the papacy armed with the power of its principles; on the other the Italian dynasty with its ministers and its weak and corrupt parliament and the following of us so-called liberals, sceptics, egotists,—careless of the public good, eager only to arise and remain in power and enjoy,—no less than a miracle would be needed in order that Italy might finally issue victoriously from the struggle.

> "Das ist der Wahrheit letzter Schluss;
> Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben
> Der täglich sie erobern muss."

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I well know that a great deal of reliance is placed on the acquiescence of the Vatican in the loss of temporal power, and hence in the reconciliation, sooner or later, of the papacy with Italy. It cannot be denied that this ardently desired consummation appears most seductive in the eyes of many. How convenient and pleasant it would be to have the papacy on our side, inclined to promote our interests and enterprises! It would be easy to imagine our country becoming great and powerful with the aid and co-operation of a papacy possessed with a patriotic and national spirit. But is this possible? I much fear that the inherent and unchangeable nature of affairs will prevent all likelihood of seeing this vague fancy realized of yoking the papacy to our chariot and profiting by its power. A papacy reconciled to Italy, a papacy which adjusts its own power to that of the nation, which espouses her cause and interest and helps her to make her way in the world, is a papacy which renounces its own power and significance and its cosmopolitan authority. It is a papacy, in one word, resolved first and last to annihilate itself. This possibility, therefore, remains an open question; and we must await developments before placing any confidence in such a turn of affairs.

II.

But even if a reconciliation with the papacy be possible, is it desirable as a means of bringing about a religious revival and an awakening of popular conscience? This brings before us the spiritual and moral problem.

One might deny any kind of importance to this question, could one rely on the opinions which are frequently expressed in Italy concerning the influence and effects of the papacy on religion in general and on the mind and moral character of the Italians. The marvel is that such glorifications of the papacy and the church are heard not only among the clergy, but also among the learned and cultivated of the laity. I shall mention only one man of universal fame—Bonghi—as one who is foremost among those who adhere to Catholicism, and who can be truly considered as the leader of that

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party. In his arguments, constantly bringing in religious questions, desirous, apparently, of seeing faith revived and rising to a clear, inward glow, he constantly arrives, by means of infinite variations and sophistical tergiversations, at the conclusion that the effect of the papal religion on Italy has been the very best; that the Italians should be proud of it; and that, thanks to it, they may be considered among the most elevated and religious of nations. Such opinions as these have the fatal defect, alas, of going to pieces when opposed to real facts.

The facts are these: papal Catholicism is uniformly a religion of externals, inferior in spirit to the progressive thought and elevated spirit of Christianity. Its effects on the conscience and the moral life have not proved themselves beneficially influential in the world at large, and least of all in Italy, where, for special though remote reasons, it has been dominant, and, for recent causes, has continued to hold absolute sway. We cannot deny that the condition of things at Rome is not so disgraceful nowadays as it was formerly; and, indeed, even Strauss had to recognize this. Undoubtedly the papal church has been purged from some of its worst vices: nepotism, simony, licentiousness, unbridled dissoluteness,—these, at least, have been reduced to more decent bounds. But the religious spirit remains what it was,—an incarnation of Christian truth as to the letter and not as to the spirit, a strict rule, a formal law, which holds and compels the conscience from without. Thus, with the sacraments reduced to a mechanical performance, with belief in purgatory and pecuniary offerings to liberate one's soul therefrom, with fasts and indulgences, with pilgrimages and jubilees, with relics and miracles, with adoration of the saints and of the Madonna, the papal church has finally succeeded in engrafting upon Christianity the forms of idolatry and of magical nature worship. As to the salvation of the soul, the church lays less stress on an internal change of heart than on the external and visible signs of actions—on outward effect. Thus, by doing charity, by paying for masses, buying indulgences, and making wills in favor of the church, man is saved;

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and not only can he save himself, but others as well. And the worst of all is that the sacerdotal hierarchy has been made the only and indispensable mediation to the religious and moral life. Aspiration, repentance, absolution, the efficacy of Christ, the benefit of His sacrifice, divine grace,—everything is corrupted and used as a monopoly of the hierarchy, and often made the object of scandalous trading. The priest performs the religious act. The intercession of the priest procures pardon and reward for those who do not think for themselves, and spiritually remain aloof from the religious act. The active reconciliation and union with God, which only the individual himself can experience, is accomplished for him by the priest. Faith and conviction alone can do nothing. Without the intervention of the priest, man can find neither pity nor pardon at the throne of God. Thus Catholicism substitutes a dead and servile faith for the free and living one.

It must be added, that in Italy the papacy, from the time of the Council of Trent, has by means of the Jesuits succeeded in subduing the conscience of the people and quenching all spontaneity of feeling, and reducing to silence all individual mental activity, and hence all differences as to what constitute the divine and the true. The inevitable outcome of this *régime* is that Italy has become petrified in the letter of the Catholic faith as no other Catholic country (with the exception, perhaps, of Spain and some of the republics of South America, which, nevertheless, have the advantage of not being the seat of the papal Curia); and thus the flow of ideal aspiration in religion, formerly so rich and powerful, has entirely ceased. Reduced to a purely formal act, and degraded to the rank of a mechanical function, religion has no longer any power to penetrate and move; it does not engage the moral sense, and is no longer regarded as the fundamental and human function *par excellence*. Religion is degraded, inasmuch as it has no longer the power of moving the human soul; it neither educates nor edifies men; and in fact holds them only by force of inertia and by the sluggish habit of tradition. It is, in short, degraded in the popular under-

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standing to a vulgar credulity in the midst of immense incredulity.

What can illustrate more clearly the impotence and weakness of a faith than its prejudices, superstitions, and fanaticisms? It may be said, "Better superstition than atheism;" and the saying of Vico may be quoted, "With superstition the most illustrious nations have arisen, but with atheism not one has ever been founded." We must not forget that everything is relative. When a nation so degrades itself as to live in a world of formulas, of superstition and signs, externally fixed and visible, without spiritual meaning, and then accommodates itself thereto and desires nothing else; when in its conscience there is no agitation and no aspiration,—in such a people (I mean the whole people, and not individuals) is spent or put to sleep the essential energy which leads to all forms of activity and culture.

My colleague at the University at Naples, Professor Barzellotti, has attempted to discover in this degeneracy of Italian Catholicism a result, not of papal rule, but of the character of the national spirit itself, derived from the classic pagan origin of the people, which, through the impulse of atavism, has come to be felt. But if this theory were correct, the conclusion would be unavoidable, that not the papacy and the Church of Rome have made the Italian people what it is, but that, instead, the Italians have reduced the church to its present condition. Such a conclusion is contrary to reason and to history. These agree in proving that the chief cause of degeneracy of the Christian spirit in Italy is to be found in the papal church, in the nature of its maxims, of its dogmas, and in its method of regulating and governing the consciences of the people. And this, Barzellotti himself is forced to admit when he observes that, owing to the despotism of the papal *régime*, the religious spirit controlling the Italian people differs from the spirit of Christianity, and is becoming constantly more and more a mere superstition, a species of paganism, so that one may well despair of seeing any new and fervent development of the popular faith. Gebhart, also, in his fine book, "L'Italie mystique," has been forced to recognize

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that, Italy having been deprived of liberty of thought and freedom of conscience, it was unavoidable that what the sixteenth century called "profound faith" should have been destroyed, that the multitude should no longer understand or take any active interest in the truths of the gospel, and that Christianity should be slowly dying, like an almost extinguished lamp in the inner recesses of the sanctuary.

This is our spiritual and moral problem,—a problem which all will concede exceeds in importance the political one. And such is its nature that although the hostility of the hierarchy is a source of immense weakness to us, still it does not render a reconciliation with the papacy desirable. For in such a case the immediate consequences would be as follows: first, the Pope would assume the sway which he used to hold over Italy; the Pope and the Jesuits would again take control of all affairs,—of the schools, social customs, the press and the pulpit, the university, science, politics and the state. In that case we should vainly hope for a revival in the church or for any external reforms, provided even that it were possible that any reform movements could spring up in the heavy and immovable atmosphere of the papal life. Indeed, it is not the loss of temporal power that could awaken the desire to return in some sort to Christ and the gospel. The essential doctrines of the papal system are not tied to the temporal power, nor would the loss of it be any ground for complaint. Those doctrines certainly have their origin in the papal spirit, where they remain unchanged, even when deprived of temporal dominion. Besides, nothing would be more favorable to reconciliation than to foster the lethargy of the popular conscience. If the doctrines of the church were restored, we do not see how Italy could raise itself to a new spiritual life, which is, nevertheless, the *ubi consistans* of its return to the sphere of activity and thought.

III.

But is it right to judge the papacy so harshly? Can we fail to discern the new greatness to which it has with one bound been able to raise itself? When one keeps account of

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the manifold activities of Leo XIII., and the nature of the objects he desires, can one doubt that the Pope has shown himself a warm friend of Christian truth, and that science and criticism and freedom of thought and of conscience no longer intimidate him?

Indeed, there is no field of human activity or of ethical truth on which Leo XIII., by means of his numerous bulls and letters, has not attempted to throw light and, by clear and suitable arguments and the force of moral suasion, to set right the thoughts of men. Thus, to give an example, in the Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, of August 4, 1879, he enjoined the faithful to return to the careful study of the scholastic philosophy of Thomas Aquinas; he also desired that for purposes of research and criticism there should at last be disclosed the hidden treasures of documents accumulated in the archives of the Vatican, the idea pleasing him that the students and the writers of ecclesiastical history should be able to make use of them. How much the social question alarmed and still troubles him is a matter of public comment. Ever since the Encyclical, *Quod Apostolici muneris*, of December 28, 1878, he tried to show that socialism is descended by direct line from the Protestant Reformation. But later, in the Encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, of May 15, 1891, putting aside the difficult question of its origin, and thus easily retiring from a rather dangerous position, he turned to consider its recent and immediate causes. Another difficult subject interests him extremely, and this he is shortly to attack; namely, the ways and means of arriving at the peace and disarmament of Europe. What next? It has even been announced that the aged pontiff has been converted to religious tolerance, and has in a measure become the leader and standard-bearer of the modern religious spirit. Judging from these appearances, we can understand how an Italian priest, in writing in a Catholic review of the pontificate of Leo XIII., takes the position that "The distinctive character of this pontificate is *wisdom;* practical wisdom in the ordering of the highest destinies of the Catholic church, and doctrinal wisdom in the administration of the universal church." But we must not forget that things seen

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from within are often quite different from what they appear from without.

To any one who has the least notion of the present state of science, the idea is repugnant that Thomism (despite its great merit of compressing a complete philosophic world into an organic system) can nowadays, as formerly in the middle ages, satisfy men's minds. This is not the place to examine its insufficiencies. Nevertheless, we can at least take some note of the situation. The Thomistic philosophy does not seem best adapted to arouse and kindle men's minds to spiritual freedom and independence, nor to induce them to admit the value and legitimacy of rational methods of criticism. If in it, on the one hand, revelation lives in the field of reason, there is no intuition or comprehension of it, save of the reason and by the reason; yet, on the other hand, it is nevertheless true that in it philosophy at bottom counts for nothing and revelation is everything,—and not, by any means, revelation in its ideal and simple elements, but revelation as understood by the hierarchal and mediæval church, such as the lucubrations and subtilties of the schools (subtilties that were often artificial, oftener still imbued with the prejudices and errors and false and narrow tendencies of the dark ages) have interpreted and moulded it, and wish it still to be maintained. For which reason philosophical research has been always forced to keep its gaze directed to the ecclesiastical doctrine, and the fundamental problems of philosophy have been solved according to the inexorable and unchangeable tenets of the church. This means that essentially the investigation and solution of such problems is simply a gymnastic feat and exercise of the mind, without any inner meaning or use of any kind. Indeed, it is only a question of repeating as sacred formulas conclusions that were known and determined beforehand.

Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to the liberality and support extended to historical studies, which, as the papal epistle to Cardinal Hergenröther, May 15, 1884, plainly declares, are not regarded in the light of impartial and objective reconstructions of history, but rather as elaborating a theme imposed and determined beforehand. The researches among

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the archives are meant to legitimize all dogmatic and temporal pretensions of the papacy, which they seek to prove are derived from primitive Christian times. These researches should serve also to demonstrate how great and manifold have been the blessings which the papal *régime* has brought to the whole world, but more particularly to Italy and Rome. This kind of history, therefore, is drawn from documentary sources, but altogether *ad usum pontificis!*

Thus, when closely regarded, the inculcation of the study of the Thomistic philosophy and the investigation of documents in the archives have all the appearance of an attempt to throw dust into people's eyes. As to the intellectual condition of the clergy and its actual needs, other measures are needed. It is not a question of considering exceptional individuals who are distinguished above the average, but we must look upon the generality of the clergy. On the one hand, the careless ignorance in which the mass of the Italian clergy is steeped, its rude and uncultivated state, and the senile lethargy by which it is overcome, are obvious and palpable facts. On the other hand, it is not easy to understand how a profession so sacred and delicate as the religious profession could have been confided to clericals of this stamp, since the religious, more than any other social office, in order to be worthily filled, seems to call for a thorough and substantial education and, besides, high and comprehensive views of life. When we come to consider it, it appears almost a sacrilege, that a man without any knowledge of the religion he professes, without any understanding of its relation to the state and the social organism, or of its laws and conditions and relations, should enter into families and society and be the inspirer and controller of the consciences of the people. It does not appear that Leo XIII. has paid much or any attention to this state of affairs. If he had done so, it would have revealed to him the need of radical reforms in the episcopal seminaries, the reduction of their number, and a complete change in their systems of education. And he would also have perceived how fit it would be that the clergy should complete the education of their minds by subjecting

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them to the test of the studies which are pursued in the state university. Any other way by which to bring the clergy into contact with the world and with life would be sought for in vain. There are dangers in this, without doubt, but is there any experiment in human affairs that has not its two sides? There are great advantages to offset the dangers. There alone, in the university, in the free and active atmosphere of unfettered research and scientific criticism, the clergy could gain an impartial view of the age they live in, and become conscious of the new material and economic requirements and of the spiritual and moral currents which are struggling to control the world. And if from this trying experiment some should return discouraged and exhausted, infected with scepticism and negations in this contact with free thought, and lacking the treasures of divine grace and those gifts of the soul needed for the religious office,—if such are lost, it is to be counted a gain to the church and religion rather than a loss.

As to the desire of the Pope for peace among the peoples, as to his tolerance in allowing that man should believe what he likes, and that even outside of his church there is a possibility of procuring justification and salvation, this is a matter which only the very credulous can believe. It would be both easy and convincing for him to make a practical proof of his love for peace. Let only the papacy conform to the new ideas, which the spirit of the world, certainly not without the disposition and help of the divine power, has arranged. But, on the contrary, it does not think of withdrawing from agitations and political intrigues, but uses them with masterly skill and diplomatic ingenuity in endeavoring to accommodate itself to princes and despots as well as to democracies and demagogues. This proves only how willingly and unhesitatingly it would set the world upside down to realize its dream of regaining universal dominion, such as it formerly held, or at least of regaining temporal power. As to tolerance, we must not close our eyes to the fact that this is diametrically and completely opposed to papal Catholicism. The entire doctrinal foundation of the dogmatic Cath-

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olic edifice rests on the culminating idea that outside the Church of Rome there is no safety, and that those who do not believe in the Pope and in what he teaches are people without faith, not only outside the pale of truth, but outside of all law and right. Hence, according to St. Thomas, the heretics are to be put to death *et possunt juste occidi;* and this has always been and still remains the ecclesiastical and papal doctrine. The first true teacher of the principle of tolerance was Luther. The thesis, "*Hæreticos comburi est contra voluntatem spiritus*," he had no sooner pronounced than Leo X. hastened to condemn it in the bull, *Exurge Domine*, June 14, 1520. And as formerly Pope Medici, so now Pope Pecci condemns it wholly, with as much, and perhaps still more, fervor. It has certainly never occurred to him to refer to the Protestants of whatever sect, be they Lutherans, Anglicans, Waldenses, or Methodists, or to their doctrines and cult and temples, without making it clearly understood that in the estimation of the Pope all these are abominable, true progeny of vipers, satanic creatures, hunted by pride and carnal desires in the hell of their rebellion and perdition. It is true he no longer consigns them to the Holy Office nor sends them to torture. But this is only because the mature and civilized spirit of the times and political and social conditions do not allow him to do so. As to his intolerance, and his tendency and willingness to suppress, if need be by violence, those who dissent from and oppose him, this agrees admirably with the spontaneous and congenial, and hence indefectible, leanings to which his dogmatic opinions and his view of the scheme of salvation lead him. One of the most significant signs in this regard is the list of books which the Vatican daily places on the Index. These are often the most Christian and religious books imaginable, but they give offence by the spirit of freedom that pervades them, and on this account the Pope condemns them inexorably.

It is perhaps in the attitude towards socialism and his judgment of it that the Pope has come nearest, at least in general, to sound moral ideas, that are acceptable from an ethical point of view and in harmony with religion. Taking

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inspiration from Christian and evangelical principle, he has been able to propose measures suitable, if not absolutely fit, to solve the problem (which in the absolute sense is insoluble, and will in all likelihood remain so as long as the world and man exist), at least fit to mitigate the most disastrous features, and also to remove the most harsh and crying injustice. All of which means that to the Pope belongs the merit (certainly not a new or rare one, but noteworthy in him in his position as the head of the Catholic Church) of striking a just mean, and avoiding all extremes on both sides, with due regard to the proper relations. Thus he repels the idea of *laisser faire et laisser passer*, which is the denial of any ethical motive, inasmuch as it unfetters universal competition and takes away the restraints of selfishness of individuals, so that it has finally given rise to a new form of slavery in the midst of Christian society, where all men, sons of the same Father in heaven, ought to regard each other as brothers. And no less has he held aloof from that idea of an omnipotent and all-absorbing State, which is a very Moloch, swallowing up and devouring all equality, all spontaneity, all activity, which, having been used to bring about the well-being and happiness of every individual, will end by plunging them all in the very worst sort of slavery and unhappiness, robbing them of their personality and their moral freedom, and destroying those institutions of family and property which are inseparably bound up in them.

At the same time, this merit of the Pope's can be admitted only in a general way. For when we come to particularize besides the fact that the greater or less value of remedies pointed out is open to discussion, we cannot but wonder that the Pope, who sees so well what is at a distance, should omit to turn his eyes to what is in the immediate vicinity. How did it ever come about that, while he is so desirous of seeing applied, as far as possible, the divine law of fraternity and love in social relations, he should not care that this same law should touch with its light the hierarchal system of government in his church, so that perchance in the circumstances of the higher and lower clergy there may not be so enormous

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a difference as to approach to luxury and profusion among the former and to descend to absolute want and starvation among the latter? In arguments of this kind, if anywhere, it would be desirable that a good example were set. When it is insinuated that it is the duty of the fortunate and prosperous to reduce the number of their pleasures and give them up for the benefit of the poor and hungry, may they not, with right, answer the Pope and the Cardinals: "You have set up a god of gold and silver." The saying, "Physician, heal thyself," would not seem out of place here.

It thus seems that the Pope does not hope to change in the least the spirit or the tendencies that have now become characteristic of his church. Even if intrinsic reasons were wanting in proof of this, the external facts would be sufficient: such as the fact of his having added St. Joachim to the list of the patron saints of the city of Rome; his having advised the assiduous use of the rosary—that powerful antidote to the spiritual diseases of our age and to the vexed problems that so seriously disturb society; his having advised that those who wish to obtain divine pardon should practise for fifteen Saturdays most pious devotion in honor of the image of the famous Madonna of Pompeii; his having ordered that in all the churches of St. Roch a special service of prayer should be held in order to preserve Italy from the cholera. This list could be continued indefinitely. Such acts as these, only recently ordained by Pope Leo XIII., serve to demonstrate that in papal Catholicism the power of the flesh is still great and strong, that the spirit is not only weak, but lamentably weak, and that such a form of religion is not fitted to lead men's minds to great and high ideals, least of all to inspire their thoughts and desires with the spirit of the Gospels.

IV.

With such formidable problems before us respecting our relations to the papacy, what policy has been adopted and pursued by us Italians? Our policy has consisted in having none at all. By a sophistry entirely our own we have been persuaded that we must leave the problem alone, and not even

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touch it. And now for a quarter of a century we have remained in this condition of inactivity, still holding by the old motto, "*Inertia sapientia.*" And, when we were actually forced to do something, this axiom of ours had the singular power of setting us against what was desirable and indispensable. This was the case when the plan for separating Church and State was discussed, introduced in conformity with the formula of Cavour, "*Libera chiesa in libero stato;*" and when there was a question as to the laws regarding the pontifical guarantee of May 13, 1871, which have commonly come to be regarded as the Magna Charta of Italian ecclesiastical policy. In each case the results have been pernicious for all alike, for the laity as well as for the state, for the clergy as well as for the church itself. The formula, "a free church in a free state," and the doctrine of the separation of the two which is merely its application, show an entire misconception of the true religious and moral conditions in Italy, and are the most substantial proofs of the indifference prevailing in the political circle. One speaks of a free church. But exactly what is lacking in papal Catholicism is freedom in the church. There only one is free, and that is the Pope. The church is enslaved. It is true that in principle and in its idea the church is the universal community of believers. But in reality the church in Italy is so interpenetrated by and combined with the papacy that in every thought and act it is nowadays completely dominated and controlled by the papal authority. For which reason liberty conceded to the church has come to mean liberty ceded to no one else than the Pope. With respect to the laws of guarantee, these have only served to strengthen the autocratic system prevailing in the government of the church, by which all power is concentrated in the supreme hierarch, and all others are degraded to be blind and passive instruments in his hands. And now, as if the old decrees and the new decisions of the Vatican councils were not sufficient to maintain the iron, doctrinal rule of the Pope, canonically established and strengthened by the stamp of infallibility, the Italian state has unexpectedly desired to add its sanction thereto. Besides according honors and immunities, prerogatives and privileges

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of all kinds to the person of the Pope, it has cast aside all power of jurisdiction, every right of nomination, of recourse, of appeal, every means of defence against the abuses and the preponderance of the Roman Curia. The bearing of all this is exactly and obviously the following: that to the good pleasure of the Pope is left the solution of every question touching the life of the church and the manner of its actual manifestation, as if the things at issue regarded in no wise the existence and future of the state. Truly, to confide in the Pope and to expect from him decisions which shall conduce to the vigor, compactness, and integrity of the national existence, and, while awaiting his decision, to prostrate ourselves at his feet and allow him to play the master in the church and to control the consciences, and to leave everything to his discretion—this is, of all possible modes of action, the most senseless and infatuated.

And we cannot discern, even distantly, a sign of any movement, not rash or violent, but concentrated, temperate, and conforming to fixed ideals and practical aims, in touch with the popular conscience, and anxious to provide for its needs, In regard to many of these particulars, the state, without transcending the limit of its powers, could by prudent and careful legislation have given shape to the institutions of the church, and have imparted to them a healthy and liberal tone, thus preparing the popular conscience to assist in the task of reforming and improving its ethico-religious content. How this is to be done, we need not specify here. But, in general, it would not be right to ignore that, inasmuch as there is a ray of hope, this hope can be founded only on the favorable disposition and co-operation of the minor clergy. This class has the appearance of life, and is the most active and hard-working part of the religious community, being in daily contact with the people, sharing with them their joys and their sorrows, and procuring for them hopes and comforts ineffable. Therefore, let us league ourselves with the minor clergy, attract them to our side, conciliate their spirit; not descending to them as equals, be it understood, but raising them gradually to the height of the new life of the nation, to the level of its

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progressive thought and needs. And the first duty of all, but especially of the state, is to show them great respect, and to keep in high consideration, through definite and active powers, their character and august social functions.

It is, in truth, most apparent that we have always done precisely the opposite of what we ought to have done. Towards the clergy we have shown and felt only indifference and contempt, and at bottom this feeling was a mixture of hypocrisy and cowardice. Aside from the blind money spirit which caused us to lay hands on ecclesiastical property without any discrimination, we have shown not a shade of interest in the clergy, not the least desire to inform ourselves of their privations and sufferings, which are endless. Now, after more than thirty years, we have with difficulty resolved to assign to parish priests who have an annual income of less than eight hundred lire (one hundred and sixty dollars) an additional allowance which shall make it amount to that sum. What a mockery! Even to our domestic servants we must pay a larger sum. There is no excuse, no apology, for such a condition of things, which is the result of our complete subjection to the sway and terrorism of the papacy, and which has alienated the clergy from the state and caused them to curse and hate it as their worst enemy. Formerly we were always talking of the faults of the clergy, and were looking for corrective and repressive measures to apply to them. But instead of seeking for their wrongs, it would be more just to make amends for our wrongs towards them. Whether they shall be on our side or against us depends solely on our attitude towards them. Moreover, by uniting with them in frank and loving faith, we might easily find them most useful aids in facing the social troubles, most powerful allies in sustaining the new national life. This, I repeat, might have brought the Roman and papal problem to its true and definite solution.

Nor are these merely fanciful suppositions. It is a hope based upon experience and facts. In the first year of our political reconstructive period, the attempt to found a national church made it clear that there were some among the clergy who desired a different sort of religion from that of the Jesuits,

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and that this desire could be revived and made to shine out with brilliant light. The movement propagated itself widely, especially in the southern provinces of the kingdom, promoted by monks and priests full of religious fervor and patriotic ardor. But the end to which it came was as sudden as it was pitiful. And it was the Italian State that took the trouble to suppress it. The plots of Ricasoli at the papal court, in 1866, resulted in the monks and the priests being abandoned to the persecution of the Roman Curia. With shameful deference and connivance, the State co-operated with the papacy in this persecution. And this even a Father Curci could not commend in his book, "Il Vaticano Regio." And Bonghi himself (who on this subject is a wonderfully agile temporizer, and uses his authority to advise with tireless persistence an indolent *quieta non movere!*) has been obliged to recognize that the government is not without serious responsibility in regard to these two charges,—that the younger far more than the older clergy, more than those of the years 1862 to 1866, are opposed to any thought of reform, and that among the laity attached to the church every breath of a new spiritual life has gradually died out entirely.

V.

But such a policy as we desire,—serious, objective, earnest, and anxious to improve and elevate the condition of the church and the clergy, eager, also, to see religion and the moral life tempered and purged,—such a policy requires time, hard work, and great force; it implies trouble, strife, and conflict. That is certain. But all the same it is necessary to note that having shunned every fruitful spiritual conflict is precisely that which has weakened the new Italy within, and driven it, as it were, into the void. Its lack of faith is deplored by many. Others complain of the breaking down of the intellectual life. Do they really think that this has no connection with the elimination of all spiritual and moral contests? They forget that it is by means of such spiritual friction and contest that the character of a people is moulded. It is through such conflicts that high ideals and faith in them, that

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strong convictions, and even liberty and practical energy, are awakened and kept vigorous.

In fine, we have endeavored to avoid all difficulties, offering to the papacy (how vainly, we have seen) a miserable bargain, —complete jurisdiction in all things on its side, provided it submits to the loss of temporal power. Now, this has been a renunciation, in order to live quietly, of the very reasons for living. The political action of a people ought, without doubt, to adapt its purposes, measures, and policy to the particular time and circumstance; but, above all, these should be forceful and lead to results. It must not propose to itself impossible aims; but when living and immediate problems present themselves, it should have the courage to attack them and prepare the way for a solution of some kind. And this cannot be done by holding aloof and doing nothing. It is one thing to say that we must seek for a solution within the limits of the real, the possible, and the attainable, and another to say that there is no solution possible, and that there is none to be thought of. A people cannot live a real, historic life in any other way than by the positive and active energy which it puts forth in solving the problems that grow out of its condition. If it refuses to do this, its moral worth diminishes and its historic significance and importance decay.

In looking for the chief agent in the decline of Roman Catholicism and of its efficiency as a factor in civilization, we find it less in its formal and literal incarnation of objective Christian truth than in the exclusive domination it exercises over the consciences of the people, without any necessity of conflict and without a fear that it can ever be supplanted. Now, it is an undeniable historic experience that in moral and even in intellectual respects Catholicism wears a very different aspect where it coexists with Protestantism, where it is subject to its influence and gathers from it, more or less, its needs and tendencies. The prophetic words of Luther launched against the clergy, "My name shall take away peace from you forever, until ye shall either have gone to perdition, or have changed for the better," has not remained without effect in Luther's own fatherland. There in Germany, Catholicism is

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not a mixture of gross superstitions and of liturgical and mechanical practices, but is the life of the soul, inwardly and vividly felt. This, I repeat, is owing to the friction with and the impulses derived from Protestantism, thanks to which German Catholicism has become what it is. As it is in Germany, so it is in England and America, and to a certain extent even in France. Religion and the history of religion form to-day a great part of the literary and scientific activity of France. Evidently the French people owe the freshness of their faith to the Albigenses and to Calvinism, to the Huguenots and to the Reformed Church, to Jansenism and the men of Port-Royal, to the long-continued Gallicanism of its history and to the Protestant School of Strasburg. These are the elements which, in spite of the Voltairism by which France is infected, have always revived anew, by combating and opposing it, the old French Catholicism.

The truth is, that an immovable society unfailingly bears within itself the germs of weakness, stagnation, and degeneration, and leads to servitude and quietism. Life, spirit, and religion, these are to be found in free debate and discussion. We Italians have failed to recognize this elementary truth. We have obstinately refused to recognize that only a current of active opposition to the papacy and reforms within the church, springing from the faithful and ardent among the laity and clergy, could produce differences and contrasts, and hence life and movement, and an interaction of minds, which would be useful to all, even to Papal Catholicism. Perhaps the Pope will finally perceive that the Syllabus, the decrees of the Vatican, the dogma of infallibility, intolerance, and all the old garments of superstitious beliefs which he tries to sustain and nourish, imply at bottom the negation of Christianity. At any rate, it is more than permitted to hope that the clergy of both parties will re-enter into possession of that wisdom, of that doctrine, and of many of those gifts of the Spirit of which now they seem to be destitute.

In short, this has ever been true: every battle waged, every effort made on behalf of spiritual conviction, every test to which the moral energies are exposed, is so much new life

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poured into the veins of society at large. But where indifference and scepticism flourish, there faith and fervor are kindled anew. Hence the imperishable benefit of religious reforms. Therefore the debates between Luther and Zwingli and all the differences between the Protestant sects have not been without influence on their life and vigor. Christianity, in contrast to Paganism and Hebraism, has brought about the regeneration and the life of society solely in this way: by means of Christ, it has opened, in a manner at once explicit and dialectical, the most intense of conflicts that have ever arisen—the inextinguishable conflict between matter and spirit, between the human and the divine.

RAFFAELE MARIANO.

UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES.

[NOTE.—A reply to the foregoing article, by Monsignor Satolli, Papal Ablegate to the United States, will be published in the next number.—MANAGING EDITOR.]

DISCUSSIONS.

THE MEANING OF "MOTIVE."

IN writing a word of reply to Mr. Ritchie's criticism (in the October number) upon the meaning I attach to motive, I wish to be as short as possible. I find myself so much in sympathy with his view of the nature of motive and with his published opinions on matters of joint interest, that I should much regret it if I hereby created the impression in the mind of any reader of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS that there was any important difference of principle between us. I should merely like to say,—

1. That the passage quoted by him on p. 56 of the "Elements of Ethics" must not be taken to imply that the "idea of an end" can "move" in the sense which would entitle it to rank as a motive except in so far as it is interesting,—*i.e.*, felt. I think I have made it sufficiently obvious in the neighboring sections that I regard feeling as an essential element in all desire and therefore in motive.

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2. It would not have been supposed that I made this mistake if it had been noted that the passage quoted occurs in juxtaposition with an attempted analysis of desire, in which the elements of thought and feeling are distinguished from one another and the opinion hazarded that it is better to confine the word motive, as distinguished from desire, to the *ideal* side of *effective* desire.

3. I admit that this is to narrow the use of the word which in common language sometimes denotes (*a*) the effective rather than the ideal side of desire, as when we say that Macbeth's motive in murdering Duncan was ambition,—*i.e.*, the *feeling* of interest awakened in him by the thought of the crown. (*b*) Any one of several competing feelings or ideas, as when we speak of a "conflict of motives." But, while making this admission, I still claim, first, that motive is an aspect of desire and ought not in strict language to be taken as simply equivalent to it, and, secondly, that in giving it this sense I am more in harmony with current usage than Mr. Ritchie, who seems to identify motive and desire. He writes, "Whatever else a motive is, it is a desire." On the contrary, I should say, Whatever else a motive is, it is not desire pure and simple. Mr. Ritchie may say I am here refining upon words, but then—he began it.

There is, indeed, a further question suggested by Mr. Ritchie's remarks which is more than one of nomenclature, and which I should like to see opened up before this discussion is allowed to drop. I mean the question, What is the precise nature of each of the two elements of feeling and of thought or idea which we are all agreed go to constitute desire? How does each react upon the other? and how does it operate or co-operate in the result? Whatever differences there may be as to the use of names, I do not anticipate that Mr. Ritchie's answer to this question, or group of questions, would differ in any important respect from my own. Whether Mr. Alexander's boycott of my use of "final cause," as applied to the idea of the end or object of an action, conceals more fundamental differences remains to be seen. Meantime, however, lest this new issue which is only indirectly raised

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obscure the present question, I reserve what I have to say upon it for a future occasion.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

On the general merits of this controversy I have not much to add to what Mr. Muirhead has said.* I certainly had no intention, any more than Mr. Muirhead, of implying that a motive could be effective without feeling. All conscious activity involves feeling, but feeling (in the sense of pleasure and pain) is never, I think, the complete inner explanation of conscious activity.† We have always to inquire, further, what is the source of the feeling. This may be either a blind impulse or the consciousness of some end. In the latter case alone is it properly described as a motive. It was this point that I wished to emphasize, and on this point I understand that Mr. Ritchie is in complete agreement. As to the use of the terms efficient and final cause to describe this difference, I readily admit that this involves some violation of the Aristotelian sense of these terms,—a violation, however, which seems to me to be inevitable in the modern use of the expressions. I took efficient cause as meaning simply the antecedent change on which a movement depends. This would, in some cases,

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* I ought perhaps to note, however, that Mr. Muirhead's use of the term "motive" does not exactly coincide with mine. He confines it to the ideal element in an *effective* desire; whereas I have thought it preferable not to introduce this limitation. I admit that there is some advantage in restricting the meaning of the word as Mr. Muirhead (like Green) has done. But it seems to me to involve too great a violation of ordinary usage, and to deprive us of any convenient mode of describing the important fact known as "conflict of motives."

† This point will, no doubt, be further discussed in the Note which Mr. Muirhead promises. I may content myself with saying here that the habit which some psychologists have of speaking of feeling as the cause of action, seems to imply an unreal division between the different elements in a conscious state. It is to be regretted that Dr. James Ward, who, in his article on "Psychology" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, has done so much to break down this false division, yet seems frequently to permit himself to speak as if the different aspects of a conscious state could be separated from one another and regarded as, respectively, cause and effect. This idea has been a fruitful source of error in psychology and ethics.

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be the action of nerves, muscles, etc.; in other cases it would be an appetite; in other cases it would be the presence of the desire for some object. All these are impelling or antecedent causes; and every action is dependent upon such antecedents, whether it is a motived action or one dependent on mere impulse. If it is a motived action, the motive is undoubtedly included in this antecedent, and it is only in this way that a motive can become operative. It is in this way that final causes act. A house is not built by its final cause, except in so far as this pre-exists as an idea in the mind of the builder, impelling him to act in a particular way. Thus, in a sense, the final cause is included in the efficient cause. But the important point is that in explaining some conscious acts we simply look back. Why did this man commit a murder? He was carried away by passion. Here the passion is simply regarded as preceding the act and leading on to it.* On the other hand, there are cases in which we feel bound to look forward for an explanation. Why did Columbus cross the Atlantic? He hoped to discover land. This hope also preceded his action; but this antecedent has reference to an anticipated consequent. Now some writers would use the term motive in both these cases. They would say that anger and hope are both motives. My view, on the other hand, is that neither of these should be described as a motive. They are both merely efficient or antecedent causes, but the latter of the two *involves* a motive,—*i.e.*, a final cause. The motive is not the hope, but the object as hoped. I admit, of course, that in ordinary usage the term is often used in such a way as to include anger and hope and the like. But if we were to include these in the scientific use of the term, it would be necessary, I think, to include also mere animal impulses, and this would be very inconvenient. Moreover, I think the ordinary usage of the term (and still more of the corresponding terms *motif*, *Motiv*, *motiviren*, etc.) tends to be limited to cases in which some definite end is proposed.

* How far it can rightly be so regarded, in the case of any human action, I cannot here discuss.

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In the passage which Mr. Ritchie quotes from Bancroft ("The conversion of the heathen was the motive to the settlement"), I admit that the expression is somewhat elliptical; but I do not think that the omission is quite accurately supplied by saying, as Mr. Ritchie suggests, "The *desire* or *wish* to convert the heathen was the motive." It would, I think, be better to say, "The conversion of the heathen, regarded as an object of desire, was the motive," or, "The idea (or purpose) of the conversion of the heathen was the motive." So, also, in the passage which Mr. Ritchie quotes from my "Manual of Ethics," instead of saying, "The final cause is the desire of reaching a certain destination," it would have been more accurate to say, "The final cause is the reaching of a certain destination, regarded as an object of desire," or, "The final cause is the idea (or purpose) of reaching." A motive or final cause is not, I think, correctly described either as a desire or as a future event, but rather as a future event regarded as an object of desire. In this particular passage, therefore, I think Mr. Ritchie has convicted me of an inaccuracy* in expression, which I much regret.†

J. S. MACKENZIE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

I agree with Mr. Ritchie that "when we speak of a person's motives we generally mean the feelings which influence his conduct, and not simply the ends or objects of his action,

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* In defence of my use of the term, however, it may be urged that the word "desire" is sometimes employed in this way,—*e.g.*, when we say that a man has gained his desire. In fact, there seems to be no single English word to express an object of desire. But I admit that "desire" ought not, without due warning, to be used for the object of desire.

† It is interesting to note that Dr. Simmel, in his recent "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," appears to be in substantial agreement with the view of motives which Mr. Muirhead and myself have adopted. See especially Vol. I., pp. 307, 308, where he distinguishes between "die teleologischen *Motive*" and "die blossen *Ursachen*." It is gratifying to find such a point of agreement with one who is so keen a critic and whose general point of view is so different from ours.

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apart from their mental existence as constituting the content of his feelings," and I think it desirable to limit the word, for scientific purposes, to this sense. Such motives are what Dr. Martineau calls "springs of action." I believe that Mill is right in saying that motives, so understood, make no difference to the morality of conduct, so long as they do not alter the intention. Different persons may perform the same conduct in consequence of quite different motives; therefore the motive cannot be that by which the conduct is judged. I am, of course, far from asserting that the motive does not "throw light on character." Plainly, there are long odds that a man will act virtuously if his motives are such as when left to themselves issue in good actions. But the question is whether the motive (though possessing *moral* significance) is *ethically* (*i.e.*, for the science of morals) a satisfactory test of either conduct or character. This I deny. By character we understand not merely habitual disposition, but effective disposition. A man may be habitually kind-hearted and shrink instinctively from hurting the feelings of others, but this may lead him into acts of culpable tenderness, and we should consider him so far a blamable character. It was on this ground that I held Mill's statement to be slightly inaccurate.

Mr. Ritchie appears to me to understand motive not, according to his definition, as equivalent to the feelings which influence conduct, but to the feelings which are decisive of conduct. In the case supposed, if the man acts wrongly, his motive was unwillingness to hurt a friend's feelings; if he acts rightly, his motive was, say, a sense of duty. But the operative feeling (supposing that it is feeling which operates) is neither in the one case the kindness, nor in the other the sense of duty, but one or other of these feelings as directed upon the particular object,—*i.e.*, as guided by the intention. I venture to call this complex state the active sentiment. This is what Mr. Ritchie calls the "spirit of the action." The expression is a loose one. If Mr. Ritchie means that the spirit of the action consists entirely of feelings, then, since the motive in its final form is determined by the idea of the end, the moral judgment still is passed on the ground of this idea,—that is, of

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the intention. If, as I suppose, he means by the spirit of the action a complex of feelings and ideas, then this is nothing more nor less than the whole volition taken along with its elements of feeling, or considered especially in connection with its elements of feeling. No doubt such a motive is the true subject of moral judgment, but then it is identical with the conduct.

On the other hand, if Mr. Ritchie thinks his motive, so analyzed, to be the efficient cause of conduct, he lays himself open to an objection like one which he urges against Mr. Mackenzie. His motive is the efficient cause, not of conduct, but of the mere external action. It is part of the material cause of conduct. We can, in fact, distinguish in the complex whole of conduct two elements: one is the motive—in my sense the feeling—which suggests the action, the other is the mere external act. These are both ethically indifferent. The feeling might have been different and the conduct remain morally the same, or the same good external act might have proceeded from a good or a bad motive. Both the motive and the intention act or may act as efficient causes. But what is judged morally is the volition as a whole, the agent as acting; and the character of his volition is given by the intention.

The difference between Mr. Ritchie and me appears to amount to this. I limit motive to the feeling which suggests an action; he takes motive to be the feeling as modified by the intention,—*i.e.*, what I call the active sentiment. In this he has the support of Professor Sully, who defines motive ("Outlines of Psychology," p. 392, new edition) as "a desire viewed in its relation to a particular represented action, the carrying out of which it urges or prompts." When Mr. Ritchie says that he can speak of "a good man doing a wrong action from good motives," he is clearly using the word motive in my sense, not in his. But the discussion illustrates both the ambiguity of the word and the difficulty of analyzing the thing.

The earlier portion of Mr. Ritchie's article does not affect anything I have said, and I agree with him in his antagonism to the misuse of the term "final cause" in the passages quoted from the writers he criticises; but I should like to observe that even supposing that an action must be caused by a feel-

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ing, which it is certainly rash to assert in so unqualified a way at the present moment, I do not see why the representation of the end should not include elements of feeling. So far as I can see, it does, and the intellectual apprehension of the end, its accompanying feeling, and the feelings of the agent not suggested by the represented idea, all combine to produce the active sentiment.

S. ALEXANDER.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD.

The discussion which I have been the means of raising has at least had the good effect of obtaining from Mr. Muirhead and Mr. Mackenzie useful explanatory notes on their ethical text-books, and I am glad to find that the difference between us narrows itself to very little, if anything, more than a difference about the use of a term. I still adhere to my original view that it is most convenient, because most in accordance with ordinary literary use and most in accordance with the previous philosophical history of the term and its Greek antecedents, to take "motive" as equivalent to "a *desire* for an object conceived as a possible end of action." But I do not *identify* "motive" with "desire": "desire" is the genus of which "motive" is a species. The differentia of "motive" is the presence of a conception of an end. I think, however, that it is an inaccuracy of language which is too apt to suggest an error in psychology, to restrict "motive" to the merely intellectual element of the complex mental state. In insisting that motive must include the element of "feeling," I am, of course, using that term in its widest sense, and certainly not restricting it to the feelings of pleasure and pain, which are distinguishable from appetites and emotions, even though they may always accompany them in some degree. In Mr. Mackenzie's illustration of a man murdering another out of passion (*i.e.*, anger), the act may be a foolish one, and may be said to have very slight motives (*cui bono?*), but it cannot rightly be called *un*motived. The motive even in such a case contains a conception of an end. The man in anger thinks

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of, or pictures, the person he murderously assaults as paying the penalty of the supposed wrong-doing which has caused his (the assailant's) anger. If the act is clearly unmotived, we regard the doer as no longer a rational and responsible being: he is not guilty of "murder" any more than a tiger is.

I think it inconvenient to limit "motive" to the effective desire for an object,—the desire that issues in action. If the term were so limited, "conflict of motives" and "strongest motive"—phrases with a very respectable philosophical history—would be meaningless. Of course, when I speak of *the* motive of some particular act, I mean the motive that has shown itself effective: the defeated motives were merely possible efficient causes that have been counteracted. To talk of "motives" which have not actually "moved" the person to overt actions (though they may have moved him *towards* them) is permissible, just as it is to talk of "causes" that have been counteracted.

In all phraseology about causes a certain amount of abstraction is inevitable. The term "efficient cause" loses its meaning altogether if "cause" be taken strictly as the sum total of the conditions of an act or event. In the sense in which Mr. Alexander uses "conduct," the conduct includes all the psychical conditions of overt action, but in ordinary use conduct is distinguished from character. Conduct means "a course of action." (It generally means more than a particular act, and so I think Mr. Alexander a little overstates Mill's view by substituting "conduct" for "act.") A man of generally good character may do several bad acts, which might be described as bad conduct. When we say a man may do a wrong act from a good motive, we mean that the act is of *such a kind* as we consider socially mischievous, while the motives are of *such a kind* as we commend. Most usually in such cases the motives are mixed,—*e.g.*, in the case Mr. Alexander suggests, desire to do a kind action is a good motive, while desire to escape trouble or fear of causing morally necessary pain is a bad motive.

The psychological problem to which Mr. Alexander refers at the end of his reply I cannot here attempt to discuss. In

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defence of Aristotle (and myself) I will only say that, so far as my experience goes, a mental image or idea of a movement alone cannot, as a matter of fact, cause me to make that movement; else why does such a mental image or idea so often *deter* me from making the movement? Moral education would be an easier thing than it is if it were only necessary to supply mental pictures of right actions, and not also to mould the feelings. If it be said that ideas have of themselves "an impulsive quality," that is only to use the word "idea" to cover a complex state which contains desire in it.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

JESUS COLLEGE, OXFORD.

PRINCIPLE OF CLASSIFICATION OF RECENT ETHICAL WRITERS.

WITH regard to a criticism made by my reviewer in the July number (Vol. III., pp. 535, 536), I should like to say just a word.

The criticism in question had reference to the principle on which my selection of the authors considered in Part I. of my "Review of Evolutional Ethics" was made. The selection is, as Professor Royce states, a difficult one. Indeed, if "Evolutional Ethics" is to include all writers who have taught the reality of a progressive movement in human society, a work on the subject could scarcely draw a line at any point, since, even if one goes back as far as early Greek philosophy, one finds some recognition of such a movement. Again, it is certainly a fact that our modern distinctively biological theory of evolution has unconsciously affected all modern thought, even where it is not consciously received; so that its influence can often be distinguished even in the works of writers who verbally repudiate it. However, although exact classification is difficult in all cases, and particularly so with regard to thought, of whose evolution we are ourselves the observers, so that no missing links leave us convenient gaps of division; yet, in disagreement with Professor Royce, I am of the opinion that there may be other principles of classification than the one represented by the title "Recent Ethical Idealists." This is not, at least, my title; and in making my selection I endeavored to adhere to the principle involved in the latter—

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that is, to choose such authors as not only have left behind older metaphysical methods, but also show in their work a distinct acceptance of the theory of a biological evolution, with all its consequences, in the region of morals. I am unable to class Paulsen as one of these; and Wundt's repudiation of the theory of heredity in morals places him at once definitely and completely outside my list, since it renders his theory merely one of human progress, cutting it off from connection with the biological idea. Stephen, on the other hand, distinctly receives and recognizes the broader biological form of theory, even makes some definite use of it in ethics, and, though he is especially occupied with another side of the social problem, exhibits in his work, as a whole, the influence of this acceptance. The like may be said, I think, of the work of Alexander, who, indeed, makes continual application of Darwinian concepts to the moral evolution. I have stated in the preface to my book my reasons for analyzing Gizycki's "Moralphilosophie." This is, perhaps, the most doubtful of all the books I have considered in Part I.; but Professor Von Gizycki himself gives me, in earlier works of his, a right to believe in his acceptance of Darwinian ideas, the fruits of which appear to me continually and strongly exhibited in the "Moralphilosophie." If, on the surface, the latter seems to afford no greater evidence of the influence of biological ideas of evolution than many other recent books on ethics, this, I think, is due chiefly to its intentionally popular character; and the internal evidence appeared to me, on the other hand, sufficient to place it on my list.

I trust that I have at least made plain that my principle of selection was not "sectarian." I fancy that with the title "Recent Ethical Idealists" selection would be even more difficult than under my own title.

C. M. WILLIAMS.

[NOTE.—The name that I proposed for the inclusive class containing the evolutional ethical writers was "Ethical Realists," not "Idealists."—JOSIAH ROYCE.]

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SPENCER'S "PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS."

SEVERAL criticisms having shown that the preface to Vol. II. of "The Principles of Ethics" is seriously misleading, Mr. Spencer has decided to recast it. The preface which is to appear in all copies hereafter issued may be of interest to those who have seen it only in its original form. It runs as follows:

"Now that, by this issue of Parts V. and VI., along with Part IV. previously published, I have succeeded in completing the second volume of 'The Principles of Ethics,' which some years since I despaired of doing, my satisfaction is dashed by the thought that these new parts are less definite in their conclusions than I had hoped to make them. Complete definiteness was of course not to be expected. Right regulation of the actions of so complex a being as Man, living under conditions so complex as those presented by a society, evidently forms a subject-matter unlikely to admit of specific statements throughout its entire range.

"The primary division of it—private conduct—necessarily dependent in part on the nature of the individual and his circumstances, can be prescribed but approximately; and guidance must, in most cases, be obtained by a judicial balancing of requirements and avoidance of extremes. Entrance on the first great division of public conduct—Justice—does, indeed, introduce us to conclusions which are in large degree definite. Happily, into this most important portion of Ethics, treating of certain right relations between individuals, irrespective of their natures or circumstances, there enters the ruling conception of equity or equalness—there is introduced the idea of *measure;* and the inferences reached acquire a certain quantitative character which partially assimilates them to those of exact science. But when, leaving this all-important division, the injunctions of which are peremptory, and take no cognizance of personal elements, we pass into the remaining divisions—Negative and Positive Beneficence—we enter a region in which the complexities of private conduct are involved with the complexities of relations to the no less complex conduct of those around: presenting problems for the solution of which we have nothing in the nature of measure to guide us, and must commonly be led by empirical judgments.

"In view of these admissions, some will contend that no aid is here furnished by the general Doctrine of Evolution. The first reply is that in that chief division of Ethics treating of Justice, it furnishes aid both as verifying conclusions empirically drawn and as leading to certain unaccepted conclusions of importance. If it be said that throughout the divisions of Ethics dealing with Beneficence, Negative and Positive, the conclusions must, as above implied, be chiefly empirical, and that therefore here, at any rate, the Doctrine of Evolution does not help us, the reply is that it helps us in general ways though not in special ways. In the first place, for certain modes of conduct which at present are supposed to have no sanction if they have not a supernatural sanction, it yields us a natural sanction—shows us that such modes of conduct fall within the lines

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of evolving humanity—are conducive to a higher life, and are for this reason obligatory. And, in the second place, where it leaves us to form empirical judgments, it brings into view those general truths by which our empirical judgments should be guided—indicates the limits within which they must fall.

"Beyond serving to reinforce the injunctions of Beneficence by adding to the empirical sanction a rational sanction, the contents of Parts V. and VI. have these claims to attention:—First, that under each head there are definitely set down the various requirements and restraints which should be taken into account: so aiding the formation of balanced judgments. Second, that by this methodic treatment there is given a certain coherence to the confused and often inconsistent ideas on the subject of Beneficence, which are at present lying all abroad. And third, that the coherent body of doctrine which results, is made to include regulation of sundry kinds of conduct which are not taken cognizance of by Ethics as ordinarily conceived."

It will be observed that Mr. Spencer no longer admits, as frankly as he seemed to do in the first issue, that the concluding portions of his book are unsatisfactory. The general judgment, however, expressed in the review of his second volume which appeared in the October number of this JOURNAL, still seems to me to be substantially just.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

PHILANTHROPY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS. Seven Essays by Miss Jane Addams, Robert A. Woods, Father J. O. S. Huntington, Professor Franklin H. Giddings, and Bernard Bosanquet. Delivered before the School of Applied Ethics, at Plymouth, Massachusetts, during the session of 1892. With Introduction by Professor Henry C. Adams. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company. Pp. xi, 268.

Not only are these seven essays all admirably written, but in each, except the last, its author has given us a part of his best life and thought; and even in the last, if this be not the case, the theme alone is to blame. Mr. Bosanquet could not but find the methods of the London Charity Organization Society, however scientific and just, too narrow and thin a material for him to expend his best energy upon, and with excellent taste he does not attempt to make more of his subject than it deserves. He perhaps adds nothing to

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what has already been said for charity organization principles and methods, but he believes so thoroughly in them that he reiterates them without fatigue to himself or to the reader. One is pleased to learn from him, also, that the principle of charity organization work is "faith in the ideal,"—"only it must be faith in that ideal which is the essence and controlling force of the real; not in fancies and sentiments which are simply a failure to cope with reality." One is pleased to learn this. But perhaps Mr. Bosanquet might have made it clearer how this faith manifests itself in the methods he so painstakingly describes, for those of us who are familiar, as Father Huntington and the president of the New York Charity Organization Society are, with the ghoulish glee aroused in many Charity Organization Society members by the detection, for its own sake, of fraud, those of us who know how lamentably they fail to procure work for the unemployed or to organize existing charities, have supposed that the radical defect in the Charity Organization Society was lack of any ideal at all,—at least of any social ideal. Undoubtedly, it is pledged to "the essence and controlling force of the real" economic order of modern competitive capitalistic society. But surely Mr. Bosanquet does not mistake this essence for an ideal? He does not mean to teach us that the controlling force of all that is real, however bad and unjust, deserves our allegiance? Again, the faith that Mr. Bosanquet preaches, which believes that "character" in individuals will almost always set them on their feet industrially and secure them a competence, is too naïve and too flattering to the prosperous to be accounted as anything but a failure to cope with reality.

The next to the last essay in the book (on "The Ethics of Social Progress," by Professor Giddings) belongs to that class of writings which challenge us to gratitude, because they provoke us to think. At every step in the logical advance we feel forced for truth's and humanity's sake to stop and protest. The contrast between this essay and the five preceding ones of the volume affords a striking illustration of the difference between abstract reasoning and concrete reasoning, therefore between a false kind of thinking and the only true kind. Professor Giddings would not utter many of his boldest statements were he in the habit of keeping in sight the fulness and manifoldness of individual and social life. Like the older school of economists, he lets fall many factors of the problem for convenience' sake, as if they were inappreciable in value, and then comes to conclusions monstrously untrue. Profes-

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sor Giddings lacks natural insight, and he ought, therefore, to supplement his study of books by actual work, such as that by which Miss Addams, Mr. Woods, and Father Huntington have been growing wise. Until years of such activity have mellowed his judgment, he will never be able to see the Christ in every human being, even in "a drunken woman or an idiot child," as Miss Addams does, surely never in tramps, whom he goes out of his way to call "absolutely worthless wretches." Now, not all tramps are wretches, or worthless, and few are absolutely worthless. And when he says that "every tramp within the borders of civilization should be placed under arrest and put to severe enforced labor under public direction," he makes one feel that possibly there are even some professors who should be restrained; for really these sweeping statements in condemnation of whole classes of men are bad and unscientific in this decade, and he who teaches them to the young women and young men of our colleges does harm.

So conspicuous on every page is the absence of any mark of individualized affection for the unfortunate victims of the modern so-called Social Progress, that it is hard to appreciate at their full value the wise, practical conclusions with which Professor Giddings closes his paper. He suggests that we should resist the tendency to competitive activity, forbid competition in the education of children, provide the conditions of country life for children, and cultivate individuality in the consumption of wealth. Again, he advises that international migration should be regulated, that each nation should assume the burden of pauperism caused by its own progress, that society should regulate industries that displace the better man by the inferior—but we have not space to give his complete list of practical measures. These proposals have a value independent of Professor Giddings's theory of social ethics. This theory seems to us unworthy of the conclusions attached to it.

Professor Giddings is an optimistic evolutionist. In his opinion the unseen antagonist in life's fateful game of chess is "always just, patient, and fair." The real evolutions of society seem to him to make for the true end,—the survival of living creatures through a progressive evolution of their intelligence and sympathy. It is well just here to remember that so great a believer in the fact of evolution as Professor Huxley recognizes that ethics sets up standards many times in direct moral opposition to the real results of progressive evolution, and in our opinion not one of the historic changes in industrial life cited by Professor Giddings as illustra-

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tions of social progress were really moral advancements, even according to Professor Giddings's own definition. The living creatures who survived did not do so through a progressive evolution of their intelligence *and sympathy;* the latter essential factor in moral progress was lacking. They were survivals through shrewd, selfish struggle, through the degradation of intelligence into an instrument for individual self-preservation. As a result, ethical personalties were less in evidence than before, so that to-day our whole economic structure is but a compromise of intelligent greed.

Nor can we follow this essayist in his deductions from his first law of the cost of progress. He infers that because there can be no social progress except at the price of an absolute increase of suffering, economic prosperity and social justice can never mete out comfort to all, and multitudes of human beings must always be in subjection to individual or corporate masters. To outgrow suffering from hunger and want and to be free industrially would, in his mind, involve the attainment of "finality in a world of change." But surely the cost of progress—an absolute increase of suffering—might still be paid, and yet not in the grosser forms of physical want and slavery. Decentralized socialism might merely substitute, as Professor Giddings thinks, competing communities for competing private organizations, and still the individuals might become free and rise above the liability to starvation.

Miss Addams's two essays breathe in every sentence the spirit of rationalized humanity. Nothing could be more to the credit of the University Settlement movement than that it should allure such persons as Miss Addams. Her sympathy for humble folk is as strong, tender, and comprehensive as George Eliot's. The refuse elements of foreign populations dumped into our cities do not seem such to her. She regrets the vulgarizing process to which our American social progress will subject them. "The Italian and Bohemian peasants who live in Chicago," she tells us, "still put on their bright holiday clothes on a Sunday and go to visit their cousins. They tramp along with at least a suggestion of having once walked over ploughed fields and breathed country air. The second generation of city poor have no holiday clothes and consider their cousins 'a bad lot.' I have heard a drunken man, in a maudlin stage, babble of his good country mother and imagine he was driving the cows home, and I knew that his little son, who laughed loud at him, would be drunk earlier in life, and would have no such pastoral interlude to his ravings." And the serenity with which she urges

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upon us the *social* expression of democracy, the sharing of the life of the race and "a certain *renaissance* of Christianity," is as confident and unruffled as the sweet preaching of Emerson.

Her account of Hull House is clear and satisfying. We cannot but regret, however, that the chief glory of Hull House and of its presiding genius, the assistance rendered to four trades-unions for women,—a fact which will bring to the educated classes of America more than anything else ever done by them the confidence of workingmen and the respect of labor leaders,—should have been introduced so incidentally and subordinately into Miss Addams's account of her work. And she seems to imply that the reason she has allowed four trades-unions to meet at Hull House (two of which were organized there) is not because she recognizes the moral and social necessity for organizing women into labor-unions. She says, "It seems to me of great importance that as trades-unions of women are being formed, they should be kept, if possible, from falling into the self-same pits the men's unions have fallen into." If there had been no danger of pitfalls, would the occasion have fallen away for encouraging these organizations of women? However this may be, it was a plucky thing to do, and perhaps a stroke of moral genius, for the prevailing sentiment of "cultivated Americans" is at the present juncture strongly opposed to trades-unionism.

Mr. Woods's article on "The University Settlement Idea" is full of sound, practical suggestions for any one wishing to enter such work as that of Andover House. But we have here only space for expressing our regret that neither Miss Addams nor Mr. Woods advocates or seems to have thought of the only kind of "a social settlement" which, in our opinion, can ever become a permanent centre of organic reform. Both these writers seem to have in mind only the "educated young persons,"—exceptional individuals who leave their homes and surroundings to live among working-people. But the true and abiding social settlement, that which will succeed and render unnecessary the University Settlement, will be one of educated *families*. Whole families must and will feel "the subjective necessity for social settlements." Four such families in London, from the interest of one or more members of each in the Leighton Hall Neighborhood Guild, have taken up their residence in houses adjoining the guild. We cannot here enlarge upon the advantages of a settlement of families over one of isolated young persons, but they are easy to discover, and it is unfortunate that Miss Addams's and Mr. Woods's pens could not have used their

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happy skill to arouse the conscience of American families to their civic duty as families.

In Father Huntington's essays on "Philanthropy: Its Success and Failure" and on "Philanthropy and Morality" the people themselves seem to be speaking, voicing at last their needs, confessing their weaknesses, and rebuking the rich. If Miss Addams sympathizes with the humble, Father Huntington is humble. He also more than the other writers seems to be conscious of the laws of social life and the causes of poverty. But it is a little curious that while charity organization finds in this volume a champion in Mr. Bosanquet, the single-tax theory an advocate in Father Huntington, and trades-unions an indulgent friend in Miss Addams, not one of these writers has a word to say in favor of any form of socialism. Were representatives of socialism not invited to speak at the School of Applied Ethics? Or, among cultivated men in America interested in Philanthropy and Social Progress, is there no one in favor of the municipalization or nationalization of capital as well as of land?

Above all other teachings of this volume the idea of the Social Settlement stands out. But, heartily as we approve of the spirit and methods of settlement work, there is, we think, one other defect in the plea for it set forth in this volume besides its omission of the idea of family settlements. This other defect is the failure to make the centre of reform life spring from a group of the working-people themselves. According to Miss Addams, it is to spring from the residents,—from Hull House. But rather does it seem to us that ultimately the life of the working-people must be organized about a centre of their own, where Miss Addams would be their guest, not they hers.

STANTON COIT.

APPEARANCE AND REALITY. A Metaphysical Essay. By F. H. Bradley, LL.D., Glasgow, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. xxiv, 558.

This is a truly great book; and though the discussion of a metaphysical essay does not lie within the scope of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, yet there are some points in the volume which demand our attention. The part that concerns us is contained chiefly in Chapter XXV., which is entitled "Goodness," but this

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part cannot be fully understood without reference to some other chapters, such as IX., X., XVII., etc. The general character of Mr. Bradley's philosophical position may be briefly indicated as follows: He makes a sharp antithesis between the world of appearance and the world of reality. The essential characteristic of reality is that it must be in harmony with itself. Appearance, on the other hand, is in a state of perpetual self-contradiction. Nevertheless, reality (or the Absolute) is not to be thought of, as by Mr. H. Spencer, as something entirely unknowable* behind the world of appearance. "Reality appears in its appearances, and they are its revelation. . . . Reality comes into knowledge, and the more we know of anything the more in one way is reality present within us" (p. 552). Reality is, as it were, simply appearance straightened out, appearance made consistent with itself. It must not be opposed to experience or to the nature of our self-conscious life. "Reality is one experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Its character is the opposite of that fabled extreme which is barely mechanical, and it is, in the end, the sole perfect realization of spirit. . . . Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is spiritual so much the more is it veritably real." This last remark evidently involves a conception of *Degrees* of Reality,—*i.e.*, it involves the idea that a thing may be more or less real. This idea is worked out with great force and suggestiveness in Chapter XXIV., and is perhaps the most original and characteristic feature of the book.

To attempt to criticise Mr. Bradley's working out of this position would evidently carry us beyond our province, but a few remarks are necessary. Mr. Bradley's general attitude is closely related to that of Hegel. The difference seems to lie chiefly in the sharper contrast which Mr. Bradley draws between the Absolute and its revelation. With Hegel the Absolute is necessarily self-revealing: its essence involves a process. This process contains self-contradiction, and it is the dialectic arising from this self-contradiction which is the nerve of the movement. With Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, the process appears to be non-essential, and the self-contradiction is merely something to be got rid of. Mr. Bradley's

* On Spencer's worship of the unknowable Mr. Bradley has a highly characteristic joke. Mr. Spencer's attitude, he says (p. 128), "seems a proposal to take something for God simply and solely because we do not know what the devil it can be."

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view, in fact, approximates to that of Spinoza. Spinoza's Absolute has been compared to a lion's den. All the tracks converge to it: none issues out. So with Mr. Bradley. Self-contradiction has to be got rid of. Appearance has to be straightened out. Thus we get to the Absolute, to reality. What seems to be not sufficiently answered on Mr. Bradley's view is the question, how there ever comes to be a self-contradiction at all, why reality appears; in other words, what is the origin of evil. Nor, indeed, does the difficulty in Mr. Bradley's system end here. The idea of reality which he opposes to appearance is itself an appearance. The idea of the Absolute is not the Absolute, and so far as it is not the Absolute, it is false. How, then, can it be taken as the standard by which appearance is judged?

I may say, generally, that Mr. Bradley's metaphysical work impresses me as being fragmentary. He raises particular problems which could not really be solved without being brought into a more systematic connection with one another than Mr. Bradley attempts. We feel the want, on the one hand, of a dialectic like that of Hegel, by which the various points might be brought into relation to one another; and, on the other hand (if, indeed, this is not the same thing), of what may be described as Epistemology (or Logic). We require a general theory of the nature of our knowledge and the place of the various factors in it.* Only by means of such a theory could we understand the significance which is to be attached to such an idea as that of the Absolute; only by means of it could we estimate the importance of the various contradictions which arise in the world of experience. But it must be left to writers in metaphysical reviews to press this criticism home. Here we must now turn to the ethical side.

Goodness, according to Mr. Bradley, belongs to the world of appearance. It betrays its phenomenal character by its inner contradictions. There is a "radical vice" in all goodness (p. 414). This is brought out in various ways. The chief contradictions seem to be two. In the first place (p. 432), "that a man is to be

* Mr. Bradley's own "Logic" does not fully supply this want; and even if it did, his present work does not appear to be written with sufficient reference to that. I cannot here discuss the question whether if such a Logic or Epistemology had been written there would be anything left for Ontology. My own view is that nothing would be left except the working out of something akin to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature and Spirit.

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judged by his inner will seems in the end undeniable. And, if such a doctrine contradicts itself and is inconsistent with the very notion of goodness, that will be an indication that the good is but appearance. . . . But . . . a will, after all, must do something and must be characterized by what it does; while, on the other hand, this very character of what it does must depend on that which is 'given' to it. And we shall have to choose between two fatal results; for either it will not matter what one does, or else something beyond and beside the bare 'will' must be admitted to be good."

The second contradiction, which is the one to which Mr. Bradley gives most attention, is that which comes out in the opposition between self-assertion and self denial. He explains this opposition with great care. After rejecting the ordinary common-sense view of the antithesis, he sums up by saying (p. 417), "It is the essential nature of my self, as finite, equally to assert and, at the same time, to pass beyond itself; and hence the objects of self-sacrifice and of self-advancement are each equally mine. . . . In self-assertion the organ considers first its own development, and for that purpose it draws material from the common life of all organs. But in self-sacrifice the organ aims at realizing some feature of the life larger than its own, and is ready to do this at the cost of injury to its own existence. It has foregone the idea of a perfection, individual, rounded, and concrete. It is willing to see itself abstract and mutilated, over-specialized, or stunted, or even destroyed. But this actual defect it can make up ideally by an expansion beyond its special limits and by an identification of its will with a wider reality. Certainly the two pursuits, thus described, must in the main coincide and be one. The whole is furthered most by the self-seeking of its parts, for in these alone the whole can appear and be real. And the part again is individually bettered by its action for the whole, since thus it gains the supply of that common substance which is necessary to fill it. But, on the other hand, this general coincidence is only general, and assuredly there are points at which it ceases. And here self-assertion and self-sacrifice begin to diverge, and each to acquire its distinctive character."

Now, that both these antitheses come up in the sphere of morality seems to me unquestionable. Indeed, they are closely connected with one another. We may state them briefly in this way. Both our moral judgments and our conceptions of the moral end present

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themselves naturally in two distinct ways, which we may roughly describe as subjective and objective respectively. We judge a man's will, and we also judge the objects which he achieves. Again, we consider the moral end to involve a personal condition, and we also consider it to involve a state of the world. Now, in each of these two cases it is possible to lay the emphasis either on the one side or on the other,—*i.e.*, either on the subjective side or on the objective side; but in neither case can the one side be conceived as existing without the other. A perfectly good will must be a will issuing in acts that tend to the development of a perfectly harmonious world. Similarly, a perfect form of personal development could exist only within a world that is perfectly developed. It is only so long as the objects with which we are dealing remain imperfect that there is any conflict between the two sides on which it is possible to regard them. A will may be commendable which issues in foolish actions, and actions may be beneficial which issue from an impure will. A life like that which Matthew Arnold ascribes to Goethe as the "physician of the iron age," standing above the stream of "headlong fate," and enjoying the happiness only of knowing its inevitable course,* may be regarded as a type of personal development in the midst of inharmonious conditions; while, on the other hand, the wretchedness and vice of a few individuals may seem little more than a foil to the glory of an age of great achievements. But it is not so, as Mr. Bradley would say, "in the Absolute;"† and I venture to think, also, that it is not so in any true conception of what is meant by goodness. Any real ideal of goodness must involve both the inner and the outer, both the subjective and the objective, in perfect harmony with each other. Now, if this is so, then the mere fact that in an imperfectly developed condition the two sides may be opposed, does not imply any ultimate contradiction in the conception of goodness. An athlete may develop his arms but not his legs. In an imperfectly developed physique there may be a certain

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* "And he was happy, if to know
Causes of things, and far below
His feet to see the lurid flow
Of terror, and insane distress,
And headlong fate, be happiness."

This is, of course, taken from Lucretius.

† "It all comes right in the Absolute" is the characteristic refrain throughout Mr. Bradley's volume.

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opposition between these; but it does not follow that there is any contradiction in the ideal of a perfect human body, which would necessarily involve both. If there is any truth in this view, then the oppositions to which Mr. Bradley calls attention do not represent ultimate speculative contradictions in the conception of goodness, but only practical difficulties in the way of the realization of goodness in an imperfect state. Certainly there is often a practical opposition between purity of heart and practical effectiveness in external acts, between the realization of an individual character, with its circle of particular interests, and surrender to a whole recognized as higher. Such practical difficulties as these were discussed, for instance, in a very able paper by Mrs. Bryant in a recent number of this JOURNAL,* and there can be no doubt that they are of great importance with reference to the art of conduct; but, unless they imply an ultimate contradiction in the ideal aimed at, they can hardly be said to have any important speculative significance; and Mr. Bradley does not appear to have proved that they do involve any such contradiction. If the difficulties are merely practical, they are, on the whole, of the same order as those that arise with reference to the pursuit of different ends in life,—*e.g.*, science and politics, religion and art, etc. Often a "choice of Hercules" between such competing aims has as much practical significance as one that may fairly be characterized as one between the self and a larger whole (a characterization which has, in any case, only a relative justification).

It seems to me that Mr. Bradley's treatment of this whole question is rendered unsatisfactory by the fact that he has given no systematic account of what is to be understood by self. In Chapter IX., indeed, he has some interesting statements on different senses in which the term is used, but the connection between these different senses does not seem to be adequately brought out.† This question, however, is mainly of metaphysical importance, and, in any case, our limits will not permit any discussion of it here.

I may add, in conclusion, that Mr. Bradley's general view of

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* Vol. III., No. 3, pp. 308–323.

† Mr. Bradley's view (p. 95 *et seq.*) of the self as a "construction," seems to me to be one that can commend itself, at most, only to empirical Psychology. If he had worked out a complete Epistemology (or Logic), a different view of the self as a self-transcending unity would, I think, have become necessary. His view on this point, as on some others, seems to be unduly influenced by Herbart.

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goodness seems to me to result from what may be described as his statical conception of the Absolute. Goodness evidently belongs to the process of spiritual life, to the struggle towards the ideal of perfect harmony; and if the Absolute exists only in a state of repose, goodness must suffer the condemnation of all mere appearance. But if it is the nature of the Absolute to reveal itself in a spiritual process, goodness may perhaps claim to be its highest manifestation. At any rate, it does not seem to be proved that the ideal to which goodness points involves any ineradicable vice.

This review cannot but be felt to be miserably inadequate to the work criticised; but enough has probably been said to make it apparent that the book is one of supreme interest and importance to the student of ethics as well as to the student of metaphysics. I could have wished to add something on several other points, such as the doctrine of immortality, the relation of religion to morals, the significance of art, etc., on all of which Mr. Bradley has some very interesting remarks; but I must content myself with commending his discussions on these subjects to the attention of philosophical students. I may say, generally, of Mr. Bradley's book (parodying one of his own oracular utterances) that the work as a whole is unsatisfactory, but every particular thing in it is most delightful. The style, though often paradoxical, is singularly bright and attractive. It is hardly too much to say that the book is altogether the most important independent work on metaphysics that has ever been written in English.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

ETHICS. An Introductory Manual for the Use of University Students. By F. Ryland, M.A., author of "A Hand-book of Psychology," etc. London: George Bell & Sons, 1893. Pp. x, 220.

This book contains chapters on the Scope and Method of Ethics; on Good, Happiness, and Perfection; on Right, Obligation, and Duty; Hedonistic and Intuitionist Theories; Ethical Psychology; the Relation of Ethics to Theology and Law; and the Classification of Virtues. The final chapter gives a brief sketch of English Ethical Theories; and the book concludes with a useful bibliographical appendix, and a reprint of the ethical questions in the London Pass Papers from 1883 to 1892. The general arrangement

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is good, and the expositions of ethical doctrine, though sometimes superficial, are frequently clear and vigorous.

The object of the author, as announced in the preface, is to provide a hand-book of ethics suited to students preparing for the Pass Examination of the University of London. But this hand-book is not a mere reproduction of the views of accepted ethical authorities, for the writer has strong (though not always consistent) views of his own. He rejects utilitarianism and all categorical imperatives, and advocates a treatment of ethics which is rather æsthetic than scientific.

Mr. Ryland's book is thus both better and worse than a mere manual: better, because more vivid than if it were simply a colorless repetition of other men's doctrines; worse (I think), because his own opinions, though held with conviction, have not been thoroughly thought out, and therefore both some criticisms of the ethical systems which he refuses, and also the statement of his own view, are deficient in clearness and in insight. For instance, some of his strictures on utilitarianism proceed on distinct misunderstanding; as where he objects to the Benthamite "Greatest Happiness" axiom, on the assumption that it regards all men as having "the same capacity for pleasure and pain." Again, the suggestion conveyed in his remark that "to the genuine utilitarian, rightness is a *proprium* of the useful action" (and other remarks to the same effect) is highly misleading, since for the utilitarian (as for every other) moralist, the *first* question is, *What is right?* And Mr. Ryland's account of the relation between ethical and psychological hedonism is not as clear as might be desired; in fact, his whole treatment of pleasure and desire appears to be very much wanting in grasp and accuracy. The criticism of Hedonistic doctrine on p. 32 may be especially mentioned as involving confusion of thought and expression, and misapprehension of the doctrine criticised. Again, he insists strongly on the impossibility of a Hedonic calculus, but on p. 70 is enabled by means of it to arrive at a very decided conclusion.

When Mr. Ryland proceeds to find fault with utilitarianism on account of its vagueness, one cannot help wondering; not so much because utilitarianism is, in fact, comparatively definite, as because the æsthetic view, which he inclines to, is—as he describes it—essentially vague, and this very vagueness seems to be regarded by him as a merit. He says (p. 38), "The natural instinct of good men seems to assume that the various kinds of human perfection,

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although rivals, are yet not absolutely exclusive of each other. . . . If this be so, we may have to do away with the idea of a *summum bonum* altogether (unless we can find one which shall embrace all three), and substitute for it the conception of a cycle of ends, a self-supporting system of goods." We have "no absolute principles," and "the ultimate end of reasonable conduct cannot be absolutely determined;" "we are to take a purely relative view of the meaning of *obligation* and of *right*;" "there remains no categorical imperative;" "we are under no necessity to regard the moral precepts as rules." All this is somewhat vague and incoherent; it does not promise either a satisfying theory or useful practical guidance; and its acceptance seems to leave us—whether as moralists or as plain men—rather badly off. When it is said to be questionable "whether the highest kind of morality is compatible with ethical codification," we may indeed admit that in conduct, as in art, what is most perfect and most beautiful cannot by mere observance of rules, or even by strenuous pursuit of an ideal, be reached by all,—in fact, some transcendent power of will or insight or imagination is needed for the production of masterpieces either in art or in life. And in drawing analogies between art and morality it is important to remember that, while no man is called on to paint pictures or compose music unless he has genius, every man is bound to live a good life; and though rules of art—of harmony, of perspective, etc.—are not *enough* to insure artistic excellence, yet they are *indispensable*. Rules are not everything, but good rules are a good deal.

The æsthetic view leaves us without definite rules or a definite end, and without any common measure of ethical value; and it seems to me to be but a poor substitute for even the inconsistent and defective morality which common sense unreflectingly accepts. And Mr. Ryland does not hold to it unflinchingly, for he sometimes seems to agree with Kant that the only good is a good will, and at other times maintains that it is the object of desire that is the good.

Still, in spite of its faults, this hand-book is, on the whole, above the average in merit. It has a certain completeness of form and is free from irrelevancies, the style is bright, and it is the work of an instructed and earnest, if perhaps somewhat hasty, thinker.

E. E. C. Jones.

Girton College, Cambridge.

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PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SOME OF THEIR HISTORICAL RELATIONS. By James Bonar, M.A., LL.D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. xvi, 410.

Mr. Bonar's work is an outcome of the larger treatment of Political Economy which distinguishes most contemporary writers as compared with the economists of a generation ago. The title of the work is itself enough to indicate this. By Ricardo and his followers of what might be called the Augustan age of Political Economy, the science was based on apparently simple and obvious principles of human nature, and elaborated deductively into a complete and rounded system. It was not thought of as having any special relation to philosophy. It was founded, indeed, on principles which philosophy (or rather psychology) had to justify. But it was not conceived as relative either to men's thoughts about ultimate questions or to their stage of social or political development. It was the criticisms of the historical school which awoke English political economy from this "dogmatic slumber," and discredited the old economic tradition. The insistence by Cliffe Leslie and others upon the variation of human motive and of external conditions made it even appear doubtful whether a separate science of economics was possible at all. Recent economists have thus been forced to define the conceptions with which they deal, and to investigate the limits of their validity. And this investigation has made them fall back on the sciences of human nature and of social relations. Political Economy is thus brought into line with and given a place among the philosophical sciences, founded on psychology, and recognized as one of the branches of social science. It is, as Mr. Bonar defines it, "the study of the relation of human society to its material wealth." Philosophers have not always been conversant with the special facts and reasonings of economic science, nor have economists been uniformly interested even in the philosophical ideas connected with their own economic theories. But economic facts, nevertheless, form part of the material with which social philosophy is concerned; and systems of economics can be shown to be connected with philosophical views concerning human life and its position in the ultimate order of things. There is room, therefore, both for a theory of the philosophical position of economics,—such as has been given more than once from different points of view,—and

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also for an historical record and criticism of such theories, whether expressed or merely implied in the writings of philosophers or of economists.

Mr. Bonar's book deals with the latter question,—the history of the relation between economics and philosophy. The question, as he puts it, is, "how far men's thoughts about the world and human life in general have affected their thoughts about the economical element of human life in particular, and how far this influence of thoughts upon thoughts may have been material." In his comprehensive treatment of this subject he has had no predecessor, and his book will be welcomed by every student of philosophy who is interested in its social applications, and by every economist who does not neglect the principles of his science. To say that it is learned, accurate, and clear, full of keen insight and happy expression, is only to say that it is written by Mr. Bonar. If it has not all the attractiveness of style which charms the reader of "Malthus and his Work," it is because the author has had to exercise self-repression in the interest of completeness and method.

The author's treatment of the subject is divided into five books, the first of which deals with Ancient Philosophy, the last four with different periods and schools of Modern Philosophy. The second book is entitled "Natural Law," and its chapters deal with the precursors of Grotius, with Grotius himself, Hobbes, Harrington, Locke, Hume, the Physiocrats, and Adam Smith, with a concluding chapter on Natural Rights and the Law of Nature. Book III., on Utilitarian Economics, treats of Malthus, Bentham and James Mill, and J. S. Mill. Book IV., on Idealistic Economics, treats of Kant, Fichte, Krause, and Hegel. Book V., on Materialistic Economics and Evolution, contains a chapter on Karl Marx, Engels, and Lassalle, an Epilogue on the relation of Economics to the theory of Evolution, and a Summary of the whole work.

With this comprehensive plan, it is not astonishing if some differences should appear in the mode of treatment of different points. The history begins almost where the history of philosophy is accustomed to begin; but political economy, as a separate study, has existed barely for a century and a half. So far as Ancient Philosophy is concerned, we have a useful *résumé* of the views of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, so far as they touch upon economic subjects, and an account of the influence of Christianity upon the way in which men regarded industry and trade. If these are determined by ethical ideas to a

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greater extent than in modern economics, it is because economic conceptions do not as yet stand by themselves, but are, as Mr. Bonar points out, subordinate to—indeed, form a part of—political and ethical conceptions. In modern times, also, and after economics had secured a place for itself as a separate study, the philosophers who have influenced thought most profoundly have not always paid much attention to the special doctrines of economics. This is the case especially with the idealist philosophers dealt with in Book IV., under the title Idealistic Economics. The views there given belong much more to political philosophy than to economics. To some extent Fichte is an exception, but his *Closed Commercial State* is an economic Utopia rather than a theory of actual industrial relations. Kant and Hegel give but scant attention to economic notions as distinguished from those of political and legal relations. Had Kant carried out an analysis of the notion of value in consistency with his doctrine of desire, it is allowable to think that his reduction of all the material determinants of desire to the principle of private happiness would have led to a hedonistic conception of value: the economic motive being at the same time shown to be a destructive principle, and the "economic man" the antithesis of the moral man. A more assured position is assigned to economics in Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*. But Hegel's actual influence in the science was, for the most part, indirect, through certain of his disciples of the Left; and they are classed by Mr. Bonar under Materialistic Economics.

When the philosophers are not also economists, it is in the writings of the latter that we have chiefly to seek for the points of relation between philosophy and economics. Accordingly, the most important sections of Mr. Bonar's work are the second book, in which he traces the philosophical notions connected with the origin and early history of economics, and the third book, in which he discusses the connection of economics with Utilitarianism. The fifth book is also of great interest. It deals with a group of writers who were well equipped both in philosophy and in economics, and it gives, besides, a suggestive discussion of the bearing upon economics of the modern notion of development.

In the second book we have a luminous account of the way in which philosophy influenced the growth of modern political economy. The latter was not reached simply by the application of philosophical conceptions. It arose out of the needs of the new form of State. It "may be said to begin with the introduction of

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taxation as a means of supporting the State; . . . and taxation begins with the absolute monarchy that superseded the feudal system. . . . It is connected at this middle stage of its history rather with finance and political philosophy than, as at first and afterwards, with moral philosophy." (P. 59.) The author's own summary of the process, given in the introduction, may be quoted as bringing out clearly the part which philosophy played in the beginnings of economics:

"In mediæval and modern times (if we pass over the time when economical arrangements were forced into the rules of common law), political economy grows out of political philosophy. The mercantile theory was essentially political. The theory of property, in which, as treated by Hobbes and Locke, economical considerations played a great part, was colored by the politics of the day; and the question of origin was not sufficiently distinguished from the question of justification; still less were the two questions discussed with the calm indifference of science. Economical subjects were first brought prominently into ethical controversy by Mandeville; the discussion of them in this connection by Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith himself, has given countenance to the impression that modern political economy grew out of moral philosophy. But it was hardly ethical so much as political in the hands of their contemporaries the French economists, who embodied it in their grandiose system of political and social philosophy, as a feature of first importance; and it was largely on the foundation of the physiocratic system that Adam Smith constructs his own. We owe to the physiocrats also the continuance of the discussion begun long before their time by Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke, about Natural Rights; and this abstract question of political philosophy has had a connection with political economy, which only the rigidly abstract student of the latter study can ever wish to ignore. The persistence of this question in conjunction with the comparatively new question of the rights of man has been a feature not only of political but of economical writings down to our own day; and modern socialism does no more than frankly combine what had in other quarters been tacitly combined, the economical and the philosophical problems."

It is impossible, within the limits of this review, to follow Mr. Bonar's investigation of the influence of the notions of Natural Law and Natural Rights upon the early economists. The discussion cannot help being intricate sometimes, for few notions can boast more diverse and elusive meanings than those ascribed to nature; but it is clear, thorough, and, above all, fair-minded. Mr. Bonar never attempts to snatch a dialectical victory, but gives to each writer the benefit of the best meaning. Thus, in speaking of Adam Smith's view of the "natural progress of opulence," he says (referring to a passage in the "Moral Sentiments"), "The order is called 'natural,' simply because it is the better means to a given end. . . .

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Intense individual interest and assiduity are indispensable for the making of wealth. It is not, and it cannot be, a fit work for societies and States." But this seems to me to interpret Adam Smith from the modern point of view, which regards every case of state interference as mischievous unless there are special grounds to justify it. The author of the "Wealth of Nations" was addressing readers who looked from a different point of view, and who needed no special reasons for believing that it was the function of the state to guide the "progress of opulence." In the chapter referred to, the "natural" order does not simply *mean* "the better means to a given end," but the fact that modern states have inverted the natural order is one ground for believing that the means they have chosen are the worse. And in this passage Adam Smith attempts something like a definition of what he means by "Natural." In the "natural" order, he says the progress of the town should follow in the wake of the progress of the country, for, in the first place, the country affords subsistence which is "in the nature of things prior" to the conveniences and luxuries supplied by the town; and in the second place, the "natural inclinations" of man would lead him to cultivate the land rather than to engage in manufacture or foreign trade. This second reason speaks, in the language of the time, of the individual man as nearer to "nature" than human institutions. In the first reason there is a reference not only to an order of time, but also to an order of dependence. The "natural" order is from that which is fundamental to that which is dependent. And to follow this natural order is the best means of attaining the goal it tends to; but this is a property rather than a definition of the notion "natural."

Of Adam Smith's political economy as a whole, Mr. Bonar says, "There would not be even the appearance of contradiction, if the notion of liberty were more positively defined, so as to include opportunities of development and not simply relief from interference, and if the notion of law had not been opposed to that of custom." This is true and suggestive; but we must bear in mind how profoundly these changes would affect the "system of Natural Liberty."

By the Utilitarian Economists of the present century, the conceptions of Natural Law and Natural Rights were expressly rejected as belonging to the mythical region of the *a priori*. But, as Mr. Bonar shows, "the idea of natural and non-natural is rather redefined than discarded" by Bentham and James Mill, and, although J. S. Mill,

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in his posthumously-published essay, not only casts aside the authority of Nature, but seems to have a feeling of personal resentment against the order of things, yet it would not be difficult to show that the ideas of Equality and Liberty—the two ruling ideas of his ethics and economics—are never established by evidence, but are simply survivals of the old notion of Natural Rights.

In the chapter on Bentham, Mr. Bonar examines in detail the "alliance of political economy with Utilitarianism." The purpose of his analysis is both to show the obvious points of contact which led to the alliance, and also by thoroughly examining these points of contact to bring out "the difficulty of consistently explaining economic facts by a utilitarian ethics of any kind." Mr. Bonar will have done real service to economics if he succeeds in inducing political economists to reconsider the psychological doctrines which they have adopted with too little question from predecessors whose economical theories they have so profoundly modified.

In the concluding book, on Materialistic Economics, the author makes but little of the alliance between Hegelian Socialism and Ricardo, of which other economics have made much. He draws attention rather to "the economical view of history and the belief that the working-classes are now the tools of the other classes," as the positions common to Lassalle, Engels, and Marx. "Socialism," he concludes, "owes its strength to them far more than to particular economic theories, such as that of the Iron Law of Wages, or that of Surplus Value, which have been unable to stand criticism."

The Epilogue on the question "whether the theory of Evolution, either in its philosophical or in its Darwinian* form, is an argument for Socialism," is full of interest; but the author would probably be the last to regard it as quite satisfactory. It seems

* Exception may be taken to the way in which Mr. Bonar and some other historical writers use the term "Darwinian development:" applying it, for instance, to the survival of the mechanical inventions which best subserve the purposes of the industrial arts. The selection in this case is deliberate, made consciously by people who knew what they were about, and therefore chose the fit and rejected the unfit. What Darwin established was that a similar end was reached by natural causes without deliberation or consciousness of the end. To this only the term "natural selection" should be appplied. The former process is deliberate, or, as it is called, artificial. The survival of useful inventions is as much due to artificial selection as the English race-horse.

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difficult to get the two terms of the relation to close quarters. And the divergence of views on the subject is sufficient evidence of the difficulty. Hegel himself was a conservative; but the Hegelians who have most distinguished themselves in economics have maintained that the present industrial order is but a stage in the development of Socialism, without considering where the further dialectic of the notion may carry them. Darwin was an individualist, who felt himself reluctantly compelled by his theory of natural selection to approve all forms of competition; while some of his followers look to Darwinian development to bring about a Socialistic state, although Darwinism gives little support to their private belief that the Socialistic state will prove itself the fittest to survive. The truth seems to be that the theory of Evolution has little to say on the question, just because it is a theory of processes without being a theory of ends. Mr. Bonar's conclusion is that it contains nothing "to point us clearly to any centralization of all industrial organization in the State." He bids the individualist rest at ease. "Men will never sell their liberty to purchase a compulsory equality and fraternity, and if socialism became a tyranny it would have a short life."

The editor and publishers of the "Library of Philosophy" are to be congratulated on having obtained for the series this "first attempt to present a view of the relations of philosophy and economics through the whole of their history." There is perhaps no one better qualified than Mr. Bonar to speak with authority on both subjects; and this "first attempt" is likely to be the standard history for a long time to come.

W. R. Sorley.

University College, Cardiff.

An Outline of Legal Philosophy. By W. A. Watt, M.A., LL.B. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Pp. ix, 184.

This book is described as "an attempt to state shortly and simply some of the main principles which underlie the facts of law." The author endeavors to "focus upon jurisprudence the various lights derived from historic, 'analytic,' and philosophic sources," and the underlying conception of the book may be said to be Hegelian. But this conception is rather implicit than explicit, and the book would have been clearer to the uninstructed reader if the author had thrown into an Introduction what he has

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relegated to an Appendix upon "The Conditions of Right," in which he justifies the philosophical stand-point. It is there shown, or rather indicated, how such a metaphysic of right as is given in Hegel or Green "yields, in ethics, a theory of common good and in jurisprudence a theory of social right, both based on personality and implying an ultimate end." But the author seems anxious to keep on a line with common sense, or, at any rate, not to prejudice his inquiry by "transcendental" conceptions; and such ideas as that of the state as the universal, of the organic conception of legal authority, of property as the realization of will, and the like, are stated rather than developed, or even occur as *obiter dicta*. A more definite statement, also, of the relation between the "historic," "analytic," and "philosophic" methods would have been appropriate. The idea of jurisprudence as "philosophical criticism applied to law" is a so much more familiar conception in German than in English law-books that it seems to require explicit consideration, if not justification. A philosophical reader, on the other hand, has every reason to be satisfied with the method adopted. How fruitful are the working conceptions which Hegel has provided for the study of law, as of every other concrete product of "spirit," may be gathered from Mr. Watt's handling of juristic conceptions; it is permeated with the kind of view of which the "Philosophy of Right" and Green's "Lectures on Political Obligation" are classical statements. It is this that gives to the book a unity "which may be felt" and makes it the reverse of mechanical; and it is this that makes the author so sensitive to the aspect of law as the reflection of a growing and expanding social life, as indeed being like life itself, "many" and yet "one,"—"sweeping onward" and therefore at no point final, "sweeping onward" and therefore to an end. The whole book is worked out with much skill and sense of proportion, and its expression of principles is at once simple, clear, and exact (*e.g.*, "justice might be roughly explained to be the obtaining by each man of what is appropriate to his character as it expresses itself in life"); the statement of Hegel's conception of the relation between the "phases" of Property, Contract, and Penalty is admirable, as is also the criticism of Kant's system of Natural Right.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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NEW YORK STATE REFORMATORY AT ELMIRA; SEVENTEENTH YEAR-BOOK, 1892. Pp. 275.

In form, the foregoing document is the annual report of the New York State Reformatory at Elmira. In matter, it is an exposition of the principle and workings of the reformatory idea upon which the discipline of the institution is based. In its latter aspect the document merits attention as the latest and most complete formulation of the reformatory scheme. The form in which it is presented may render a rounded view of the system difficult for those not already familiar with its general outlines. This could not well be avoided, and we must be grateful to the reformatory management that they have taken the occasion of the annual report to furnish us with so much documentary and detailed evidence of the methods adopted to secure the aims of the institution.

On reading the Year-Book, one cannot fail to be impressed by the multiplicity of effort. This impression may crowd out for the time being that of unity of purpose. The casual reader will demand the why and wherefore of this vast mechanism. This he must read through the lines and pick up in occasional sentences or phrases. It is useless to attempt to formulate it in a single phrase. The title of the institution gives a clue, but "reformation" may convey widely different meanings. Here reformation means rehabilitation; it means providing a man with the elements of knowledge and character necessary to an orderly, law-abiding existence in our modern society. Law-breakers, and especially the first offenders who are sent to the reformatory, are persons who have failed to comply with the conditions of life in society as expressed in penal laws and codes. Society must protect itself against such persons; but if the protection is to be effective, it must equip them not only with a knowledge of the restrictions placed upon them, but with a capacity of using their liberties along lawful lines. The offender must learn how to do right as well as unlearn vicious habits.

The inmates of penal institutions may be classed as incompetents. They are incompetent, either morally, intellectually, or physically, of that sustained and constant effort in legitimate lines of activity which characterizes the law-abiding citizen. Hence this vast machinery of the Elmira Reformatory, designed to remove so far as possible such incompetence. Hence its insistence upon three things, —discipline, the observance of moral habits; schools, the stimulus of mental activity; the workshop, the military drill and the gymna-

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sium, the training of the body to continuous directed effort. Its hope of success lies in the prospect that the unremitting exercise of right practices will lead to the formation of right principles.

We cannot give an account in detail of the hundred applications of these principles. Every year witnesses some new plan, some development of those already existing. In recent years, two points call for especial notice: first, the trades schools, and, second, the wage system. Without supplanting productive labor as a part of the discipline of the institution, trades schools have been given an enormous extension. What they accomplish is seen in the Year-Book itself. It is entirely the work of the inmates. The printing, binding, and the numerous illustrations and vignettes, which have all been prepared by them, testify to the excellence of the results obtained in at least one department of trade instruction. A new feature is basing each prisoner's record on a fixed wages. He pays so much for his clothes, and so much per day for board, room, and washing. After that the remainder is written to his credit, saving such deductions as are made for punishments for various offences. Truly, the amount which he can earn is not large; but it does make a pecuniary difference whether he conforms to rules or not.

We have called attention to the general principle of the discipline established, and to some of its more recent applications. We cannot go further into detail. The Year-Book supplies this, and supplies, further, much instructive information as to results. It contains one hundred biographical records, which will be read with interest by those to whom a specific case appeals more strongly than a general statement. It is worthy of note that, whatever be the special subject under consideration, a correct tone runs through the entire book, which lends a heightened interest to its exposition. The book closes with a review of reformatory legislation in the United States, and an eloquent plea for the wider extension of the principles which it embodies.

ROLAND P. FALKNER.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL; the Journal of the British Economic Association. Edited by Professor F. Y. Edgeworth. Vol. III., No. 11. September, 1893. London: Macmillan & Co.

This number of the *Economic Journal* contains at least two articles that are of the greatest interest to students of ethics. The first of these is the report of the annual meeting of the British

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Economic Association, containing the address of the president, the Right Hon. G. J. Goschen, M.P., on "Ethics and Economics," and a report of two short speeches on the same subject by Mr. Leonard Courtney and Professor Alfred Marshall. The speeches of Mr. Goschen and Mr. Courtney, though interesting, do not, perhaps, contribute much that is new to the discussion of the subject. Mr. Goschen's address at least suffers seriously from the want of clear definition. At one point Mr. Goschen seems to identify the ethical student with the emotionalist; at another point he identifies him with the socialist; and at both these points he appears to contrast the ethical student with the economist. Yet at another point in the address he states that political economy itself is ethical. Again, throughout his address Mr. Goschen describes the ethical objections to the methods of some economists as being of a popular character. If the German Historical School is to be described as popular, who are the scientific men? Professor Marshall's speech, as might have been expected, is more to the point. It is especially noteworthy for the distinct repudiation which it contains of the idea that the treatment of "utilities" by political economists involves adhesion to a hedonistic system of ethics. This point had been already brought out by Mr. Bonar with great clearness ("Philosophy and Political Economy," especially p. 236), as well as by some other writers;* but this declaration by Professor Marshall will no doubt carry more weight than the opinion of any other economist would have done, especially as Professor Marshall is one of those who use the conception of "utilities" most freely. Professor Marshall's statement is, indeed, not quite so clear as could be wished. He tends somewhat to mix up the question whether pleasure is the motive to action with the question whether higher forms of satisfaction are to be included as well as lower, and with the question whether the motive to action is selfish. A hedonist might be a universalistic hedonist, and might recognize the highest forms of pleasure. The important point is that the economic calculus does not involve hedonism at all; and Professor Marshall would have made this clearer if he had kept it separate from the other issues. It is to be regretted, also,

* In the newly-published "Principles of Political Economy," by Professor Nicholson, this point is very clearly stated. See pp. 23–26. The whole question of the relation between Ethics and Economics is well dealt with by Professor Nicholson.

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that Professor Marshall uses the term "utilitarian" instead of "hedonist." A hedonist need not be a utilitarian, and the repudiation of pleasure as a basis for the economic calculus would have been more complete if the wider term had been used. On the other hand, we have reason to be grateful for Professor Marshall's acknowledgment that the language of some economists who were not utilitarians (and this means, I suppose, chiefly Professor Marshall himself) has given rise to misunderstanding, inasmuch as the term "pleasure" has been used by them in an unusual sense. I understand Professor Marshall to use the term "pleasure" to signify anything which serves as a motive to voluntary action.* He does not use it for "agreeable feeling," which seems to be its most common acceptation.† One cannot but hope that Professor Marshall in his future writings will either abandon this use of the term or accompany it with a precise definition of the sense in which it is to be understood. It is a pity that, in giving an illustration of unselfish action which is recognized by the economist, Professor Marshall instances only the "wayward action" of an artist. Some people will be apt to jump to the conclusion that all unselfish action is wayward. But it is perhaps ungrateful to raise any such captious objections to Professor Marshall's weighty and valuable manifesto.

The other article in this Journal which is of special interest to students of ethics is Mr. C. S. Loch's (incomplete) essay on "Some Controverted Points in the Administration of Poor Relief." This is a reply to Professor Marshall's views on the subject, and should be read in connection with Mr. B. Bosanquet's recent article in the JOURNAL OF ETHICS (Vol. III., No. 3) on "The Principles and Chief Dangers of the Administration of Charity." The question involved is, on the whole, more ethical than economic.

There is also an interesting and erudite article on "Fashion," by Miss Caroline Foley, and a valuable account of "Labour Federations," by Mr. Clem. Edwards. The rest of the Journal is more purely economic.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

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* Or (to put it more briefly and avoid the ambiguity of the term "motive") *any desired end.*

† One gathers from other sources that Professor Marshall regards Bentham as having also used the term "pleasure" in the unusual sense here suggested. Surely this is not the case.

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THE ECONOMIC REVIEW. Vol. III., No. 4. (Containing articles, "The Casuistry and Ethics of Investments," by Professor Percy Gardner, M.A.; "Bonar's Philosophy and Political Economy," by David G. Ritchie, M.A.; "Some of the Christian Socialists of 1848 and the following Years (I.)," by J. M. Ludlow; "Old-Age Pensions," by the Rev. L. R. Phelps, M.A., etc.) London: Rivington, Percival & Co., October, 1893.

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LA RÉFORME SOCIALE. Paris: Secrétariat de la Société d'Économie Sociale, 54 Rue de Seine.

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RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. Roma: Balbi Giovanni.

The following books were announced in the last number without the name of the publisher or with some typographical errors:

LES LUTTES ENTRE SOCIÉTÉS HUMAINES ET LEURS PHASES SUCCESSIVES. Par J. Novicow. Félix Alcan, 1893.

DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL. Par E. Durkheim. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

L'ANNÉE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Par F. Pillon. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

LA PSYCHOLOGIE DES IDÉES-FORCES. Par A. Fouillée. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893. 2 vols.

DESCARTES. Par A. Fouillée. Paris: Hachette, 1893.

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:

Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.

Prof. G. von Gizycki, Nettelbeckstrasse 24, Berlin, Germany.

J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1894.

SOME REMARKS ON PUNISHMENT.

THAT the doctrines connected with the name of Mr. Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It will not modify our conception of the end, either for the community or the individual, unless we have been holding views which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to a truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.

And yet in ethics Darwinism after all may perhaps be revolutionary. It may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relative importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part and in part rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realize how in its very principle the Christian ideal is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with

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all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.

Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our idea of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realized in its members. There is, of course, a question as to the meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or again with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are not forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purposes need not distinguish the community from the state.* The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism—or we may call it the organic view of things—urged by German Idealism early in the present century.

Now, this conception of the end, it seems to me, is not affected by Darwinism; but the case is altered when we come to consider the elements and means. For Darwinism has much to tell us about the conditions of welfare. We are all agreed that the community, though it may have grown naturally to be what it is, should now more or less consciously regulate itself, and deliberately play its own Providence. As to the manner and the amount of this interference we are not at one, but as to its necessity in principle there is no real disagreement. But, if the survival and progress of the race have been due to certain causes, these same causes can hardly now have become not worth considering. If, that is, a foreign

* The above view, in my opinion, is not wholly true. It is, however, true enough, I think, to serve the purpose of this article, and so far as any corrections are required in the conclusions, the reader can introduce them.

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Providence has led us, so to speak, hitherto by a certain rule, when we are our own guides and masters are we forthwith to ignore its method? So far as there is a presumption, that surely points to a very different conclusion. I do not mean that it is right for us now consciously to adopt unchanged the old unconscious mode of progress. For it is not possible to return to an unreflecting condition, and again no community could allow within itself an unchecked struggle for existence. But when we modify and depart from the workings of natural selection, I urge that we ought at least to proceed on some kind of principle. We ought not thoughtlessly to disregard the old conditions of welfare, but where we supersede these we should know what is to operate in their stead. The laws of past progress must, I admit, be qualified through progress itself, but it is not likely that these laws have become wholly invalid. And, at any rate, to assume this without ground seems plainly absurd. But in our morals and politics this absurdity is dominant. We do not deny that progress has been made largely by natural selection, and we must admit that in this process the extinction of worse varieties is essential. It is clear again that with this struggle and this extinction the community now interferes. Thus the method which in the past *has* succeeded is more or less modified. But, if we ask on what principle it is changed, and what is to serve in its place, we find no rational answer. The competition *à outrance* has been checked, and under artificial conditions we seem to sanction a struggle between rival fertilities. We compel the higher type, it may be, to stand by helpless and to be outbred by the weaker and lower, and we force it to contribute itself to the process of its own extrusion.* We lay an irrational stress on the education of the individual, we

* It is no good answer to urge the infertility of the criminal class. The only good answer would be to show that the higher type is everywhere so much the more fertile that this superiority alone insures its prevalence. And such a contention surely would be ridiculous. I certainly include Mr. Spencer among those who irrationally interfere with natural selection. The limits he would set to competition seem arbitrarily fixed. The old metaphysical doctrine of the individual's rights—a doctrine which became obsolete early in this century—can hardly to-day be considered a rational principle.

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emphasize the less important and the more doubtful teaching of Darwinism. But on the main point, the suppression of undesirable types, we appear ready to intrust our destinies to Providence. Yet we are called on, we know, ourselves to be a Providence to ourselves. And we ourselves deliberately, we know, make frustrate the old providential working.

What has succeeded has not been merely superior fertility. The stronger in other points has used his strength to drive the inferior out of existence. He has certainly not been forced at his own cost to protect that inferior from the natural doom of its defects. And surely the presumption is that what has prospered will continue to prosper. But where is the view of politics which fails to interfere with these past conditions of success? And where is the view which interferes on any consistent principle? But, if so, on perhaps the supreme problem of politics our general frame of mind must be called deplorable. It is full of blindness, cowardice, superstition, and confusion unspeakable. Indeed, one's main consolation must be that perhaps in practice after all things have got to go blindly. But, however that may be, it is not the concern of this paper to deal in general with progress. Assuming here that the welfare of the community is the highest end and law, and assuming that selection among varieties is necessary to that welfare, I intend briefly to apply these ideas to the subject of punishment.

Darwinism, we may presume, should modify the view which we take of punishment. This does not mean that any of our old doctrines need quite be given up. The educational, the deterrent, and the retributive view may each retain, we may rather presume, a certain value. But all of these, it seems, must be in part superseded. They must be made subordinate to another and a higher law,—what we may call the principle of social surgery. The right and the duty of the organism to suppress its undesirable growths is the idea of punishment directly suggested by Darwinism. It is an old doctrine which has but gained fresh meaning and force. And its principle is the old principle and the one ground for any sound theory of punishment. The moral supremacy of the

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community, its unrestricted right to deal with its members, is the sole basis on which rational punishment can rest.

But, if so, how does Darwinism alter our views and threaten moral revolution? It tends, in a word, to break the connection between punishment and guilt. This connection, clearly or obscurely, confusedly or explicitly, is still maintained by well-nigh every theory of punishment. The union of these ideas is in fact so rational and strong that in the end perhaps we have no choice but to respect it nominally. While widening the idea and the thing we might confine the name of punishment to that surgery which seems retributive. But the retributive principle, the absolute restriction of punishment to crime, is the very centre of the position threatened by Darwinism. We have here the main root of that confusion which now obscures the subject. And in passing on to consider some current doctrines I need pay little or no regard to any other principle. Hence I shall at once criticise the retributive view under two forms, a normal and a diseased growth. Guilt and punishment in both of these doctrines are connected necessarily. The first accepts and justifies this essential connection, while the second attempts to reject it. But rejection and acceptance in the end stand on precisely the same ground. Crime by the perverted view is regarded as *mere* disease, while disease itself is still treated as *only* disease, and therefore to be respected (as hitherto) because it is *not* criminal. I will proceed to explain this statement.

Let us first examine the normal form of the retributive view. We must here distinguish two aspects, a positive and a negative. The first of these declares punishment to be essentially the supplement of guilt, while the second asserts that apart from guilt individuals are sacred. Now, on its positive side I still hold to the retributive principle. The doctrine that punishment is moral reaction, the reaction of the moral organism against a rebellious member—this doctrine, so far as it goes, seems quite satisfactory. And there is little of what I urged years ago,* whether in its favor or

* "Ethical Studies," 1876.

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against its inappreciative critics, that I would scruple to repeat. But then this retributive view pure and simple will not work. For practice, if taken by itself, it is too narrow, and even in itself it labors under intrinsic difficulties. These latter (to take them first) arise from the doubtfulness of every moral valuation. If you are to estimate morally, then, in proportion as the moral standard grows more inward, the genuine facts become inaccessible. And it becomes less and less possible anywhere to measure exactly moral responsibility. But with a more external standard again you are threatened from the other side. You are left in doubt if your estimate is genuinely moral.* And in particular you have to struggle with the task of drawing in each case a line between wilful badness and unwilled disease. Such internal difficulties are a serious hinderance to retribution. If you can acquire the right to punish only by proving moral crime, it seems hard to be sure that this right is really secured. Thus the principle is good, but its application is seriously embarrassed. And partly for this reason we do not usually attempt to apply the principle pure and simple. In practice having secured, as we believe, the right to punish, we give weight also to other considerations. We modify our sentence with an eye to the general good. We make an example, or, on the other hand, we let mercy or policy more or less abridge strict justice. But with this the retributive principle has ceased to be absolute. Punishment has ceased to be essentially an affair of justice, and we have been forced to recognize a superior duty to be unjust. We have not, indeed, given up the idea of retribution and desert, but we have made it secondary and subject to the chief end of the general welfare.

And the negative side also of retribution must suffer the same fate. To punish any except the guilty was wrong because unjust. But how will it be when justice is but an inferior and subordinate duty? It is obviously unjust to remove members not morally culpable on the simple ground that

* On this difficulty see some further remarks in my "Appearance and Reality," pp. 431 *et seq.*

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their removal is good for the organism. But then it was unjust before to punish any one in any degree more or less with a view to secure the general good. We cannot, in short, play fast-and-loose with the supremacy of justice. And having once set that down to be an inferior and subordinate principle, we cannot then attempt on any point to take it as absolute. To remove the innocent is unjust, but it is not, perhaps, therefore in all cases wrong. Their removal, on the contrary, will be right if the general welfare demands it. The negative side of justice proves, in short, no stronger than its positive side. And the sacred rights of innocence have become a thing conditional. They exist, so far as the rule of justice is not overruled, and they are intact, if anywhere, there where punishment corresponds to desert. But, where the good of the whole may call for moral surgery, mere innocence is certainly no exemption or safeguard. We may doubt if such cutting-off without crime can fairly be called punishment, but, the thing being justified, I will not pause to consider the name. It is better to ignore a question which does not seem to affect our main result.

We have now considered the normal form of the retributive view, and we have found that its validity is merely relative. Justice, in other words, is but a subordinate principle of Ethics. And on its negative side also the principle is not absolute. To remove the innocent may everywhere perhaps be wrong, but you cannot urge this barely on the ground that their removal is not merited.* Let us go on to see the diseased growth from our normal principle.

There is a way of thinking and feeling about punishment, not uncommon in our days, which exhibits a high degree of inconsistency. It more or less explicitly accepts the doctrine that crime (all of it or some of it) is mere disease. Or, rather, crime is taken as a natural deviation from the type. And

* The retributive view again on its negative side is inconsistent, because, apart from punishment, individuals are in practice not sacred. The community is forced to inflict more or less relative disadvantage, and therefore injury, on its members without regard to moral desert. The state is forced to be unjust, and against this injustice the retributive view does not utter any protest.

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rightly from this ground a protest is made against such unwilled defects being imputed and judged of morally. Now, with this protest no one can fail more or less to sympathize. But here is the beginning of blind and thoughtless confusion. For, protesting against the principle of the retributive view, or at least partially against its application, and thus, at least in effect, withdrawing part of life from that principle's sway, these moral innovators stand at the same time on its absolute supremacy. Justice on its positive side is restricted, but on its negative side is to retain unlimited sovereignty. Criminals, some or all, are diseased, and are therefore innocent, and the innocent, of course, are by justice proclaimed to be sacred. They are to enjoy therefore that treatment which was assigned to mere disease, when mere disease was not taken to include and cover crime. And surely such an attitude and such a claim are most inconsistent. This insane murderer, we may hear it said, is not to be destroyed. Justice is the assignment of benefit and injury according to desert; but this man is not a moral agent, and hence it is unjust to injure him. But, if he is not a moral agent, I reply, surely what follows is that justice is indifferent to his case. What is just or unjust has surely nothing to do with our disposal of his destiny. And hence, so long only as we do not pretend retributively to punish him, we may cut him off, if that seems best for the general good. For justice, we have found, is but a subordinate and inferior principle. It can hear no appeal from the tribunal of the common welfare. And to take a view of crime which seems to abolish all accountability, to make in this way everywhere impossible any application of strict justice, and then in the name of justice to claim protection for ravishers and murderers, seems really preposterous. The claim is rational only as an appeal to us to modify our principles. It is a confused request to us in the name of justice to dethrone justice. But when justice (as it must be) is dethroned, and when Darwinism (as it will be) is listened to, there will be a favorable hearing for the claims of ethical surgery. And we may now dismiss both forms of the retributive view.

But against the unlimited right of the moral organism to

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dispose of its members is there anything to be set? There is nothing, so far as I see, but superstition and prejudice. The idea that justice is paramount, that, with the individual, gain or loss must correspond to desert, and that, without this, the Universe has somehow broken down—this popular idea is, after all, the merest prejudice. It seems to rest either on the assumption that there is no principle above justice, or on the common error as to the absolute validity of principles. But the necessary collision both of rights and duties, their mere conditional force, and the subordination of all else to the one principle of general welfare, are truths not to be refuted. And, dwelling no more on this crude popular superstition about justice, I will pass on to consider an opposite error. There is a belief that (not animal, but) human life is sacred. The former prejudice as to justice is, I suppose, anti-Christian; but the sacredness of human life seems largely a Christian idea. And I exhibited the root of this error in a former discussion.* The individual in the next world has an infinite value; the things of this world, our human ends and interests, are all alike counted worthless, and the rights and duties founded on these interests, of course, bodily disappear. The good of the whole, worthless in itself, can therefore confer no right to interfere with its members; and each individual, on the other side, is, so to speak, the preserve of Providence. Violence, immoral in itself, or, at least, immoral for us men, is forbidden us, and is left in the hands of the Deity. Now, to criticise this view, otherwise than by stating it, seems here not necessary. Once admit that life in this world is an end in itself, and the pure Christian doctrine is at once uprooted. For, measured by that end and standard, individuals have unequal worth, and the value of each individual is but relative, and in no case infinite. And the community, we have seen, is itself its own Providence, and therefore against its rights the individual is not sacred. With this we may pass from the Christian error, and may proceed to consider a fresh form of delusion. The individual may be taken, as such, to have

* Unpublished.

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positive and negative rights, rights not derived from another world, but still inhering in him independent of his place in the community. But both the individual and his rights, in this sense, certainly do not belong to our human world, and hence, unless they exist in some other world, they are existent nowhere. They are survivals, in short, from obsolete metaphysics, and about their vital principle I do not intend to speak further. But the rights of these supposed individuals, once placed in a community, must necessarily collide, and all attempts to avoid this collision are idle. And to find a rational ground on which mutual interference is here legitimate and there unlawful, is once more impossible. This question is one which called for discussion a century ago, but at the present time it can be considered a question no longer. The rights of the individual are, in short, to-day not worth serious criticism.

What is the result which, so far, we have gained? The welfare of the community is the end and is the ultimate standard. And over its members the right of the moral organism is absolute. Its duty and its right is to dispose of these members as seems to it best. Its right and duty is, in brief, to be a Providence to itself. And what went counter to this doctrine we found to be mere superstition.

Darwinism, on the other side (if we may speak for Darwinism), suggests a further conclusion. It could not tell us anything new concerning the end, but about some of the means it spoke decidedly. It urged on us that a condition of welfare is the selection of the more fit, and it added emphatically that selection means the rejection of worse varieties. And, since we now are Providence, it begged us in the name of Providence to reflect. And we found on reflection that we do much to thwart and very little to further the necessary conditions of our welfare. Then, as to punishment in particular, Darwinism showed us a strong presumption. Punishment should, it concluded, in the main be governed directly by the principle of moral surgery. The removal of diseased growths, of worse varieties, Darwinism insisted was obligatory. And it urged us, on this ground, to reform and make consistent our doctrine

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of punishment. This is our result; and as to punishment, we have to ask if the conclusion drawn by us in the name of Darwinism is sound.

The conclusion might be unsound as containing but a partial truth. It might be false, in other words, because one-sided. The welfare of the community is the supreme and paramount end. No objection possibly can be based on any ground but this. But on this ground it may be urged that there are other interests, other elements in the moral end, other conditions of welfare. Darwinism unrestricted, we may be told, cannot even exist in social life. There are spiritual conditions of that life, we may hear, more essential than the removal of worse varieties. And the ethical surgery, if so, might cut deeper than Darwinism perceives. It might in the end sever that moral bond by which the community is made one. This is a fair issue; but let me endeavor to make it more clear. Let us ask what Darwinism teaches and what it does not teach. The reader must bear with me if I dwell on what seems self-evident.

Darwinism, rightly interpreted, does not teach a return to nature. Given a community aware of itself in its members, we have, with this, gone beyond any stage of mere natural drift. For such a community, less or more, aims consciously at an end. It more or less has become its own Divinity and Providence. Further, Darwinism does not fix a hard limit to the community's rights. It does not suggest their confinement to the protection of person and property. Indeed, to start with mere competition as a first principle, and then to exclude competition in the most characteristic form of violence, would not be rational. But if, on the other side, the state may repress violence, clearly the state may also suppress other forms of the struggle. Darwinism, again, does not teach the supreme value of education. Certainly education works as a means for getting the best to the front, and as a means for obtaining the full use of the individual's powers. But Darwinism hesitates to ascribe to it greater efficacy. And in comparison with the suppression of unfavorable varieties, the importance of education in any case seems not great. And

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further, Darwinism assuredly does not teach universal selfishness. It neither proclaims it as a fact nor does it inculcate mere self-seeking as a moral duty. Mutual assistance, on the other hand, action in common, with more or less of self-sacrifice, is shown to be a condition of higher well-being. Darwinism, in fact, teaches us that within the whole the principle of competition has become subordinate. It has ceased to be absolute, and is overruled less or more by the main principle of general advantage.* Help for the helpless, benevolence, charity and mercy, are proclaimed by Darwinism to be conditions of social welfare. They are hence principles, principles once again not absolute, but once again secondary and subject to the general end. And thus, in pressing on us the claims of ethical surgery, Darwinism would indignantly deny a neglect of benevolence. It would urge that true benevolence is unflinching pursuit of the general good. There is no one (it might retort) so remorseless as the humanitarian, no one more ruthless and bloody than the sentimentalist, no one so pitiless as the rider on Christian principles. And it is not a rational world where the surgeon is charged with cruelty.

On another planet, if you like, it may all be quite otherwise. But on our planet, so far as we know, some hardship is inevitable. And if we are to play at Providence, as we must, then we must by commission or by neglect ourselves inflict hardship. Surely, then, the least cruel, the most merciful course of conduct—the best means in our power to diminish suffering—is to regard nothing but the conditions of general advantage. And as to these conditions Darwinism offers a positive doctrine. It teaches, in a word, the necessity of constant selection. It insists that the way to improve—the way even not to degenerate—is on the whole unchanging. That way consists in the destruction of worse varieties, or at least in the hinderance of such varieties from reproduction.

* Darwinism does not teach the principle of tribal or national selfishness. Regard for a whole beyond my social group, for humanity, and indeed for all sentient beings, is certainly not opposed to Darwinism. I have omitted these points in the text because I found it best for the sake of argument to simplify the question.

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Merely bring the fittest in each generation to the front—do nothing to secure that the next generation shall come from these fittest—and, in short, you are trifling with your mission as Providence. This is what Darwinism teaches, and it adds that society at present sins grossly by commission as well as by neglect. Not content with inaction, society works directly in the very interest of evil. It secures artificially the maintenance and the propagation of the unfit, while the fit are even injured in order to contribute to this general injury. And against such ruinous perversity Darwinism protests. It insists on the necessity of social amputation. The wholesale confinement, or, again, the mutilation of worse specimens, is not a satisfactory substitute. For it seems wrong to load the community with the useless burden of these lives, and, in the second place, there is a consideration too often ignored. To maintain in existence a creature, while depriving that creature of the conditions of happiness, is surely to inflict on it the direst suffering. Now, to pass such a sentence worse than death would, of course, be right if it were necessary and an ultimate resort. But in any other case it would be the extreme of indefensible cruelty. To remove from the social organism, as it were, by ligature a member sentient and miserably conscious through life of its own protracted dying, seems a most barbarous device. And by comparison clearly there is more kindness and mercy in the knife. To my mind this question of imprisonment has been often a cause of indignant surprise. That a man should hate capital punishment is not surprising. For, apart from religious and metaphysical superstitions, we must admit that such punishment is a terrible necessity. But that the same man should on another side feel no compunction, that he should cheerfully sanction a long, or even a life-long, imprisonment, that to bury alive a fellow-creature should, in plain words, seem a matter of course —this, to me, I own, is disgusting. It illustrates glaringly our moral confusion and blind sentimentality. For to shrink from an evil because we cannot ignore it, and to forget every horror not inconveniently forced before our eyes, is too characteristic of our morality. And too often we drape with the

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clothes of mercy the detestable idol of stupid cruelty. But human nature everywhere is prone to avoid fundamental issues. Life is a thing beset on all sides by hard necessities, and of these to choose the least is the one rational way of kindness. To face a problem in this spirit is, however, not possible for the sentimentalist.

Now, against this claim, and this plea for ethical surgery, I do not suggest that no rational objection can be urged. For our remedy clearly would bring some amount of evil. It would cause a shock, not merely to superstition, but to a large body of genuine moral feeling. It would certainly neither prohibit nor discourage works of true mercy, and it would entail no degree of physical cruelty. But still our remedy would have to utter and to enforce this sentence, "You and you are dangerous specimens; you must depart in peace." It would probably add, "There are some children here over and above what we want, and their origin, to say the least, is inauspicious. We utterly decline to rear these children at the public cost and, so far as we can judge, to the public injury." Now, such an attitude plainly would outrage a large mass of moral sentiment, and it would undeniably therefore be a source of suffering and evil. But on such points our sentiments to some extent are conventional, and therefore, so far, might very well be changed. And in any case to avoid as long as possible any moral shock is not the end of our being. The real question is, on which side lies the balance of harm? Measured by the good of the community, is moral surgery the less or the greater of two evils? We have to choose, in brief, between the complex results of alternative courses, and I do not propose to attempt a detailed estimate. I wish not to advocate any result to which my mind has been led, so much as to press for a serious consideration of the problem. I am satisfied if I have shown that the claim of moral surgery, however inconvenient it may be, cannot at least be ignored.*

* It is no good answer to urge that, after all, we have progressed so far in spite of neglect. For the conditions certainly have not remained the same. They are changing every day, and in great part unfavorably. The positive checks to population, in the shape of hardship and disease, acted as a selection

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"Then, on an ethical subject too, you really offer no practical suggestion?" No, in an ethical discussion I even venture to think that practical proposals are out of place. And then for myself I make no claim to be a practical man. I am sceptical as to the value for such a purpose of any moral philosophy, and I am sure that my small energies would not be decently expended in the field of practical reform. I am a theorist, in short, but yet, I hope, not anything of a projector; and if I am to make myself ridiculous, I prefer at least some manner which suits my tastes. But what advice could I offer beyond general platitude and well-worn commonplace? It is the part of a wise man to consider carefully the "for" and the "against," and before accepting an operation to weigh critically the worth of the diagnosis. But it is the part of a fool blindly to suffer evils to take their course. We may be right to wait and to observe, but there is a thing still which it cannot be wrong to remember. Radical plans of reform, if we suppose Darwinism to be right, are very certainly for the most part not radical at all. They may alleviate, or again they may aggravate, the symptoms, but most assuredly they cannot touch the real disease. And Darwinism, if it cared to quote Greek, might remind us of what everywhere is still the mark of the quacksalver and the mountebank,

θρηνεῖν ἐπῳδὰς πρὸς τομῶντι πήματι.

But, for myself as a bystander, there are some feelings which I am not careful to hide. I am oppressed by the ineffectual cruelty of our imprisonments. I am disgusted at the inviolable sanctity of the noxious lunatic. The right of the individual to spawn without restriction his diseased offspring on the community, the duty of the state to rear wholesale and without limit an unselected progeny—such duties and rights

of stronger varieties; and these checks every day are lessened. It is far easier now for weak and diseased specimens to survive and to breed. The struggle again, if we retain free trade in reproduction together with protection of the results, is becoming largely a mere struggle between rival fertilities. And from this competition the morally superior more and more refrain. I do not think that in the past such conditions have ever prevailed.

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are to my mind a sheer outrage on Providence. A society that can endure such things will merit the degeneracy which it courts. More and more on certain points we seem warned to return in part to older and to less impracticable principles of conduct. And there are views of Plato which, to me at least, every day seem less of an anachronism and more of a prophecy.*

F. H. BRADLEY.

MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD.

* Since this article was written, I have read a criticism on myself by the Rev. H. Rashdall in this JOURNAL, October, 1891. Mr. Rashdall appears to me to misunderstand the view which he attacks. He takes me to hold an "intuitive theory of punishment" (p. 22), by which (so far as I can judge) he means a view based on some isolated abstraction. I find this strange, and what is perhaps stranger is that he treats me as teaching that punishment consists in the infliction of pain for pain's sake. At least I am unable otherwise to interpret his language. Now, I certainly said that punishment is the suppression of guilt, and so of the guilty person. But I pointed out that negation is not a good, except so far as it belongs to and is the other side of positive moral assertion ("Ethical Studies," p. 25). Pain, of course, usually does go with the negative side of punishment, just as some pleasure, I presume, attends usually the positive side. Pain is, in brief, an accident of retribution, but certainly I never made it more, and I am not aware that I made it even an inseparable accident. If a criminal defying the law is shot through the brain, are we, if there is no pain, to hold that there is no retribution? My critic seems, if I may say so, to hold an "intuitive theory" of my views.

Starting, as it seems to me, from such misapprehensions, Mr. Rashdall's criticism does not appear to myself to hit the mark; and I will therefore not attempt to meet it in detail, but will merely add a few remarks on punishment by the state. Punishment does not rest on an abstraction, but is the reaction of a moral organism, and this organism in every case has a particular concrete character; and what is punished is, of course, always a revolt of a special and concrete nature. Surely, therefore, the varying amounts of the reactions required will follow naturally in accordance with the general principle. It is the welfare of the special state which, of course, decides the amount of ill-desert. And I find, again, no difficulty in the increase or diminution of the penalty by considerations other than those of desert. But, since the welfare of the state is used in punishment as the criterion of desert, I would remark that such increase or diminution may be less than is imagined. Still, I admit it, as, for example, in the case of pardon, and I consider that it occasions no real difficulty. It is a mere instance of the collision of rights and duties and of a superior duty and right to be here unjust. All that is required is that (if pressed) we should admit that such a modified penalty is not strict punishment.

In short, I should have little to correct in the old statement of my view except a certain number of one-sided and exaggerated expressions.

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OCCULT COMPENSATION.

THE process known to moral theologians as Occult Compensation furnishes an interesting chapter to the history of ethics. It signifies that when a man has a valid claim which he is unable or unwilling to substantiate by legal process he can without sin compensate himself by stealing an equivalent from the debtor. It is thus a survival from the primitive stage of barbarism, before society had advanced to settled laws and machinery for their enforcement, when the safety of each individual's life and possessions depended upon the force or cunning with which he could protect them. With the advance of civilization it has been the earnest effort of all lawgivers to suppress this natural instinct; the preservation of social order depends on its renunciation and on the readiness of the citizen to submit even to an occasional injustice rather than to take the law into his own hands, to be judge in his own case, and to vindicate his rights, real or supposed, by violence or fraud. Human nature is too frail to be intrusted with the power of determining, under the pressure of self-interest, when the eternal law prohibiting rapine and theft shall cease to operate.

In this both the ecclesiastical and the civil authority agreed during the earlier ages of Christianity. The spoiling of the Egyptians by the Hebrews to compensate themselves for their hard and unpaid labors—a favorite precedent for the theologians—was explained by St. Augustin as justified only by the special command of God: the chosen people would have sinned if they had done it of their own will or simply by command of Moses, and perhaps they sinned if they desired to do it.* The imperial jurisprudence was equally emphatic. A law of Gratian in 376 forbids any one from acting as judge in his own cause.† One of Valentinian II. in 389 declares that

* S. Augustin. contra Faustum Lib. XXII. c. 72. See also Augustin. Quæstt. in Heptateuch. Lib. II. c. 39, which is carried into the collections of canons (Reginon. de Discip. Eccles. Lib. II. c. 273; Burchardi Decret. Lib. XI. c. 53).

† L. 1 Cod. Theod. Lib. II. Tit. ii.—Const. 1 Cod. III. v.

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he who attempts to right himself, in place of awaiting judicial action, shall forfeit the value of the thing for which he ought to have litigated,* and in the Justinian jurisprudence this assumed the shape of a rule that if any one attempted to seize a thing which he believed to be his own in the possession of another, he lost the ownership, if it proved to be his, and if not he was obliged to restore it and forfeit in addition its value.† So careful were the limitations imposed on individual action that if a thief sold a stolen article the owner could not take from him by force the money received for it without being liable to an action for theft: the sum realized from a theft is not the thing stolen and is not itself stolen.‡ The utmost latitude allowed was that a man could secretly remove an object which he had lent, without being subject to prosecution for theft, provided the borrower had no claim for expenses incurred on it.§ All private vindication of right, real or supposititious, was thus condemned equally in the *forum internum* and the *forum externum.*

As social order reconstituted itself after the Barbarian conquests, these principles held good in the *forum externum.* The early codes show throughout the earnest effort of the legislators to bring the turbulent races to settled methods of procedure, and the only indication I have found in them recognizing any right to retake property is a provision in the Longobard law allowing a man to clear himself by oath when he has seized a horse or other animal belonging to another, believing it to be his own.‖ We shall see hereafter that the secular courts throughout the Middle Ages recognized no justification for theft in the fact that the thief was only endeavoring to make good a claim.

As for the *forum internum*, the Penitentials, in their prescriptions for theft, make no allusion to any extenuation arising from compensation. On the contrary, many of them seek to enforce the command of the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v.

* L. 3 Cod. Theod. Lib. IV. Tit. xxii.

† Institt. Justin. Lib. IV. Tit. ii. § 1. Cf. Const. 7 Cod. VIII. iv.

‡ Fr. 48 Dig. XLVII. ii. § Fr. 15, 59 Dig. XLVII. ii.

‖ L. Langobard. Rotharis, 347.

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39–42, Luke VI. 29, 30) by ordering that if a man recovers from a thief that which has been stolen he shall give it to the poor.* The same absence of allusion to compensation is observable in the collections of canons which served as guides in the courts of conscience from the tenth to the twelfth century; and when, in the second half of the latter, the canon law became interpenetrated with the civil law, the *Summa* of Bernard of Pavia, in its elaborate definition of all species of theft, observes the same silence.† Gregory IX. indeed positively prohibited a creditor from compensating himself out of a deposit made with him by a debtor;‡ whence, oddly enough, when subsequently occult compensation came into vogue, deposits with the creditor were excepted from among the things on which it could be exercised.

The first indication of a tendency to recognize such a principle is manifested in a passage of S. Ramon de Peñaforte, in which he quotes the section of the Institutes referred to above, and says that if a man believes a thing to be his and that he has a right to take it, he does not commit theft, but is to be punished otherwise.§ A few years after this, Alexander Hales treats the subject more at length. It was a question which, in those ages of turbulence, must have frequently arisen, and the efforts of legislators continued to be directed to the repression of the ever-recurring tendency to obtain satisfaction by violence or fraud. Thus Hales tells us that, if a man loses a thing by rapine or theft, he can, while his blood is hot, retake it by force or theft; but if an interval occurs, and there is time for passion to cool, he is guilty of theft, and is liable to punishment by the secular courts; by the divine law, however, he is not held to restitution if without scandal he recovers his property or its

* Pœnitent. Bigotian. III. ii. § 2 (Wasserschleben, Bussordnungen, p. 452).—Pœnit. Cummeani c. viii. § 4 (Ib. p. 483).—Pœnit. XXXV. Capit. cap. xxii. (Ib. p. 518).—Pœnit. Pseudo-Theodori c. x. § 5 (Ib. p. 594).

† Bernardi Papiens. Summæ Decretalium Lib. v. Tit. xxvi.

‡ C. 2 Extra, III. xvi.

§ S. Raymundi Summæ Lib. III. Tit. vi. § 1. "Si aliquis credebat rem esse suam et sibi licere rem suam surripere, non committit furtum liceat alias teneatur."

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equivalent, whether openly or secretly.* He adds a remark which is of interest, as the first utterance on a question which has remained a subject of debate to the present time, and also as showing how thus far the matter was confined to the recovery of some definite object taken, and how little the schoolmen imagined that the claim could be expanded to cover demands of other kinds. Servants, he says, whose wages are not paid cannot steal from their employers, for the master's property is not, and never has been, the servant's; the debt cannot make it so, but only that it ought to be so.† A few years later Cardinal Henry of Susa, in treating at much length on all related questions, makes no allusion directly to this, except to say that a man cannot compensate himself out of a deposit; he seems to know only the legal methods of obtaining restitution, save when in hot blood a man regains possession by force.‡

That the alleged principle, however, was commencing to attract attention is shown in its condemnation by Aquinas, who says that he who secretly retakes an article unjustly detained by another commits sin; he does not injure the detainer, and therefore is not required to make restitution, but he sins against common justice in usurping judgment to himself and pretermitting the settled order of law.§ Soon afterwards a forward step in the evolution of occult compensation occurs in the remark of Henry of Ghent that if a steward or factor is a creditor of his principal, and if something belonging to the latter comes secretly into his possession, although as a rule a man cannot take the law into his own hands, still in this case it is conceded to him to do so as a minister of the law and

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* Alex. de Ales Summæ P. IV. Q. xxiv. Membr. 5, Art. 3. The ecclesiastical definition of "scandal" is that which gives occasion to sin in others.

† Ibidem. "De serviendo vero patet dici quod nec in tempore negatæ mercedis nec post, licitum est ei spoliare dominum suum: quia nihil quod dominus habet est vel fuit servientis, neque ipse serviendo et jam completo servitio effecit quod suum esset, sed quod suum debeat esse."

‡ Hostiens. Aureæ Summæ Lib. II. *De Causa Proprietatis* § 7; *De Restitutione Spoliatorum* § 1.—Cf. Lib. V. *De Furto* §§ 1, 2.

§ S. Th. Aquinat. Summæ Sec. Sec. Q. LXVI. Art. 5 ad 3.

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special judge.* Here at length we find introduced the conception of compensation for a debt, and not the mere reclaiming of an object unjustly detained; and this is the only importance of the dictum, for we hear nothing more of the special case on which it is based.

For a while the decretal of Gregory IX. and the views of Aquinas continued to be the rule. John of Freiburg about 1300 and Astesanus de Asti in 1317 are virtually at one in saying that no compensation can be taken from a deposit in the hands of a creditor, and that any one who steals a thing belonging to him and unjustly withheld by another commits sin; he is not obliged to restore it, but he must render satisfaction to God, and must labor to remove any scandal which he may have caused to his neighbors. Astesanus, moreover, quotes Richard Middleton as assenting to this.† It was not long after this that Pierre de la Palu was the first to suggest the modern teaching, in opposition to his fellow-Dominican Aquinas. Incidentally he asserts that a man can retake by stealing anything that has been stolen from him; that a subject, as well a judge, has a right of vindication, for otherwise the Hebrews sinned in spoiling the Egyptians and all wars would be unjust.‡ This new view did not commend itself to immediate acceptance. In 1338 Bartolommeo da S. Concordio copies the Institutes in saying that he who takes what he believes to be his does not commit theft, but is to be otherwise punished; and a century later his commentator Niccolò da Osimo explains that he thus loses the right he possessed in the article, and that if it proves not to be his he must restore it and forfeit as much again in penalty of seeking to make law for himself.§

While Niccolò thus held fast to the ancient lines, his con-

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* Henrici Gandavens. Quodl. VI. Q. 27. I quote this at second hand, not having access to the works of the *Doctor Solennis*. I find it cited in the *Somma Pacifica*, c. 10, and in *Zuccherii Decisiones Patavinæ* Mart. 1708, Q. II. n. 7.

† Jo. Friburgens. Summæ Confessorum Lib. II. Tit. vi. § 7.—Astesani Summæ de Casibus P. I. Lib. I. Tit. xxxiii. Art. 3, Q. 3; Lib. V. Tit. xxix. Art. 2, Q. 4.

‡ P. de Palude in IV. Sententt. Dist. xxxv. Q. ii. Art. 4, Concl. 3.

§ Summa Pisanella s. v. *Furtum*, in corp.

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temporary the Dominican St. Antonino of Florence cut loose from Aquinas and formulated the principle of occult compensation in nearly the shape in which it has continued to the present day. It is true that he copies Bartolommeo, but he adds that a man has a right to compensate himself by recovering, secretly or otherwise, anything withheld from him unjustly through theft or rapine, usury or fraud. This right, however, is subject to seven conditions, which are worth enumerating, as they form the basis of all subsequent rules and were doubtless only the expression of what was gradually taking shape in the schools. The first condition is when the creditor cannot obtain his dues by personal application or through the courts. The second, that it must be a matter subject to the ordinary and common law, for no one can be a judge in his own cause. The third, that it must not be a doubtful claim. The fourth, that there must be no likelihood of scandal or injury to others, who may be accused of the theft. The fifth, that the creditor shall not run the risk of being reputed a thief through inability to prove the debt. The sixth, that he shall not imperil life or limb by being accused of the theft. The seventh, that he does not act against his own conscience, but believes that he has a right to do so, and is not prepared to commit perjury in case he is prosecuted for it.* An important feature of this is that the permission to steal is no longer confined to recovering an object unjustly detained, but is extended to ordinary claims, including those arising from the payment of interest on loans, which was always recoverable in the ecclesiastical courts; this alone opened a wide sphere of action, for usury, though under the ban of the canon law, was the commonest of offences.

Not long afterwards Pacifico da Novara follows St. Antonino and develops the subject still further. The claim may arise from any cause, including injuries suffered, thus enabling men to estimate their wrongs and redress themselves; the claimant is warned that if he is detected he will be punished as a thief, and he may be induced to commit perjury in the effort to escape; if the crime is imputed to another he must secretly

* S. Antonin. Summæ P. II. Tit. i. cap. 15, § 1.

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return the article stolen and not attempt again to compensate himself; if the debtor should ignorantly pay him subsequently he must secretly return the amount, and in any case he must provide for such contingency by warning his heirs not to receive it after his death; he must also be conscientious in valuing his claim and not take more than will strictly settle it. Still, with all this, occult compensation is a sin to be confessed —a very grave sin if the debt could be collected by legal process, but the perpetrator is not required to make restitution. If, as was customary, the loser should cause an excommunication of the unknown thief to be published, he can confess to the priest or bishop, if they can be trusted to maintain secrecy, and can ask to be excepted from the intention of the excommunication; but if this is attended with risk he can rest in peace and disregard it.*

From all this we can see how gradual and how tentative was the development of the practice, and how, even in the permission, there still lurked a consciousness that it was wrong. Nor was it as yet universally admitted. Few authorities at the end of the fifteenth century had wider or more enduring reputation than Angiolo da Chivasso, who gives the law as laid down in the Institutes and contents himself with the remark that this is the secular law, but that the divine law is different.† Baptista Tornamala briefly repeats Bartolommeo da S. Concordio.‡ Bartolommeo de Chaimis only says that if property of a debtor who will not pay falls into the hands of a creditor he can retain it if no evil or scandal is caused.§ Still the practice made progress, though slowly and irregularly. Cardinal Caietano justifies it by natural law which has been impeded by civil law.‖ Prierias is evidently somewhat puzzled; he agrees with Aquinas and Richard Middleton that it is a sin, but that the property stolen need not be restored, and he adds that the doctors

* Somma Pacifica cap. 10.

† Summa Angelica s. v. *Furtum* §§ 3, 6.

‡ Summa Rosella s. v. *Furtum*, in corp.

§ Bart. de Chaimis Interrogatorium, Venetiis, 1480, fol. 33^{b}.

‖ Caietani Summula s. v. *Furtum*.

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hold that there is no sin if six conditions are observed—conditions similar to those already mentioned.* Giovanni da Taggia is even more reserved; theft is not committed on one's own property, but an assertion that the thief believes it to be his own is not to be received, for thus every one would readily escape, and his definition of *compensatio indirecta* is merely that if a debtor's property happens to come without fraud into the hands of a creditor he can detain it until the claim is settled.† Rosemond adheres more closely to Aquinas: a man sins who retakes his property, forcibly or secretly, but he is not required to make restitution.‡ Pope Adrian VI., who was a learned theologian before Charles V. made him a cardinal, is quoted as teaching that although in the interest of public peace the law prohibits a man from thus righting himself, yet in the forum of conscience he cannot be required to make restitution, and he even extends the privilege to the loser at dice, who can thus recover his losses from the winner.§ Towards the middle of the sixteenth century Bartolommeo Fumo holds that there is no sin in a man retaking furtively what is his own, provided he can get it in no other way and avoids the risk of scandal; he is not making a law unto himself, but is following the natural law, of which the civil law deprives him.‖

The second half of the century saw the rise of the school of able and acute men who built up the new science of Moral Theology, who explored with exhaustless subtilty every possible aspect in which sin can be viewed, and whose refined distinctions sometimes argued away the existence of sin itself. Though not identified with this school, and though at times complaining of their endless disputations and audacious argumentation, Azpilcueta, the renowned *Doctor Navarrus*, shows their influence in the detailed investigation which he devotes to occult compensation. It is a mortal sin if the claim can

* Summa Sylvestrina s. v. *Furtum* §§ 16, 17.

† Summa Tabiena s. vv. *Furtum*, *Compensatio* § 1.

‡ Godscalci Rosemondi Confessionale, Antwerpiæ, 1519, fol. lxxxiii.

§ Alfonsi de Castro de Potest. Legis pœnal. Lib. I. c. 10, Arg. 4.

‖ Armilla Aurea s. v. *Furtum* n. 5.

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readily be enforced at law, or if the claimant exposes himself to risk of life or limb through condemnation for the theft, or if he believes it to be a sin, or if he foresees that it will cause much scandal. It is no sin, however, if legal recovery is impeded by partiality of a judge, or if the expense is disproportionate to the value, or if legal action will lead to quarrels and loss of friendship, while restitution is due to any third party who may be exposed to corporal or spiritual damage. The claimant must steal no more than will satisfy his claim; the debtor must not be allowed to pay it over again, and the claim must be just and indubitable—a point on which he says that many deceive themselves. Under these circumstances the claimant can disregard any excommunication published against the thief, even if it includes those who may have committed the theft in compensation. Even articles pledged or deposited with the debtor can be taken, provided it does not expose him to too great injury; although this is denied by some authorities. If the claimant is prosecuted he will not commit perjury in swearing that he does not know the thief, for he can use the mental reservation that it is not a theft. If there is a doubt as to his ownership of the article taken he sins in stealing it, though he is not required to make restitution.*

Cardinal Toletus gives the same general rules, the only important modification being that if grave injury is caused to innocent third parties the thief must confess and restore the article stolen.† This feature of the matter is important, for such injury to others is an almost invariable accompaniment of occult compensation, and we shall see that later moralists were less nice. Bishop Angles adds another condition—that the article stolen be not specially necessary to the debtor, for in such case it is a sin to rob him.‡ This perpetual variation of limitations, which we shall find continue, indicates how difficult the theologians found it to justify the practice to themselves. There was no recognized standard. On the one

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* Azpilcueta Manualis Confessarior. cap. xvii. nn. 112–17.

† Fr. Toleti Instruct. Sacerd. Lib. v. cap. xv. nn. 3–5.

‡ Jos. Angles Flores Theol. Quæstt. P. II. fol. 95–6 (Venetiis, 1584).

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hand, a contemporary authority suggests usury as a substitute for theft, though usury was a sin much graver than stealing; a man unable to collect a debt or to enforce a claim arising from injury endured can compensate himself by lending on interest until the gain satisfies the wrong.* On the other hand, Pelbartus de Temeswar, one of the last of the scholastic theologians, strictly follows Aquinas, and refuses to recognize that there is no sin in such an act.† Henriquez assumes a somewhat self-contradictory attitude; it is a mortal sin, and yet the thief and his accomplices are not bound by an excommunication uttered against them, even though its terms specially include such acts.‡

Thus far, occult compensation was purely the creation of the theologians, without any authoritative definition by the Church. This latter came with the issue in 1607 of the only expurgatory Index attempted by the Holy See. Manuel Sa's *Aphorismi Confessariorum*, issued in 1595, was one of the books subjected to its censorship, which disapproved of his paragraph on this subject, and ordered it erased and the following substituted, which may therefore be accepted as embodying the official opinion of the Church: "If you cannot conveniently otherwise collect a debt, you can take it secretly, provided you are careful that the debtor shall not pay it a second time, and that it is done without scandal or danger of reputation or life to you or to others; nor are you held to reveal it even if a prelate orders this under pain of excommunication, if it is probable that on revealing it you will be forced to make restitution, nor are others obliged to reveal it, if they know for certain that you have received it justly." A subsequent passage authorizing the retention of what is stolen, even if there is doubt as to your ownership, passed the censorship without alteration.§

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* Agost. Montalcino, Lucerna dell' Anima, cap. xiv. § 10, nn. 4, 5 (Venetiis, 1590).

† Pelbarti de Themeswar Sacræ Theologiæ Rosarium s. v. *Furtum* § 7.

‡ Henriquez Summæ Theol. Moral. Lib. XIII. c. xxi. n. 1 (Venetiis, 1600).

§ "Debitum tibi, si non potes aliter commode recuperare, potes clam tollere, modo cures ni creditor [*potius* debitor] iterum solvat, et id fiat sine scandalo et

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The first half of the seventeenth century witnessed the marvellously rapid growth of probabilism and casuistry, leading in many cases to conclusions deplorably lax. Occult compensation did not escape the scrutiny of the theologians of the new school; it was universally accepted as justifiable, and, while some still held to the old limitations, others extended its sphere of action. Forcible seizure was generally recognized as not permissible, though burglary could be committed; false swearing with mental reservation was recommended to those unlucky enough to be suspected and prosecuted; it was not necessary to await the maturity of a debt if the creditor feared that the debtor would not pay when due; an uncollectable claim against a prince could be recovered by cheating the revenue, even though this were farmed out, and Juan Sanchez goes so far as to assert that claims not recoverable at law, such as gambling and outlawed debts, can thus be made good. There was still sufficient reminiscence of the origin of the practice in the retaking of a certain object, for some authorities to insist on stealing being confined to articles of the same general nature as those from which the claim had arisen, although this of course could not be made to apply when a recompense was sought for insults, blows, or defamation.*

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sine periculo tuæ vel alienæ famæ aut vitæ, neque teneris revelare etiam si prælatus præcipiat sub pœnam excommunicationis, si est probabile quod revelans cogeris restituere, imo neque tenentur alii quicunque sint si certo sciant te hoc modo juste recipisse."—Index Brasichellensis, p. 351 (Bergomi, 1608); Sa, Aphorismi Confessar. s. v. *Debitum* (Venetiis, 1617).

"Si accepisti quod dubitas an tuum esset, debere te restituere quidem aiunt, alii negant, quod in dubio melior est conditio possidentis: quæ opinio locum non habet quando res jam erat in alterius possessione." Sa, s. v. *Furtum* n. 5.

Whatever doubt there may be as to the meaning of this last passage is removed by a reference to Azpilcueta as cited above.

* Sayri Clavis Regia Sacerdot. Lib. IX. c. xiv. nn. 5–15.—Reginaldi Praxis Fori Pœnitent. Lib. XXIII. nn. 7, 8.—Laymann Theol. Moral. Lib. III. Tract. iii. P. 1, Cap. 1, nn. 9, 10.—Escobar Theol. Moral. Tract. 1. n. 83.—Alphonsi de Leone de Officio et Potest. Confessarii, Recollect. XI. nn. 618–32.—Mendo Epitome Opinionum Moralium s. v. *Furtum* n. 16.—Berteau Director Confessar. p. 342 (ed. XXI., Venet. 1684).—Summa Diana s. v. *Compensare* n. 2.—Gobat Alphabetum Confessar. n. 222.—Busenbaum Medullæ Theol. Moral. Lib. III. Tract. 5, cap. 1, Dub. 1, n. 3.—J. Sanchez Selecta de Sacramentis Disp. XLIII. n. 56.

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The teaching of the period is summed up by Tamburini, who says it is universally accepted by all doctors that occult compensation is permissible, even from a deposit made with a creditor by his debtor, in spite of the prohibition by Gregory IX., although anything lent to or pledged with the debtor must not be taken; the claim must be a valid one, but it need not have matured if there is a moral certainty that it will not be paid, while if the debtor will suffer loss by the anticipation allowance must be made for it; with regard to the question of a prior appeal to the courts, it may be assumed in practice that collection by legal process is always difficult; as for protecting the debtor against paying a second time, if this can easily be done by a fictitious release it is well; if not, to omit it is only a sin against charity and not against justice and does not entail restitution; if he pays you a second time you are only the cause of it *per accidens;* in the same spirit you are required to protect innocent third parties from falling under suspicion only if it can readily be done, for this also is an obligation merely of charity and not of justice, and therefore if through your negligence an innocent man is condemned to the galleys or to other severe punishment you sin gravely against charity but not against justice and are not required to make reparation; in these matters you should weigh your own advantage against your neighbor's danger, for charity requires that you should not, for a trifling consideration, bring upon him the gravest injury. If suspected, you can swear to ignorance and you can disregard excommunication. As respects the nature of the thing to be stolen, it should if possible be of the same class as that for which it is compensation, but if this is impossible you can steal anything else, and if it inflicts special damage on the debtor he has only himself to thank for it, though in this case also you should weigh your own gain against his loss.*

Naturally the class most addicted to taking advantage of this license to steal was that of employees, especially domestic

* Tamburini Explic. Decalogi Lib. VIII. Tract. ii. Cap. 5, §§ 1–3. For the numerous editions of this authoritative work between 1654 and 1755 see De Backer, Bibliothèque des Écrivains de la Compagnie de Jésus, II. 617.

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servants, whose opportunities for pilfering were constant, who were accustomed to regard their wages as unjustly inadequate to their services, and who, when the principle was extended to compensation for personal injuries, were rarely without excuse arising from ill treatment, real or fancied. We have seen above how early this question arose, and how emphatically it was negatived by Alexander Hales. Prierias quotes approvingly Richard Middleton as holding that even when wages are unpaid a servant sins in compensating himself, though, in the forum of conscience, he cannot be required to make restitution.* Azpilcueta does not except servants from the benefits of occult compensation, but he says that many deceive themselves in thinking that they are justified in having recourse to it, as it is applicable only to legal claims and not to those arising from gratitude or as a recompense for zeal.† Cardinal Toletus endeavors to define the rights of servants as limited to stealing the equivalent of an amount actually due, when there has been an agreement as to wages, even if the wage is too low, provided that extra service has not been exacted; when no agreement has been made, then the current rate of wages is the standard.‡ It was easy to formulate rules, but difficult to restrain the cupidity of servants when once the way was opened to honest stealing; and Sayre repeats the complaint that many deceive themselves in thefts to which they have no right.§ The tendency to laxism showed itself in this as in other departments of the subject, and the opinion became current, especially among the Jesuit confessors, that insufficient wages justify occult compensation,‖ and, as the servant necessarily was the sole judge of the value of his labors and of the adequacy of his pay, it can readily be conceived what encouragement was given to the art of domestic pilfering. The first protest against this abuse naturally arose in France, where

* Summa Sylvestrina s. v. *Furtum* § 16.

† Azpilcueta Man. Confessarior. cap. xvii. n. 113.

‡ Fr. Toleti Instruct. Sacerd. Lib. v. cap. xv. n. 5.

§ Sayri Clavis Regia Sacerd. Lib. ix. cap. xiv. n. 6.

‖ Laymann Theol. Moral. Lib. iii. Tract. iii. P. 1, cap. 1, n. 10.—Busenbaum Medullæ Theol. Moral. Lib. iii. Tract. 5, cap. 1, Dub. 1, n. 3.

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the austere virtue concentrated in Port Royal, and afterwards stigmatized as Jansenism, was becoming scandalized at the growing laxity of casuistry and probabilism. In 1639 the Sorbonne condemned a number of propositions contained in the *Somme des Pechez* of Père Estienne Bauny, S.J., among which was one asserting that servants who have been obliged to agree to inadequate wages can steal to make up what they consider to be the deficiency.* Pascal, of course, in his cruel satire, did not neglect the opportunity which this teaching afforded, and he made merry over a case, occurring in 1647, in which a certain Jean d'Alba, a servant in the Jesuit Collége de Clermont, was detected in stealing, and, on his trial at the Châtelet of Paris, claimed that thirty crowns were due him, and alleged this doctrine in his defence, much to the disgust of the good fathers, who hastened to disavow it. The court apparently admitted the truth of his allegations, for it discharged him with a reprimand and restored to him all his personal effects, merely enjoining him to return to his home.† When, in 1656, the parish priests of Paris and Rouen presented for condemnation, to the assembly of the Gallican clergy, a series of propositions drawn from Père Bauny's book, this was not omitted; and when the Jesuit Pirot, in his unfortunate *Apologie des Casuistes*, was so ill advised as to assert "que les valets qui ne sont pas contents de leurs gages peuvent se payer de leurs mains," this was included among the errors extracted from that work and condemned by various French bishops in 1658 and 1659.‡ In 1657, moreover, at the instance of the Bishop of Ghent, the University of Louvain condemned a series of propositions including this.§

The pressure on the Holy See to impose a check on the audacious and alarming progress of laxity among the moral-

* Antoine Arnauld, Morale des Jésuites, p. 186 (Cologne, 1667).

† Provinciales, Lettre VI.—Extraits des Assertions dangereuses, etc. Paris, 1762, T. III. p. 287. It is observable that Père Daniel in his elaborate rejoinder to Pascal (*Entretiens d'Eudoxe et de Cléandre*) discreetly avoids all allusion to this subject.

‡ Arnauld, *op. cit.*, pp. 288, 379, 614, 704, 737.

§ D'Argentré, Collect. Judic. de novis Erroribus, III. II. 286.

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ists at last met with a measure of success. In 1665 and 1666 Alexander VII. condemned a series of forty-five propositions, and in 1679 Innocent XI. followed this with a list of sixty-five more. Among the latter was included the assertion that household servants can steal from their employers what they consider sufficient to equalize their wages with their services.* As this was the only condemned proposition connected with occult compensation, by implication the equally demoralizing practices taught by Tamburini and others were tacitly approved, although Innocent, in the exordium of his decree, disclaimed responsibility for all propositions not explicitly condemned. Although excommunication, removable only by the pope, was imposed on all who should teach or defend the forbidden doctrines, the casuists were not accustomed to pay more respect to papal decrees than might be shown by their ingenuity in evading or arguing them away. It was held that Innocent only forbade the servant from compensating himself at his own estimation; he continued therefore to be told that he could steal without sin if his wages were unpaid, or if, pressed by necessity, he had hired himself at too low a rate, and, with a singular lack of humor, he was advised to consult his confessor or some "prudent man" as to the amount that he should pilfer. This has continued, up to the present time, to be the doctrine of the predominant laxer school of moral theologians.†

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* "Famuli et famulæ domesticæ possunt occulte heris suis surripere ad compensandam operam suam quam majorem judicant salario quod recipiunt."—Innoc. PP. XI. Decr. *Sanctissimus*, 2 Mart. 1679, Prop. 37.

† Viva Comment. in Prop. 37 Innoc. XI. nn. 12, 13; Ejusd. Cursus Theol. Moral. P. III. Q. vi. Art. 3, n. 8.—Zuccherii Decisiones Patavinæ Mart. 1708, Q. ii. nn. 36–48.—Arsdekin Theol. Tripart. P. III. P. ii. Tract. 5, cap. 7.—Sporer Theol. Moral. Tract. v. cap. 5, nn. 83–4.—La Croix Theol. Moral. Lib. III. P. i. nn. 971–4.—Kresslinger Declaratio Propos. Damnat. n. 96.—Felicis Potestatis Examen Ecclesiast. T. I. nn. 2643–8.—Salmanticens. Cursus Theol. Moral. Tract. XIII. cap. 1, nn. 315–17.—S. Alph. de Ligorio Theol. Moral. Lib. III. n. 522; Ejusd. Istruzione Pratica per i Confessori, cap. vii. nn. 10–11.—Manzo Epitome Theol. Moral. Tract. *de Restitutione* nn. 154–6 (Neapoli, 1836).—Gury Compend. Theol. Moral. I. n. 623.—Varceno Compend. Theol. Moral. Tract. XIII. P. ii. cap. 3, Art. 1, § 2 (Aug. Taurin. 1889).

Bonal, however, restricts it to cases where the servant has performed extra

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With regard to occult compensation in general, the absence of any further allusions to it among the propositions con-

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work at the desire, expressed or implied, of the employer.—Institt. Theol. Moral. Tract. *de Justitia* n. 180 (Tolosæ, 1882).

The rigorist school, which has become nearly extinct, under the predominant influence of Liguori and his followers, naturally claims that the condemnation by Innocent XI. applies to all domestic pilfering. See Summa Alexandrina P. IV. n. 733.—Antoine Theol. Moral. Tract. *de Justitia* cap. 5, Q. 9.—Th. ex Charmes Comp. Theol. Univ. P. I. Tract. XV. cap. 4, § 3, Q. 8.—Alasia Theol. Moral. *De Restitutione* Diss. I. n. 22 (Taurini, 1834).—Zenner Instructio Practica Confessarii, § 333 (Viennæ, 1857).

Pontas, though strongly inclined to rigorism and hedging around occult compensation with almost impracticable conditions, is disposed to make exceptions in favor of servants. He holds the opinion, which is not universal even among the laxists, that a son who serves his father without pay can compensate himself (Pontas, Dict. de Cas de Conscience, s. v. *Compensation* c. 5. Cf. Viva, Cursus Theol. Moral. P. III. Q. vi. Art. 3, n. 10).

Pontas (*loc. cit.* c. 10) gives the details of a case submitted to him for decision in 1697 which reads like a chapter from Le Sage and throws so curious a side-light upon fashionable life in Paris that it may be worth repeating. A man entered the service of a woman of quality as a lackey and served for eleven years without wages or reward. He was then promoted to valetship, with a promise of 100 livres a year, but when she died five years later he had received only 150 livres. To compensate himself he managed at her death to steal a bag containing 1600 livres, and was retained as valet by her married daughter, with the promise of 150 livres a year. He served her for eight years without payment, as she habitually lost at cards the money given to her by her husband for the servants' wages; moreover he lent her 300 livres, which she never returned, and 2000 to her brother, who died insolvent, besides spending 200 in repairs to her country-seat. She kept a *table ouverte pour le jeu*, where the winners were expected to give to the attendant a gratification to pay for the cards and candles; according to custom this was a perquisite of the valet, but she made him account to her for it, and he had thus paid over to her 4000 livres, managing, however, to retain 1000 for himself, and he had in addition pilfered to the amount of 600 livres. He still remained in her service without expectation of better pay in the future, but he desired a settlement with his conscience. Pontas decided that he ought to refund the 1000 livres retained from the gratifications, less the cost to him of the cards and candles, also the 600 livres of stealings and the 1600 taken at the death of his first mistress, less the loan of 300, the 200 spent on the country-seat, and the arrears of wages due on his first and second terms of service as valet. He was also entitled to wages for the first eleven years of unpaid service, which should be settled in court or by the judgment of a prudent man. The loan of 2000 livres to the deceased brother was not to be taken into consideration.

The natural deduction from all this is that the system of occult compensation

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demned by Alexander VII., Innocent XI., and Alexander VIII. during the last half of the seventeenth century, left the subject open to the speculations of the theologians. The Jansenist movement was the expression of the opposition of the more rigorous party, shocked at the prevailing fashionable laxity of the casuists, and two schools formed themselves, which maintained an active contest for more than a century. As a rule, the laxer teachers, known as probabilists, favored the extension of occult compensation, while the more rigid probabiliorists endeavored to restrict or suppress it. Occasionally, it is true, we find a probabilist like Arsdekin who looks on it askance and urges that the cases are very rare in which it can be employed,* or a probabiliorist like Wigandt who admits it, subject to the strict observance of the established conditions.† As a rule, however, the probabilists inclined to the largest liberty. Zuccheri argues away all the limitations with which the earlier moralists had sought to guard it against abuse, and the most eminent theologians of the laxer school adopted the views of Tamburini; it could even be used for debts not yet due if there were risk of their non-payment at maturity, and also when claims were not certain but only probable. In spite of the condemnation by Innocent XI. of perjured oaths with mental restrictions, the thief, if suspected, could swear to ignorance, and the practice was even extended to priests who had been compelled to accept an inadequate fee for celebrating

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was tacitly accepted by all parties. Employers were careless as to paying wages, knowing that the servants stole, and servants continued to serve without pay, satisfied with their stealings.

It is perhaps worth noting that a recent *Kathedersocialist* ("A League of Justice," by Morrison I. Swift, Boston, 1893) teaches the same doctrine: "people who are meagrely paid for their services to the rich would be quite justified in stealing from them."

* Arsdekin Theol. Tripartita P. II. P. ii. cap. 7. At the same time he says that if a thing is detained unjustly it can be recovered either secretly or by force (Ibid. P. III. P. ii. Tract. 5, cap. 7). This, as we have seen, was the original starting-point of the system. It is now, however, properly distinguished as *recuperatio*, in contradistinction to *compensatio* (Bonal, op. cit., Tract. *de Justitia* n. 179).

† Wigandt Tribunal Confessar. Tract. VII. Exam. vi. n. 129. See also Antoine Theol. Moral. Tract. *de Justitia* c. 5, Q. 8.

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mass, or who had not been paid for what they celebrated.* When the moral teachers were thus liberal it was not likely that the people would be over-nice in the exercise of the privileges accorded to them. Corella was no rigorist; he limits the conditions to only two—that the debt shall be certain and be overdue—and we therefore may well believe him when he tells us that the confessor will find many irregularities committed in this matter. Some, he says, when they think that an injury has been done to them, without taking the trouble to verify it, will steal something; others, when the debt is certain, will steal in excess of it; others again, when they lose anything, will compensate themselves by stealing from any one whom they suspect of having taken it.† Roncaglia, a moderate probabilist, adds his testimony to the caution which the confessor should exercise in admitting the justice of the compensations which servants and peasants are accustomed to allow themselves, for they are wont to do so on grounds not defensible.‡ The whole subject was a matter well fitted to arouse public indignation, and when, in 1762, the Parlement of Paris desired popular support in its movement for the suppression of the Jesuits, and caused to be compiled a collection of the lax doctrines taught by the theologians of the Society, occult compensation and theft furnished material for a section of formidable length.§

The rigorist school evidently were not without justification in endeavoring to abolish, or at least to limit strictly, the whole

* Zuccherii Decisiones Patavinæ Mart. 1708, Q. ii. nn. 8–26, 30.—Salmanticens. Cursus Theol. Moral. Tract. XIII. cap. 1, nn. 318–24.—Viva Comment. in Prop. 37 Innoc. XI. n. 13; Ejusd. Cursus Theol. Moral. P. III. Q. vi. Art. 3, nn. 1–12.—Sporer Theol. Moral. Tract. v. cap. 5, nn. 69–79.—La Croix Theol. Moral. Lib. III. P. i. nn. 962–8.

† Corella, Pratica del Confessionario, Tratt. VII. cap. iv. P. 7, nn. 67–78 (Parma, 1707). This work was one of the most popular of the eighteenth century. Besides more than twenty editions in the original Spanish, there were repeated issues of Italian and Latin translations. The latest I have met with is of Vienna, 1757. It was twice placed on the Index, in 1710 and 1712 (Index Benedicti XIV., 1758, p. 67), without interfering with its popularity.

‡ Roncaglia Universa Moralis Theol. Tract. XIII. cap. ix. *ad calcem.*

§ Extraits des Assertions dangereuses et pernicieuses que les soi-disans Jésuites ont soutenues, etc. Paris, 1762, T. III. pp. 252–396.

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theory of occult compensation. Apparently the earliest to place himself on record against it was the Jesuit Elizalde, whose treatise *De recta Doctrina Morum* appeared from 1670 to 1684 under a pseudonym and without the knowledge of his superiors.* Noël Alexandre abstains from all reference to it, except with regard to servants; apparently he was willing to allude only to that on which he could quote a papal condemnation.† Matteucci asserts that he who compensates himself commits mortal sin, though he is not obliged to make restitution if he has strictly observed all the conditions, but confessors are directed to inquire of the thief whether in the act he did not feel some doubt that suspicion might fall on an innocent third party, in which case he must restore the article stolen, for, though he had a right to take it, he had no right in taking it to expose another to risk.‡ The rigorists, in fact, had a narrow path to tread. In the bitter controversy between the rival schools they were accused of Jansenism and of throwing unnecessary obstacles in the path to salvation; they could not utterly deny a custom which had the sanction of centuries, and they were reduced to nullifying it as far as they could in practice. Thus Habert fairly states the common opinion justifying occult compensation under the customary conditions, but he adds that these can rarely occur, for there scarce can be absence of danger of scandal or defamation; the confessor should never advise it, for there would be a shocking scandal if the thief should be caught and condemned to death and should plead that he only acted under the counsel of his priest; if consulted, the confessor should say that it is commonly affirmed under the requisite conditions, but that it is full of danger and is to be avoided.§ Reiffenstuel contents himself with stating the conditions fully and pointing out the attendant risks, for judges are wont to punish such compensa-

* Concina Theol. Christiana contracta Lib. VI. Diss. I, cap. 5, n. 10.—De Backer, I. 283.

† Summa Alexandrina P. IV. n. 733.

‡ Matthæucci Cautela Confessarii Lib. II. cap. xxi. nn. 31–33 (Venet. 1710).

§ Habert Theol. Dogmat. et Moral. *De Injustitia* c. IX. § 5, Q. 8, 9.

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tion as theft.* Reuter advises the confessor to discourage servants from compensating themselves, for the conditions can rarely be clearly fulfilled.†

As the general discussion waxed hotter between the contending schools, the rigorists took a bolder position. The Dominican Daniele Concina, who devoted his life to the vain endeavor to stay the triumphant advance of probabilism, gives the customary list of conditions, which, he says, are rarely enforced in practice, for the moderns have so relaxed them that they are reduced to nothing; he laughs at the evasions with which Viva and La Croix nullify Innocent XI.'s condemnation of pilfering by servants. He admits that he cannot absolutely reject the opinions of so many eminent theologians in favor of occult compensation, but he argues forcibly against it as subversive of law and justice, as overriding the laws of the land, constituting a man a secret judge in his own cause, and opening the way to the violation of all law, human and divine, giving occasion to frauds and thefts and disturbing the social order; it is condemned, he says, in the secular courts, and why should it be permitted in the courts of conscience?‡ Concina's fellow-Dominican and ally, Gianvincenzo Patuzzi, is equally outspoken. He devotes much space to this subject, and points out in full detail the results of the teaching of the casuists in authorizing theft and destroying confidence between man and man, especially in the relations between employer and employed.§ Another systematic theologian of the same school treats the subject briefly, stating the usual conditions, and warning the confessor that he is never to advise it and rarely to permit it.‖

These efforts were fruitless against the overshadowing authority of St. Alphonso Liguori, who, though he professed to be not strictly a probabilist, nevertheless inclined almost

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* Reiffenstuel Theol. Moral. Tract. IX. Dist. 5, nn. 117–18.

† Reuter, Neoconfessarius instructus, P. II. cap. vi. Q. 2, n. 4.

‡ Concina Theol. Christ. contracta Lib. VI. Diss. 1, cap. 5 (Bononiæ, 1760).

§ Lettere di Eusebio Eraniste, Lett. V. VI. (Venezia, 1761, Tom. I. pp. 183–219).

‖ Jo. Ant. Cæsaremontani Theol. Moral. Tract. VI. Quæst. vii. Quær. 15 (Venetiis, 1772).

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invariably to the laxer side. He fully admits the principle of occult compensation; he cites Tamburini and La Croix, and quotes without dissent the opinion of the Salamanca theologians and other weighty authorities in favor of its application when the claim is only probable, though in his instructions to confessors he imposes three conditions,—that the debtor be not injured, that the debt be certain, and that satisfaction cannot be obtained otherwise.* This enlarged greatly the opportunities for exercising the privilege, for it ignored the factor of danger to the thief or to innocent third parties, on which the rigorists relied to prove that it could rarely be employed; but in fact it is necessary to eliminate these considerations if servants are to be allowed to compensate themselves, as Liguori emphatically states that they can. His beatification in 1816 and canonization in 1839, after exhaustive examination of all his writings to detect any possible errors or imperfections, and his final exaltation in 1870 to the dignity of a Doctor of the Church, the decision of the Papal Penitentiary in 1831 that all confessors can safely follow blindly whatever they find in his works, without troubling themselves to investigate his reasons, and the laudations of successive popes who place him among the foremost of those whom God has raised up for the illumination and adornment of the Church, give him irrefragable authority, against which opposition is vain.† The rigorists, moreover, were discredited by stigmatizing them with the hated name of Jansenists, and it was officially declared that one of the chief merits of his great work on Moral Theology was that its appearance terrified the Jansenists like a stroke of lightning and inflicted on them a mortal wound.‡ Since then rigorism and probabiliorism, discountenanced by the ruling influences in the Church, have steadily declined. Some sixty years ago, Alasia, who was a probabiliorist, sought to limit occult compensation as much as possible; it

* S. Alph. de Ligorio Theol. Moral. Lib. III. n. 521.—Ejusd. Istruzione Pratica, cap. X. n. 21.

† Concessionis Tituli Doctoris I. 23-4; IV. 6 (Romæ, 1870).—Vindiciæ Alphonsianæ, pp. X. sqq. (Romæ, 1873).

‡ Concessionis Tituli Doctoris I. 10.

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is, he says, inimical to the public good, for it opens a wide path for thefts, scandals, and duplicate payments, and he insists, as an additional condition, that it must never be practised without the advice of a learned and pious man.* Similarly, Bishop Zenner, who about forty years ago was vicar-general of Vienna, insists on all the old conditions, and points out that their coexistence is exceedingly rare, wherefore the confessor is never to advise it, for it can scarce ever be without danger of scandal or defamation; when a penitent, however, has thus compensated himself, he is not required to make restitution.†

On the other hand, the modern text-books of moral theology which are almost universally used in the seminaries are based upon Liguori and teach his doctrines. Cardinal Gousset defines occult compensation to be lawful when through lack of evidence a debt cannot be proved and yet is certain, when the debtor refuses a settlement, or when the object stolen belongs to the thief and he does not take too much.‡ Archbishop Kenrick only says that it is a venial sin to have recourse to it when other means are available, unless judicial proceedings are expensive or tardy, or there is some other weighty reason.§ Subsequent authorities are not wholly in accord with each other as to the conditions, though they are all much less rigid than those prescribed by the older theologians, and the slight differences between them are important only as indicating the substratum of uncertainty in the minds of the writers. An opening is even made for claims of doubtful validity. Gury and Guarceno require only what is called "moral certainty," which in the mind of a claimant is a term of elastic capabilities, while Bonal states that if there is doubt the theft should be reduced proportionately,—though he admits that this is a procedure full of peril. Marc is more rigid, and requires the debt to be certain, though there is no necessity of claiming it at law if this should entail expense. A very wide extension is further given to occult compensation in the general assent

* Alasia Theol. Moral. *De Restitutione* Diss. I. nn. 19–22 (Taurini, 1834).

† Zenner Instructio Practica Confessarii § 333 (Viennæ, 1857).

‡ Gousset, Théologie Morale I. n. 777 (Paris, 1850).

§ Kenrick, Theol. Moral. Tract. III. n. 167.

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to the proposition that it is permissible in cases where a man is condemned by court to pay a debt which he has not incurred or which he feels certain that he has already paid.* In the complication of human transactions there are few defeated defendants who will not range themselves with this class, while defeated plaintiffs can assign judicial partiality as a similar justification.

The practical application of occult compensation can perhaps best be understood through a few examples furnished by recent casuists.

A man's ass is stolen; it escapes from the thief and commits damages for which the owner is forced to pay. This is unjust, and he can compensate himself secretly.

A man who is treated unjustly but legally in the division of an estate with his sisters compensates himself in the distribution of the assets. He is within his rights in so doing, but we are told that it is dangerous unless he first consults some honest man as to the amount to be secreted. After it is done, however, the confessor had better let it pass without requiring him to make restitution.

A servant breaks a valuable piece of glassware, and his employer deducts the value from his wages; if the breakage was unintentional he can compensate himself by stealing.

A. borrows a hundred napoleons from B., and meeting him promises to send the amount to him the next day, whereupon B. confidingly gives him a receipt. Now, B.'s father had died owing a similar sum to A.'s father, wherefore A. refuses to fulfil his promise, and when sued exhibits the receipt and swears that he has paid the debt. B. is defeated and cast in the costs. A.'s conduct is perfectly justifiable throughout.†

A peasant woman confesses to stealing her neighbors' chickens, and alleges four reasons—I. that her chickens are

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* Gury Compend. Theol. Moral. I. nn. 622–5.—Bonal Institt. Theologicæ Tract. *de Justitia* nn. 180–1.—Varceno Comp. Theol. Moral. Tract. XIII. P. ii. cap. 3, art. 1, § 2.—Miguel Sanchez, Prontuario de la Teología Moral, Trat. XX. Punto vi. n. 1.—Marc Institutiones Morales Alphonsianæ nn. 916–18 (Romæ, 1893).—Pruner, Lehrbuch der katholischen Moraltheologie, p. 680 (Freiburg i. B. 1883).

† Gury Casus Conscientiæ I. 106, 499, 500, 573, 575, 576–8 (Ratisbonæ, 1865).

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lost and she takes her neighbors', II. that she knows her neighbors steal hers, III. that the chickens which she stole consorted with her own when young and ate her food, IV. that the neighboring chickens damage her garden. Of these the first and third are pronounced insufficient, while the second and fourth justify her.*

HENRY CHARLES LEA.

PHILADELPHIA.

THE REALITY OF THE GENERAL WILL.

"There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter looks only to the common interest; the former looks to private interest, and is nothing but a sum of individual wills; but take away from these same wills the plus, and minus, that cancel one another, and there remains, as the sum of the differences, the general will." "Sovereignty is only the exercise of the general will."†

THIS celebrated antithesis, the statement of which I have translated from Rousseau's own words, has the effect of setting a problem to which Rousseau himself scarcely finds an answer. The problem is emphasized by the various reasons and indications which make it difficult to believe that the action of any community is a mere sum of the effects of wholly independent causes operating on a number of separate individual minds. No doubt, the action of a community sometimes is, and often appears to be, the sum of effects of such independent causes. One man gives a certain vote because he hates Mr. A.; another man gives the same vote because he thinks Mr. B. will do something for his trade; and a third gives the same vote because of some one out of a thousand possible social reforms which he thinks the man he is voting for will help or will hinder, as the case may be. Now, assuming these causes to be independent of one another, the direction in which they will sum up is a question of chance. Of course it is determined by causation, but it is not determined by any

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* Bertolotti Sylloge Casuum I. 147 (Romæ, 1893).

† Rousseau, "Contrat Social," Book II., chap. i. and chap. iii.

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general cause, corresponding to a general element in the result which takes place. As related to the separate causes in operation, the general character of that result is a coincidence or matter of chance.

And this is, in fact, how Rousseau seems to regard it, and he therefore suggests what is practically, I should imagine, just the wrong method for eliminating private interest and getting at the general will. Let the citizens all vote as independent units, not organizing themselves in groups or adjusting their views by private communication, and then, he thinks, as I understand him, the general interest will assert itself, as any general cause does, in the elimination of chance, among a great number of counteracting independent causes; that is, as he says, the independent causes, if present in sufficient numbers, may be expected to cancel, and the general cause will have a visible effect in deciding the question. If private interests are equally balanced, the public interest will affect some minds on both sides enough to turn the scale. This element of regard to the public interest is what he calls the general will, as distinct from the will of all.

I do not think that this view is false; but it is not adequate to the action of a very complex society with elaborate constructive tasks before it. It is rather adapted to a plebiscite on a single question, in which the general will is represented by a conscious though feeble inclination to what is admittedly the public interest. The discouragement of discussion and of organization in groups, which he insists on in order to keep the chances fair, *i.e.*, to keep all the private interests independent of one another, would make all complicated legislation impossible, and is quite incompatible with the method which I shall maintain, that necessity prescribes for the formation of the general will. He so far admits this, that the ideal legislator is for him a person outside the community, who interprets the general will into a system of laws.

What we have got then, so far, is a problem or a paradox: the idea of a will whose sole aim is the common interest, although it can exist as a will only in the minds of the human individuals who make up the community, and all of whom

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are for the most part occupied with their own individual interests. There is no social brain other than and separate from the brain of individuals, and because we seldom face this difficulty fairly, our great modern gospel, that society is an organism, is becoming a little stale before it has rendered us the one service which it might perhaps be able to render; that is, to make us ask ourselves in what properties or relations of individuals in society there resides anything corresponding on behalf of society to the brain or mind of each separate individual. We know that many not contemptible people speak of the individual members of any community as mostly fools, and say that the wise and those who are in the right are always in the minority, and that the ordinary man picks up his opinions out of a newspaper, and adjusts them by conversation with two or three other persons no better informed than himself. The expressions, more or less in this sense, of so eminent a writer as Mr. Bryce, in his discussion of Public Opinion in the third volume of the work on the "American Commonwealth," were what I had chiefly in my mind when I resolved to try and examine this paradox, which in that discussion Mr. Bryce fully recognizes. No candid man can altogether, I think, deny the judgments to which I am referring, so far as they deal with the general capacity for intellectual processes in unfamiliar matter. Mr. Bryce indeed tries to blunt the paradox by pointing out that the so-called educated classes are *not* especially fitted, by the training which has hitherto been customary, for dealing with important practical questions; but this does not help us to see how the bulk of the community *are* able and willing to deal rightly with such questions in the common interest. If the majority of separate individuals are, on any question immediately put before them, more likely to miss the common interest than to hit it, both from blindness and from selfishness, which cannot practically be distinguished, why does not society come to grief? Aristotle says that all the citizens taken together may have more wisdom than any one. Is there any meaning in this?

Is it true that the intelligent pursuit by the individual of his

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private interests necessarily in the system of things conduces to the preservation of the community? Not if we mean by his private interests merely certain aims which are definitely before his mind, which he might tell you are the ruling objects of his life. On the other hand, if we say that the pursuit of his private interests *as*, on the whole, he pursues them, conduces to the preservation of the community, that is pretty much a tautology.

What necessity is there that this mode of action and judgment should have in it any general reference whatever? When and why is the general will a reality within individual wills?

I have taken some time to state the paradox, because I think that the facts which it indicates are of extreme importance, even if the explanation offered is inadequate. I will now attempt an explanation, borrowing in some degree the ideas of modern psychology.

By an individual will I mean a human mind considered as a machine, of which the parts are ideas or groups of ideas, all tending to pass into action but liable to be counteracted or again to be reinforced by each other. The groups of ideas are connected with each other by associations of all degrees of intimacy, but each is for the most part capable of being awakened into action by the appropriate stimulus without awakening more remotely associated groups, and the will, for the time being, consists of those ideas which are guiding attention and action. The ideas are not thrown together anyhow, but are more or less organized; some being of a nature which enables them to serve as a clue or plan in which others find their places, and in a sense every group of ideas might be called a single idea, and all that there is in the mind has the character of a single idea,—that is to say, all its parts are connected in various degrees, and more or less subordinated to some dominant ideas which, as a rule, dictate the place and importance of the others. We know what a ruling idea is: it is one that has got the control of the mind, and subordinates all the other ideas to itself. This mental system, with its dominant ideas in relation to external action, is the individual will.

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Now, at first sight all these individual wills, or minds in action, are separate machines, locked up in separate boxes, each with its indicator outside, and the response which each of them will make to a stimulus from without is determined by its own structure, which is again determined by its own private history. If we go no farther than this we seem not to get any hint of a general will, but only a sum of individual wills, which need not have any reference to each other's ideas.

But we can perhaps go behind this. The individual will is shaped by its dominant ideas. What, on the whole, determines which ideas get the upper hand? The answer seems to be that the ideas which tend to be victorious are those distinguished by logical capacity; because they are especially able to marshal the content of consciousness in a way suitable to themselves, checking and defeating the ideas that cannot be brought into their system, and reinforcing themselves by those that can. All practical action tends to give the victory to such ideas as these, while modifying and extending them. Any suggestion which enables you to deal with matter that you have to arrange is maintained in your mind and reinforced by the successful action to which it leads, and receives new content, which it embodies in itself, from the combinations which arise in carrying it out. Other suggestions, that "would not do," as we say, are driven out and disappear. Still, all this is a play of ideas within the individual mind locked up in its separate box.

But now, does the quality which makes certain ideas dominant in one individual mind insure their having any relation to the ideas which are dominant in other individual minds? Under certain conditions, clearly this is the case. These conditions are, in brief, community of life and of experience. Ideas do not spring from nowhere; they are the inside which reflects the material action and real conditions that form the outside. So that the common life shared by the members of a community involves a common element in their ideas, not merely in their notions of things about them, though this is very important, but more especially in the dominant or

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organizing ideas which rule their minds. For the matter which is before their minds to be organized consists in great measure of connections between persons, and life simply cannot go on unless the organizing ideas in different people's minds with reference to these connections correspond definitely to one another. This is, of course, a truism, except that it is not always driven home with reference to the actual shape and content which it implies in individual minds.

It may be said this only means that different persons' minds in the same country have a good deal in common; it does not mean that they participate in any conception of a common interest, but merely that they are influenced in the same way by the same appeal, with a certain general result, which is no more *in* each of them than the waving of a field of corn before the wind is in each separate stalk of corn. Well, this comparison is just for some cases,—for the case of a mob, for instance, when they act as one man, under the influence of an identical sentiment of anger or cupidity. This is an irrational form of the general will, as a burst of feeling is of the individual will; but it is definitely general in so far as it is owing to the operation of the same sentiment in all the minds at once.

But there are stronger cases than this. Just as the material working of any industry or institution is not complete in a single person, but consists in corresponding though different actions of different persons, so it is with the dominating ideas which in different individual minds represent this working. Therefore, if we could see these minds, which are locked up in boxes tolerably like each other on the outside, we should perceive that each of them bears quite a definite reference to the others outside itself; in short, it is not really a complete machine, as the body, though to some degree marked and moulded by its habitual occupation, appears to be, but is only part of a machine, of which the other parts are the minds of other persons with whom the first is in connection. The proof of this lies in the fact that external life is organized, which organization again consists in the fact that the dominant ideas of the persons who participate in this life consti-

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tute, when taken together, a machine whose parts play into one another.

Then we may identify the general will of any community with the whole working system of dominant ideas which determines the places and functions of its members, and of the community as a whole among other communities. The system is never quite harmonious; readjustment is always going on, but the direction of this readjustment is determined by the forces in collision together with the other forces of the machine. Both the more important workings of the machine, and especially the direction of its readjustment, are the most familiar *expression* of the general will. But the general will itself is the whole assemblage of individual minds, considered as a working system, with parts corresponding to one another, and producing as a result a certain life for all these parts themselves.

Such a conception seems illusory, because it is hard to define exactly where the thing which it describes begins and ends; but really in modern philosophy nothing can be parted sharply at the point of transition; it is enough if the central phenomena in each region are clear and distinguishable.

I will mark it off by three negatives.

The general will cannot be identified with the decision of a community by vote upon any single issue. Every such decision is an expression or consequence of the general will, but needs interpretation in order to say what direction of movement it really represents. In short, the general will is a system in motion, and cannot be expressed in a single proposition. And no system of voting can secure its expression, because it does not exist in a form that can be embodied in a vote.

Again, the general will is not identical with public opinion, considered as a set of judgments which form the currently expressed reflection upon the course of affairs. It may include these current notions or part of them, but it certainly includes much more, because the ideas that dominate the will do not always appear in reflection, or at least not with the importance

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which they have in life. The general will is more a system of wills than a system of reflections, and appears in action quite as much as in discussion.

Again, it is not merely the *de facto* tendency of all that is done by members of the community, though it is much more like this than like a vote or a set of opinions. It *is* to a great extent a *de facto* tendency, but only in so far as this tendency reveals active ideas with reference to the connection of persons or groups of persons. Other tendencies than these do not directly concern the organization of life, and therefore do not directly form part of the active scheme of society.

Take two examples from opposite extremes in mental development. An agricultural laborer thinks, I suppose, chiefly about making his living and supporting his family. His choice of where he will work and what kind of farm work pays him best does not greatly affect the nature of his connection with other people, being all within the same general scheme. But, although he does not reflect—or even if he does not reflect—on this general scheme, yet it is represented in the shape of his mind; that is, in his customary active ideas, and in their limitations. Now, these active ideas of his in their general character—*i.e.*, the general character and limits of what he is prepared to do and to expect with reference to other persons,—this is the factor of the general will operative in his mind. It is acted on by his daily life, and rests upon that life; but it is rather the outline or scheme of that life than the every-day details of it.

A dramatic poet, again, will exercise his conscious choice about his subjects and his form of writing, and so forth. All this makes no direct difference to other people, and they cannot directly help him in it. Society cannot write a play. But if, for example, a school of really great dramatists were to arise in England to-day, the result might be to remould the working ideas in their own and other minds. The theatre would force itself, as a matter to be taken account of, into the mental systems of individuals, and in doing so would modify their dominant notions as to the place of art in national life, and so there would be a tendency of one kind or another which

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would enter into the active scheme or logical machine of social relations as a factor in the general will.

After these three negatives, I will say affirmatively that we may identify the general will with public opinion in a pregnant sense; not as consisting in the things said in the newspapers, but as the *actual* tendency of the whole process in which the necessary organizing ideas of all individual minds in the community are factors.

The corollary from these suggestions, which is chiefly of interest to us, concerns the process of formation of the general will, or of public opinion in this pregnant sense.

It is not essentially superficial nor sentimental. It is essentially logical.

What is the root of the whole matter? It is nothing less than the correspondence with each other of the shapes taken by separate minds, each under the stress of its particular experience, giving the victory to those ideas which are able to grapple with the matter pressed upon it. If the external life of the community works as a system, then this internal life must work as a system also; the one reflects the other.

Therefore, though it seems, as we said, as though most people are wrong when they express their opinions, and as if they pick them up from hearsay or from newspapers by sheer chance, this is to a great extent a *mere* appearance. Every person who does anything which is a necessary function in the community has in virtue of this function, which is mirrored in the shape of his leading active ideas, a definite position in the logical system of the community. So far as his mind reflects the real necessities of his active life he is on solid ground, and his will is so far a factor in the general will, because his life—which is his will seen from the outside—is a factor in the general life. If we all understood our own active ideas completely and rightly in relation to those of others, then we should have the whole general will in our explicit consciousness.

But, as it is, no individual ever can have this, for two principal reasons:

First, we are never thoroughly aware even of our own prac-

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tical ideas. The will is a great mass of associated ideas guiding attention and action, of which very different portions come into play in different contexts, and our description of which in general language, however honest we are, is not infallibly true, but, just like our description of any complicated phenomenon outside us, depends on our skill, patience, and truthfulness. Nothing is commoner than to succeed in telling a man something about his own conscious action which he really did not know till you told him. Especially, the nature of practical ideas consists very much in their limitations, and of these, except by intellectual self-criticism, we are not aware. A man may honestly believe that he has no prejudice against perfect social equality, and a short cross-examination will often show him that he has a strong prejudice of the kind. We are not conscious, either of all the influences active in our will, or of its limitations.

Secondly, no one, not the greatest statesman or historical philosopher, has in his mind, even in theory, much less as a practical object, the real development in which his community is moving. In modern philosophy the contrast between man and nature is apt to be far too sharply drawn at this point, as if the whole moral world was consciously constructed by man. In very great men the relation of conscious purpose to historical result seems sometimes—as in Cavour, for example—to be considerable; but on the whole we are to the structure of legal, political, and economic organization like coral insects to a coral reef. All these things, and the body of science itself, are on one side natural products—that is to say, that, although conscious purpose works in them, the effect it produces is always part of a system which is more than any particular agent intended. The process always needs the future to explain its real tendency.

Thus the general will is only in part self-conscious, and in as far as an attempt is made to formulate it in judgments it seems to become fallible. For then it ceases to be fact, and becomes interpretation of fact.

Still, it is important, in thinking of the formation of the general will with a view to its interpretation, to remember

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what kind of facts it consists of. The solid basis for every one is in his own practical will, determined by the real necessities of his life in discharging a function in society. The process of interpretation and rationalization of this will is then technically a process of criticism, that is to say, of adjusting the bearings of our whole view of life to the solid data of our own necessary working ideas in relation to those of others.

Now, this process again is not entirely conscious. It has two forms,—practical organization and reflective discussion. In practical organization, ideas adjust themselves to each other without consciousness of anything beyond an immediate daily purpose, and it is only after a long interval that people wake up and find perhaps the entire relations of classes and of industry changed as it were in their sleep. This practical organization is probably the most important phase in the formation of the general will. Of course it includes conflict within the law. And the second phase, discussion, if it is to be of any service, ought really to be the same thing in a reflective form—that is, contrivance, organization, ascertainment by criticism of solid data, consisting in reasonable necessities, and their adjustment in a working system, such as to satisfy them all.

Now, of course these two processes pass into one another, and will more and more do so. And the two together really make up a very great part of life, so far as the persons concerned participate in a common experience. Every person is thus always being moulded into a logical unit much more than he is aware, and the casual opinions which he expresses do not really represent the content of his will or the process by which it is formed.

/ We must modify the theory to admit of our belonging to more than one community. The different ideas which rule us in different relations allow easily of this. The communities to which we belong are now like a nest of boxes inside one another; but we cannot effectively share the general will of any community with which we have no common life and experience. Whether humanity can yet be said to have a general will is at least doubtful.

I do not think I am trenching on practical politics if I illus-

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trate the importance which I attach to the unconscious or semi-conscious logic of life in contact with our neighbors by a reference to Mr. Hare's election scheme, the essence of which is that the constituency is de-localized. I once spoke of this to the late Professor Green, being myself much fascinated by its ingenuity, and he replied, "I rather despise all those schemes for detaching people from their locality." Mill, on the other hand, in the "Autobiography" speaks of it, we remember, as a real triumph of political contrivance.

What I desire to point out is merely that, for good or evil, I think men would judge quite differently, acting under such a scheme, from the way in which they judge when they act in their locality. Everything depends on the context to which one's views and action have to be adjusted. If you have to fight out a set of opinions in practice and in discussion among your neighbors, that is quite a different process from letting the returning officer look out a few thousand people in Great Britain who happen to agree with you on a single point. In the one case, your whole life is really an argument, both unconscious and conscious, with reference to the general working scheme of society. In the other case you simply pronounce a single casual reflective judgment. It appears to me an apt illustration of the general or organic will as contrasted with the will of all as a number of units.

I do not say that locality is a necessary condition. I only say that it is a simple case of the necessary condition, of which there may be other cases.

Well, then, how does all this apply to matters of very special information either about distant countries or about the technique of management in difficult concerns, which the community as a whole undertakes? Here, no doubt, Mr. Bryce's account becomes much more true. We know what sort of life we want for ourselves and others, but we are not generally competent to construct it *in unfamiliar relations.* In our own life, as I have tried to explain, the thing works itself out by a self-adjusting process, because, whether we *know* what is wanted or not, we ourselves *are* the want, and behave accordingly.

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The result is, then, that the general will is a process continuously emerging from the relatively unconscious into reflective consciousness. And the reflective consciousness does its work best when it as nearly as possible carries on, in self-criticism and adjustment of purposes, the same moulding of the individual mental system, as part of a machine in which other mental systems correspond to it, as goes on unconsciously in the formation of the every-day practical will.

Is the view which I have suggested hostile to the theoretical study of social conditions? I should be very sorry if anything that I have said appeared to have such a tendency. But it is not a bad thing to bear in mind that all knowledge, whether practically or theoretically employed, is only real and vital when it is the extension of a process like that which I have been describing. Books cannot contain knowledge in a perfectly vital form; they are rather instruments or materials of knowledge than knowledge itself. In this science differs from fine art; poetry, for example, is destroyed if we destroy the particular form which it has in a book; but knowledge hardly exists for us till we have destroyed the form which it has in a book. It must be recast in the intelligence; that is, interpreted and criticised bit by bit till we have made it all of one tissue with our own vital experience—our experience of the matter in question in its most real form, whatever that may be, whether given in observation only, or in practice as well. When this is accomplished, and not before, the knowledge is really knowledge; that is, it is present as intelligence in our view of life or nature, and not as a recollection of something printed in a book. Such intelligence, however wide-reaching, always begins at home, both in social matter and in abstract science; there is always some point where we are more especially in contact with reality, and from which we extend our ideas by analogy. In all social matters this point is furnished by our own necessarily dominant ideas prescribed by our individual life. Therefore I say that all vital speculation is a process analogous to that which I have described as the formation of the general will, and speculation upon social matters is actually an extension of this process, ultimately

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radiating from the same centre. The end of the whole inquiry is to understand life, and we are not likely to understand any other life until after we have understood that which is at our doors.

B. BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

THE COMBINATION OF CAPITAL.

IT requires but little observation to assure one that the competitive system of industry is fast passing away. It is on every hand succumbing to trusts and other combinations for production and distribution. In agriculture, in some simple forms of manufacturing, and in retail trade, competition persists more or less perfectly, and bids fair to do so for a long time to come. But in almost every line of activity where combination is possible, and it is possible in nearly all, combination of some kind either already prevails or is in process of establishment.

Trade combinations are of various sorts. There are mere monopolies, where certain parties, few or numerous, sufficiently control the entire market to determine the prices at which wares are bought and sold. Then there are cases where different dealers, not closely bound together, have an understanding not to sell under such and such prices. Pools form a third variety of combination. Regular contracts to allow special rates in return for exclusive trade are a fourth. Corners, of the well-known sort, make a fifth. I mention as sixth a form of combination which is usually called a trust, but not very properly so. A small firm sells out to a larger one, receiving a lease in return, and perhaps also some stock. It then goes on in apparent independence, though really under the thumb of the purchasing party.

In the trust proper, or unincorporate trust, making a seventh class, several corporations place their stock in the hands of certain trustees, who, issuing trust certificates in return for such stock, so that the profits of the consolidated concern may be properly passed around, yet themselves, owning or at least

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holding the stock, direct, more or less completely, all that each of the corporations does. This is the trust *par excellence*, made so familiar in the earlier history of the Standard Oil Trust, the Cotton Oil Trust, the Sugar Trust, and the Whiskey Trust. The eighth and last kind of combination is the incorporated trust, an arrangement to which most if not all of the old unincorporated trusts have now been driven in order to avoid the attacks of the law. This change does not alter the form or the purpose of their activity in the slightest. It simply makes them legal.

Although these bandings together of capitalists are now usually protected by law, I call special attention to the fact that the system of combined business is not originally due to legislation, or to any extent kept up thereby. Combination has sprung from the very soul of our old, *laissez-faire*, competitive sort of industry. These monopolies, daily arising to new power and numbers, are the logical and inevitable result of that industrial liberty which was formerly our boast. They are the products of economic and social forces, not of statutes.

At the beginning of this century competition was almost universally considered a sort of divinely appointed instrumentality for the fixing of prices in a just manner. If, it was said, given dealers charge more than cost of production plus a living profit, others will undersell them; if less than this is the price, dealers will fail, competition become less severe, and prices recover the fair level.

Men at last saw, however, that competition did not always work in this benign way. If the operation specified was the normal effect in small and simple industries, quite a different result revealed itself in massive and complex production. In this, the manufacturer first in the field might charge for his products far above cost and reasonable profit, and long continue to do so, before capital, ever apt to be timid, would take the risk of competing. When, on the other hand, competition did begin, it was nearly certain to go too far, pushing prices as much below the normal figure as they previously were above, leading to crises and failures, with vast losses, to the immense net depletion of public wealth. From perception of

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this destructive agency attending competition arose, in the most natural way, the tendency of capitalists to try co-operation and be rid of competition.

Acrimony of competition was not the only force which prompted business rivals to join hands. They were pushed to this also by the fall in prices fatally incident to the vicious monetary system from which the world has been suffering since 1873. While prices are going down all the time, men are loath to enter upon productive industry without some special guaranty of safety and of profit, such as was not necessary in times of rising prices and industrial prosperity. This motive for combination, to gain shelter from industrial heavy weather, like the mere wish to escape competition, takes effect in a perfectly natural and logical manner.

The combine is thus the brother of the protective tariff, and not its child, as so many allege. Most trusts are little affected by tariffs, flourishing about equally whether customs-duties are high or low. Some are entirely independent of tariff legislation. The Cotton Oil Trust is so. Another set would be more or less interfered with by a reduction of the tariff. The Starch Trust is one of these. It was built upon the tariff, and would perish were this support withdrawn. The great Sugar Trust has derived little aid from tariff acts, and would not be crushed by out-and-out free trade. At least two American firms of sugar refiners are strong enough to defy all changes in sugar duties. Were these removed, they would at once combine with each other, and, if necessary, with foreign refiners.

The Standard Oil Trust is not in any sense indebted to customs legislation. There is, to be sure, a duty on petroleum; but it as yet has no effect whatever. After a time it will come to mean something. Russian oil is now strongly competing with ours abroad. As this competition waxes severer and presses nearer home, our tariff on oil may certainly come in to help the Standard keep up its prices. If, after that time arrives, the tariff should be thrown off, the Standard would almost certainly ally itself with the Russian producers.

This, I conceive, is going to be the general course of mam-

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moth industry as the world grows smaller. The governmental protection of industries by tariffs will more and more give way to self-protection on their part, through international combinations. The tariff question is ere long to be removed from politics by the irresistible force of events.

Lest some think me mistaken in supposing that competition is vanishing from the business world, I wish to make it clear that monopoly often exists where it does not appear.

Not a few suppose that monopoly is impossible in an industry so long as any sort of competition exists there. If the competition is other than formal, this is, of course, true; but, in a great number of businesses where what is called competition exists, the competition is not real, but simply formal.

People affirm that the Standard Oil Trust, for instance, cannot be in the enjoyment of a monopoly, because there remain active refineries not leagued with it. The argument is thought to be re-enforced by the observation that the number of outside concerns has increased, perhaps even doubled, since the trust went into effect. A moment's reflection will show the belief to be unwarranted. It is not necessary, in order that a great business may be a monopoly, or, what implies the same, keep a higher than competitive price upon its goods, that it should directly control the entire production. Immediate mastery of a decided majority is practically the mastery of all, and insures to outside dealers as well as to the allies whatever advance of price is realized.

No one will question that the great French Copper Syndicate enormously elevated the price of copper above what competition would have made it, yet it purchased only about three-fifths of the world's entire product. This enabled it to dictate prices to consumers, and all the little producers not in the syndicate came in for a part of the advance.

This syndicate, a combination of the very loosest order, lasted nearly eighteen months, and during its continuance imposed upon the commodity in all the markets of the world a purely arbitrary price not far from one hundred per cent. above what it would naturally have been.

Every trust or combine known has to encounter formal com-

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petition more or less severe. If the total absence of this is required to secure monopoly, there is not a monopoly on earth. The Cotton Oil Syndicate, the Whiskey Union, the Steel Rail League, and all the rest throughout the lengthy list, are met by a certain species of opposition. They do not mind this, however, for the most of them are as sure of a monopoly with it as without.

Combination in industry is to be permanent. Many cling to the delusion that these mighty combinations of capital are to pass away and the old-time competition to return. Bills have been brought before half the legislatures of the Union to compel free competition by making trade syndicates absolutely illegal. To my mind there is no question that such legislation will be vain. The age of competition, as we have known it, has gone forever.* Recall it? As well try to waken the dead. In simple industries, whose capital is small and little specialized, competition has worked well and will continue. The weakest party drops from the strife to-day, to-morrow the next weakest, and so on. But each loss is slight. The unfortunate employer lets himself for wages, and his stock passes to creditors. In such businesses competition is the best practical way to insure a healthy life. Not so when the contestants are industrial Titans, each with a plant worth its millions, much of it so specialized that to relinquish business is to sink it utterly. In such cases, which more and more each year represent the world's industry, competition cannot end with a little friction. It grinds, and, in time, kills. The great mill, placed at a disadvantage by position, by some tariff act, or perhaps by railway discrimination, is yet forbidden to shut down. That were to lose all. Better keep running and lose less than all. The least penny over fixed charges and running expenses is better than nothing. Down at least to that dead-line the strife is certain to go on, the stockholders

* On this see the author's article, "Individualism as a Sociological Principle," *Yale Review*, May, 1893. Other thoughts to be touched upon are more fully treated in "The Economic Law of Monopoly," *Journal of Social Science* for 1889, and in "Trusts according to Official Investigations," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, January, 1889.

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impoverishing themselves that their mill may compete. At last a bankrupt sale ensues, machinery going for junk, the building left to collapse from decay. The victors survive, but, of course, poorer because of the war. Here, too, competition has proved a regulator—as Cæsar kept the peace in Gaul.

Men have learned of a much milder and more successful regulator—combination. Instead of keeping up that mortal conflict, they unite, pool their interests, make common cause against others trying to enter the field, parcel out the production in as fair a way as possible, and fix buying and selling prices so that all alike may realize gains. No part of the causality involved in this process is of a temporary nature. The history of the Standard and Cotton Oil Trusts makes it certain, it seems to me, that a combination of this sort, involving an absolute monopoly, which no power on earth can overthrow, may, with proper skill and capital, be set up in almost any substantive industry.

One of the causes mentioned which brought about the military organization of capital, I mean the long-continued fall in general prices, may, of course, pass away, though there is too little present prospect of this; but the influence of it has been affecting us long enough to let the world behold how good and how pleasant it is for business brethren to dwell together in unity, and I do not believe that the lesson is ever to be unlearned. Not hap or whim has made combination the industrial fashion of the day, but rigid social laws; nor is there any prospect that these will ever cease to have this effect. Every great industry is destined to take on complete solidarity of organization, and to maintain the same in perpetuity.

These monopolies may work society immeasurable evil. Unless somehow regulated, they will certainly so result. The system of combines is not to be held responsible for the doubtful methods and rapacity which some of them have displayed in coming into existence. Rank rebates on freight extorted from railroads, summary methods with competitors, and so on, whether justifiable or not, will not continue. Reasonable foreboding points in a different direction.

I ask the reader specially to note, for it is widely overlooked

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or denied, that when a business comes under the trust form, no mere economic law is going to force it to deal fairly with society. So far as economic law is concerned, it may, and, unless seriously, systematically, looked after, probably will, prove rapacious instead.

When a commodity is produced under trust conditions, cost does not regulate selling prices. This is done quite arbitrarily for a time, the seller's whim being perhaps sobered a little by his memory of old competitive rates. Slowly, caprice gives way to law; but it is a new law—that of men's need. In other words, the tolerance of the market now governs price. Prices go higher and higher till demand, and hence profit, begins to fall off, and they then play about the line of what the market will bear, much as they used to play about that of cost. The producer can be more or less exacting, according to the nature of the product. If it is a luxury, he may not be able to elevate prices greatly above the old notch. If it is a necessity, he may bleed people to death.

The price cannot, of course, permanently fall below the cost of production; but, if the monopoly is close and the article one of necessity, it may indefinitely exceed cost. In rare cases this might occur with a luxury. Should fashion create among the wealthy an intense desire for Constantia wine, a pipe of it costing one hundred dollars might sell for one hundred thousand dollars. Let Constantia become indispensable to life, and the ratio of selling-price to cost would be vastly greater than that.

This contention is not invalidated by the fact that few, if any, of the combinations now existing have as yet raised prices up to the full tolerance of the market. There are many reasons why they have not. But that it will be done in due time, provided these powerful embodiments of capital are left unbridled, to the play of mere economic law, is as sure as fate.

Trusts threaten the people with a graver evil than that of exorbitant prices, that of apathy toward industrial improvements and inventions and tardiness in adopting such. Competition has been a keen spur to the betterment of methods in production. The danger is that now, so soon as all the pro-

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duction in a given line comes under a single management, old methods will be thought sufficient and kept in use long after competition would have cast them aside.

To realize the seriousness of this peril we must remember that the present state of things, in which, owing to the existence, still, of alert would-be rivals in their business, even the firmest monopolies neglect improvements at their peril, this cannot always last. That mighty motive to improvement must at length cease to act. The evil confronting us will then be not an army of combines knowing that all sorts of bettered methods are abroad yet stubbornly refusing to adopt them, but a downright dearth of invention and inventiveness due to lack of incentive. I cannot but think that in this important regard the system of trusts is obnoxious to the same criticism nearly always made against socialism.

Another momentous and threatening change must attend the general marshalling of industries in companies and battalions. This marshalling is to bring with it a subordination of men to men, of the many to the few, more complete than has ever prevailed since feudalism. It will introduce in effect a new feudalism, with the chance that in the new, lords and vassels will be very lacking in the mutual love and sense of mutual responsibility prevalent under the old. Nor does it appear how long a political democracy that shall be more than a name can endure in face of such an aristocratic industrial organization.

Monopoly may work injustice without appearing to do so. The law of monopoly price shows its full significance only when industry is considered dynamically. Whereas a *régime* of competition inevitably tends to throw into the lap of consumers all the benefits arising from improved processes in production, monopoly tends to retain all these in producers' hands. It may thus come to pass that, even when prices experience no absolute rise, or even fall a few points, they still range far above what they would have been if governed by competition, the producer pocketing all the gains afforded by new inventions in machinery and methods, whether made by himself or by others.

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In a case like this, the circumstance that prices have not risen makes it specially easy to deceive the public. The profits, how exorbitant soever, are not likely to be published; and the fact that they arise more or less at the expense of all of us, since now, though we pay no higher than formerly, we still do pay more than we should have had to pay with competition, is too recondite for popular attention. Press and platform echo the praises of such a monopoly, when it may, in fact, be a much worse leech upon the body politic than another which, having elevated prices a little absolutely, is deafened with a perfect diapason of anathema.

If the lessened cost of the article is entirely due to the monopoly, or to the skill and exertions of those who profit thereby, many will be of the opinion that the monopolists have a right to all the gains thus arising. Massed capital and centralized control are tremendous advantages, and may be made vastly to cheapen production. Ought not those to reap the gains who render possible these better conditions of industry? Ought not society gladly to acquiesce in an arrangement, though perhaps excessively profitable to a few, which furnishes it a given line of products as cheaply as competition ever did?

This is a very important ethical question. Its bearings are too manifold for full discussion here. Permit a remark or two, however. Monopolists often utilize, to swell their own dividends, improvements which they had no hand whatever in originating, and of which they have gotten the control by the most doubtful means. To the proceeds of these society has as good a claim as they.

Again, it seems clear that society's right, whether enforceable or otherwise, to participate in the advantages which the bettered means of production in any department afford, is not cut off at the limit which invention had reached when the monopoly was established. Some advancement would surely have been made had competition continued. This would then naturally have accrued to the weal of all of us; and the use of any means to thwart such a result would have been denounced as an infringement of our rights. If that judgment

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would have been just, the public is justified in demanding at least that share in the present profits of any form of production now monopolized which would have fallen to it had not the monopoly arisen. Hence, even if we limit society's right in the manner just indicated, the mere truth that a monopoly has not elevated prices is no proof that its riches have not been gotten in part at the expense of consumers.

But I, for one, should not always agree to this limitation of the social claim, since, though an existing monopoly may have effected colossal saving, as much as you please beyond what would have been possible with competition, and may have shared these gains with the public so as to lower prices a little, it does not appear but that a different private monopoly or control by the state itself might have done for the public far better still. Patent rights are limited, however probable it may now and then be that but for the patentee the improvement would never have been made.

The plea is sometimes interposed that no harm can come to people in general, let monopoly profits be never so high, for the reason that the winners cannot possibly keep to themselves what they get. The wealth cannot remain piled up, it is said, but the very motive which prompted the amassing of it must lead to the spending of it; and this cannot take place without a wide and rich dissemination of its benefits.

Such as find comfort in this thought are very easily pleased. The same logic could be employed to justify the creation of financial princes by taxation outright. Any such policy would desperately discourage wealth-creation, even if every cent of the vast piles were to be productively spent. The greater part might be invested abroad—profitably for owners, at little less than dead loss to their fellow-citizens. But a generally lucrative employment of so great wealth, either at home or abroad, could not be expected. Excessive incomes, save in rarest cases, however thriftily intentioned their recipients may be, cannot be invested in the wisest manner. But economists are forced to observe that inordinate wealth almost inevitably tends to impair thrift, leading its possessors to prefer unproductive to productive forms of expenditure.

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There is hope that combination in industry may, after all, become an immense net advantage to humanity.

While it is unfortunately true that the central control of each great business must dull the old spur to improvements in production, it is to be noticed that combinations open vast possibilities of improvement which, if another motive to the utilizing of them can be in any way provided, will change the world. In illustration of these new possibilities, I need refer only to the pipe-line system for transporting crude petroleum, the colossal scale on which cotton-seed is now pressed, the tank steamers which carry oil across the ocean, the glorious and successful campaign of market-making in which the two oil trusts are engaging in Europe and Asia, and the lucrative by-industries which these as well as the Sugar Trust carry on. For stupendous undertakings like these competition was utterly inadequate.

Combination's benign power in co-ordinating industry is manifest in another sphere. Socialists have said none too much about the destructive cross-purposes and lack of system which of necessity prevailed when production was unregulated. Let the business man be as careful as he may, under the style of business once prevalent he cannot but take most dangerous risks. Competition offers but the roughest means for ascertaining what the next season's demand for this or that line of goods is to be, and still fainter hints touching the output to be expected from one's rivals. Amid such uncertainty, every year's operation of a manufactory is to great extent a game of hazard. Prices fluctuate abnormally, deranging and discouraging industry. Lines of business are over-wrought, begetting glut and necessitating sales below cost; needless plant is set out, which must decay or burn. Losses in these ways are beyond computation, and so much the more sad in that they might be avoided. Through such waste of capital interest rises, and wage-yielding businesses which might have flourished are prevented from starting.

The prevention and destruction of wealth in these ways are great enough to make some economists doubt whether the trust-system does not, at its worst, effect for society some net

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saving. I do not think it as yet benefits society thus; but it is very certain that in this matter of haphazard and amorphous production, trusts compass vast economy for some one. They forecast the demand and regulate supply accordingly, much as would occur under Socialism. Then, in providing the needed store, massed capital and centralized control offer incalculable advantages over the old go-as-you-please way of producing. That the intrinsic cost of commodities turned out by organized industry is less than it would be under competitive production, no one can deny. The question is, how much, if any, of the saving thus effected finds its way into consumers' pockets. The point for society to aim at is to continue all the advantages of monopoly, increasing them if possible, while preventing the monopolists themselves from going to sleep or retaining more than their just share of what they make. Society wishes to utilize the Trust with all its actual and possible economies in production, and to devise some means, as efficient as competition used to be, for breeding inventiveness and for draining into its own till all the savings of all business after paying producers the cost of production plus a generous profit.

Three schemes for doing this have been proposed: 1, Socialism; 2, the assumption by the State of all monopolized production; and 3, regulation.

The first, Socialism, is simply the system of trusts made universal, all land and productive wealth belonging to the one great, all-inclusive trust, and every citizen being in effect a holder of trust certificates. This plan would be attended with many and insufferable difficulties, which it is impossible to review in this place.

It has also been proposed, in order to secure to society the benefits of massed capital under central management, that the State assume, not indeed all industries without exception, but all such as naturally take on the monopoly-form. Advocates of this policy usually have in mind businesses like railroads, the telegraph, and mines,—those, that is, which never have been and cannot be subject to competition.

Whatever reasons there have been heretofore, in a discus-

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sion like ours, for distinguishing these from the other substantive industries of the civilized world, there is none now. All are or are soon to be monopolized. The proposal now under consideration would, then, practically amount to socialism, which, as just remarked, is not to be thought of except as a fate. I have no doubt, for my part, that many industries now in private hands will sooner or later be bought by the public power, and I would unhesitatingly vote for thus dealing with any one of them so soon as it proved defiant or subversive of the general good. Until this is clearly the case with any given one, regulation should be the method of dealing with it rather than assumption.

Many Socialists themselves admit that, till men are morally better, grave dangers must attend any enlargement of State participation in industry. That policy gives scope for cheating; it is apt to render workmen indolent; and it narrows the field for invention and other splendid forms of personal initiative. It is not wise, then, for the State to undertake industry faster than this is necessary for public protection. Try regulation in every case until it certainly fails. No systematic effort to regulate monopolies in the public interest has yet been made except in the case of the railways, and even there the effort is as yet none too serious. We shall become serious in this endeavor soon, and carry it further. Nothing would be easier, in most industries, than to insure the public against wrongs, while at the same time avoiding all injustice to stockholders and bond-holders. We should be as careful to do no wrong as to suffer none.

But supposing that we can rely upon the regulation of massed industry by public authority to shield us from robbery in the form of exorbitant prices, where shall we look for that spur to the invention of improved machinery and of processes which has been the glory of competitive industry? and what is going to put such a spirit into the coming feudalism as may render it a blessing, or at least save it from being a curse? Society wants all the good which banded industry can bring it through the agency of great capital and orderly control; but these benefits alone will not compensate for the

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loss of civil liberty or for the decadence of genius in invention and initiative. If the new age of industry is to advance humanity instead of causing retrogression, something must come with it that shall conserve freedom and enterprise. If the solidarity of industry is in store, as I believe to be the case, unless it is to bring some such preservative accompaniment, the outlook is gloomy indeed. What can we hope?

That is a question which political economy does not answer.

It brings us to one of the very numerous points where political economy abuts upon ethics. That the approaching industrial age may carry our dear humanity a step nearer its millennium, moral betterment must come to men. We must have more philanthropy, richer, more solid character, willingness in men to do for love what hitherto only money could induce. Nor is this humanity's imbroglio here alone. At every point, economic advance, increase in temporal good, waits, in last analysis, upon spiritual advance, increase in moral good.

Let us recapitulate.

We have seen that the competitive system of industry is fast giving way to one of combination; that this is not due, in any extent, to legislation, but springs out of stringent social laws; that solidarity in industry often exists when it does not appear; that such solidarity is not a transitory phenomenon, but destined to be permanent; that this monopolistic form of industrial organization has in it the power to work society great evil; that it often produces ill consequences without appearing to do so; that there is, indeed, hope, after all, of its bringing to society immense net advantages; but that no such happy result can come save on the condition of men's moral improvement.

E. Benj. Andrews.

Brown University.

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THE RELATION OF ETHICAL CULTURE TO RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.*

IT is a matter of regret that the Positivists of Newton Hall find themselves unable to take personal part in the Conference of Ethical Societies. Primarily and essentially, this body claims to be an Ethical Society; for it seeks to promote the development of moral life on a strict basis of positive sociology and scientific ethics. It would therefore find itself in complete accord with all serious efforts to place the true culture of self and of the community on rational and human grounds.

Whatever differences of view might arise between a Positivist and an Ethical movement would be found—not in the common ground which would extend over the entire programme of an Ethical Association—but in the further aim of the Positivist movement to add to ethical culture Philosophy and Religion. It would serve little purpose to enlarge on the ground which is common to both Positivist and Ethical movements. It will be more useful to state the grounds which, in the former point of view, make the ultimate extension of the ethical culture to Philosophy and Religion not only legitimate, but indispensable. Right conduct is the true end of a worthy human life. But our conduct is ultimately determined —not by what we are taught to do, or by what we should like to do—but by what we believe and what we revere.

In using the word Religion, we are not giving it any theological significance, nor are we limiting it to any special form of belief. The Chinese and the Negroes (not to mention many other races) have a formal religion which is certainly without God; and in all schemes of belief which can be called *religion* there is a common element. That common element is (1) *a belief in some Power* recognized as greater than the individual or even than the community, as able to deal out

* Read before the Ethical Congress and Convention of Ethical Societies, Chicago, August 30, 1893.

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good and evil, and as interested in the acts of the individual and the community, (2) a sense of reverence, awe, love, and gratitude towards such a Power, and some mode of making that sense manifest, and (3) certain practices, a course of conduct, or rules of life, which are believed to be welcome to that Power, and such as will procure its favor. It is not proposed to argue for any particular type of creed, worship, or practice. The argument of this paper is simply that ethical conduct is powerfully affected for good or for evil by the type of creed, worship, and discipline current in the society or ruling the conscience of the individual. It follows that ethical culture, carried to whatever perfection, cannot secure any given course of conduct; for a dominant religious belief may supersede and control the ethical sense, unless in a society where Religion is inoperative or atrophied.

It is true that for considerable groups and masses on both sides of the Atlantic, Religion seems to have reached this inoperative stage, and acute persons are found to regard this as its final form. But the teaching of history is against this view; for it shows us man, over incalculable periods of time and under a thousand varying conditions, always powerfully stirred and modified by religion in one of its many types. And even in societies such as the working-class of Berlin or Paris, where it may seem that all sense of religion is atrophied, it is difficult to maintain that the practical results of the religious habits of centuries do not still mould conduct. But in order to prove that Religion will not continue to influence conduct in the future, it would be necessary to show that a tendency to recognize some dominant Power and to feel strong emotions about such a Power, and to act under the control of that belief and those emotions, is not an innate habit of human nature. But philosophy proves no such thing; no philosopher of repute has even attempted such proof; and the best modern psychology of every school concurs in scientific analysis of those qualities of brain and heart which make up the compound religious instinct. Philosophers in turn expose the inadequacy of certain forms of religion; but they are constantly making more definite and positive

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the common element of religion, and its roots in man's moral and mental structure which the various forms of religion are designed to satisfy.

The same may indeed be said of Philosophy, understanding by the word Philosophy the sum of our knowledge of Nature and Man. So long as our philosophy was limited to physics, and the analogies of natural with moral and social science were not understood, it might be supposed that ethical conduct was not controlled by our interpretation of the phenomena of Nature, at least for societies which had passed beyond the African, Hindoo, and Chinese types of civilization. But now that Philosophy has brought Nature and Man into line and shows us in both correlative laws, and finds a similar evolution in societies and in ethics, it is impossible to doubt that moral conduct is ultimately controlled by the general ideas we hold about the laws of man's moral and social life. The masses, it is true, are not aware that they have any philosophy, and it would be vain to talk to them about moral and social laws. But, just as they can speak intelligibly without knowing rules of grammar, or even the names of parts of speech, so they have dominant habits of mind which affect their daily lives. Men, however ignorant, act differently according as they hold or deny that their acts have some relation to a Superior Will. And a practical result is at once visible when men become accustomed to regard events and acts—not as decreed or inspired by arbitrary wills—but as the intelligible consequences of scientific law. See how different is the attitude in an outbreak of cholera of the people of Berlin, Paris, or New York from that of the fatalist pilgrim to Mecca and Benares!

The result is that Religion and Philosophy so powerfully affect conduct, that no ethical culture can determine conduct unless by an alliance with Religion and Philosophy—*Religion* meaning deep feeling about a Power believed to be supreme or superior, and *Philosophy* meaning general ideas about the order of Nature and the evolution of man. At the very basis of ethical culture, at its threshold and on its crown, stand the problem of the relation of the individual to society,

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and the crucial problem, how to harmonize the claims of the individualist and of the social ideal. No one can doubt that Religion and Philosophy have very much to say on this crucial problem, and that the whole ethical solution may be recast, whatever ethical training there may have been, either under an overmastering religious enthusiasm such as that preached by Buddha or St. Francis, or, again, by a dogmatic scheme of individualism based on a general physical and social philosophy, such as that which animated the rigid political economy of the last generation, and which sprang from the self-interest doctrines of Bentham.

The difficulties which encompass all human efforts after right conduct amidst the spasmodic forces of appetite and interest are enormous; and civilization, which on the one hand strengthens the resources of moral culture, on the other hand opens new and subtle modes in which appetite and interest can find gratification. Morality, however pure and elevated, must always remain a somewhat tepid and prosaic stimulus when contrasted with the whirlwind of passion and the subtle phthisis of self-interest. It is certain that man's benevolent instincts never reach the red heat of lust and hate. History shows us one force, and one only, which has ever successfully contended with these appetites and conquered the promptings of self. That force is Religion, in some form. It may be in a bad form,—Moloch-worship, Obeism, the devotion to tribe, city, church, sect, or prophet. But the passionate submission of self to some dominant power or idea, to whom life itself is owed, has in all ages proved strong enough to overmaster the stings of appetite, and even the instinct of escaping pain and death. The white heat of religious enthusiasm has proved stronger than the red heat of selfish desire. And nothing else in the history of mankind has done so. Civilization, so far as it is limited to mere ethical culture, may somewhat diminish violence, though it makes murder even more diabolically deliberate; but, on the other hand, it is the soil in which fraud grows like a deadly fungus.

It is quite true that Religion has only done this imperfectly

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and unsteadily, acting only in certain ages and societies, or on given persons, and in special spheres of human life. And it is true that Religion, in the most advanced societies of the Old and the New World, seems to have lost its savor, like the salt in the Testament parable. Else what would be the meaning of an ethical movement outside and independent of the Gospel? But the true explanation is that the salt has lost its savor because its whole intellectual basis is honeycombed, because it has got into a hopeless conflict with Science, and because Philosophy has proved that even its ethical standard is rude and misleading. That is the point from which we set out—viz., that ethical culture, Religion, and Philosophy are really so much interdependent and so organically correlated that it is only possible to treat them as separate for temporary and special purposes. They are not independent institutions which can be applied to the conduct of life without reference to each other. We can no more isolate any one, except for study, analysis, and comparison, than we can cure an ailing human body by exclusive treatment of the digestive, nervous, or vascular system, treating any one of the three as being practically independent of the other two.

On these grounds, we who meet in Newton Hall believe that any permanent movement for ethical culture must be at the same time a movement for religious and philosophical culture jointly. Indeed, the religious and the philosophical problems are really antecedent—must come first. These problems are truly the basis: they govern and determine the ethical problem. Conduct is *the result* of the Ideal that we revere, *plus* the Truth which we know to be supreme. When we have settled on an Ideal as an object of love and devotion—when we have reached the furthest limit of human knowledge—then we may build up an ethical culture in accordance with our religious emotions and our philosophical beliefs. As we said at the beginning, neither Religion nor Philosophy can, in our view, transcend this planet, human nature and human life as found thereon, and the sphere of demonstrable science. We will admit nothing superhuman in Religion, and nothing

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supra-scientific in Philosophy. We find both here on earth, and in the domain of verifiable knowledge. Nothing has been said in this communication about Positivism as a system, Auguste Comte as a teacher, or Humanity as an object of reverence. We have argued the question on general grounds. But it will be understood that we find the core of ethical culture in the practical service of Humanity, by the light of the general doctrines of Positive Philosophy.

FREDERIC HARRISON.

NEWTON HALL, LONDON.

IN the foregoing paper on the "Relation of Ethical Culture to Religion and Philosophy," read at the Ethical Congress in Chicago, Mr. Frederic Harrison has stated with admirable clearness the points wherein the Positivist Society, of which he is so distinguished a member, differs from the Ethical Society. The two, indeed, have this in common, that they recognize right conduct as the only true end of a worthy human life. But there exists, nevertheless, a fundamental difference between them. The Positivist Society teaches a specific religion and a specific philosophy as prerequisites of the moral life. And Mr. Harrison—with but a passing reference to his own creed—devotes the bulk of his paper to setting forth the reasons which, in his opinion, make it imperative to teach a religion and a philosophy of some sort, though not necessarily his own, as the basis of a permanent and valuable ethical culture. In what he says on this subject he expresses the prevailing view. Christians of all shades of belief will agree with him; so will the majority of those who have pitched their tents outside the lines of Christian doctrine. Almost all the so-called radical movements of our time have been characterized by the attempt to put a different religious and philosophic basis of conduct in place of the traditional one, but have concurred in holding that agreement on first principles is indispensable. If there is anything new in the Ethical Movement it is its dissent from this widely-accepted view. It affirms,

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and the emphasis of its position is laid upon this affirmation, that previous agreement with respect to Religion and Philosophy among those who join an Ethical movement is not necessary; that strong Ethical Societies can be built up with no other bond of union among their members than the common desire to increase the knowledge of the right, whatever the source from which that knowledge may be obtained; to deepen the love of right, by whatever means that love may be deepened; and to advance the practice of right, whatever the methods that may be found suitable to this end. Does the Ethical Society, having no common foundation in Religion and Philosophy, therefore hang in air?

It will be useful to consider Mr. Harrison's objections. The most formidable one is, that our very notions of what is right and wrong are modified by our religious and philosophical opinions. On the simpler, every-day questions of morality, indeed, a substantial agreement has been reached among good people generally: no one disputes that it is wrong to kill, to steal, or to inflict needless pain upon our fellows. But when we come to the more complex questions, especially those which relate to the evolution of the existing moral order into a higher order, the same unanimity does not exist. And yet it is precisely with respect to such questions that the Ethical Society must take a decisive stand if it is to mean anything. Such questions, the moment they are raised, will inevitably bring to the surface latent and fundamental differences of conception, and unless these differences have previously been healed, how can it be hoped to create common notions as to what is right and wrong? And in default of such common notions how can there be concerted action? An Ethical Society, it would seem, devoid of intellectual unity, will be compelled to adopt, in all the stirring and vital moral issues of the time, a mere temporizing policy, and to purchase peace within its ranks at the sacrifice of all earnestness and power.

It must be admitted, without qualification or reserve, that religious and philosophical ideas do determine and often strangely pervert men's notions of right and wrong. The philosophy of the Stoics, for instance, led them to sanction

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suicide; the religious views of Christian ascetics caused them to withdraw from all active participation in the business of life; the economic theories of socialists and individualists, at the present day, are of so opposite a nature that measures which commend themselves to the former as the very flower of justice are often stigmatized by the latter as the most flagitious of crimes. To dwell for a moment on the last instance, let us ask whether it would be possible for socialists and individualists to dwell together harmoniously in an Ethical Society. Granted that both sides believe in social righteousness, must not a split occur as soon as they fully realize how utterly incompatible with one another are their definitions of social righteousness? I should answer that I do not believe a split will occur, provided the two parties are devoted to social righteousness with all their heart and all their soul; provided the love of righteousness is stronger within them than the love of the particular theory by which they hope to promote the ends of righteousness. It is the very aim of the Ethical Society to kindle in the breasts of its members such a supreme love.

And now may I, in turn, be permitted to define the objection which deters me from falling in with Mr. Harrison's plan of working out a dictatorial scheme of religion and philosophy beforehand, and then applying it to practice? It is this, that all preconceived theories tend to narrow the field of mental vision; tend to exclude those facts which are in conflict with the theory, and to admit only those which comport with it. Whenever we approach a subject with a theory ready in hand, the facts are apt to be fitted into the Procrustean formula of the theory, instead of the theory's adapting itself with unceasing flexibility to the ever-changing complexus of facts.

The history of all the natural sciences tells the same story of retarded progress, due to the ascendency of arbitrary theories which claimed to possess an inherent certainty before and above the facts. The science of ethics—if indeed in its present state we can properly speak of it as a science—has suffered even more than the natural sciences from the same cause. Surely it is an imperative rule, that the first principles of any

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department of knowledge should be sought within that department, and not prematurely fetched from without. Let the first principles of ethics be sought within the ethical field, and let their connection with the principles of all knowledge in a philosophical system and with the universal ideals of the human soul in a religious doctrine be matter of ulterior consideration, after the elements to be correlated have first independently been ascertained. Let not Religion nor Philosophy intervene too early. Neither is concerned merely with the ethical nature and needs of man. The scope of each is wider, and embraces elements not ethical at all. To borrow from Religion and Philosophy, therefore, the governing principles of conduct, is to import the maxims of morality from an alien sphere, is to threaten the independence of the moral realm. It is jealousy for the independence of morality that has led the Ethical Societies to put practice into the foreground, and to gauge principles by their fitness to inform and ennoble practice, thus reversing the usual manner of proceeding. And yet this position, though it has never been consistently followed out, is not new: it is wholly implied in the well-known promise that if we do the deed we shall know the doctrine.

Not indeed that we of the Ethical Societies discourage theorizing on moral and religious questions, and commend mere impulsive, unreflecting action. We recognize fully that philosophic and religious convictions do, to a great extent, determine men's notions of right and wrong, and hold that every member of an Ethical Society ought, as a matter of duty, to make his thinking with respect to the problems of life as consistent and coherent as possible. But we also hold that an antidote to the narrowing effect of mere theory is needed, and find that antidote in that supreme interest in practical righteousness which it is our principal aim to cultivate. There is a simple test to which all theories that assume to determine human conduct should be subjected: do they manifestly tend to promote the well-being of mankind, or do they not? If they do not, then they stand condemned; if they do, and in so far as they do, they are to be approved. And if this test shall come to be accepted, if the spirit of supreme

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love for and devotion to righteousness shall have been engendered in an Ethical Society, it will not be difficult even for socialists and individualists to dwell together harmoniously within it. Their violent antagonism is largely the result of one-sidedness. In reality they supplement one another. Each party represents an extreme view. Each should learn from the other, each adopt a part of the other's programme for the common good. Yet there is little likelihood of such a reconciliation being effected between them unless some higher interest be introduced which both revere, and that can be only the ethical interest.

A second objection very forcibly put by Mr. Harrison relates to the weakness of ethical as compared with religious impulses. "No one can doubt," he says, "that the whole ethical solution may be recast, whatever ethical training there may have been, under an overmastering religious enthusiasm such as that preached by Buddha or St. Francis." And again, "Ethical culture, carried to whatever perfection, cannot secure any given course of conduct; for a dominant religious belief may supersede and control the ethical sense, unless in a society where Religion is inoperative or atrophied." It is true that dominant religious beliefs have, unfortunately, but too often superseded and controlled the ethical sense, as in the case of the worship of Moloch, and the treatment of heretics by the Spanish Inquisitors. It is true that religion, in consequence of the non-ethical elements with which it is interlarded, has proved itself as dangerous a foe to morality, whenever its special interests were in conflict with the moral, as it has glorified and transfigured the moral ideals at those points where the religious and ethical spheres coincided. But "for considerable groups and masses on both sides of the Atlantic, Religion seems to have reached this inoperative stage, and acute persons are found to regard this as its final form," though "the teaching of history is against this view." I, too, am entirely of the same opinion,—viz., that the teaching of history is against this view. I am equally with Mr. Harrison convinced that Religion, even where it appears to be inoperative and atrophied, is merely lying in a trance

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state, from which, probably before very long, it will awaken to renewed life and activity. But on this very account it seems to me that the present situation should be utilized as offering a most favorable opportunity for strengthening the defences of ethical culture, so that no dominant religious belief shall ever again hereafter commit the enormity of superseding and controlling the ethical sense. Now, if ever, is the time so to fortify the moral consciousness of mankind that every new religion which may appear in the world shall have to justify itself before the ethical tribunal, and shall be constrained to rest its claims primarily upon its fitness to incorporate and reflect the highest moral ideal.

A third objection is likewise concerned with the apparent inadequacy of the merely moral motives. "Morality," says Mr. Harrison, "however pure and elevated, must always remain a somewhat tepid and prosaic stimulus," contrasted with the force of passion and self-interest. "It is certain that men's benevolent instincts never reach the red heat of lust and hate. History shows us one force, and one only, which has ever contended with these appetites and conquered the promptings of self. That force is Religion, in some form." "The white heat of religious enthusiasm has proved stronger than the red heat of selfish desire. And nothing else in the history of mankind has done so."

It is at this point that I find myself at the farthest remove from Mr. Harrison's position. My reading of history is certainly different from his. I am persuaded that there is such a thing as moral passion,—*i.e.*, devotion and self-surrender inspired solely by the contemplation of the excellence of the moral ends. I should find myself utterly unable to understand the Prophets of Israel, did I not behold in this passion the mainspring of their work. The fire, taken from the altar, which purified the lips of Isaiah was the fire of moral enthusiasm; the heat which burned in the breast of Jeremiah and gave him no peace was fervor of the same sort. And it was their reverence for justice, to which they gave such sublime and reiterated expression, that enabled the founders of Monotheism to rise from nature-worship to the level of a loftier,

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spiritual creed. Morality thus reacted on Religion, and Religion was indebted to Morality for expelling from it its more gross non-ethical elements and giving it for the first time the name and place which it has since held as a regenerative force of the first magnitude. St. Paul, too, was primarily actuated by a moral impulse when he exclaimed, "Oh, who shall free me from the body of this death?" And it was the desire for moral freedom, moral wholeness, which led him to construct that system of religious thought that has left its imprint so deeply on the history of the last eighteen centuries. Again, the moral impulse indigenous and irrepressible in human nature has plainly demonstrated its power in all the mighty movements of the past for political and social reform. And to mention but a single modern instance: in the great anti-slavery conflict which divided this country thirty years ago, it was certainly the moral sentiment of the community, the sense of humanity outraged in the person of the down-trodden slave, and not at all a religious belief or philosophical conviction of any kind, that proved itself stronger than the "red heat of selfish desire." This moral passion, though often semi-dormant, still lives in the world; to it the Ethical Societies make their appeal, seeking to kindle it into purer flame. And some of us, at least, silently cherish the hope, though in this respect there is a wide diversity of opinion amongst us, that when the moral life shall have been thoroughly quickened it will once again react on men's religious faith, and give to the latter a new convincingness and reality.

Finally, it may not be amiss to point out that intellectual differences tend to increase rather than diminish as civilization advances, and should be encouraged rather than suppressed; that a philosophic scheme, however valid and comprehensive at the time it is announced, cannot fail to become an obstruction in the way of further progress, if set up as an authoritative statement of truth, and that any movement which attempts to establish perfect intellectual unity among those who join it is condemned at the outset to become a sect. The Ethical Societies are extremely solicitous to prevent the growth among them of the sectarian spirit. But while they renounce

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the hope and desire for perfect intellectual agreement, they find in the love of righteousness a practical bond of fellowship which is both close and strong. The Ethical Movement, as a matter of fact, is meeting with a most encouraging popular response, and many are joining it precisely because in so doing they feel that they abate not one jot of their mental freedom, and that their religious and philosophic convictions remain wholly unpledged for the future, while yet they enjoy the sense of unity with their fellow-men in virtue of common efforts to make themselves better and the world better.

FELIX ADLER.

NEW YORK.

"ITALY AND THE PAPACY."

AN article under this heading by Professor Raffaele Mariano appeared in the January number, and the Managing Editor of the JOURNAL has courteously asked for a reply.

It is not, of course, the novelty of Professor Mariano's paper that makes the invitation welcome; for he has, to speak in culinary terms, simply treated his American readers to a "warmed-over" morsel from earlier repasts. In other words, he has reproduced, with proper modifications, the brochure which he published in 1879 with the higher-sounding title "Cristianesimo, Catechismo, Civiltà"; and this brochure, to complete the genesis, can be traced immediately to his articles in the *Dritto*, especially to the one published February 20, 1877, and remotely to his volume "Roma nel Medio Evo," compiled in 1873 from the "Geschichte der Stadt Rom" by Gregorovius.

It should not be supposed that these views, even in their author's opinion, have gained force or solidity by repeated condensation, much less that the various forms in which they have appeared are meant by him as specimens of scientific work. On the other hand, it is necessary to guard against the inexact appreciation which his writings have encountered.

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When, for instance, a Protestant paper, *The Gazette* of Montreal,* asserts that his latest article is written with the *parti pris* of a Puritan of the seventeenth century, it does injustice to the Puritans. Sig. Mariano's paper is, more properly speaking, a sample of the partisan literature which the Italy of the nineteenth century has developed. Like many kindred publications, its chief claim upon serious attention lies in the subject itself, the importance of which is quite independent of any particular treatment, and therefore warrants the present rejoinder.

As the Professor candidly admits, the question we are considering does not relate exclusively to Italian conditions (though the welfare of thirty millions is by no means a trifle): it is one of international interest. Whatever affects the papacy comes home to millions of Catholics, and consequently is of importance to every Christian nation. Thinking men the world over realize that the so-called "Roman question" is as full of actuality as it is of complexity. That "Rome is not a city that can be taken by cannon-shot," most people readily concede without the explicit assurance of Sig. Mariano: it is a fact demonstrated by frequent experiment. But the tactics which he employs, though milder than those of Porta Pia, are just as ineffectual for the solution of the problem.

His whole paper is a criticism of the superficial manner in which the Italians have dealt with the matter; yet he himself has rather skimmed the surface of things than sounded the depth where reason listens calmly to justice. What helps to sadden his failure is the appeal to principles, apparently of a higher sort, but in reality devoid of foundation and sustained by a mere trestle-work of unwarranted or one-sided assertions. So long as principles are wrong or misused, a right understanding of facts is impossible; and so long as facts are distorted, no conclusion can be drawn that will afford a plan of action "serious, objective, and earnest." To open the way for such a conclusion, we are obliged not only to correct various statements of Sig. Mariano and supply data that he has over-

* Issue of January 2, 1894.

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looked, but also to steady and elevate the discussion by setting it on a sounder basis.

It is now some twenty years since Rudolf von Ihering's little work "Der Kampf ums Recht" made its appearance and was translated into so many languages, Japanese included, that it literally travelled round the world. The eminent jurist develops two propositions: *the defence of one's rights is a duty towards one's self; it is also a duty towards society.* It is not difficult, I think, to show that in the actual conflict between Italy and the papacy the Pope's insistence upon the historical rights of the Holy See is a duty which he owes to the Catholic Church, and, moreover, to Christian civilization at large. That the means he has employed in asserting his rights are both just and efficacious, will be evident to any fair-minded reader who will consider the religious and moral aspect of the question, its political bearing, the action of the Pope, and the action of the Italian government.

I.—THE RELIGIOUS AND MORAL ASPECT.

This phase of the question, though first in importance, is yet so closely bound up with the political problem that the solution of the one implies, for a large number of minds, the solution of the other. There is, as a matter of fact, something more in the Italian situation than the world-old friction of the secular and the religious power. Every blow aimed in this conflict at the temporal sovereignty of the Pope has had for its ultimate object the overthrow of his spiritual supremacy. Not only were the Papal States to be blotted from the map of Italy, Catholicism itself was to be uprooted from the soil. To disclaim this purpose and to cloak it over with other pretexts are empty illusions or expedients that barely deserve the name of intrigue. The open avowals of the more sincere anti-papal leaders leave no doubt as to their real object.*

* "Fare la guerra alla preponderanza cattolica nel mondo per tutto con tutti i mezzi, questa è la nostra politica avvenire. Noi vediamo che questo cattolicismo è un istrumento di dissidio, di sventura, e dobbiamo distruggerlo." Petruccelli della Gatina, Session of Parliament, 20 Jul. 1862.—"L'abolizione dei conventi

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Sig. Mariano has long since put himself on record in this respect, and the reiteration of his views in the JOURNAL has at least the merit of consistency.

To his way of thinking, Catholicism is a "religion of externals"—"an incarnation of Christian truth as to the letter and not as to the spirit, a strict rule, a formal law," "a mechanical function." Hence it should be abolished or forced to evolve into something else. Almost any cult would serve as a substitute, the preference, if any, being given to Hegelian idealism.

To such an opinion Sig. Mariano is welcome: we have no protest to make against his freedom of choice. But what we do protest against, in the name of common justice and scientific fairness, is his method. To distort Catholicism and to render it odious by caricature may be quite in the line of *Fischietto:* it is not what we expect of a university professor. Of the numerous savants who are busied at present with the comparative history of religions, not one, I venture to say, would dare to present such a travesty of any cult as Professor Mariano has given of Catholicism. They are objective enough, or at least prudent enough, to base their criticism on reality.

Though the Naples professor has chosen an easier mode of controversy, we cannot believe that he is guilty of the threadbare fallacy which makes religion a purely interior function. Such a form of worship will do for flesh-free spirits, and something akin to it may suffice for those exceptional persons who are all intellect. But the great majority of mankind, being composites of soul and body, have to learn of things divine through the medium of sense, and naturally translate their religious feelings into outward act. This would be the case even if the original balance between spirit and organism had never been disturbed. In the actual state of things, which

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e la soppressione del clero a noi nemico è la rivoluzione grande, la rivoluzione italiana, la rivoluzione politica, che dobbiamo tutti volere per abbattere il papato." —Miceli, Session 17 Feb. 1866.—"E ben vero che noi combattiamo il cattolicismo, perche convinti di scorgervi il piu grande pericolo per i tempi nostri. Abbiamo scolpito in mente che cattolicismo e papato sono una cosa sola."—*Gazzetta della Capitale*, 2 Ap. 1876.

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makes the control of passion an essential function of religion, external forms are all the more necessary. Eye and ear become the channels of temptation and corruption, and it is only through the senses that images of a higher sort can be awakened, nobler aspirations aroused, and virtuous action secured. Such notions, elementary as they are, may be styled *a priori;* if so, they are amply verified in the history of Protestantism, the positive forms of which are coming back to ritual and liturgical observance. Whether Sig. Mariano is aware of this tendency, we cannot say; at any rate, it is well to remind him both of the fact and of the principle which it illustrates. He will be better prepared to understand our correction of his statement to the effect that Catholicism is *merely* external.

He has no warrant whatever for saying that "the Church lays less stress on an internal change of heart than on the external and visible signs of actions—on outward effect." Quite the contrary: the chief motive the Church has for insisting on outward observances is the awakening and fostering of inward spiritual life. She knows and teaches that the moral worth of any action is from within, and that, if the corresponding disposition of heart be wanting, "outward effect" is a sham.

She lays so much "stress" on conscience that in her eyes an apparently good action loses its value if the intention is not upright, though it is equally true that the best of intentions cannot justify an evil action. The same spirit runs through all the religious practices which Sig. Mariano attempts to ridicule by means of trite misrepresentations. If the sacraments have an efficacy of their own, this in no way lessens the necessity of worthy dispositions on the part of the recipient. Protestants believe in justification by faith alone: to assert that they pay no heed to piety and virtue would be a calumny. It is only a little worse to assert that, for Catholics, the sacraments are "mechanical performances." Has our Professor never heard of the sin called *sacrilege*, which, as the Church teaches, is committed by unworthily approaching the sacraments?

If not, then I fear that an explanation of less important doc-

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trines is altogether beyond his theological range. For the sake of the reader, however, I may remark that in granting indulgences the Church not only presupposes the forgiveness of sin, but also obliges the penitent to the performance of good works; that from the Catholic point of view prayer, fasting, and alms-deeds are meritorious only so far as they are prompted by motives of faith and sanctified by divine grace; that the honor (not the *adoration*) paid to the Saints is subordinate to the worship of God, is a glorification of His works in the supernatural order, and consequently is no more offensive to Him than the respect shown to the royal family of Italy is displeasing to the king. As to the veneration of images and relics, no long disquisition is needed to show that this proceeds from the most natural of impulses, and that it is intended for the originals of whom these things are but reminders. Catholics maintain that a Francis of Assisi in marble deserves at least as much respect as a Garibaldi in bronze; nor is their conviction at all weakened when they see their Italian rulers placing a bust of Aquinas opposite to that of Buonaparte on the Pincian Hill.

In thus hinting at the realities of Catholicism I have no idea of making Sig. Mariano a convert—of turning him, for instance, into a devotee of St. Januarius. I should feel rather that some apology is due to the public for this extract from the Catechism, were it not painfully obvious that even an educated man may have erroneous notions on the simplest subjects.

Lest his assertions should mislead others, I would advise them to consult some authentic exposition of Catholic belief, such as the *Catechism of the Council of Trent.* They will there learn the true spirit and purpose of observances which, because of their delicate adjustment to the framework of Christianity, are only too easily wrenched out by prejudice and disjointed by ignorance. What is more, they will avoid the sophism of holding the Church responsible for the shortcomings of individual members. Catholics who retain their faith, but through passion or weakness contradict it in their lives, are no more an argument against Catholicism than was the fall of Peter or the crime of Judas. And those whose

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religion is merely superficial know full well that their attendance at mass, their charities, and their pilgrimages, though better perhaps than nothing at all, are not what God requires and what the Church commands for their sanctification.

It is a risky thing in any case to pass judgment on a man's religious motives or his lack of such motives; but where facts speak plainly against his sincerity, they simply intensify the contrast between him and the greater number of his fellow-Christians who are thorough in belief and practice.

It is no doubt by mistaking this really *human* contrast for a geographical one that Sig. Mariano has been betrayed into the strangest sort of distinction. He speaks continually of *papal* Catholicism; as if there were any other! Catholicism is one, and it is the same everywhere. His attempt to invent a plural has more serious results than the offence against grammar: it forces him into open contradiction with himself. Outspoken in his contempt for Italian Catholicism, he is full of admiration for its counterpart in Germany. As seen from Naples, the transalpine church is full of vigor and inward glow, unsullied by superstition and unhampered by parasitical forms. The very brilliance of the illusion adds to the cruelty of dispelling it. Does Sig. Mariano forget that German Catholics believe in the infallibility of the Pope, that they venerate images and relics, are given to fasts and pilgrimages, are assiduous in their devotion to the Madonna and the Saints? A visit to Cologne, Echternach, or Aix-la-Chapelle would quicken his memory and convince him that for what he calls "superstition" these places compare favorably with Naples, Loreto, and Rome.

Differences he would certainly remark. The least observant of tourists knows that a Teuton is not an Italian, and that even a Prussian contrasts as strongly with a Bavarian as a Venetian with a Neapolitan. Tacitus, fresh from the "sunny skies" of Italy, complained of the *cœlum germanicum*. Twenty centuries have wrought no perceptible change in these physical conditions, and Christianity has not transformed the nature of the races which they affect. No such transformation was ever intended. Religion, as it penetrates

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a people, elevates and purifies them; but to accomplish this it must adapt itself, without sacrificing essentials, to the national character, turning to profit whatever is noble in order to eliminate whatever is vicious. For this process neither a generation nor a century is long enough. The whole Christian era has been spent in uplifting Europe from barbarism, and in toning down the pagan heritage of ignorance and passion. If to the present day we find one race cold and reserved, another brimming over with vivacity, we need not be surprised that religious manifestations differ according to local conditions. In the North they are serious to the verge of severity; in the South they are as lively as decorum will permit. Either a German working himself up to Italian enthusiasm, or an Italian freezing his feelings to the Teutonic zero, would, in point of religious expression, be suspected.

With this psychological law as a warning, I cannot share Sig. Mariano's conviction that "papal" Catholicism is a distinct species. He might as well persuade me that because the students at Leipsic or Berlin have not the overflowing *brio* of his own disciples, science is a different thing in Germany from what it is in Naples; or even that the guttural utterance of one people is a more fitting expression of truth than the charming accents of the other.

The real import of the comparison, as too frequently happens, has been overlooked. The Church has not aimed at fixing a stereotyped expression of religious feeling upon all peoples: this would have been unnatural. The marvel is that she has succeeded in grafting the same *supernatural* life upon such diverse temperaments, giving evidence at once of her vitality and of her catholicity. No nation, it is true, has ever fully come up to her standard; for, to say nothing of her *ideal* perfection, the nations as such have not realized completely the idea of essential Christian virtue. On the other hand, it is certain that all have reached, through her influence, a higher plane both in the religious and in the secular order.

Italy itself is a noteworthy example. A glance at the history of the Middle Ages will show that the interaction of church

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and people resulted in a vigorous spontaneity of Christian life that permeated thought, imagination, and sentiment with a power of elevation surpassed only perhaps in Catholic Spain. Nor were these aspirations choked down by the Council of Trent. Sig. Mariano is as unfortunate in his chronological as in his territorial distinctions. If such an inhibition of the Christian spirit had, as he asserts, taken place, we should be at a loss to understand the lives of Borromeo, Barbarigo, Philip Neri, Camillo di Lelli, and numberless other post-tridentine instances of superior virtue. And we have no less difficulty in understanding the discordant assertions of Professor Mariano and Professor Barzellotti. The Church, says one, has ruined Italy; Italy, says the other, has ruined the Church. And both of these conclusions, I may add, are ruinous "to reason and to history."

Both, in fact, are myopic. They leave out of sight what may be called the "principle of fluctuation" in national growth. Not only do we discern in the nation, as in the individual, periods of infancy, maturity, and decline; we must allow moreover for variations in the curve itself—for bright phases and dark phases, for intervals of energy and health that alternate with feverish collapse. As a rule, these variations are not simultaneous in every part of the world. At the very time that Italy, Spain, and France reached the high-point of splendor, England under the Stuarts and Germany in the throes of the Thirty Years' War sank to the opposite extreme. During the last century, Italy in turn showed a falling off; and this depression, affecting her religious, artistic, and scientific life, has continued under the stress of political disturbance to our own day. The fact is too plain for denial; but its explanation is to be sought in the law of fluctuation, not in the influence of Catholicism; and, if we look for the causes of that fluctuation, we shall find that the fact is due rather to the opponents of Catholicity, who impede its action and menace its life, as history most clearly proves.

At all events, there is no need of exaggeration. The morality of Italy in the eighteenth century will bear comparison with that of England, Sweden, and Prussia; while in point of

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culture the Italian courts surpassed those of Stockholm and Copenhagen, of Potsdam and London.* The same verdict is rendered by recent statistics, in spite of the adverse conditions arising in Italy from revolution and misrule. For a million of its inhabitants over fifteen years old there are 59 outrages, while in Germany there are 218; 45 suicides, offset by 392 in Saxony, 198 in Würtemberg, and 166 in Prussia; 2444 cases of theft, against 2608 in England and Wales and 4236 in Scotland.† Of 1000 births, Italy counts 73 illegitimate, Saxony 127, Sweden and Denmark 101.‡ In 1885 there were in Prussia 230,707 marriages and 3902 divorces (1:60);§ whereas in Italy there were 233,931 marriages and 556 divorces (1:420). It must be admitted that murder is at present more frequent in Italy than elsewhere—a fact that is obviously due to the fiery and passionate character of the people. But on the score of alcoholic abuses she is far behind Germany, England, and Sweden, where excess is the result of climate.

Over and above these facts, which need no comment, there are certain considerations that help to put this question in the proper light. From time to time, in every nation, currents of exceptional force are felt whose causes are difficult to trace, though their effects are unmistakable; now philosophic or religious, again artistic and literary. These overwhelming activities seem, while they last, to effect a transformation as deep as it is wide. Such was the tidal wave that swept Germany on to the reform of the sixteenth century; such is the flux of rationalism which, since it issued from England in the last century, has spread over all countries, carrying with it especially the Latin races. Wherever it passes, religion appears to be submerged. Men, at least those who attract much attention, throw aside their Christian ways or carefully screen

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* P. de Romont, "Le Danemark au Siècle dernier" (d'après les mémoires de Reverdil). Rev. Cath., 1876, tom. 2, p. 380.

† T. Bertillon, Enc. d'Hyg. Demog. p. 297. Corre, Crime et Suicide, pp. 164–165.

‡ A. Leffingwell, M.D., Illegitimacy and the Influence of Season upon Conduct. (London, 1892.)

§ Carroll D. Wright, "Marriage and Divorce," Appendix. (Rev. edit., 1891.)

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their convictions. Morality languishes, and faith seems to wither.

Italy, I admit, has not escaped this rationalistic influence; but is she the only sufferer? Sig. Mariano would certainly have revised his article had he read the complaints of Protestant clergymen regarding the condition of non-papal countries. It would doubtless surprise him to find how many non-Catholic Christians belong to no church, and are little concerned about religion.* And among those who do attend divine service, the proportion of rich and poor would give him food for reflection. The information he might thus obtain need not be supplemented by a study of those peculiar conditions in which the Christian pulpit and Christian language are made the vehicle of rationalistic ideas. This is a phase of "progress" for which Italian Catholicism offers no equivalent.

Yet even this broader view of the religious situation, while it leads to an impartial judgment, should not land us in pessimism. In order rightly to appreciate the moral standing of any people, we must take into account not only their average character, but those exceptional phases as well that border on the heroic, and those exceptional personalities that stand out in strong relief against the "common." This is the criterion by which we estimate the culture of a nation. It may be interesting to know exactly how many of its inhabitants can read and write, how many can thrum a piano or daub a canvas; but these data are not sufficient for our judgment. We must look at the number of real savants and artists; they are the true indices of national growth. Viewed from this higher stand-point, Italy, in her moral and religious aspect, has no reason to blush for her Catholicism. Men like Dom Bosco, Ludovico da Casoria, and Cardinal Massaia are not found everywhere. That their lives and work have been appreciated and imitated in Italy is proof that the spirit of unselfish devotion is by no means extinct in the land.

A word must be added concerning the clergy, for whose

* See *The Forum*, vol. xiii. p. 519, "Impending Paganism in New England."

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welfare Sig. Mariano is extremely solicitous. His acknowledgment of the wrongs they have suffered and his apparent anxiety to make amends might have led him to sounder conclusions, were it not for the lofty compassion with which he regards them as an inferior body. Had they actually fallen to the lowest intellectual level, no one familiar with Italian history could have blamed them. What with the oppression of the Church by the Bourbons in Naples and the Lorraines in Tuscany; with the confiscations of ecclesiastical property, the extension of military service, and the dispersion of the religious orders, the wonder is that the Italian priesthood were educated at all. If, as a result of this struggle for existence, the organization of the seminaries is in some respects defective, there has not been wanting on the part of the Church authorities a determined effort to raise the standard. So far they have succeeded admirably. The colleges of Rome and the seminaries of Turin, Milan, and Verona are equal to similar institutions in any country, while the theological schools of Perugia and Naples, thanks to the endeavors of Cardinals Pecci and Sforza, have become real centres of learning. Vicissitude they have known; but such has been the experience of divinity schools under far more favorable circumstances,* and such will always be the lot of theological studies unless they be as generously provided for as other branches of science.

Sig. Mariano is convinced that clerical students ought to attend the universities. For what? Surely not for their theology: the chairs of sacred science that were once so ably filled have been overturned by the revolution, and the Italian government is not liberal enough to establish free universities with a teaching acceptable to the clergy. Perhaps then for a training in logic—*quod Deus avertat.* It must not be inferred that the Church is opposed to university education. She knows well enough its importance, or rather its absolute necessity, for maintaining a scientific spirit. Leo XIII., in his recent Brief to the Spanish bishops, declares emphatically that

* See "The Divinity School of Harvard University," Cambridge, 1893.

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the separation of seminary and university is fatal to theological studies. They flourish, on the contrary, in Germany chiefly because faculties of divinity, Catholic as well as Protestant, form an integral part of the university. In this regard, at any rate, Italy has much to learn from her Northern ally.

But the "blind money spirit" of the government has not entirely quenched the scientific ardor of Italy's clergy. For profound erudition, Cardinal Mai; for biblical learning, Vercellone and Patrizzi; for the moral sciences, Audisio, Prisco, and Taparelli;* for physics and mathematics, Secchi, Denza, Tortolini, and Stoppani,—such men would do credit to any university. Oddly enough, Sig. Mariano has failed to appreciate their worth, which is the greater because of the disadvantages under which they labored. He is too much occupied with the "minor clergy"—"not descending to them as equals, but raising them gradually to the height of the new life of the nation." Passing over the insulting tone of this monition, we can assure its author that if the "new life of the nation" is embodied in Italian university professors, the "minor clergy" will in all probability let the "height" stay where it is, preferring their "daily contact with the people, sharing with them their joys and sorrows and procuring for them hopes and comforts ineffable." How these phrases, if they have any meaning, bear out the former assertion that religion in Italy is a mass of lifeless forms, only Sig. Mariano can explain. The logical connection is "ineffable."

To conclude: the moral and religious depression of Italy, so far as it is a reality, depends not upon the Church, but upon more general influences which equally affect non-Catholic nations, and, internally, upon the convulsive movements of the last hundred years. On the other hand, we have ample evidence that in Italy Christian life, far from being extinct or altogether latent, can and does produce most wholesome fruit. The true solution, then, of the question consists not in

* As 1894 is the centenary of Taparelli's birth, it may not be out of place here to call attention to his "Saggio teoretico di Dritto naturale."

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the introduction of Protestantism or the spread of rationalism, but in the revival of the faith and of the practices which in the past made religion so vigorous, which animated Gregory VII. and Pius V., Catherine of Sienna and Francis of Assisi, Guido d'Arezzo and Palestrina, Fra Angelico, Michael Angelo, and Raphael. Now, as in the days of Dante, the people of Italy must be reminded:

> Avete 'l vecchio e 'l nuovo Testamento,
> E 'l Pastor della chiesa, che vi guida:
> Questo vi basti al vostro salvamento.

II.—THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE QUESTION.

The politics of a people must depend in great measure upon their territorial conditions, upon the circumstances of their development, upon the historical facts which have played a decisive *rôle* in the nation's life. The outcome of these various influences may be peculiar rights or peculiar obligations of such essential importance that to set them aside in framing a constitution or in organizing a government would be simply absurd. The position of Egypt, for instance, especially since the opening of the Suez Canal, is *sui generis*. Every "foreign office" in Europe is bound to protest against the exclusive domination of the Nile-land by any power, and Egypt in consequence is not at liberty to dispose as she pleases of her destiny. Somewhat similar is the situation of Belgium, whose independence is mortgaged to neutrality, and whose profits in the bargain are gained at the expense of sovereign freedom. To come nearer home, the location of the American capital on the banks of the Potomac involves exceptional conditions for inhabitants of the District, so far as their political rights are concerned.

Now, a fact of deeper significance than any of these is the Catholic Church. For us her very existence is a something supernatural, the result of divine institution; for those who do not share our beliefs, it is at least the most striking of human realities. Civil governments may oppose the Church; they cannot ignore her. One nation may suspend its relations

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with another; it is not so easy to break with the Church. And the reason is that although Church and State work in different lines for different purposes, they are made up of the same elements. The same individuals whose temporal interests make them citizens are, in regard to their spiritual affairs, members of the Church. Hostility, therefore, to the Church implies something more than a conflict with abstract principles; it implies a molestation of the citizen in the exercise of his most sacred rights and the performance of his most sacred duties. It would be just as reasonable for two railways, owned by the same syndicate, to declare a rate-war. In both cases the result is bankruptcy, either pecuniary or moral; with this difference, however, that neither State nor Church can go into the hands of a receiver.* This is the lesson that Bismarck learned. Failing with all the weight of his power and strength of his "iron will" to alienate the sturdy Catholics of Germany from their loyalty to the Church, he was wise enough in the long run to change his tactics. In so doing, he was neither sceptical nor inconsistent, much less did he abandon his Lutheran principles: he simply accepted the situation. As a journalist or as the leader of a faction, he might have mistaken his own views for those of the entire nation, and identified Protestantism with Germany. As Chancellor, he was forced to recognize the fact that more than a third of the Empire is Catholic. He was not privileged, like Sig. Mariano, to write on one page "*we* Italians" and on the next to state that in Italy the multitude is at heart attached to the Church and to the Pope.

This popular feeling is no matter of surprise, for it grows out of the realization of another important fact, and that is the establishment in Italy of the Holy See, the heart of Catholicism. In whatever way we regard it,—as a disposition of Providence or as a shrewd contrivance of human policy,—certain it is that the centring of the Church in Rome has been not only an honor but a substantial benefit for Italy. Apart

* Em. de Laveleye, "Le Gouvernement dans la Démocratie," tom. i. liv. 3. (Paris, 1892.)

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from the pre-eminence which it has given her among Catholic nations, it has secured her a lease of life which was denied by the course of events to other civilizations. Through the papacy, Rome has survived the Cæsars, and, more fortunate than Memphis, Nineveh, and Athens, has remained in a higher sense the world's capital. By fostering the arts, and by sheltering science and philosophy, the Popes have made Italy a source of culture to all mankind. It is not only the "orphans of the heart" that must turn to the "city of the soul;" men of genius, lovers of research, and all who are sensitive to the subtlest refining influences, must pay her their tribute. The least that Italy could do would be to show her sense of gratitude, or rather of justice, by acknowledging the unique position of the papacy, and by so directing her policy and laws as to leave the Pontiff untrammelled in his sovereign action. Such a liberal course seems, moreover, to be the direct conclusion from Sig. Mariano's admission that "it would certainly be a great mistake to believe that the papacy could be actually destroyed by violence, or that it is destined to disappear from the face of the earth." "Why not confess it? The papacy is truly the most substantial and imposing power in the new Italy, and the Pope is the most important man among us." No doubt; but the pity is that he has maintained his importance in spite of the "new Italy," and not, as should have been the case, with her wise co-operation.

Unfortunately, the Savoyard rulers shut their eyes to a consequence that flows of necessity from the two facts already mentioned. The Pope, as head of the Catholic Church, must be independent of all human authority. Catholics consider that his liberty is implied in the very institution of the papacy, and every unprejudiced mind must grant that it is in accordance with the principles of international law. A European sovereign in passing beyond his territorial limits, be his purpose what it may, does not become the subject of foreign authority, because, insomuch as he personifies an outside power, his freedom is inviolable, and could be hampered only at the risk of innumerable complications. But if such be the constant usage in favor of personages who represent, after all,

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nothing more than their own distinct nations, equity demands similar independence for the head of the universal Church.* As the interests which are concerned in his action have, in the highest sense of the term, an international character, so must every restraint to which he is subjected encroach upon international right.

Now, some sort of restraint is inevitable so long as the territory in which the Holy See is located belongs to any other power. It is not only that such control renders the Pope's position extremely difficult: there are other effects far more disastrous. The open hostilities of opposing governments, and the jealousy with which they resent anything like foreign interference, make it impossible for the Pontiff as an Italian subject to exercise in a normal manner his supreme jurisdiction over the whole Church. Here then is the dilemma that confronts him: if his relations with his ruler are strained, his action in Italy is sure to be cramped; if those relations are friendly, outside nations will oppose him on the pretext that his action is biassed, or will seek to make him their tool with Italy as a go-between. Further complications, arising from certain alliances, need not be mentioned here: they limit the Pope's efforts to a protest against flagrant wrongs, instead of allowing him to accomplish any great amount of positive good.

Only a complete indifference to history and to the lessons taught by wiser statesmen can account for the actual treatment of the Holy See. Metternich's conversation with Napoleon displays a breadth and a penetration that are rarely found in the advice given in our day to sovereigns.

"There is no need," he said, "of insisting upon theological reasons, which are beyond the comprehension of politics. It is sufficient to argue in this form: You cannot deny that the head of the Church is a great and powerful personage. As such he must reside somewhere—either on his own or on alien territory. If on alien territory, then he is in somebody's power. But how could I, whose subjects are Catholic and owe allegiance to the Pope, consent that he should have a master, without exposing myself to the most serious difficulties? By the

* Bluntschli, "Le Droit international codifié," liv. iii. (Tr. par Lardy, 4e éd. 1886.)

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very fact of having the Pope under his sway, such a potentate would rule in my dominions, and often be more of a ruler than myself. . . . It is not as a Catholic but as an Austrian minister that I desire *le Pape chez le Pape, et non chez un autre.*" *

Napoleon felt the force of the argument, for, as Thiers informs us, he reproduced it afterwards in language no less emphatic:

"It is well for us all that the Pope resides neither in our midst nor with any of our rivals, but in ancient Rome, far from the influence of German Emperors and of French and Spanish kings, holding an even balance among Catholic sovereigns. . . . This is the work of the ages, and well have they done it; it is at once the wisest of arrangements and the best that could possibly be devised for the government of souls."

If Napoleon himself in the height of his power had attempted to undo the "work of the ages," he recognized in the calmer days of St. Helena that his effort had been not only vain but also unjust.†

Slow in its formation, consolidated by the trend of events, supported by the spirit of justice and generosity, employed for centuries to the advantage of Italy and of the Christian world, the temporal power of the Pope could be suspended by nothing short of violence, the outcome of passions which paid as little heed to self-interest as to historical rights. Conversely, his reinstatement, while satisfying a well-founded claim and bettering the condition of the Church, would be highly profitable to Italy. Without the least prejudice to the real unity of the nation, without any diminution of national power or hinderance to lawful aspirations, it would bring about domestic peace and improve foreign relations. In her present volcanic condition, Italy must feel the necessity of internal harmony, and realize that it is a surer guarantee of her stability than an alliance which is both precarious and costly. She ought to know at least that there are elements in her "unity" more dangerous and less patient than the Pope.

Of one thing, however, she may be certain: the papacy

* Blanc Saint-Bonnet, "De l'Infaillibilité."

† Thiers, "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire."

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will never become her instrument. "How convenient and pleasant it would be to have the papacy on our side, inclined to promote our interests and enterprises!" Assuredly; but when Sig. Mariano, to give these generalities a definite meaning, talks of "yoking the papacy to our chariot and profiting by its power," he is perfectly justified in fearing "that the inherent and unchangeable nature of affairs will prevent all likelihood of seeing this vague fancy realized." He does not seem to perceive that other fancies have failed of their realization, because contrary to the "inherent and unchangeable" dictates of reason.

III.—THE ACTION OF THE POPE.

No great effort of mind is required for a synthetic view of the policy followed by Leo XIII. It was outlined in his first encyclical, and has been pursued step by step during the sixteen years of his pontificate. Though developed under trying circumstances, it by no means shows the egotistic concentration ascribed to it by Sig. Mariano, but is worthy of the Sovereign Pontiff in its bearings upon the Church, upon other religious bodies, upon society, and in its relations both to foreign powers and to Italy.

1. The action of the Pope in regard to the Church has resulted, first of all, in a more thorough organization and in a considerable extension of the hierarchy. Since the beginning of Leo's reign, there have been established one patriarchate, twenty-seven archiepiscopal sees, seventy-seven bishoprics, forty-seven apostolic vicariates, and eighteen apostolic prefectures. Does this look like "weakness, stagnation, and degeneration"?

Again, no effort has been spared to maintain ecclesiastical discipline, to preserve order in all ranks of the clergy, and especially to uphold episcopal authority. The laity also have experienced the wholesome influence of Leo's zeal for peace, exemplified in his suppression of the quarrels between the so-called "ultramontanes" and the "liberal" Catholics of Belgium, France, and Spain. Do such measures prove that

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papal supremacy is not fitted "to inspire the thoughts and desires" of men "with the spirit of the Gospels"?

It is precisely in furtherance of this spirit that the Pope has given a fresh impulse to two practices which originated in the golden age of the Church, and which, if properly understood, are admirably adapted to modern religious needs. Sig. Mariano ought to know that the rosary at which he sneers is simply the life of Christ in miniature, and that the "third order" of St. Francis is a practical embodiment of the principles on which Christian fraternity is based. If such matters of devotion are beyond his spiritual sense, his misinterpretation may be understood and perhaps excused; but I see no explanation for his criticism of other pontifical measures which he, as a scholar, should be the first to commend.

Leo XIII. in fact has striven with a tireless energy for the advance of knowledge, especially for the promotion of philosophical, historical, and scriptural studies. His encyclical on the last-named subject, having appeared after Sig. Mariano's article was written, may properly be passed over in the present discussion; but the other encyclicals must be briefly touched on, if only with a view to correcting erroneous impressions.

According to Sig. Mariano, the Pope's attempt at a restoration of Thomistic philosophy is doomed to failure, because the system itself is not adapted to modern methods of criticism, because "in it philosophy counts for nothing and revelation is everything"—revelation coated over with the subtleties and "narrow tendencies of the Dark Ages." This sort of appreciation is not new: it is the one most commonly formed by people who infer the contents of a book from its antique vellum binding, and conclude that the ponderous volumes of Scholasticism must teem from cover to cover with "forgotten lore." The truth is that the philosophy of Aquinas is essentially the philosophy of Aristotle. And of all philosophic systems the Aristotelian, on account of its positive character and its comprehensiveness, is the one best suited to our actual needs. Its author was not merely a metaphysician; he was a keen observer, a student of nature, of politics, and of sociology. His teachings certainly give no support to extreme

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materialism or extreme idealism; but they are masterpieces of searching analysis and all-embracing synthesis, the very processes that are requisite for scientific philosophy. St. Thomas and his school applied these rational principles and methods to revealed truth, just as modern criticism makes use of philology and archæology in studying the Scriptures. But the Scholastics were not exclusively theologians: they found time for physics and natural history, for the moral and political sciences. Many of their hypotheses no doubt appear grotesque to the modern mind, but to ridicule them is more than unfair; it sets a bad example to posterity. Fully allowing for the selective process which, in the development of science, determines the survival or oblivion of particular views and theories, the Pope insisted, not upon a return to mediæval notions of empirical research, but upon a rehabilitation of those principles which are best fitted to guide human speculation when it passes, as it always must, the bounds of experience. What he desires is, on the one hand, thorough investigation of every problem, and on the other a more satisfactory co-ordination of results than is possible with the *Ding an sich* or the "Unknowable" for our limit. This double purpose he has manifested by action no less than by word. To cite one instance: the same Pope who extols Thomistic philosophy erects an observatory in the Vatican. Does any one suppose that he means to revive the Ptolemaic theory? On the contrary, it is simply his desire to co-operate, so far as lies in his power, with the scientific labors of his age, and, by taking the initiative in one branch, to spur on Catholics in every line of research. This is the spirit in which his counsels are followed out by men like Mercier at Louvain, like Domet de Vorges, Gardair, and Farges at Paris, and by others no less progressive at Freiburg and Washington. This is a side of the "Thomistic movement" which Sig. Mariano naturally overlooks; but we can afford to be patient with him, considering the attitude of capable judges like Barthélemy St.-Hilaire and Von Ihering.*

* *Revue Philosophique* (Ribot), Mars 1892, Avril 1893: Travaux récents sur le Neo-Thomisme et la Scolastique. Both for its own sake and by contrast, Von

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Another measure of Leo's that Sig. Mariano cannot crown with his approval is the impulse given to historical studies. With all his shrewdness, the Pope has failed to conceal from the Professor his real intention, which is to elaborate a predetermined theme, to botch up a history *ad usum pontificis.* Truly, it would take more than infallibility to please some folks. If the Pope locks up his archives, he is afraid of their contents or an enemy to knowledge; if he opens them, it is only to further his sinister designs. As a matter of fact, however, there is no need of worrying about his motives. What the world cares to know is, whether the Vatican archives have been opened to scholars, infidel, Protestant, and Catholic; whether Leo XIII. asks them to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth; whether in placing these documents at their disposal and appealing to their sincerity he has rendered a service to history; whether, in consequence, he deserves the gratitude which the colony of German scholars in Rome has more than once expressed; whether his action might not well be imitated by certain "liberal" governments, and in particular by that of Italy, which two or three years ago refused the Duke of Broglie access to the archives of Turin, for fear, no doubt, that some of the documents would not add to the reputation of the house of Savoy. One mistake the custodians of the Vatican should carefully avoid,—that of handing over their keys to certain "interpreters of facts."

2. The dealings of Leo XIII. with the non-Catholic world have had two objects: the conversion of unbelievers, and the return to unity of those Churches which schism had detached

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Ihering's appreciation of St. Thomas is interesting. "The reproach of ignorance [concerning Thomistic doctrine] I am unable to cast off, but it weighs far more heavily upon modern philosophers and Protestant theologians who have negligently failed to make use of this man's superb ideas. In astonishment I ask myself, how was it possible that such truths, after they had once been expressed, should have lapsed into complete oblivion at the hands of our Protestant science? What blunders might this have escaped, had it taken those teachings to heart! For my part, had I but known them, I would perhaps have left my whole book unwritten; the very principles with which I was concerned have been exposed by this powerful thinker with perfect clearness and pregnant expression." "Der Zweck im Recht," 2. Aufl., Vorw.

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from the main body. It would carry me too far to enumerate all the steps taken by the Pope in both directions: suffice it to say that they have been singularly successful, as is evidenced by the re-establishment of the hierarchy in countries where it had been suppressed, and by the extinction of the Armenian and Chaldean schisms. These attempts to realize Christ's ideal of "one fold and one shepherd" do not go far enough to merit the sanction of Sig. Mariano, or, rather, they run counter to his notions of Christian tolerance. He would have the Pope prove his love of peace by disbanding the fold altogether, letting each of the flock pick his own path to heaven, believing and practising what suits the individual fancy. Here again we must tolerate the Professor's idea of tolerance: what we object to is his misrepresentation of the Church in order to prove that she is intolerant. Let me state as briefly as possible the Catholic doctrine on this point. Christ founded a Church and intrusted to her the means of salvation: hence, objectively speaking and in general, the necessity of belonging to that Church. Those who recognize this fact yet refuse to enter the Church, evidently deprive themselves of the means of salvation, besides disobeying the ordinance of God. Those who remain outside the Church because they are convinced that their own religion is the true one, possess the means of salvation in an imperfect manner, or perhaps not at all. Should they be lost, it will not be because they were non-Catholics, but on account of the sins they have committed. Such is the meaning of the proposition *extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*. It is, however, to be noted that, while the Church maintains this doctrine as to the conditions fixed by Christ for salvation, she forbids us to pass sentence upon the lot of any one who is called from this life, declaring that the destiny of every man is a question for God's judgment alone. If her teachings seem intolerant to Sig. Mariano, I scarcely know what epithet he would apply to various expressions employed in this connection by the gentle Saviour. Is a physician intolerant because he tells his patient that a certain remedy is the only hope of recovery? Or the economist who assures his government that prosperity is impossible un-

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less such a law be enacted or such a treaty concluded? Think as we may of these opinions, we have no right to brand them as proofs of intolerance. Why then prefer such a charge against the Pope for insisting on the Catholic faith as the way to salvation? If he believes it to be the true religion, he cannot be expected to say that all religions, no matter how opposed to it, are equally true.

In alluding to civil and political tolerance, Sig. Mariano unwittingly treads on dangerous ground. Without following his lead by entering into questions of principles and history, and, above all, without wounding the feelings of any one, I may remind him that, on this score, Catholics have not received the most wholesome lessons from their fellow-Christians. Along with the opinion which he cites from St. Thomas he might have quoted passages from Luther and Calvin, who did *not* live in the "dark ages;" and, instead of trying to tell Protestants what the Pope thinks about them, he would have done well to inquire how long it is, for instance, since religious liberty was granted in Sweden and Denmark, or since England abolished her Test Act and permitted a priest to show himself without incurring a penalty. He must surely know that Prussia has not spoiled her Catholic subjects by excessive freedom, and, as he writes for Americans, might study with profit the vicissitudes of religious tolerance in the Colonies, and especially in Maryland. A shorter and less painful route to the proper conclusion he will find in the admission of fair-minded historians to the effect that the persecution account is at least well balanced by what Catholics have had to suffer.

3. The efforts of Leo XIII. for the bettering of social conditions began with his encyclical on Socialism, were continued in his letters on the abolition of slavery in Brazil and the suppression of the slave-trade in Africa, and culminate in the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. This document drew out a tribute of thanks from the world, especially from the governments and from the laboring classes. What is more remarkable, it compels the approval of Sig. Mariano, who thinks the measures proposed in it, "if not absolutely fit to solve the

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problem, at least fit to mitigate the most disastrous features, and also to remove the most harsh and crying injustice." This is encouraging; for once at least the Professor is *almost* satisfied. Unfortunately, his subsequent assertions prevent me from returning the compliment. Supposing, in the first place, that he has mastered the elements of political economy, how are we to explain his statement that the idea of *laissez faire et laissez passer* is "the denial of any ethical motive"? Admit or reject the doctrine implied in these words, *i.e.*, free industry and free trade; tell us, if you will, that it is, from the economical and social stand-point, full of danger; but do not try to persuade us that it is the denial of any ethical motive. The origin, the meaning, and the use of the formula protest against such an implication—a protest which the Adam Smith school has time and again repeated.

Less serious but more puerile is the slur cast upon the Pope's failure to "turn his eyes to what is in the immediate vicinity," and to practise what he preaches, by preventing luxury and profusion among the higher clergy while the lower descend to absolute want and starvation. This reproach I call puerile, because every one who is well informed knows that in our day luxury is unknown in the Church, and that, in particular, the expenses of the Vatican have been reduced to a minimum. As regards the lower clergy and their wretched condition, Sig. Mariano himself points out the real causes when he tells us on another page, "Now, after more than thirty years, we have with difficulty resolved to assign to parish priests who have an annual income of less than eight hundred lire an additional allowance which shall make it amount to that sum. What a mockery! Even to our domestic servants we must pay a larger sum." But the puerility borders on absurdity when, perhaps to escape the palpable contradiction, he calls this condition of things "the result of our complete subjection to the sway and terrorism of the papacy." In other words, the Pope has frightened the Italian government into starving the clergy! The scare must have been the most effectual of all papal schemes; for, besides the wholesale confiscations already noted, the government has

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taxed the paltry incomes of ecclesiastics, and has even levied upon the pittance they get for saying mass. But the Pope has taken good care not to second the reductive zeal of terrorized Italy. On the contrary, he has imitated, whenever he had a chance, the conduct of his predecessors Sixtus IV., Clement VII., and Pius V. in behalf of the peasantry,* the examples of Gregory XIII., Sixtus V., and Innocent XII. in relieving the poor of the larger cities,† and the humane disposition of Clement XI. concerning the treatment of criminals.‡ One has only to run through the list of educational, charitable, and correctional institutions organized by the Popes in order to be convinced that they found a practical as well as a theoretical solution of the social problems which their own times developed.§

4. The Sovereign Pontiff has not ceased to exert his influence upon secular governments. In his encyclicals on the origin of authority, the Christian constitution of states and human liberty, he has explained from the most elevated point of view the nature of civil and of spiritual power, their points of contact and their mutual limitations.

These principles have guided his political action, his negotiations with various governments for settling on a concordat, or at least on a *modus vivendi*, and his instructions to the Catholics of different countries regarding their line of policy. Even Sig. Mariano gives him credit for "wonderful objectivity and great adjustment of means to ends, entirely worthy of the secular tradition of the Roman Church." But the penetrating critic of the papacy sees at once "the inner and central motive" of Leo's policy, its "supreme directing thought"—"to reconquer Rome and regain temporal power."

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* Gli Statuti dell' Agricoltura, p. iii, nella quale si contiene Bolle, Decisioni e Voti. (Roma, 1718.)

† C. Piazza, "La Mendicità proveduta nella Città di Roma" (Roma, 1693); F. Lefebvre, "Les Etablissements charitables de Rome." (Tournai, 1860.)

‡ Lacointa, "De l'Influence du Christianisme sur le Droit pénal et la Régime pénitentiaire." (Paris, 1888.)

§ Morichini, "Degli Istituti di pubblica Carità ed Istruzione primaria e delle Prigioni in Roma." (Roma, 1842, 2 vols.)

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Granting that such is the case, what follows? The end, as I have shown, would be a just one, and the means are certainly of a nobler sort than those made use of to despoil the Pope. In reality Leo has been actuated by higher motives, by an earnest zeal for the salvation of souls and the welfare of the Church, and by a hearty desire to promote peace and prosperity in all lands. Had he been cringing, had he sacrificed a principle of religion or bartered the dignity of the Holy See for a little prestige, his action might bear a different interpretation. But, though conciliatory to the last degree, he has never forgotten what is due to the head of the Catholic Church, nor has he, as Sig. Mariano gratuitously asserts, striven to gain or regain the sympathies and good graces of any nation "at the cost of humiliation and dishonorable transactions." When he urged the Centre to accept the German military law, he very well knew that France would frown; and when he insisted that French Catholics should give in their adhesion to the republic, he was aware of Germany's displeasure. A less resolute man would have hesitated at the very thought of such misconstruction; but Leo saw in both cases the possibility of a higher good, and acted accordingly, leaving time and reflection to clear away the clouds raised by passion and national feeling.

The Pope, moreover, with centuries of experience to direct him, knows enough of diplomacy to set a proper value alike on the promises and on the threats of interested statesmen. If, with honor to his position, he can obtain from them concessions in favor of the Church, well and good; and if, as the beneficial effects of Catholicism become more evident, they revive the sense of spontaneous justice that originally formed the "patrimony of St. Peter" into an independent state, so much the better. But rulers and peoples may rest assured that no prospect of temporal power will make the papacy swerve in the least from the line of its duty and of its adherence to the highest interests of religion. Nor would the union of the temporal and the spiritual sovereignty in the Roman Pontiff imply what it does in Kaiser, Queen, and Czar: the spiritual would always control.

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Catholics, therefore, are accustomed to treat rather coldly such phrases as "papal intrigue," "Vatican schemes," and the like. Also they know what confidence to place in rumored connections of the Pope with the "triple alliance" or with the Franco-Russian league. Neither of these coalitions offers any great attraction to the Pope: the one aims to perpetuate the wrong which he suffers, the other to exalt a nation which, in the name of its pretended "orthodoxy," oppresses Catholicism at home and thwarts, so far as it may, the action of the Church abroad. The alliances which Leo XIII. would favor and support are of a far different character,—more pacific and more conducive to civilization. He would certainly, if occasion offered, take the initiative towards a European disarmament, and in doing so he would be faithful to the "secular traditions of the Roman Church." The spirit which brought about the Truce of God, which federated the nations in the Holy Roman Empire, which leagued them in the Crusades against encroaching barbarism, and which made the Court of Rome a court of arbitration for the strong and of appeal for the weak—this spirit lives on in the papacy, and would avail more to-day for the harmonious development of civilized Europe than the millions of soldiery armed to keep peace or the over-zeal of rulers whose protests against war are its real provocation.*

After what has been said, it is not hard to define the Pope's attitude towards Italy. Since 1870 he has consistently refused to sanction by his acceptance the unjust conditions proposed by the invaders, and has held firmly to the rights of the Holy See. Engaged in a struggle that is all the more painful because it places him in apparent opposition to his countrymen, Leo XIII. has carefully abstained from anything like reprisal. It is doubtless this power of patience that irritates certain minds. Such people would have been better satisfied had the Pope asked for foreign troops or stirred up the elements of rebellion so plentiful in the peninsula. If he has disappointed them, it is because he realizes that violence can never beget

* Ludwig Huberti, "Gottesfrieden und Landfrieden" (Ansbach, 1892); E. Dreyfus, "L'Arbitrage international" (Paris, 1892).

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stability, and desires that the restitution of his temporal domain should be dictated by a sense of equity, freely accepted by the people of Italy, and sanctioned by the other powers. He knows, too, that the present situation is the outcome of a movement which began with this century, and which if it had been properly directed would have issued in a real national unity, with less bloodshed and more respect for traditional rights. Not to deaden these aspirations, but to guide them more wisely, is the purpose which the Pope keeps in view, and of which he gives proof whenever and however his circumstances permit. It is no exaggeration to say that the period of passion is near its end, and that the Italians begin to open their eyes. The mirage of wealth, power, progress, and supremacy with which the revolution tricked the popular mind has vanished, and the reality of ruin is not made more welcome by contrast. What a difference between the triumphant tone of the "venti settembre" and the acknowledgment of Sig. Mariano that "no less than a miracle would be needed in order that Italy might finally issue victoriously from the struggle"! He forgets to blame the Pope for not working it.

IV.—THE ACTION OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

Sig. Mariano has persisted for years in charging the government of Italy with "negative indifferentism," with a political inertia in regard to the papacy, and an idle disposition to let events take their own course. Yet it seems to me that the various administrations which have attempted the control of affairs have done their best to solve the problem after the fashion which he suggests. A brief survey of the facts will show that this opinion is well founded, and that Sig. Mariano is either very hard to please or very unfair towards his rulers.

Could he, for instance, desire more energetic measures than those which have been adopted with a view to eliminating the religious elements in the conflict? Religion has been expelled from the schools and from all state institutions, in order to emancipate the rising generation from antiquated notions. Its outward manifestations have been so carefully

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suppressed that processions, solemn administration of the Viaticum, and devotional pilgrimages no longer offend the liberal eye. Its temples have been closed or turned into barracks, its clergy kept in check by drastic legislation, and its Orders fairly scattered to the winds. Look at the record for the first five years of the new *régime:* four thousand two hundred and twenty-four monasteries abolished outside the city of Rome, thirty thousand monks and twenty-four thousand nuns driven off, over twenty-six thousand ecclesiastics deprived of their revenues. Nor has the higher clergy been neglected. Bishops have learned their duty by imprisonment or expulsion from residence, and even their head, the Pope, has been scourged with calumnies, while the remains of his predecessor were insulted on their way to the tomb. And, finally, lest religion, profiting by this "inactivity," should continue to flourish, the Propaganda was fettered, Catholic congresses forbidden, the press put under restraint, and foreign colleges in Rome obliged to ask protection from their respective governments. With so many "honors and immunities, prerogatives and privileges," accorded to the papacy, little wonder that Sig. Mariano is unhappy.

But he shows "an entire misconception of the true religious and moral conditions in Italy," when he attempts to comment upon "a free church in a free state." Montalembert, who originated this formula, had different notions of liberty from those held by Cavour, who perverted it, and men of the Mariano school, who turn it into a mockery. According to their interpretation, freedom of the Church is not what the term implies in Belgium, England, and the United States, that is, the right of the Church to govern herself by her own laws and constitutions, without hinderance from the civil power. It is not liberty *within* the Church that they want—the rational freedom secured by the Canons to every Catholic, for the encouragement of every noble aspiration. The *libera Chiesa,* as they understand it, is a Church in which license is the only rule and caprice the sole authority—an organism in which every organ is a head unto itself. In other words, they conceive the "free church" pretty much as certain immigrants to

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America think of a "free country." From this point of view, the Pope naturally looms up as a tyrant and "the Church is enslaved." But what grieves Sig. Mariano is the supposed indifference of the *libero Stato* to such matters. He is not perhaps conscious of the fact that the government has anticipated his desires by fostering every attempt at apostasy, schism, emancipation of subordinates from their lawful obedience, and intrusion of laymen into the management of ecclesiastical affairs. Hence his strictures, though wide of the mark, need not be taken too seriously. But when he censures the Italian government for casting aside "all power of jurisdiction" and "every right of nomination," he is inexcusably severe. Although contrary to the principle of the separation of Church and State and to the letter of the constitution, the powers implied in the *exequatur* and the *placet* are tenaciously maintained by the crown and vigorously used as persuasive means on every possible occasion. At this very time a score of sees are vacant, because their bishops have not received the royal approbation.

One more instance will suffice to show how anxiety for progress may blind a critic to the significance of facts. Sig. Mariano, in his before-mentioned solicitude for the "minor" clergy, thinks they should be conciliated by higher wages, and, to prove that they *could* be conciliated, refers to a movement that was widely propagated in the first year of the "political constructive period." He means, of course, the agitation set on foot by Cavour and his tool, the ex-Jesuit Passaglia. A large number of priests, carried away with the "national idea," went so far as to sign Passaglia's address *pro causa Italica;* but the moment they learned the true inwardness of the "Causa," the hallucination ceased and their fervor took the form of retraction. The survivors of that movement are evidently beyond hope; far more "opposed to any thought of reform" (?) are, says Sig. Mariano, the younger clergy: yet these are the men who are to be won over by offers of material improvement! Here indeed the government has learned more by its experience than our professor: it knows well enough that, when the national coffers begin to

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overflow, any bribes it could spare for the clergy would be flung back with a decided *pecunia tua tecum sit.*

There is, however, a form of governmental "inactivity" which has escaped the invective of Sig. Mariano. Comparison aside, it is certain that crime has been on the increase in Italy for the last quarter of a century, and that in some respects it has given the country an unenviable notoriety.* How are we to explain this phase of national progress? A thorough-going deputy of the liberal party, Sig. Miceli, declared in parliament on May 24, 1874, "I do not think that I exaggerate in saying that it is we who are corrupting the public mind." Strong as his words may seem, they are simply the echo of Cavour's maxim that in the reconstruction of Italy morality had to be left aside. Add to these candid avowals the example given by Minghetti and other leaders in publicly violating their oaths, the respect for ownership inspired by seizure of private property and legislative suppression of corporations,† the social improvement effected by

* "Il reato in questi ultimi anni ebbe ed a un incremento progressivo; e mentre nel passato le statistiche criminali non registravano che varii casi digrassazioni a domicilio, ora invece non passa quasi giorno senza leggere che nel tal luogo una masnada di malefattori si porto al domicilio di pacifici cittadini."—*Diritto*, 1879.

† Terentio Mamiani, in his work "Delle Questioni sociali e particolarmente dei Proletarii e del Capitale," says, "Che diro della persona civile delle corporazioni fatta e disfatta a volontà della legge, e per la cui cessazione il fisco stende le mani sul loro patrimonio, paragonandole ai cittadini morti ab intestato. Laonde agli occhi ed alla mente del popolo minuto rappresentasi ogni di questo caso, che il patrimonio altresi de' privati e di antiche corporazioni va cambiando di possessore e di padrone a volontà della legge." The Marquis de Chambrun in his book "Droits et Libertés aux Etats-Unis" has an observation which applies as well to Italy in 1870 as to France in 1789: "Among the enactments of the French Constituent Assembly of 1789, those which are least comprehensible to American jurists are the decrees confiscating ecclesiastical property. I shall mention one here, a man of great prominence, whom I heard express such views quite freely. 'How,' said Jeremiah S. Black,—and no higher authority on these matters could be quoted,—'can a donation or a sale which was made in perpetuity to a religious institution, chartered as a civil corporation, be revoked by the State which was not even a party to the transaction—and that without the formal consent either of the contracting parties or of their successors?' Another jurist, whom I shall not name, as he is still living, told me that on a recent trip through France he chanced to ride in the same compart-

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stripping marriage of its Christian features, and it will at once be evident how far the "regeneration" has helped on the cause of morality.

This is the "new life of the nation, the level of its progressive thoughts and needs," to which the clergy are to be elevated. If Sig. Mariano's idea that faith flourishes by friction with unbelief could be applied to the conflict of morals as well, "papal Catholicism," in its Italian environment, would be burnished to dazzling sanctity.

In his address to the Protestant Consistory, April 20, 1852, Guizot said,—

"The grand question, the paramount issue that to-day absorbs the minds of men is the recognition or the denial of a supernatural order, certain and supreme, though impenetrable to human reason. Faith in the supernatural order must revive in the world and in the human soul, in the greatest minds as in the simplest, in the highest spheres as in the lowest. On this condition alone can religious belief exert its efficacious and regenerative influence."

Nearly half a century has passed since the distinguished statesman uttered this truth, and the world has advanced. The very idea of religion is now on trial. But religion in the concrete means Christianity, and the social form of Christianity is Catholicism, and the heart of Catholicism is the papacy. Hence every attack upon the Church and her head is likewise an attack upon Christianity and religion itself. Conversely, all who maintain the religious idea and its Christian form must side with Catholicism and the Pope.

Yet how can the papacy accomplish its mission unless, in its own possession, it stands apart from the trammel of secular power and aloof from the clashing of rival interests? Says Guizot elsewhere,—

"The Pope enjoyed in his sovereignty an effective guarantee of his independence and of his moral authority. Secure in its strip of territory, the papacy

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ment with several priests, entered into conversation with them, and questioned them regarding the effects of the confiscations of 1789. The priests, surprised at the freedom with which he expressed himself on the subject, asked him out of curiosity for his opinion. The American replied simply that it was robbery at the Church's expense. The curious part of the incident was that the American Protestant horrified the French ecclesiastics!"

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has proclaimed and upheld in Europe the essential difference between Church and State, the distinct character of the two powers, of their respective domains and of their reciprocal rights. *In this fact lie the safety and the honor of modern civilization.*" *

Catholicity, religion, civilization—all are involved in the problem which discussion narrows down to *Italy and the Papacy.* Whoever realizes its broader import and honestly seeks its solution must advocate the development of Catholic life and a proper respect for the rights of the Holy See. In defending these rights the Pope discharges a duty towards the Church and towards the civilized world.

FRANCIS ARCHBP. SATOLLI,
Apostolic Delegate.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

[NOTE.—Mgr. Satolli wishes to express his acknowledgments to Dr. Th. Bouquillon and Dr. E. Pace, of the Catholic University, through whose assistance he was able to contribute the above article.—MAN. ED.]

DISCUSSIONS.

REPLY TO SOME CRITICISMS.

MR. STOUT'S review of my "Manual of Ethics" has interested me very much; and some of the points that he has raised seem to me so important that I cannot refrain from making a brief reply † to them.

Two of the chief points appear to me to be very closely connected with one another,—viz., the criticism of my view of Hedonism and the criticism of my view of Punishment. In both cases it seems to me that Mr. Stout raises an imaginary difficulty by supposing it possible to separate feeling from the concrete content to which it belongs. In the case of Hedonism, indeed, he admits that the supposition which he makes

* Guizot, "L'Eglise et la Société chrétienne."

† This reply was unavoidably omitted in the January number, owing to want of space.—MAN. ED.

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is made *per impossibile.* I do not see what is gained by such a supposition. I have never denied that what has value for us has value for us as self-conscious beings, and consequently is accompanied by a sense of value. If in the end we were not aware that it is valuable,—*i.e.*, if in the end it were not pleasant to us,—it would not *be* valuable. This I entirely admit. But what I insist on is that what is valuable is the concrete content, and that it is erroneous to say that the only thing that has value for us is the consciousness that something has value.* Moreover, it must be remembered that it is only *in the end* that the sense of value necessarily comes,—*i.e.*, it is only when we have attained to a perfectly clear self-consciousness.

Similarly, with regard to Hegel's theory of Punishment, I quite admit that punishment would be silly and malevolent if it meant simply the adding of pain to evil; but what I maintain, and what I understand Hegel to maintain, is that evil is in its nature painful. It has negative value; and in the end the consciousness of this negative value must somewhere and somehow be produced. The object of punishment is to bring the consciousness of it directly home to the offender. Mr. Stout may reply that this object is the one that is emphasized by the deterrent and corrective theories. Of course it is. Hegel's view includes these. The difference is merely that according to these theories the connection between evil and punishment is accidental, whereas with Hegel it is essential. Hegel recognizes that punishment is implicit in evil, because evil is by its nature a negative value. Punishment simply makes this explicit. It does not, as Mr. Stout puts it, "add pain to evil:" it simply brings the painfulness of evil home to roost. If it did not do this, it could not in the end effectively either deter or correct. If a man does a piece of work that has bread in it, he has earned the bread; and if he receives it, both he and others are encouraged to do such work. If a man does a piece of work that has a horsewhipping in it, he has earned the horsewhipping; and if he receives it, both he and others

* Mr. Stout's image of the clock surely involves a gross misrepresentation of my position. The shadow on a sundial might have been a better image.

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are deterred. In both cases the good result depends on the recognition that a man has received what he earned, that the normal result of his action has been produced *within his own world.* The criminal ought to be made to feel that what has come upon him is just that with which his action was big. "The wheel has come full circle, I am here." Of course it should be remembered that this is merely a *Theory of Punishment,—i.e.,* a justification of the practice of inflicting pain upon a wrong-doer. It is not at all incompatible with the view that it would be better to reform than to punish—*i.e.,* that it would be better to raise a man into a higher world instead of merely completing the circle within his present world. Similarly, a Theory of Wages is not incompatible with the doctrine that a man ought to be rewarded in proportion to his wants rather than in proportion to his earnings. Though a man has earned punishment, there may be a sufficient reason for a reprieve; and the possibility of curing him may constitute such a reason. Hegel's theory of punishment is merely designed to show that there is a sense in which punishment is earned, not necessarily that in such cases it ought always to be inflicted.*

Mr. Stout's other points seem to me less important. I admit that in dealing with "universes of desire" a reference might with advantage have been made to Herbart, though I do not think that the idea is by any means peculiar to him, and though Herbart's view is connected with a psychological theory to which I do not wish to commit myself. I admit also that the provisional answer to the question, what is the nature of the self with which we are to be consistent? is "scarcely satisfactory." In the passage to which Mr. Stout refers I state that the answer is unsatisfactory, and go on to discover a better. I do not consider that a complete answer could have been given at that point. There must, however, be some want of

* There may even be cases in which, for the sake of social welfare, it may be necessary to inflict pain on those who have not earned punishment. But in such cases it seems best not to describe the pain as punishment; just as it is best not to describe the surplus profits of a manufacturer (however justly they may be due to him) as his wages.

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clearness in the passage; for I observe that Mr. Muirhead also, in his review of my book in *Mind*, misunderstands my meaning in the same way as Mr. Stout does. In his reference to my treatment of Dr. Sidgwick's view of "Pleasure and Desire," I do not feel sure whether Mr. Stout intends to raise an objection to my position. So far as I understand his remarks on this subject, I entirely agree with them. I never denied that there is such a thing as pleasure of pursuit, in the sense of pleasure of progressive attainment; or that in the case of such pleasures the desire remains at each stage partly unsatisfied; or even that in such cases the pleasure is dependent on the fact that the attainment is progressive; and these are all the statements that Mr. Stout appears to make at this point. What I affirm is merely that in all such cases the pleasure, so far as I can see, is dependent on the fact that there is an attainment, actual or prospective, and not on the fact that the desire is unsatisfied. To put it paradoxically, if there were an immediate attainment in such cases it would not be an attainment at all; because what is sought is not an immediate result, but a process. The only possible end is the completion of a series, and the series can be given only as a succession. No one desires a happy old age, for instance, except as the crown of a happy life. To become suddenly old would not be the fulfilment of such a desire, though it were accompanied by all sorts of honor and troops of friends. The object aimed at is, on the other hand, becoming progressively attained at every stage in a happy life, and the ultimate goal is simply the consummation of all that has gone before. As regards the freedom of the will, again, I am somewhat surprised that Priestley should be referred to as having understood the freedom which consists in self-determination. I should have thought that Priestley was one of the most remarkable instances of a man who entirely failed to see this, and who habitually thought of the will as being determined by external motives. This seems to come out clearly in the whole course of Priestley's arguments with Price. It is true that Price's own view of self-determination was not clear. He understood it in the purely indeterminist sense. But surely

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Priestley was equally unenlightened on the opposite side. Such a merely negative criticism as that quoted by Mr. Stout does not suffice to show any positive appreciation of the significance of self-determination.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

A PERSONAL EXPLANATION.

WHEN a book has been long out of print and is not to be reprinted, what is its author to do when parts of it are attacked? What is he to do specially when the attack is aimed at a point on which for many years he has come to think that he was partly mistaken? If he keeps silence, he may seem to shrink from acknowledging an error. But if he thrusts himself forward to admit that seventeen years ago he made a mistake, he may be charged with some degree of indecency.

A portion of the arguments which in my "Ethical Studies" I brought against Hedonism, I find has been attacked by Mr. Hodder in this JOURNAL, Vol. III. pp. 107–8. Mr. Hodder's writing is vigorous, and when I say that the substance of his article strikes me as much what in his day J. S. Mill might have put out, I shall not have strained my conscience and yet may hope to have gratified my critic. But I feel concerned in the matter only so far as it compels me unwillingly to obtrude a kind of personal explanation.

In my "Ethical Studies," 1876, and in a pamphlet which followed in 1877, I urged that the Hedonistic End contradicts itself in a certain way. If you take this End, I argued, as a collection or aggregate, and still further if you take it as an infinite sum, you find yourself landed in inconsistencies. There were other additions and refinements, into which I need hardly now enter. But I used the above argument, and I admit that it was largely mistaken, and I would ask permission to say why and how I think it went wrong.

I first made an assumption. I assumed that with regard to its End Hedonism is bound to have an idea which is logically consistent. As to the truth of this assumption I

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will say something presently, but at least the contention I based on it seems certainly wrong. For Hedonism is not forced to place its End in an infinite series or collection, nor is it compelled to define its End, when that is taken in general, as a collection at all. And so far as I asserted this, I was certainly in error. Whether my argument was good or bad if taken as an *argumentum ad hominem* is, of course, another question. It is a question on which, having let the subject drop, I do not now feel qualified to judge. And at this date I cannot be asked to renew the studies which would be required for a decision. As to the main point, the one point which I presume has any interest, I have no doubt. The argument did not hold against Hedonism considered as a principle.

And whether a moral philosopher is bound to formulate his first principle consistently seems doubtful at best. We must in each case perhaps judge by the attitude and pretensions of the writer. If he claims to have some grasp of first principles, we may ask him, I suppose, for logical consistency. I do not mean that the idea of good can fail ultimately to contradict itself. But in my judgment it must contradict itself only in such a way as to pass into something fuller, something in which its elements cease to conflict and its end is realized. It must not be left stranded and stuck in a fixed discrepancy. And so far, I believe, I was right. But to demand clear principles from all who wish to write about ethics was probably mistaken.

But what underlay this misconceived objection was, I think, no mistake, and, in justice to myself, I would ask permission to point it out. I took the view that the good must be a whole and a system, or (if you prefer the phrase) must be a concrete and consistent individual. Hedonism did not and does not seem to me to meet this demand. For the quality of pleasure, taken by itself, is obviously not a system. And if, on the other hand, we try to find our whole in a mere collection of so-called pleasures, we fall at once into difficulties from which there is no exit. I do not, of course, forget that Hedonism demands the systematization of life, but the ob-

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jection here is that the system is external to the End. For if it is included, then at once Hedonism is in principle given up. To identify the pleasant and the good is, in my judgment, not Hedonism, nor is it Hedonism to identify the more pleasant and the better. You are not properly a Hedonist until you deny the worth of everything but pleasure. I may add that, though my language was in many respects one-sided and much overstrained, I was explicit on the point that I on my side did not exclude pleasure from the good.

I may be allowed perhaps to say further that it was Individualism, much rather than Hedonism, on which really I was making war. I would not say now that *every* consistent Hedonist *must* identify virtue with self-seeking. But Hedonism, whatever conclusion it may adopt on this point, will on this point, I think, infallibly break down. It will, when pressed, become plainly bankrupt, or end in something inconsistent or arbitrary. A rational way of transcending the abstraction of the private self must (it seems to me) transcend also the abstraction of mere pleasure. But this is matter of controversy on which it is not my object to dwell; and between some later Hedonism and myself there is no great cause for controversy. If I have moved a little, on the other side there has been movement also. Indeed, I sometimes fancy that I might end on terms of friendship with Hedonism. For if I may reject the weak psychology and crude metaphysics of, say, J. S. Mill, if I may turn my back on every shallow attempt to compromise between extremes or to bring together uncriticised discrepancies mechanically and from the outside, and if I may take without prejudice the Hedonist's conclusion to be general pleasure, why should I seek to deny that such a statement may after all convey, erroneously and one-sidedly, the truth?

F. H. Bradley.

Merton College, Oxford.

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THE STAND-POINT OF AN ETHICAL SOCIETY.

THE Union of Societies for Ethical Culture, organized in 1887 by the Ethical Societies of New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and St. Louis, held a Convention in Chicago, last September, at which there were some interesting papers and discussions. In the preceding number of this JOURNAL we printed one of the papers read before the Convention, "Moral Science and the Moral Life," by Mr. J. S. Mackenzie, and in this number we print Mr. Frederic Harrison's paper on "The Relation of Ethical Culture to Religion and Philosophy." These papers raise a question as to the stand-point of an Ethical Society. No one is better qualified to speak on this subject than Professor Felix Adler, who organized in 1876, in New York City, the first Society for Ethical Culture, and whose paper in this number is therefore of special interest.

À propos of these papers, it may be well to state the aim of the Ethical Societies as expressed in the Constitution of "The American Ethical Union" (the new name adopted at the Chicago Convention). It is as follows:

"The general aim of the Ethical Movement, as represented by this Union, is to elevate the moral life of its members and of the community, and it cordially welcomes to its fellowship all persons who sympathize with this aim, whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions."

In further elucidation of the stand-point and purpose of an Ethical Society, we give some extracts from a recent address by William M. Salter, in welcoming new members to the Philadelphia Society. We quote from the printed address:

"We are not a body ruled by a creed or a dogma, but we are animated by a certain spirit. We are not sure about many things and we may differ about many things; but there is one thing we are sure about, and that is, that whether there be a God or Heaven or no, there is a right and a wrong, and that good is better than evil and virtue better than vice. We cleave to this truth; it is the rock on which we stand. With it we feel that we have something firm under our feet, whatever else changes. We do not, indeed, ask a profession of this from those who join us, and we will welcome any one who wishes to have the belief and is not in actual possession of it; none the less is this the fundamental thing we stand for as a Society—it makes the atmosphere, subtler than any definition,

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in which we live. We are not sceptics, we know something; we are not astray in the world, we are in some deep sense at home; we are not on by-paths, we are on the highway of humanity and in league with what is good and holy and strong in the past, and with what will be the same in the future. . . ."

"But it is not with knowledge that we stop in our Society—indeed, our knowledge is only of how we ought to live, of what we ought to do and strive for, and so this knowledge is nothing and is of no avail unless it is turned into aspiration and into life. We want to live worthily of our knowledge, to have it transform us and make us better men and women. An Ethical Society and an aimless life are not compatible. A member may, of course, lead an aimless life, but he is so far untrue to his membership. In the Society we wish to hold our members to better things; to win them in this direction by argument, by appeal, by mild persuasion. We would have them feel that membership is a reason for striving for better things—as a man's recollection of his mother may silently draw him to gentleness and purity and truth."

"For our fellowship is not a fellowship in which good things and bad things mingle on an equality; as in the private soul the effort must ever be to enthrone the good and to master the evil, to rise to the nobler heights of our being and forget the common, the base, and the mean, so in the Society ill-will and hatred should vanish before love, and harshness and evil-speaking should be put away, and injustice and pride and selfishness should be ashamed to defend themselves. . . . "

"I have said that we have found truth and are trying, or should be trying, to live it. But it must equally be said that we should be ready for new truth. . . . We should see all, discover all, and fear nothing. We should learn what we can to-day, and to-morrow should learn what we can to-morrow. We should open our minds, be receptive, and live a free progressive life of the intellect as to all unsolved problems. As Tennyson says:

> 'Meet is it changes should control
> Our being, lest we rust in ease.
> We all are changed by still degrees,
> All but the basis of the soul.'

"The basis of the soul with its unconquerable, unforgettable sense of the primal laws of right is ever the same; but the area of being and the area of duty are ever widening before its eyes. Let us be ready for new duty as for new truth; let us nurse our hearts so that we may be prepared to meet it. Let us resolve that nothing, not our interests or our prejudices or our possessions or our dearest friends, shall keep us from heeding that clear call whenever it shall come to us. So may an Ethical Society be an enlarging, an ennobling, and a hallowing influence in our lives."

Mr. Salter has devoted twelve years to the Ethical Movement, and hence his conception of what membership in an Ethical Society means is of interest.

S. BURNS WESTON.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE CIVILIZATION OF CHRISTENDOM, and Other Studies. By Bernard Bosanquet, M.A. (Oxon.), Hon. LL.D. (Glasgow), formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893.

This book will probably be read by nearly every student of our JOURNAL, and it is consequently needless to give a detailed account of its contents. It is equally unnecessary to call attention to its "beauties," of which a copious anthology could easily be culled. Every reader will readily discover them for himself,—if, indeed, he does not at last agree with the present reviewer in thinking that the beauty of Mr. Bosanquet's book lies at once in the whole and in every part. The book is, in truth, one of those which a reviewer feels himself scarcely worthy even to praise. All that I can hope to do is to make a few remarks that may help the judicious reader to discriminate between what is admirable and what is only good. In trying to do this, I shall indicate (1) what is the general nature of the volume before us, (2) what are the most important ideas underlying its contents, (3) some special points that seem particularly interesting in it, (4) some points in which it appears to be defective, and (5) the general character of the series to which it belongs.

(1) The book is a collection of addresses delivered before various societies, ethical and other. It is far, however, from being a mere collection of detached essays. One or two of them, indeed (especially the first, which seems to me on the whole the least important), might have been omitted without serious injury. But in reality they form a connected whole, and ought to be carefully read in connection with one another. They are the *disjecta membra* (and not very *disjecta*) of a treatise on Applied Ethics. The qualifications for such a task are two,—speculative grasp and practical wisdom; and in both of these the writer seems to me to be singularly well equipped. From the direction in which his chief work has hitherto lain, one would naturally expect him to be more fully equipped in the former than in the latter; and probably this may be the case. But one of the most striking features of the present volume is the finely artistic way in which the speculative principles

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are concealed. As Mr. Bosanquet himself says (p. 198), "if you use ideas about morality, you need not show them." Indeed, he seems to have made his philosophic ideas so thoroughly his own that he is scarcely conscious of applying them. Remarks showing the deepest insight fall from him as if he could not help it. I cannot remember any other philosophical writer who appears to me so well to illustrate the fine saying of Carlyle that "the Unconscious is alone complete." He loosens, one would say, the knottiest points of controversy, "familiar as his garter." Perhaps his well-known artistic sympathies may have helped him to this lightness of touch, which is the perfection of style. This very perfection, however, has the accompanying danger that the reader may forget, as the writer himself almost seems to do, that he is dealing with philosophical ideas at all. What flows so easily looks as if it scarcely required any thought to plumb; and the hasty reader may imagine that he has fathomed its depths when he has only been gathering pebbles by the shore. The more reflective reader, on the other hand, may find himself not unfrequently puzzled by the emergence of ideas that appear as if they had dropped from heaven. It is all the more necessary to make some effort to bring out the leading conceptions that underlie the work that has here been done.

(2) The leading idea, I should say, is one that is now not unfamiliar in English Ethics,—the idea of self-realization as the moral ideal. Of this idea Mr. Bosanquet has a firm grasp, though he seldom refers to it in so many words. Like Aristotle or like Goethe, he conceives the end of life as being life itself. It is perhaps this fact, more than any other, that keeps him so close to the concrete. "If, sometimes," he says (p. 269), "we were to think less of a 'high ideal,' and more, as Plato has warned us with a foresight unappreciated by his interpreters, of an intelligent, that is a discriminating and coherent, view of life,—the view of one who is awake and not lost in dreams,—we should be gainers morally no less than intellectually." This conception gives a certain homeliness, in spite of its profundity, to Mr. Bosanquet's philosophy. His ideal is not something fantastic and far away, but the perfection of our concrete personality with its many-sided interests. Everything human thus becomes his concern. He finds himself at home among practical problems, and solves them with a wisdom that would scarcely be possible to a dreamer about Absolute Ethics or a Noumenal Will. His ideal, no doubt, in its full accomplishment, is as distant as that of any one else; but he sees it realizing itself at every step. This

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conception is, of course, common to Mr. Bosanquet with many other writers; but very few have grasped it so firmly or applied it so fruitfully.

Another important idea, closely connected with this one, is that of the universal as being realized in the individual. "The open secret of modern life," he says in one place (p. 22), "is that we find the universal not in the general, but in the individual." And again (p. 64), "It is a mistake to suppose that what is definite is therefore finite, or that what is individual is therefore narrow. Nothing can be noble or infinite which is not definite; nothing can be broad or universal which is not deeply and profoundly individual." Hence he ridicules any flight into the blue, like that involved in the worship of the Unknowable. "Alas! how is it with you," he exclaims to the Agnostic (p. 136),

> "That you do bend your eye on vacancy,
> And with the incorporal air do hold discourse?"

What is truly admirable is what we definitely know, not what is hid from us. So also the true infinity is not the "bad infinite" of mathematical progression, but the complete comprehension of the concrete individual. As Goethe put it,—

> "Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten,
> Geh' nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten."

This idea also, like the last, helps to keep Mr. Bosanquet to the concrete. In this, also, he is no doubt in good company. But few of our English thinkers at least who have apprehended the principle have become so Greek, so like Goethe, as Mr. Bosanquet has succeeded in becoming.

A third idea, again closely connected with these, is that of the spirituality, the intelligibility, of the world. "The all-important truth," he says (p. 93), "is that we are only moral and human by finding a place in a system which is reasonable, which includes external nature, and which we did not make, and by transforming our separate animal impulses and desires in submission to a cause and purpose which we did not originate, and yet in which we can find satisfaction." Hence he finds himself at home in the world, and strong in the conviction of a rational purpose in things. This enables him to maintain a cheery optimism throughout. "Strength is brave and appreciative" (p. 74); and for him, as for Browning, heaven is "not grim, but fair of hue." "We are not strangers here on

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earth. . . . I do not believe that ethical faith—faith in the reality of the good—is the spirit of a forlorn hope; though, if it were so, it would still be the only spirit possible for us." (p. 115.) "Always distrust people who tell you that the great men have despised this life and this world, and have said that there was no truth or reality to be found in them." (p. 139.) In this world Mr. Bosanquet can find goodness, reason, beauty. Here, again, he is not singular; but of all who hold this position few seem to me so sane, so faithful, so objective.

Other ideas might be singled out as important; but these are perhaps enough to give the key of the position. They are Hegel's ideas, but Mr. Bosanquet has made them his own. He does not merely *know* them; he *has* them.

(3) It would be tempting now to digress upon a variety of the interesting topics with which Mr. Bosanquet deals. But we must refrain. I may say, however, that some of the most interesting points in the book, in my judgment, are several subtle distinctions which his grasp of philosophical principles enables him to draw. Of these, the distinction (pp. 179, 180) between "moral ideas" and "ideas about morality," which occurs in a paper reprinted from this JOURNAL,* appears to me to be particularly valuable, though I think it is partly open to the objections that were raised by Professor Dewey† immediately after its first publication. Another important distinction (pp. 306–7) is that between Economic and Moral Socialism (accompanied by one between Economic and Moral Individualism). It is possible, indeed, that the opposition between these has been pressed too far. This is one of the few points on which, for the sake of emphasis, Mr. Bosanquet has broken through the fine artistic balance and restraint by which he is generally characterized. But, after all, these essays are "Gelegenheits-schriften;" and perhaps the occasion on which this particular lecture was delivered is a sufficient excuse for a somewhat one-sided emphasis. Other interesting distinctions are those between luxury and refinement (pp. 268–303) and between sentiment and sentimentality (pp. 212–236). I am anxious, also, to call attention to the connection which is traced between Christianity and Paganism (pp. 27–62), to the insistence on the fact that there is a right and a wrong in feeling (pp. 208–9), and to the discussion of the connection between work and enjoyment

* Vol. I., No. 1, pp. 79–97.

† Vol. I., No. 2, especially pp. 188, 191, 193.

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(pp. 243–250). As against some modern sentimentalism, it is refreshing to learn (p. 244) that "while work should be as interesting as possible, and may be very enjoyable indeed, it will always, if only by our own undertaking, be compulsory as well as free, and may be of a kind that cannot by itself satisfy a human intelligence." I am glad, also, that Mr. Bosanquet has been bold enough to maintain* (what only one who so fully appreciates Ruskin and Morris as he does could safely venture to do) that the loss of beauty in our modern life and surroundings is not altogether without compensation (pp. 352–4). Equally wholesome is the reply to Mrs. Browning (p. 157), "Is it possible to work our iron nobly and not, in doing so, to work our souls nobly too?" though the implied answer might need some qualification.

(4) The criticisms that I have to make are few, and not, I think, fundamental. Such defects as Mr. Bosanquet's work has are emphatically the defects of its qualities. The weightiest charge that I should wish to make against him is that philosophy has become so much a part of his being that he seems almost to forget its value. "The ethical teacher," he thinks (p. 202), need not "himself have reflective ideas about morality." Perhaps not; but I confess I cannot remember to have ever learned much from an ethical teacher who had not.† This, however, is not the worst. "'I wish,' a friend may say, 'to provide allotments, at my private expense, for the labourers of my native country: is not this well?' 'How good of you; how altruistic,' the ethical scientist might reply, if he is fool enough to judge from the case as laid before him" (p. 176). But would he be fool enough? Is it possible that Mr. Bosanquet can have forgotten the delightful essay of Hegel, "Wer denkt abstrakt"? It is not the philosopher, or "ethical scientist," who is apt to form judgments on such abstract considerations as are here supposed. I cannot but think that here, in Mr.

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* *Cf.* his "History of Æsthetics," pp. 467–9. Here also, however, Mr. Bosanquet is under the shield of Hegel.

† I dare say this difference of opinion is largely verbal. I have a suspicion that when Mr. Bosanquet speaks of "ideas about morality" he sometimes means merely *phrases* about morality. It is a misfortune in philosophy that the maker of formulas is apt to be confounded with the maker of thoughts. In any other subject (say, engineering) it would be at once recognized that the best theorist is the one who has the firmest grasp of the concrete subject-matter. So it should be in ethics. The man who has only "ideas about morality" (in the sense of *phrases* and *formulas*) is not an "ethical scientist," but a pedant.

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Bosanquet's own language (p. 224), "the votary of science is accused of the very fault against which he struggles." It is the business of the moral philosopher to correct such judgments as these, and to furnish us with a wider standard of appreciation; and few have done this more successfully than Mr. Bosanquet himself. He forgets, I think, to what a large extent it is his philosophy that enables him to do it.

The only other defect that I wish to mention is so nearly a virtue that I feel some hesitation in noticing it at all. It may be merely what Charles Lamb calls an "imperfect sympathy" on my part. I may perhaps express what I mean by saying that Mr. Bosanquet's attitude strikes me as being rather too much that of a Greek, too little that of a Hebrew. In England this is certainly an error on the right side; but still I think it is an error. Mr. Bosanquet, it seems to me, appreciates art better than religion, order better than reform, peace better than struggle. I venture to connect this with the doctrine to which I have already referred, that the universal is to be found in the individual. This is essentially the doctrine of the artist; and, true though it is, it is not quite the whole truth. The universal does appear in the individual, the infinite in the finite; but not completely in any one individual, in any one finite. To put it in theological language, "He who loves not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" He who does not discover the universal in the individual will not discover it by looking out into a vague beyond. But, on the other hand, he who discovers the universal in the individual should discover at the same time that the universal is not fully expressed in the individual. Hence the dialectic of history, the need of progress, the need of religion. This, I think, Mr. Bosanquet to some extent overlooks. But, of course, his book is only a collection of short studies; and it may be merely an accident that this side of things is less fully emphasized in it than the other.

(5) In conclusion, I may congratulate the editor of the "Ethical Library" (Mr. J. H. Muirhead) on the auspicious opening of this series. If it proceeds as it has begun, it ought to have the greatest value in popularizing philosophical ideas and applying them to practical problems,—in carrying on, in fact, what Mr. Bosanquet describes (p. 48) as the new Scholasticism of our time. Some may think that there is a certain danger that the multiplication of such series, which is so characteristic a feature of the present, may lead us, as Mr. Bosanquet suggests (p. 58), to another Dark

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Age—an age when science and art and religion will cease to exist for their own sake, and will appear only in popular manuals, in ethical and religious congresses, and in tawdry exhibitions. I do not much fear this. But to prevent it, I would suggest that in such series as this it is desirable to make the connection pretty clear between the practical application of ideas and the ideas themselves, which can be mastered only by hard study. Reference to the great philosophic masterpieces should be kept well forward. It should be clearly understood that they are not to be in any way superseded. Otherwise, there might, I confess, be a danger that philosophy may be killed by its expositors, as Universities may be killed by their "Extension." But I do not intend this as an oblique criticism on Mr. Bosanquet. He, as he says of the "great philosophers" (p. 181), "knows his way in both worlds safe enough." Whether he deals with philosophy or with practical problems, whatever he touches he adorns. But I tremble to think what might happen if some one else should seek to wield his wand without his magic. The ordinary clumsy person must think what he is doing; he cannot afford to be unconscious of his principles. But perhaps I am falling into a Cassandra vein. I really only want to express the hope that the other volumes of this series may be as good as the first. It is, in one of Mr. Bosanquet's own phrases, "a beautiful book;" and I trust that all the readers of this JOURNAL will study it carefully.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE ÆSTHETIC ELEMENT IN MORALITY, AND ITS PLACE IN A UTILITARIAN THEORY OF MORALS. By Frank Chapman Sharp, Ph.D. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. 123.

Dr. Sharp's skilfully but still somewhat obscurely written dissertation deals with a topic often neglected in modern, but above all neglected in the most recent ethics, so far as concerns any express recognition of its importance. It is true that one of Dr. Sharp's principal theses is that this neglect is in large part only apparent. In modern ethics, "Shaftesbury, Schiller, and Herbart will," says Dr. Sharp, "at once occur to every reader in this connection, but they are by no means the only representatives of this type of thought, for the phenomena which they perceived and were therefore able to point out and describe have served as the real foundation of a very large number of attempts to vindicate the

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worth of virtue, although only too often their originators have been but half conscious of this fact."

To develop this thesis, Dr. Sharp begins by insisting upon the fundamental distinction in ethics between those who, with the Utilitarians, lay stress upon the work effectively done, or likely to be done, by a given type of character, as the test of the excellence of this character, and those who, with Kant and with all other "Intuitionalists" (for Dr. Sharp throughout chooses to use this unhappy word as a collective name for all who are not Utilitarians), "attribute an *intrinsic* worth to character apart from and independently of its value, either as a sign or a source of something else." The distinction as thus insisted upon is a poor one, since it omits all those ethical writers who, although by no means Utilitarians, do unquestionably decline to recognize any abstractly "intrinsic worth" in a character apart from its power "to do work." And Dr. Sharp appears, throughout his essay, to be almost wholly unaware of the very existence of this large, varied, and surely not unrepresentative group of moralists. However, the distinction once made, Dr. Sharp continues: "The Utilitarian values character merely as a source of actions useful to society; the Intuitionalist, on the other hand, values it for itself—that is to say, for its beauty . . . When intrinsic worth is attributed to character, the quality affirmed of it is no other than beauty" (page 5). In consequence, Dr. Sharp proposes, it would seem, to class all his Intuitionalists as consciously, or unconsciously, defenders of an æsthetic ethics,—*i.e.*, as reducers of the good to the beautiful.

This thesis, once overlooking the defectiveness of the classification, is an attractive one, and leads, later on, to interesting analyses. Dr. Sharp, in developing his subject, next proceeds to a not unskilful preliminary discussion of the "Theory of Altruism," which, for reasons later explained, he finds it necessary to dispose of in advance. For one cannot discuss "the good" unless one first defines in what sense my private good can be opposed, if at all, to the general good. With the use of arguments that are in part rather tediously familiar to all readers of this literature, our author first explains (pp. 11–17) that "the object of desire is always pleasure (or freedom from pain)." He then explains that nevertheless, owing to the way in which "the unconscious and involuntary plays a part, to an extent varying in the individual cases in all conscious volition" (p. 19), our voluntary actions are, as a fact, not wholly under the control of the desire for pleasure. The latter

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is sure to predominate only when we deliberate with care; but in that case indeed, if we look over the whole of life, "happiness will seem to be the equivalent of good" (p. 21), a result which Dr. Sharp supposes to be "practically independent of any particular theory of the will."

But now it does not follow, so our author next reasons, that to desire happiness is to desire *my own* pleasure. *"The idea of a possible pleasure tends to arouse the desire to see it attained.* Of this law, egoism, or the desire for our own happiness, and altruism, or the desire for others' happiness, are but special cases" (p. 24). The reasoning upon this topic constitutes, in fact, the not unskilful exposition already referred to, and Dr. Sharp holds, much as Wundt has maintained, that no "indirect" origin for Altruism is psychologically needed. In this one can certainly agree without hesitation. Later, in the same chapter of his essay, Dr. Sharp, in further discussing the relations of Egoism and Altruism, approaches, but does not quite consciously face, the considerations which have led those moralists who are neither "Intuitionalists" nor Utilitarians to the now fairly familiar observation that this whole distinction of Egoism and Altruism is not only psychologically indifferent as to its origin, but ethically quite unimportant as to its results, so that, in fact, *no* significant moral activity is definable as essentially *either* egoistic or altruistic. The stress laid by Utilitarians upon the categories of Ego and Alter is, as Wundt has already in effect pointed out, merely a survival of the doctrine of the individual soul-substance as an ultimate and unconquerably separate entity. One gets rid of the soul-substance in psychology, but remains its victim in ethics, just as, with regard to the will, one learns in psychology to respect the enormous complexity of the mechanism of volition, but remains in ethics still the prey of an old-fashioned and abstract simplification, which identifies the "desirable" with the "pleasurable." As a fact, two intimate and devoted friends, while they give themselves over to the business of their friendship, are neither egoistic nor altruistic in the sense in which those two words are opposed to each other in meaning. Each of the friends is devoted to their concrete life together, to their talk, work, co-operation,—to all for which *both* of them are at once essential. Each friend lives, not "in the other," as other, but in that which is *theirs*. In such a case neither I nor you can be the container of the end. It is We who contain this end,—we *as* the two of us.

But Dr. Sharp does not quite reach this point of view, and stops

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short, after all, with the "everybody to count as one,"—a most pernicious formula. In a healthy social function *nobody* counts as one; everybody is, at the very least, "twinned." Still, this old Utilitarian formula, with a few restrictions as to its application, being once in hand, Dr. Sharp returns to these complications of life which have led the Intuitionalist to lay stress upon other tests of the good than the foregoing. The current special rules of morality are, from the Utilitarian point of view, efforts to conform the individual to the general welfare; but their complexity, and some other and, as Dr. Sharp seems to hold, some heretofore ill-defined fact about them, has given the Intuitionalists great influence in maintaining that the current moral rules have still some deeper meaning than their utilitarian value. This other, this ill-defined fact, which has led the Intuitionalists to get such influence is, so Dr. Sharp maintains (p. 43), "the aspiration born of admiration, love, or respect for a definite ideal of character" to which these Intuitionalists have appealed. Their opponents have replied by asking how it is that if a virtuous character is known only by the fact that it is ideally admirable in itself, apart from its effects, virtue does still, as a fact, produce happiness. And hereto the Intuitionalists have indeed had no appeal but to a sort of pre-established harmony. In view of this helplessness of the Intuitionalists to explain the utility of their ideal virtues, which are not to be defined as idea because of their utility, but which miraculously prove to be useful despite their non-utilitarian definition, and in view also of the actual influence and plausibility of this paradoxical notion of the Intuitionalists, Dr. Sharp proposes to solve the problem of the whole situation by proving that the utilitarian ideal of the good working qualities of character will of itself explain why such qualities should appear as ideally admirable, apart from their utility, just as the Intuitionalists make them. And the proof depends upon the thesis that the moral beauty of a character is, as it were, the phenomenon of its utility—a phenomenon which, as resulting from an appeal to the disinterested æsthetic admiration of the observer, will make this observer forget the utility which is at its basis, and will so tend to make him regard this beauty as an end in itself. Thus, on the basis of a modern Utilitarianism, Dr. Sharp can still make good a sort of return to Shaftesbury.

In order to succeed in this enterprise it is "necessary to show that beauty in conduct arises according to the general laws of æsthetics," and that the conditions for our finding such beauty are

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"supplied by altruistic conduct" (p. 49). To this investigation Dr. Sharp devotes Chap. III. of his essay, entitled "An Analysis of Moral Beauty." In conduct, as elsewhere, the sublime (pp. 54–68), the skilful (p. 68), the united in plan (p. 70), the symmetrical (p. 72), the harmonious (p. 73), the peacefully self-possessed or idyllic (p. 75 *seq.*), have all of them a power to arouse æsthetic admiration. In all these cases, except the last, beauty and rightness of conduct may in some respects conflict; but, on the whole, altruism, in Dr. Sharp's opinion, will so often coincide with the sort of action which excites admiration in the beholder that "the connection between beauty and universal utility presents no mysteries" (p. 89). But of course it does not follow, as the Intuitionalists have, in Dr. Sharp's opinion, virtually held, that the beautiful character is as such the good, but it follows only that utility of character will very often appear as beautiful (cf. p. 91). The "æsthetic element in morality," considered in a following chapter on "The Æsthetic Method in Ethics," is unsatisfactory by itself (p. 100). Viewed in its true relation to Utilitarianism it becomes explicable. The essentially æsthetic distinction between "high and low" satisfactions is a case to which Dr. Sharp then applies his method (p. 108 *seq.*). In the concluding chapter of the essay, stress is laid upon the way in which the "pressure of other wills" (*i.e.*, the force of social suggestion as brought to bear upon individuals) tends, in the fashion which Adam Smith long ago pointed out, to convert the æsthetic judgments as to the worth of altruistic conduct into interests which impose themselves upon the individual in the form of moral obligation.

So much for this not altogether novel but decidedly ingenious analysis. As the present reviewer has no disposition to defend the Intuitionalists of Dr. Sharp's classification from the due exposure of the abstractness of their ideals, the chief criticism to be made on this dissertation is the one implied in several of the foregoing remarks. As a fact, no account of the æsthetic element in morality can be complete which fails to take account of the beauty possessed by those forms of conduct which, being moral, are essentially neither egoistic nor altruistic.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

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PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. By J. Shield Nicholson, M.A., D.Sc. Vol. I. London: Adam & Charles Black. Pp. xiii, 451.

Professor Nicholson's treatise, so far as we may judge from the first volume, promises to be an important contribution to economic literature. To some extent the author has stated the case for one side of a controversy of which we shall probably hear more as time goes on. The trenchant criticisms to which political economy has recently been submitted in many quarters have not been altogether without effect on the official exponents of the science in Great Britain. We have already among us a school of economists who, while anxious to maintain unbroken continuity with the traditions of the past, nevertheless desire to see the science strengthen its position by obtaining a firmer grasp of the nature of the forces which are moving our social institutions as a whole—a school the members of which are impressed with a sense of the unity underlying our social problems, and of the intimate relationship of economics to history on the one side and ethics on the other, and of its ultimate tendency to be deeply influenced by the advances which are being made in the biological group of sciences. Professor Marshall's "Principles of Economics," published three years ago, has given a great stimulus to this school in England. In Professor Nicholson's book we have what must in one sense be considered as a brief on the other side. Professor Marshall has regarded political economy as "a study of man's actions in the ordinary business of life." Economics, he has told us, "is a science of human action; and economic laws, properly so called, are laws of human action." Professor Nicholson, on the other hand, insists that it is the duty of the economist to fix his attention on wealth, and to consider other social factors only so far as they apparently affect wealth. While he allows that no economist imagines that wealth can be treated quite independently of other social phenomena, he considers that there is a science concerned with wealth sufficiently distinct and sufficiently important to be studied separately; and he even goes so far as to say that biology has about as much to do with political economy as with constitutional history, and apparently (by inference from his text) as little as astronomy with æsthetics. As to the relationship of the science of economics to ethics he is equally uncompromising. He quotes with approval Sir Frederick Pollock to the effect that the analytical branch of

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political science is altogether independent of ethical theories; and he expresses strongly his dissent from the view that the comparison of ethical ideals, or the arbitrary choice of one in particular, comes within the province of political economy.

Now, while nothing but good can come of having this side of the question so clearly and forcibly stated as it is in these pages, we venture to doubt whether Professor Nicholson has quite fully realized the nature of the case on the other side or the strength of the position which its advocates have taken up. His strongest plea is one which he does not appear to make much of, namely, that the science of sociology as a whole is still in its youth. But admitting that it is making rapid progress, and no one who is familiar with the present outlook can deny it, it seems almost impossible to resist the conclusion that the science of political economy must be ultimately far more deeply influenced than Professor Nicholson deems possible by the advances which are being made in other branches of knowledge. We must always remember that we have in human society, and, in particular, in that aspect of it with which the economist is concerned, only the highest phase of that struggle for existence with which the biologist has already dealt on a lower plane. It is with the complex aspects of this struggle that the political economist is in reality dealing when he is concerned with the distribution of wealth. As Mill was clear-sighted enough to observe, "only through the principle of competition has political economy any pretension to the character of a science." Once we admit this, we have extended the frontiers of political economy to include a far wider territory than Professor Nicholson deems it to be his duty to be concerned with. If the principle of competition occupies this central position in the science, then political economy, if it is to retain the influence which it has won in the past, must be concerned not only with the study of our social phenomena as they exist, but also to some extent with the study of the forces which are behind them, and which are continually modifying them. As a matter of fact, it is this neglect of the study of the springs of human conduct which has brought the older school of economists into a kind of antagonism with a large section of those who are in actual touch with the political and social problems of the time —an antagonism so significant that there is probably not any greater misfortune which could befall either of the two great political parties in England, at the present time, than to be seriously suspected of being identified with that school. Professor

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Nicholson apparently misunderstands, to some extent, the position taken up by those who urge a connection between the science of political economy and the science of ethics. He appears to conceive the former to be altogether independent of the latter *because the arbitrary choice of a particular ethical ideal does not come within the province of economics.* But who is there who seriously urges that it is any more the duty of a professor of the science of economics to advocate the choice of a particular ethical ideal than it is his duty to advocate the choice of a particular religion? What many of us, who cannot quite agree with Professor Nicholson, do however urge, and urge strongly, is that, as political economy deals in the widest sense with the results of man's actions in society (when it deals with the production and distribution of wealth), that science must ultimately have very intimate connections with the department of knowledge which treats of man as a source of action, namely, ethics. To admit this is not in any way to exclude the conviction that political economy will continue to advance strictly in the spirit of the scientific traditions of the past. But while we may confidently look to it to enunciate a certain body of principles partaking of the character of physical laws (such as the law of diminishing returns), we may also venture to hope that a study, at once wider and closer, of the forces which are moving society will enable the economist in the future to judge with greater certainty of the direction in which our social phenomena are being modified by those forces, and to estimate more accurately than he has hitherto been able to do the limits within which such modification will take place.

One of the most interesting sections of the book is that on "Ideal Economic Distribution." Professor Nicholson dissents from the statement, quoted from Sidgwick's "Principles," that "the aim of *Economic* distribution is to apportion the produce among the members of the community so that the greatest amount of utility or satisfaction may be derived from it." He does not regard the ideal of the greatest utility as necessarily the same thing as the ideal of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Maximum freedom is to him at least as attractive, and he adds, pregnantly, "For my own part, I should not care to regard equality of distribution, even if it could be shown to be both practicable and also productive of maximum happiness, as the ultimate goal of human progress" (p. 233). Professor Nicholson in this will have most evolutionists with him. Despite his earlier remarks as

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to the want of connection between economics and the biological group of sciences, the truth underlying this statement never comes home so directly to any one else as to the biological student. It is the latter who is able to grasp at the outset the importance of the fundamental fact that the forces concerned in our evolution in society are not those which make primarily for our happiness, but rather those which tend to bring all the members of society into the fairest and freest rivalry it is possible to attain to. Hence all our progress, as Professor Marshall has well remarked, is towards "freedom of industry and enterprise, or, more shortly, economic freedom."

Professor Nicholson's criticism of modern socialism is scarcely as full or as searching as could be wished. It can hardly be questioned nowadays that economists would better serve the cause of science by following the example of Schäffle in undertaking a more detailed examination of the proposals of socialism, rather than by confining themselves to general remarks as to the impossibility or the impracticability of socialist utopias. It is the more regrettable that Professor Nicholson has followed the general custom, as he seems to have a firm grasp of the important fact, missed by many in these times, that the ultimate effect of most of the apparent exceptions to the freedom of contract which we are allowing under the pressure of so-called socialist tendencies, is not to limit this freedom, but to give it reality.

BENJAMIN KIDD.

A HISTORY OF SOCIALISM. By Thomas Kirkup. Edinburgh: A. & C. Black.

It is somewhat difficult to discover the position which Mr. Kirkup intended his work to occupy with regard to the history of Socialism. To a writer treating of a movement such as this there are at least three ways open. He may examine the nature of Socialism, putting it in his mental balance and pronouncing his judgment in its disparagement or its favor; or he may pass in review the theories of its chief supporters, expounding, contrasting, and examining them. But there is still a third way. He may write the history of the movement in its true sense, that is, describe its origin and progress. As Mr. Kirkup has written a previous work, and as that work deals with Socialism from the first of these three supposed stand-points, the present volume does not attempt intrusion into the province of its predecessor. But which of the latter two ways of handling

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his subject does Mr. Kirkup adopt? Is he writing a history of theory or a history of a movement? This is a question which it is much easier to ask than to answer, for traces of departures in both directions meet the reader. Mr. Kirkup starts off to discuss the theories of the French Communists and of a couple of German Socialists, and concludes with an account of the nature of Anarchism in Russia and the present condition of Socialism in Europe. Complete separation between the theories of the prominent leaders and the history of a movement is, of course, impossible, as, indeed, it is undesirable; for no true historian can or should attempt to describe what people are doing without describing what they are thinking. But there is a difference between complete separation and subordination. If the history of the theories of Socialism are the subject of a book, the facts of the movement require notice so far, and only so far, as they serve to illustrate and give reality to and occasion for these theories; but if, on the other hand, it is the movement itself which occupies our attention, then the theories become in their turn influences and causes. Mr. Kirkup does not treat either the theories or the movement as subordinate. It is a pity that he did not lay down the lines of his work a trifle more definitely, for as it stands now it is unsatisfactory in whatever aspect we view it. So true is this that it is not unfair to say that in attempting both tasks he is successful in neither.

As a history of Socialistic theories the present work suffers from many and most serious defects. It follows the wearisome but time-honored custom of describing in considerable detail the essentially artificial schemes of St.-Simon and Fourier. It even criticises them. But if this be an instance of excessive commission, there are many of comparative omission. A reader who derived his knowledge from the study of Mr. Kirkup's book could not avoid the impression that till within a year or so there were no socialist writers in England, with the saving exception of Owen. Rodbertus, again, to turn to the German school, is treated to some six pages of most unsatisfactory criticism, while Lassalle, whose life was so much more interesting and whose Socialism was so much less thorough, receives close upon fifty. But if scientific influence is the test of an author's importance, surely the teacher of Lassalle and the real founder of German State Socialism deserves a little more attention. It is curious, too, to read of Schaeffle as the interpreter of Marx. If he is, the chief function of the interpreter must be deemed inimical, for in the "Quintessence of Socialism,"

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the very work to which Mr. Kirkup refers, Schaeffle pitches overboard that theory of value which Marx cherishes with such misplaced affection, and refers somewhat triumphantly to a destructive criticism, published in another book, of social democracy. There are other failings of a different order noticeable when we turn to Mr. Kirkup's criticism of Socialistic and economic theories. It is somewhat late in the day to have to echo the oft-repeated remark that Marx and his followers based themselves not on Ricardo, but on their own misconceptions as to Ricardo's meanings; but in the face of Mr. Kirkup's constant assertions, repetition, however monotonous, is inevitable. It is, however, more pleasant to record instances of agreement than of difference.

There can be no doubt that the theory of *laissez-faire* has suffered repulse from the dominant position which it threatened to hold in the writings of economists, though possibly some economic historians will demur to the sweeping assertion that "In England, Socialists are now the chief promoters of the advance in economic study from the ordinary stand-point to the historical, and from the historical to the evolutionary point of view." Without staying to canvass the meaning of the later advance thus described, some readers, and amongst them the present writer, would no doubt like to know to which of the present school of economic historians reference is made—for these are surely the chief promoters of the advance towards the historical study of economics.

The chapters which deal with the more truly historical aspect of the Socialistic movement are somewhat unequal. The best is that which treats of Anarchism with especial reference to its connection with the more orthodox Socialism, and its growth and development in Russia. Others deal with the Red International, with the early English Socialism, and with the recent progress of Socialism, etc. Of these the most unsatisfactory is that which refers to England. No adequate attempt is made to account for the present aspect of Socialism in this country. There was a man named Robert Owen, and there is a present Socialistic party, is the burden of the story; but unfortunately the genesis of this party, and the early influences brought to bear on it, escape notice, with the not unnatural consequence that an undue importance in its formation is ascribed to Marx. But English Socialism is very indigenous in its character. A host of inferior writers urged its progress, and under the veil of various movements, political as well as social, it grew in strength

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and made good its advance. This it is which gives it the importance which Mr. Kirkup deems its due.

E. C. K. GONNER.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LIVERPOOL.

DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL. Par E. Durkheim. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

This book, which appears from the title to be a work on political economy or sociology, is in reality a treatise on ethics. To speak more correctly, it seeks, in the economic and social facts summed up under the formula of the division of labor, the verification of a moral thesis. This thesis is as follows:

"Morality is developed in history and under the influence of historic causes; that is, it has a part to perform in our every-day life. What it is at any given time depends on the conditions then prevalent in society which do not permit it to be otherwise. The proof of this is that morality changes when the conditions change, and only then. If the ancient Romans did not have the broad conception of humanity that we have to-day, this was not due to their narrowness of intelligence, but to the fact that such ideas were incompatible with the nature of a Roman town. Our cosmopolitanism could no more have existed there than a plant can grow in a soil not only incapable of nourishing it, but which is sure to kill it. But, on the other hand, the fact that cosmopolitanism has since made its appearance, is not due to any philosophical discoveries; it is not because our minds have been opened to truths which we failed to appreciate before; it is rather because changes have taken place in the structure of society which render necessary a change in our moral notions. Moral ideas, then, are formed, transformed, and maintained by causes of an experimental nature. These are the only causes which the science of ethics undertakes to ascertain."

It seems clear, then, according to M. Durkheim, that changes in moral ideas are chiefly brought about by the transformations that occur in society as a whole. The author is, indeed, led by a natural progression of ideas to study the solidarity of society, of which he distinguishes two forms: one mechanical, due to the similarity of the elements that compose the social body; the other organic, due to a division of labor among those elements, which more and more tend to differentiate. The first form is mainly found in ancient times, when society was divided into clans and castes; the second belongs to our modern society. The study of these two forms brings M. Durkheim to the following conclusions:

"A characteristic of the moral order is that it sets forth the fundamental conditions of social solidarity. Law and morality are the ties which bind us to each other and to society, and which make of the entire mass of individuals an ag-

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gregate and coherent whole. In other words, everything which is the source of solidarity, everything that forces a man to take account of others and to regulate his movements by something besides his own selfish impulses, is moral; and morality is all the more vigorous when such ties are strong and numerous. . . . But for all that, we cannot be reconciled to a formula which makes morality a mere function of social interest. Without doubt, society could not exist if its parts were not in some way united. But solidarity is only one of the conditions of its existence. There are others, not less necessary, which are not moral. Moreover, in the net-work of ties which constitutes morality there may be some which are not useful, or which have force without reference to their degree of utility. The idea of utility, therefore, cannot be recognized as an essential element in our definition."

Attention is called to the originality of this conception of ethics, which has no resemblance to the views of Spencer, although it is also based on the inductive method. We can only point out here, in passing, that M. Durkheim's book treats many minor phases of the subject in an ingenious and able manner, as, for instance, in what he says of the relation of justice and charity (p. 129), and of egoism and altruism (p. 214).

E. Boirac.

Paris.

Les luttes entre sociétés humaines et leurs phases successives. Par J. Novicow. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

This very interesting and very suggestive book, full of facts and ideas, applies the methods of physical and natural science to the study of moral and social questions. From this point of view it appears to be allied to the philosophy of the evolutionists, although it nowhere sets up Spencer as an authority. The conflicts of mankind are considered as a particular instance of a general law which embraces the entire universe. The book might have had for its motto the words of Heraclitus, "ὁ πτόλεμος πάτερ πάντων." The author tries to prove that conflict is natural, universal, perpetual, and necessary, that it assumes a great number of forms, and that the most ancient and imperfect of these—war, massacre—the progress of humanity tends more and more to eliminate. He distinguishes two kinds of conflict, one slow and irrational (belonging to the past), including homicides, brigandage, slavery, robbery, persecution, intolerance, etc.; the other quick and rational (that of the future), using competition and argument. The book closes with a criticism, often very keen, of the errors of modern politics. The principal objection to be brought against it is that it is too discursive,

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too redundant. The instances cited are so numerous and confusing that they obscure the main idea. As a German proverb says, "The trees hide the forest."

E. Boirac.

L'Année philosophique. Par F. Pillon. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

M. Pillon, with his teacher M. Renouvier, was one of the founders of Neo-Kantianism in France. For nearly twenty years they both applied the principles of their philosophy to all questions, moral, social, political, religious, literary, scientific, etc., in a valiant little weekly review, *La Critique philosophique*, to which they were almost the only contributors. Since this review ceased to appear, M. Pillon has in some degree replaced it by a sort of annual inventory of all the most recent philosophical publications in France, of which he has now given us the third volume under the title "L'Année philosophique." In it we find an interesting essay upon Schopenhauer and the "Metaphysics of Pessimism," by M. Renouvier; an original study by M. Dauriac on "The Nature of Emotion," in which he improves and very happily completes the well-known theory of William James; and finally a very learned exposition of the "Historical Evolution of Idealism, from Democritus to Locke," by M. Pillon. This is followed by a bibliography of French philosophy for the year 1892, which is a review by M. Pillon of all the works, large or small, that appeared in France during that year which could be of interest to philosophical students. They are arranged under the following headings: 1, metaphysics, psychology, and philosophy of science; 2, ethics, religious philosophy, and æsthetics; 3, philosophy of history, sociology, and pedagogy; 4, history of philosophy and criticism. These are all examined from the Neo-Kantian point of view.

E. Boirac.

Darwin and Hegel. By D. G. Ritchie. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. xvi, 285.

The most obvious objection to these essays is their scrappiness. To get a system out of them is (if I may quote Mr. Ritchie against himself) "like trying to make your dinner off shrimps." But this is an objection which no one will care to urge in the face of Mr. Ritchie's own admission. He claims for them only the unity of stand-point. He is an Evolutionary Idealist, and these essays

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are an attempt to reconcile the two aspects of his faith. Though calling itself an eirenicon, the book is largely polemical. Part of the polemic is directed against the evolutionists, part against certain recent critics of Hegel.

Mr. Ritchie accepts evolution in its entirety as an account of how things have come to be as they are. But the ordinary evolutionist thinks his theory a "universal pick-lock," as Scott says of the association of ideas in his day; he claims to have driven philosophy quite off the field. Mr. Ritchie is at pains to show that there are certain regions of inquiry, both before and after, which evolution does not, and by its very nature cannot, touch. *First*, there is the previous question, the critical or transcendental inquiry, "How is this process possible?" Here Mr. Ritchie's statement of the Kantian position shows how much he has been affected by Aristotle. The essentially analytic nature of the transcendental method is brought out when it is put as follows: "If knowledge be altogether dependent on sensation, knowledge is impossible. But knowledge is possible, because the sciences exist. Therefore, etc." Taking his stand on this non-sensational element, Mr. Ritchie goes on to point out, *secondly*, that there is a further region of inquiry which no historical theory can cover. This is the region of the regulative sciences of logic, ethics, æsthetics, and politics. These sciences deal not with what is, but with what ought to be. This "ought to be" is possible only because of the non-sensational element which criticism has discovered in knowledge, the "timeless self," which constantly presents to us ideals of consistency, goodness, and beauty. The actual content of these ideals will vary with time, place, and person; but their presence is implied in all reasoning, all conduct, and all art.

In the second half of the volume Mr. Ritchie develops some of the practical consequences of this position. His main object is to combat the *laissez faire* view, which is taken to be the legitimate outcome of natural selection, and in its stead to rehabilitate (in Aristotelian phrase) the conception of the Final Cause as a working concept in politics. He maintains that with the appearance of reflection the cruel operation of natural selection should give way to rational selection, the conflict of forces being transmuted into a conflict of ideas, which are at first (and to this day) embodied in opposing parties, but may ultimately come to have their battle-ground within the individual. Then the dialectical movement of selection will go on within the soul itself.

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The little essay on the Rights of Minorities is a good example of the way in which Mr. Ritchie applies these ideas to politics. "The all-important and essential right of minorities," he says, "is the right to turn themselves into majorities if they can. This means freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of public meeting." Given these things,—and they are given wherever there is a fairly representative government and a sound public opinion,—then, if the idea which the minority has got hold of be a vital one, it will form a new and fruitful variation which is bound to succeed; if the idea be a mere survival, to protect it is simply to establish a drain upon the strength of the body politic. But when a fair chance is not given for the new variations to justify themselves by success, it may become the *duty* of the minority to suffer for their cause. It is amusing to observe how exactly Mr. Ritchie has been anticipated by that arch-Tory, Dr. Johnson: "In short, sir, I have got no farther than this: every man has a right to utter what he thinks truth, and every other man has a right to knock him down for it. Martyrdom is the test."

In the essay on "Darwin and Hegel," Mr. Ritchie applies the doctrine of natural selection to resolve certain difficulties in Hegel's philosophy of nature. This essay, like the next, is largely a defence of Hegel against Professor Seth. Professor Seth accuses Hegel of "a most transparent fallacy" in making the contingent a category. "To say that a thing is contingent," he argues, "is to say in so many words that we can give no rational account of why it is as it is and not otherwise." Here Mr. Ritchie comes to the rescue with the doctrine of natural selection. The apparent non-rationality of nature is seen to be only that indefinite variability which natural selection presupposes: the connection between the qualities of things is seen to be no longer casual, but to exist because it has in some way helped them in the struggle for existence. This is very true, but is hardly a fair answer to Professor Seth. Science has given us a new conception, which explains the apparently contingent in some cases, and shows us how it may be explicable in all. But Hegel, as Mr. Ritchie admits, knew nothing about natural selection. Why then give him the benefit of it? Hegel's "transparent fallacy" consists in taking the contingent *as it stands* and classing it without scientific mediation as a form of the idea. This is against his own view of philosophy, which can take its material only after the special sciences have done their work. Here was a gap in his science: it cannot be stopped by

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philosophy. His justification, of course, lies in his invincible conviction that there is nothing ultimately irrational in the universe.

Again, on the subject of personality, we find Mr. Ritchie championing Hegel against Professor Seth; and again, I think, he fails to do justice to his opponent's position. That position he nicknames "animated atomism," and dismisses as a pretty speculation, grounded upon the popular *Vorstellung* of a spiritual substance. But is Mr. Ritchie so sure that his own position is not grounded on another *Vorstellung?* At least, it has been too long presented to English readers in that guise; and on the whole I believe that though Professor Seth may not have made out his case against Hegelianism, he has made it out against Green. He has laid his finger on the "sublime fallacy" by which Green passes from the mere unity of apperception, the universal type of consciousness, to the conception of a universal consciousness, arguing, as it were, from synonym to subject. What makes the transition plausible is the *Vorstellung* of organism,—a useful conception, but it has become *crambe repetita* to the present generation, and they begin to ask whether its value is not exhausted. Is it the last word in philosophy? Does it give final expression to the relation between God and man? Even if Professor Seth's views are reactionary, we owe him thanks for reopening the question. The strength of his position lies in the strength of the conviction to which he appeals,—the conviction, I mean, that personalities have worth as ends in themselves. If Mr. Ritchie does not feel this conviction in all its force, it is perhaps because of his too exclusive attention to politics. There the individual counts for nothing as against the state. But what transmutes social compulsion into *moral* obligation is precisely the interest which the individual has in the common good as his good. If we co-operate with God on any other terms, "then are we bastards and not sons." Mr. Ritchie, worshipping a God "realized in a society which is a spiritual body" (the old metaphor!), does not attempt to answer that question of Professor Seth's which has found an echo in so many hearts,—"What of those who have fallen by the way, who have died not having received the promises?"

J. C. SMITH.

MANCHESTER, ENGLAND.

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THE NATURAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM. By M. D. O'Brien. London: Williams & Norgate. Pp. 388.

The novelty of this book consists in the violence of the language with which the ordinary principles of Individualism are enforced. This feature may be partly attributable to the necessities of the case. Since the State is "a bogie set up to frighten fools" (p. 10), and the "politicians and socialists" who are responsible for its establishment are alike condemned as a mixture of rascality and insanity, it at once follows that the qualities of integrity and common sense are narrowed down to an exclusively individualistic sphere. So obvious is this, that all the author has to do, in order to make his convictions forcible, is to abuse the shortcomings of others. This is a sample of the way in which he addresses "this 'society,' humanity, community, or whatever you may please to call so general a mass of folly and corruption":

"Noisy crowd of low, base natures! brave mass of trembling units! go down the broad road to your congenial hell of national torpidity and ultimate racial extinction. Miserable shams! conventional puppets! moral and intellectual pygmies! The brand of inferiority is on you forever. You hate and fear principles. Liberty is too bracing for your namby-pamby, maudlin unmanliness. You prefer the lusts of your bellies to the dictates of supreme reason." (p. 91.)

And, speaking of the same object, two pages later,—

"Some say that even in spite of all these 'virtues' it is still going fast to hell. But this is by no means certain. Indeed it is extremely doubtful whether the gentlemen below stairs would lower themselves to associate with so incorrigible a mass of depravity. Even 'auld Nickie Ben' must draw the line somewhere."

I quote these remarks, not from a belief that they are smart, or even funny, but in order to show that Mr. O'Brien has chosen controversial weapons of such potency that he is not likely to provoke an antagonist. For he applies his method of commentary not only to society in general but to individuals, and assails particular writers of repute, for some of whom even "hell is too good" (p. 295), with all the language he can command; and that is not inconsiderable.

The text is marred by numerous misprints, and it is interesting to notice that even the grammar of the writer betrays traces of individualism, whereof the sentence "It would be wrong for you and I to interfere with the work of our neighbours" is not the only example. It would be difficult to say in what respects Messrs. Williams & Norgate are to be congratulated on their new publication.

ARTHUR EASTWOOD.

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DRUNKENNESS. By George B. Wilson, M.B., C.M. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. x, 161.

The primary object of this new volume in the "Social Science Series" is, as stated in the preface, to present the student of social science with a study of drunkenness as a nervous disease. That conduct is related to a physical basis would not, I suppose, be denied by the most "idealistic" moralist, and that is enough for Mr. Wilson's purpose. This statement, therefore, of the physiological and pathological aspects of drunkenness, if somewhat slight in substance, contains matter of interest and significance for the student of ethics, whether theoretical or practical. The author would have increased the usefulness (and authority) of the book if he had confined himself to this point of view and expanded it. His chapter upon "Therapeutics" is mainly made up of observations upon the "moral" and "legislative" treatment of inebriety, and these are not characterized by any novelty or distinction, or scientific interest. The consideration of the "Gothenburg System" is in particular very perfunctory, and hangs rather loosely on to the rest of the book; the question seems beyond the province and special knowledge of the writer, and he freely resorts to opinions and reports of anything but a scientific character. In his chapter on "Etiology" the author raises a question of considerable interest,—viz., the heredity of drunkenness in the light of Weismann's theories,—but the discussion generally is not profound or far-reaching.

SIDNEY BALL.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

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Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.
Prof. G. von Gizycki, Nettelbeckstrasse 24, Berlin, Germany.
J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1894.

NATURALISM AND ETHICS.

I.

THE two subjects on which the professors of every creed, theological and anti-theological, seem least anxious to differ are the general substance of the Moral Law, and the character of the sentiments with which it should be regarded. That it is worthy of all reverence; that in its main principles it is immutable and eternal; that it demands our ungrudging submission; and that we owe it not merely obedience but love—these are commonplaces which the preachers of all schools vie with each other in proclaiming. And they are certainly right. Morality is more than a bare code of laws, than a *catalogue raisonné* of things to be done and left undone. Were it otherwise we must change something more important than the mere customary language of exhortation. The old ideals of the world would have to be uprooted, and no new ones could spring up and flourish in their stead; the very soil on which they grew would be sterilized, and the phrases in which all that has hitherto been regarded as best and noblest in human life has been expressed, nay the words "best" and "noblest" themselves, would become as foolish and unmeaning as the incantation of a forgotten superstition.

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This unanimity, familiar though it be, is surely very remarkable. And it is the more remarkable because the unanimity prevails only as to conclusions, and is accompanied by the widest divergence of opinion with regard to the premises on which these conclusions are supposed to be founded. Nothing but habit could blind us to the strangeness of the fact that the man who believes that morality is based on *a priori* principles and the man who believes it to be based on the commands of God, the mystic not less than the evolutionist, should be pretty well at one both as to what morality teaches, and as to the sentiments with which its teaching should be regarded.

It is not my business in this place to examine the Philosophy of Morals, or to find an answer to the charge which this suspicious harmony of opinion among various schools of moralists appears to suggest, namely, that in their speculations they have taken current morality for granted, and have squared their proofs to their conclusions and not their conclusions to their proofs. I desire now rather to direct the reader's attention to certain questions relating to the origin of ethical systems, not to their justification; to the natural history of morals, not to its philosophy; to the place which the Moral Law occupies in the general chain of causes and effects, not to the nature of its claim on the unquestioning obedience of mankind. I am aware, of course, that many persons have been and are of opinion that these two sets of questions are not merely related but identical; that the validity of a command depends only on the source from which it springs; and that in the investigation into the character and authority of this source consists the principal business of the moral philosopher. I am not concerned here to controvert this theory, though as thus stated I do not agree with it. It will be sufficient if I lay down two propositions of a much less dubious character:—(1) that practically, human beings being what they are, no moral code can be effective which does not inspire, in those who are asked to obey it, emotions of reverence, and (2) that practically the capacity of any code to excite this or any other elevated emotion cannot be wholly

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independent of the origin from which those who accept that code suppose it to emanate.*

Now what, according to the naturalistic creed, is the origin of the generally accepted, or indeed of any other possible moral law? What position does it occupy in the great web of interdependent phenomena by which the knowable "Whole" is on this hypothesis constituted? The answer is plain: as life is but a petty episode in the history of the Universe; as feeling is an attribute of only a fraction of things that live; so moral sentiments and the apprehension of moral rules are found in but an insignificant minority of things that feel. They are not, so to speak, among the necessities of nature; no great spaces are marked out for their accommodation; were they to vanish to-morrow, the great machine would move on with no noticeable variation; the sum of realities would not suffer sensible diminution; the organic world itself would scarcely mark the change. A few highly-developed mammals, and chiefest among these *man*, would lose instincts and beliefs which have proved of considerable value in the struggle for existence, if not between individuals at least between tribes and species. But put it at the highest, we can say no more than that there would be a great diminution of human happiness, that civilization would become difficult or impossible, and that the "higher" races might even succumb and disappear.

These are considerations which to the "higher" races themselves may seem not unimportant, however trifling to the universe at large. But let it be noted that every one of these propositions can be asserted with equal or greater assurance of all the bodily appetites, and of many of the vulgarest forms of desire and ambition. On most of the processes indeed by which consciousness and life are maintained in the individual and perpetuated in the race we are never consulted; of their

* These are statements, it will be noted, not relating to Ethics proper. They have nothing to do either with the contents of the Moral Law or with its validity; and if we are to class them as belonging to any special department of knowledge at all, it is to Psychology or Anthropology that they should in strictness be assigned.

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intimate character we are for the most part totally ignorant, and no one is in any case asked to consider them with any other emotion than that of enlightened curiosity. But in the few and simple instances in which our co-operation is required, it is obtained through the stimulus supplied by appetite and disgust, pleasure and pain, instinct, reason, and morality; and it is hard to see, on the naturalistic hypothesis, whence any one of these various natural agents is to derive a dignity or a consideration not shared by all the others, why morality should be put above appetite, or reason above pleasure.

It may perhaps be replied that the sentiments with which we choose to regard any set of actions or motives do not require special justification, that there is no disputing about this any more than about other questions of "taste," and that, as a matter of fact, the persons who take a strictly naturalistic view of Man and of the Universe are often the loudest and not the least sincere in the homage they pay to the "Majesty of the Moral Law." This is, no doubt, perfectly true; but it does not meet the real difficulty. I am not contending that sentiments of the kind referred to may not be, and are not, frequently entertained by persons of all shades of philosophical or theological opinion. My point is, that in the case of those holding the naturalistic creed the sentiments and the creed are antagonistic; and that the more clearly the creed is grasped, the more thoroughly the intellect is saturated with its essential teaching, the more certain are the sentiments thus violently and unnaturally associated with it to languish or to die.

For not only does there seem to be no ground, from the point of view of Biology, for drawing a distinction in favor of any of the processes, physiological or psychological, by which the individual or the race is benefited; not only are we bound to consider the coarsest appetites, the most calculating selfishness, and the most devoted heroism, as all sprung from analogous causes and all evolved for similar objects; but we can hardly doubt that the august sentiments which cling to the ideas of duty and sacrifice are nothing better than a device of Nature to trick us into the performance of altruistic actions. The working ant expends its life in laboring, with more than

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maternal devotion, for a progeny not its own, and, if the race of ants be worth preserving, doubtless it does well. Instinct, the inherited impulse to follow a certain course with no developed consciousness of its final goal, is here the instrument selected by Nature to attain her ends. But man being a reasoning animal, more flexible if less certain methods have in his case to be employed. Does conscience, in bidding us to do or to refrain, speak with an authority from which there seems no appeal? Does our blood tingle at the narrative of some great deed? Do courage and self-surrender extort our passionate sympathy, and invite, however vainly, our halting imitation? Does that which is noble attract even the least noble, and that which is base repel even the basest? Nay, have the words "noble" and "base" a meaning for us at all? If so it is from no essential and immutable quality in the deeds themselves. It is because, in the struggle for existence, the altruistic virtues are an advantage to the family, the tribe, or the nation, but *not* always an advantage to the individual; it is because man comes into the world richly endowed with the inheritance of self-regarding instincts and appetites required by his animal progenitors, but poor indeed in any inbred inclination to the unselfishness necessary to the well-being of the society in which he lives; it is because in no other way can the original impulses be displaced by those of late growth to the degree required by public utility, that Nature, indifferent to our happiness, indifferent to our morals, but sedulous of our survival, commends disinterested virtue to our practice by decking it out in all the splendor which the specifically ethical sentiments alone are capable of supplying. Could we imagine the chronological order of the evolutionary process reversed; if courage and abnegation had been the qualities first needed, earliest developed, and therefore most deeply rooted in the ancestral organism; while selfishness, cowardice, greediness, and lust represented impulses required only at a later stage of physical and intellectual development, doubtless we should find the "elevated" emotions which now crystallize round the first set of attributes transferred without alteration or amendment to the second; the preacher would expend his eloquence

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in warning us against excessive indulgence in deeds of self-immolation, to which like the "worker" ant we should be driven by inherited instinct, and in exhorting us to the performance of actions and the cultivation of habits from which we now unfortunately find it only too difficult to abstain.

Kant, as we all know, compared the Moral Law to the starry heavens, and found them both sublime. It would, on the naturalistic hypothesis, be more to the purpose to compare it to the protective blotches on a beetle's back, and to find them both ingenious. But how on this view is the "beauty of holiness" to retain its lustre in the minds of those who know so much of its pedigree? In despite of theories, mankind—even instructed mankind—may indeed long preserve uninjured sentiments which they have learned in their most impressionable years from those they love best; but if while they are being taught the supremacy of conscience and the austere majesty of duty, they are also to be taught that these sentiments and beliefs are merely samples of the complicated contrivances, many of them mean and many of them disgusting, wrought into the physical or into the social organism by the shaping forces of selection and elimination, assuredly much of the efficacy of these moral lessons will be destroyed, and the contradiction between ethical sentiment and naturalistic theory will remain intrusive and perplexing, a constant stumbling-block to those who endeavor to combine in one harmonious creed the bare explanations of Biology and the lofty claims of Ethics.*

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* It may perhaps be thought that in this section I have too confidently assumed that morality, or more strictly the moral sentiments (including among these the feeling of authority which attaches to ethical imperatives) are due to the working of natural selection. I have no desire to dogmatize on a subject on which it is the business of the Biologist and Anthropologist to pronounce. But it seems difficult to believe that natural selection should not have had the most important share in producing and making permanent things so obviously useful. If the reader prefers to take the opposite view and to regard moral sentiments as "accidental," he may do so without on that account being obliged to differ from my general argument. He will then, of course, class moral sentiments with the æsthetic emotions.

Of course I make no attempt to trace the causes of the variations on which

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II.

Unfortunately for my reader it is not possible wholly to omit from this section some references to the questionings which cluster round the time-worn debate on Determinism and Free Will; but my remarks will be brief and as little tedious as may be.

I have nothing here to do with the truth or untruth of either of the contending theories. It is sufficient to remind the reader that on the naturalistic view, at least, free will is an absurdity, and that those who hold that view are bound to believe that every decision at which mankind have arrived, and every consequent action which they have performed, was implicitly determined by the quantity and distribution of the various forms of matter and energy which preceded the birth of the solar system. In fact, no doubt remains that every individual, while balancing between two courses, is under the inevitable impression that he is at liberty to pursue either, and that it depends upon "himself" and himself alone, "himself" as distinguished from his character, his desires, his surroundings, and his antecedents, which of the offered alternatives he will elect to pursue. I do not know that any explanation has been proposed of this singular illusion. I venture with some diffidence to suggest as a theory provisionally adequate perhaps for scientific purposes, that the phenomenon is due to the same cause as so many other beneficent oddities in the organic world, namely, to natural selection. To an animal with no self-consciousness a sense of freedom would evidently be unnecessary, if not, indeed, absolutely unmeaning. But as soon as self-consciousness is developed, as soon as man begins to reflect, however crudely and imperfectly, upon himself and the world in which he lives, deliberation, volition, and the sense of responsibility become wheels in the ordinary machinery by which species-preserving actions

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selective action has worked, nor to distinguish between the moral sentiments, an inclination to or an aptitude for which has been bred into the *physical* organism of man or some races of men, and those which have been wrought only into the *social* organism of the family, the tribe, or the state.

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are produced; and as these psychological states would be weakened or neutralized if they were accompanied by the immediate consciousness that they were as rigidly determined by their antecedents as any other effects by any other causes, benevolent Nature steps in and by a process of selective slaughter makes the consciousness in such circumstances practically impossible. The spectacle of all mankind suffering under the delusion that in their decision they are free, when, as a matter of fact, they are nothing of the kind, must certainly appear extremely ludicrous to any superior observer, were it possible to conceive, on the naturalistic hypothesis, that such observers should exist; and the comedy could not be otherwise than greatly relieved and heightened by the performances of the small sect of philosophers who, knowing perfectly as an abstract truth that freedom is an absurdity, yet in moments of balance and deliberation fall into the vulgar error, as if they were savages or idealists.

The roots of a superstition so ineradicable must lie deep in the groundwork of our inherited organism, and must, if not now, at least in the first beginning of self-consciousness, have been essential to the welfare of the race which entertained it. Yet it may perhaps be thought that this requires us to attribute to the dawn of intelligence ideas which are notoriously of late development; and that as the primitive man knew nothing of "invariable sequences" or "universal causation," he could in no wise be embarrassed in the struggle for existence by recognizing that he and his proceedings were as absolutely determined by their antecedents as sticks and stones. It is of course true that in any formal or philosophical shape such ideas would be as remote from the intelligence of the savage as the differential calculus. But it can nevertheless hardly be denied that in some shape or other there must be implicitly present to his consciousness the sense of freedom, since his fetishism largely consists in attributing to inanimate objects the spontaneity which he finds in himself; and it seems equally certain that the sense, I will not say of *constraint*, but of *inevitableness*, would be as embarrassing to a savage in the act of choice, as it would to his more cultivated descendant; and

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would be not less productive of that moral impoverishment which, as I proceed briefly to point out, determinism is calculated to produce.*

And here I am anxious to avoid any appearance of the exaggeration which as I think has sometimes characterized discussions upon this subject. I admit that there is nothing in the theory which need modify the substance of the Moral Law. That which Duty prescribes, or the "Practical Reason" recommends, is equally prescribed and recommended whether our actual decisions are or are not irrevocably bound by a causal chain which reaches back in unbroken retrogression through a limitless past. It may also be admitted that no argument against good resolution or virtuous endeavors can fairly be founded upon necessitarian doctrines. No doubt

* It seems to be regarded as quite simple and natural that this attribution of human spontaneity to inanimate objects should be the first stage in the interpretation of the external world, and that it should be only after the uniformity of material nature had been conclusively established by long and laborious experience that the same principles were applied to the inner experience of man himself. But in truth unless man in the very earliest stages of his development had believed himself to be free, precisely the opposite order of discovery might have been anticipated. Even now our means of external investigation are so imperfect that it is rather a stretch of language to say that the theory of uniformity is in accordance with experience, much less that it is established by it. On the contrary, the more refined are our experiments, the more elaborate are our precautions, the more difficult is it to obtain results absolutely identical with each other qualitatively as well as quantitatively. So far therefore as mere observation goes, Nature seems to be always aiming at a uniformity which she never quite succeeds in attaining; and though it is no doubt true that the differences are due to errors in the observations and not to errors in Nature, this manifestly cannot be proved by the observations themselves, but only by a theory established independently of the observations, and by which these may be corrected and interpreted. But a man's own motives for acting in a particular way at a particular time are simple compared with the complexities of the material world, and to himself at least might be known (one would suppose) with reasonable certainty. Here then (were it not for the inveterate illusion, old as self-consciousness itself, that at the moment of choice no uniformity of antecedents need ensure a uniformity of consequences) would have been the natural starting-point and suggestion of a theory of causation which, as experience ripened and knowledge grew, might have gradually extended itself to the universe at large. Man would in fact have had nothing more to do than to apply to the chaotic complex of the macrocosm the principles of rigid and unchanging law by which he had discovered the microcosm to be governed.

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he who makes either good resolutions or virtuous endeavors does so because (on the determinist theory) he could not do otherwise; but none the less may these play an important part among the antecedents by which moral actions are ultimately produced. An even stronger admission may I think be properly made. There is a fatalistic temper of mind found in some of the greatest men of action, religious and irreligious, in which the sense that all that happens is foreordained does in no way weaken the energy of volition but only adds a finer temper to the courage. It nevertheless remains the fact that the persistent realization of the doctrine that voluntary decisions are as completely determined by external and (if you go far enough back) by material conditions as involuntary ones, is wholly inconsistent with the sense of personal responsibility, and that with the sense of personal responsibility is bound up the moral will. Nor is this all. It may be a small matter that determinism should render it wholly absurd to feel righteous indignation at the misconduct of other people. It cannot be wholly without importance that it should render it equally absurd to feel righteous indignation at our own. Self-condemnation, repentance, remorse and the whole train of cognate emotions are really so useful for the promotion of virtue that it is a pity to find them at a stroke thus deprived of all reasonable foundation, and reduced, if they are to survive at all, to the position of amiable but unintelligent weaknesses. It is clear moreover that these emotions if they are to fall will not fall alone. What is to become of moral admiration? The virtuous man will indeed continue to deserve and to receive admiration of a certain kind—the admiration, namely, which we justly accord to a well-made machine; but this is a very different sentiment from that at present evoked by the heroic or the saintly; and it is therefore much to be feared that, at least in the region of the higher feelings, the world will be much impoverished by the effective spread of sound naturalistic doctrine.

No doubt this conflict between a creed which commands intellectual assent and emotions which have their root and justification in beliefs which are deliberately rejected, is greatly

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mitigated by the precious faculty which the human race enjoys of quietly ignoring the logical consequences of its own accepted theories. If the abstract reason by which such theories are contrived always ended in producing a practice corresponding to them, natural selection would long ago have killed off all those who possessed abstract reason. If a complete accord between practice and speculation were required of us, philosophers would long ago have been eliminated. Nevertheless the persistent contradiction between that which is thought to be true, and that which is felt to be noble and of good report, not only produces a sense of moral unrest in the individual, but makes it impossible for us to avoid the conclusion that the creed which leads to such results is somehow unsuited for "such beings as we are in such a world as ours."

III.

There is thus a conflict between the sentiments associated with and subservient to morality, and the naturalistic account of their origin. It remains to ask what relation to Ethics, or, more strictly, to ethical imagination, has the teaching of Naturalism on the final results of human endeavor.

This is plainly not a question of small or subsidiary importance. That the ends prescribed by morality should be *mutually consistent*, and that they should be *adequate*, are demands which to me at least seem legitimate, and which, whether legitimate or not, will certainly be made. On the naturalistic theory can we say that they are either one or the other?

The question about consistency will be answered variously according to the particular ethical theory held by the answerer. Personally I answer it in the negative, because I agree with those who think that "reasonable self-love" has a legitimate though doubtless a subordinate position among ethical ends, that as a matter of fact it is a virtue wholly incompatible with what is commonly called selfishness, and that society suffers not from having too much of it but from having too little. If this be so, it is manifest, as has

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often been pointed out, that until the world undergoes a very remarkable transformation, a complete harmony between "egoism" and "altruism," between the pursuit of the highest happiness for one's self and the highest happiness for other people, can never be provided by a creed which refuses to admit that the deeds done and the character formed in this life can flow over into another, and there permit a reconciliation and an adjustment between the conflicting principles which are not always possible here. To those again who hold (as I think, erroneously) both that the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the right end of action, and also that as a matter of fact every agent invariably pursues his own, a Heaven and a Hell, which should make it certain that principle and interest were always in agreement, would seem almost a necessity. Not otherwise, neither by education, public opinion, nor positive law, can there be any assured harmony produced between that which man must do by the constitution of his will, and that which he ought to do according to the promptings of his conscience. On the other hand it must be acknowledged that those moralists who are of opinion that "altruistic" ends alone are worthy of being described as moral, and that man is not incapable of pursuing them without any self-regarding motives, require no future life to eke out their practical system. But even they would probably not be unwilling to admit with the rest of the world that there is something jarring to the moral sense in a comparison between the distribution of happiness and the distribution of virtue, and that no better mitigation of the difficulty has yet been suggested than that which is provided by a system of future "rewards and punishments."

With this bare indication of some of the points which naturally suggest themselves in connection with this part of the subject, I pass on to the more interesting problem raised by the second question: that which is concerned with the *emotional* adequacy of the ends prescribed by naturalistic ethics. And to consider this to the best advantage I will assume that we are dealing with an ethical system which puts these ends at their highest; charged, as it were, to the full

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with all that on the naturalistic theory they are capable of containing. I take as my text, therefore, no narrow or egoistic scheme, but will assume that in the perfection and felicity of all sentient creation, embracing within its ample margin every minor issue, we may find in its completeness the all-inclusive object prescribed by morality for human endeavor. Does this, then, or does it not, supply us with all that is needed to satisfy our ethical imagination? Does it, or does it not, provide us with an ideal end not merely vast enough to exhaust our energies but also to satisfy our aspirations?

At first sight the question may seem absurd. The object is admittedly worthy; it is admittedly beyond our reach. The unwearied efforts of countless generations, the slow accumulation of inherited experience, may, to those who find themselves able to read optimism into evolution, promise some faint approximation to the millennium at some far distant epoch. How, then, can we, whose own contribution to the great result must be at the best insignificant, at the worst nothing or worse than nothing, presume to think that the prescribed object is less than adequate to our highest emotional requirements? The reason is plain: our ideals are framed not according to the measure of our performances, but according to the measure of our thoughts; and our thoughts about the world in which we live tend, under the influence of increasing knowledge, constantly to dwarf our estimate of the importance of man, if man be indeed no more than a phenomenon among phenomena, a natural object among other natural objects. For what is man looked at from this point of view? Time was when his tribe and its fortunes were enough to exhaust the energies and to bound the imagination of the primitive sage.* The gods' peculiar care, the central object of an attendant universe, that for which the sun shone and the dew fell, to which the stars in their courses ministered; it drew its origin in the past from divine ancestors, and might by divine

* The line of thought here is identical with that which I pursued in an already published essay on the "Religion of Humanity." I have not hesitated to borrow the phraseology of that essay wherever it seemed convenient.

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favor be destined to an indefinite existence of success and triumph in the future.

These ideas represent no early or rudimentary stage in the human thought, yet have we left them far behind. The family, the tribe, the nation, are no longer enough to absorb our interests. Man—past, present, and future—lays claim to our devotion. What, then, can we say of him? Man, so far as natural science by itself is able to teach us, is no longer the final cause of the universe, the heaven-descended heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his story a brief and discreditable episode in the life of one of the meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which first converted a dead organic compound into the living progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine, disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a race with conscience enough to know that it is vile, and intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. We survey the past and see that its history is of blood and tears, of helpless blundering, of wild revolt, of stupid acquiescence, of empty aspirations. We sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the Universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. "Imperishable monuments" and "immortal deeds," death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. Nor will anything that *is* be better or be worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through countless generations to effect.

It is no reply to say that the substance of the moral law need suffer no change through any modification of our views

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of man's place in the Universe. This may be true, but it is irrelevant. We desire, and desire most passionately when we are most ourselves, to give our service to that which is universal, and to that which is abiding. Of what moment is it, then (from this point of view), to be assured of the fixity of the Moral Law when it and the sentient world, where alone it has any significance, are alike destined to vanish utterly away within periods trifling beside those with which the Geologist and the Astronomer lightly deal in the course of their habitual speculations? No doubt to us ordinary men in our ordinary moments considerations like these may seem far off and of little meaning. In the hurry and bustle of every-day life death itself—the death of the individual—seems shadowy and unreal: how much more shadowy, how much less real, that remoter but not less certain death which must some day overtake the race! Yet, after all, it is in moments of reflection that the worth of creeds may best be tested; it is through moments of reflection that they come into living and effectual contact with our active life. It cannot, therefore, be a matter to us of small moment that as we learn to survey the material world with a wider vision, as we more clearly measure the true proportions which man and his performances bear to the ordered Whole, our practical ideal gets relatively dwarfed and beggared, till we may well feel inclined to ask whether so transitory and so unimportant an accident in the general scheme of things as the fortunes of the human race, can any longer satisfy aspirations and emotions nourished upon beliefs in the Everlasting and the Divine.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

LONDON.

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EFFECT OF THE CLERICAL OFFICE UPON CHARACTER.

THE clergy and their office are related to each other as organism and environment; and therefore the purpose of any study of our subject would clearly be to point out the characteristic reactions which human nature exhibits when subjected to the special influences of the clerical profession. At the very outset of our investigation, however, it becomes necessary to call attention to the fact that neither organism nor environment is a fixed quantity. Not only do all sorts of men seek and obtain admission to the Christian ministry, but also the office itself has undergone great and radical changes in the course of its long and eventful history. It is evident, therefore, that the same environment will affect unlike natures in very unlike ways, while similar natures will, on the other hand, exhibit certain marked divergencies if subjected to aggravated differences in the ecclesiastical milieu. Hence any thorough and profitable treatment of the subject in hand would be such as should trace the curves of moral change in the clergy incident upon certain important changes in their office. The faithful discharge of such a task would, we believe, give results of considerable interest and value; and we heartily recommend it to any one who has the leisure and ability for its prosecution. All that the present writer can hope to accomplish, however, within the narrow limits assigned him, is, first, to point out some of the more radical transformations which the clerical office has undergone, together with their attendant effects upon the character of a great number of the clergy; and, second, to indicate the more important influences which the office, as it at present exists in Protestant communions, exerts upon the rank and file of its incumbents.

The original relation of church officers to the rest of the Christian community was simply that of leadership. "Liberty of prophesying" was acknowledged in the apostolic age and in the time of Tertullian. In the Apostolical Constitutions we

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read that if a layman possess the proper qualifications, he may teach, and the Ignatian Epistles give evidence of the fact that in the absence of church officers, meetings were held and the eucharist celebrated. The officers of the first Christian congregations were, therefore, not regarded as possessing, by virtue of their office, exclusive powers. All Christians were alike priests unto God. The functions exercised by the leaders, aside from the matter of order, were such as belonged to the whole community. Ordination was looked upon as a solemn appointment to office, and not as a magical rite by means of which special spiritual gifts and powers denied to the laity were bestowed. During these early times, also, the church was poor and often persecuted, and the officers pursued secular callings, such as banking and the practice of medicine. In addition to this the position of the office-bearer was, in many cases, the position of danger, and he who became a Bishop prior to the famous conversion of Constantine, frequently risked his life. From this hasty description of the clerical office as it existed in primitive times, it will be seen how little it could contribute to the formation of those defects and vices which in later ages became the marks and badges of clericalism.

With the political triumph of Christianity, however, the clerical office was radically transformed. Constantine took Christianity under his protection and showed his favor first of all by granting the officers of the Christian churches immunity from public burdens and exemption from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil courts. He also pensioned not only the clergy, but their widows and orphans. The clergy thus became a privileged class as well as a class "civilly distinct" from the rest of the community.

In addition to imperial patronage other causes were at work which effected great and far-reaching changes in the clerical office. Asceticism demanded that the clergy should lead the "higher life," and should avoid not only marriage but amusements. In time they became still further distinguished from the laity by the tonsure and a special dress. Superstition, too, was at work, and assigned to the priest peculiar powers

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analogous to those accredited to the Jewish and heathen priesthoods. It was, of course, inevitable that such sweeping alterations as these in the clerical office should produce their effects upon human character. The office became the road to wealth and power, while the immunity from civil burdens which its holders enjoyed induced many of the richer citizens to seek within its protecting care an escape from imperial taxation. Thus it came about that the office developed, among many other evils, the sin of avarice, and also became the seed-plot of worldly ambition. Even Jerome paints in dark colors the corruptions of the Roman clergy, and there can be no doubt that in fostering these corruptions the constitution of the clerical office had no inconsiderable share.

But further and important changes were to come. Under Constantine the clergy had been transformed from the leaders of democratic societies to a senate or separate aristocratic order with special privileges and emoluments. Under the great Popes of the Middle Ages they were raised into a monarchic and despotic class. Hildebrand brought the Emperor to Canossa, and the clergy became not only spiritual but temporal rulers. In addition to being the keepers of the human conscience and the repositories of human learning, they became statesmen, princes, and warriors. Celibacy, too, was enforced with extreme rigor under Hildebrand, and with most disastrous results to the morals of the clergy. The inviolability of the priests and their immunity from the jurisdiction of the secular courts made the commission of terrible crimes and unblushing immoralities among them facts of common occurrence. The Church became, indeed, in the very worst sense, a kingdom of this world, and its officers were for the most part pre-eminently worldlings. Clerical office was more than ever the road to wealth and power, and offered, moreover, to lust and greed an almost secure asylum of enjoyment. In brief, the clergy, who had become a sacerdotal caste, exercising despotic and supernatural powers, were, in the language of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, "a source of pollution to the whole earth." There can be little doubt, therefore, that the clerical office as

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it existed in the Middle Ages was productive in the main of the most disastrous results to the character of the clergy. My purpose in the foregoing sketch, however, has simply been to point out that changes in the official environment leave their marks upon the moral organism of the official.

The Reformation in its turn wrought extensive changes in the clerical office, which in the long run have reacted favorably upon ministerial character. With few exceptions, the Protestant clergy are no longer regarded, neither do they regard themselves, as a sacerdotal caste. They have ceased to hold a monopoly of learning, and the increasing cultivation of the pews has been known, in some instances at least, to bring about humility in the pulpit. In England the "Benefit of Clergy," which was throughout a period of many years variously abridged and modified, was finally abolished in 1827, under George IV. In these United States Roman Catholic as well as Protestant divines are citizens of the Republic, and although Church property is still exempted from taxation, the individual clergyman bears his share of the civil burdens, and is amenable to the jurisdiction of the secular courts. The salaries, moreover, which are paid to the vast majority of Protestant ministers can hardly be said to constitute a temptation either to flesh or imagination, and he who craves wealth or the privilege of an unfettered development of mind never dreams of taking holy orders. In this country, too, no church enjoys, or rather suffers from, the patronage of the state. Clerical dress, also, is becoming less common, and in addition to the many clergymen whose outward attire can in no way be distinguished from that of respectable laymen, there are others, who, with high-cut vests and secular coats, may be said to mark a transition period between this world and the next. Furthermore, the disposition to honor the parson because of what he is rather than by reason of his ghostly office is daily growing in strength and latitude. On the whole, therefore, we may confidently affirm that the clerical office as it exists to-day in most Protestant churches approximates in some important particulars to that which was exercised by the leaders of the Christian congre-

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gations during the first two centuries. It is equally certain that the moral character of the great majority of clergymen is far higher than it was in seventeen and eighteen hundred; and although many causes have no doubt contributed to this result, the effect of those changes in the clerical office which have largely abolished sacerdotalism and materially lessened privilege and patronage, cannot but be reckoned as good. The sources of moral regeneration lie, indeed, deeper than the atmosphere of office. Pure men have in all ages of the Church resisted the temptations to which their ecclesiastical environment exposed them, as well as availed themselves with pious care of its spiritual advantages. In like manner we may purify the atmosphere without cleansing the lives of many of those who live and move in it. In other words, the office does not necessarily make the man, although it unquestionably influences him for evil or for good. Due, therefore, as the improvement in the clergy is to causes which have improved society at large, yet the reformation of the clerical office itself cannot but exert, for the most part, salutary effects upon those who occupy it, as well as determine, for the good of the Church, who shall become her office-bearers.

And yet, notwithstanding the abolition of "Benefit of Clergy," and in this country of state patronage,—despite the repudiation by almost all Protestants of the sacerdotal conception of the clerical office and the consequent lessening of the gap between ministers and people, the clergy still remain, in many respects, a separate and privileged class; neither do they wholly escape the evils of patronage. It is, moreover, these three characteristics of the clerical office to which, in the opinion of the writer, most of the bad effects which it exerts upon the character of the clergyman may be ultimately traced. To some of the more important of these as they at present exhibit themselves I shall now turn my attention; and if it should seem to my readers that in the course of this paper I have dwelt too exclusively upon the evil effects of the clerical office, I can only inform them I have done so of set purpose. I am by no means blind to the virtues of the clergy, nor to the fact that their office is capable of high and holy

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influences. I shall, moreover, before I close, take occasion to mention what I regard some of these influences to be. On the other hand, I cannot but state as a fact of personal experience that *cæteris paribus* the admirableness of clerical character is in inverse proportion to its officialism. Other things being equal, the less a clergyman relies upon his office and the more he depends upon the human qualities of love and purity and mental rectitude, the higher will he stand in the scale of moral being. Dr. Hatch, speaking of the clergy, says in his admirable Bampton Lectures, "But of what they came to be, it is difficult to speak with a calm judgment, because the incalculable good which they have wrought in the midst of human society has been tempered with so much of failure and of sin. One point, at least, however, seems evident, that that incalculable good has been achieved rather by the human influence which they have exercised than by the superhuman power which they have sometimes claimed." To "the superhuman power which they have sometimes claimed" we might add most of their official prerogatives, for it is a fact palpable to most intelligent laymen that not only is the good which the clergyman accomplishes chiefly attributable to his manhood and not to his office, but also what is more to our present purpose that certain characteristics of the office itself seriously handicap and impair the development of his mental and moral character. At any rate the writer of this paper has taken special pains to question a number of sensible laymen—some twenty-one in all—as to their opinion of the effect of the clerical office upon character, and in every instance but one the answer was instantaneously given: "Bad." It would seem that we have here all the required elements of certainty, since we are not only presented with the cordial unanimity of twenty gentlemen, but also furnished in the case of the twenty-first with that inestimable supplementary proof of the rule—the exception.

But to proceed to specifications. It has been said that the Protestant clergy, despite the transformations which their office has undergone in modern times, still remain a separate and privileged class, and do not altogether escape the moral dan-

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gers of patronage. And first of all as to the evils of separateness or official isolation. There is a sense, of course, in which every clergyman, as every Christian, should keep himself separate and unspotted from the world, but we are speaking of class or official separateness. This official separateness begins at the time of ordination. Comparatively few Protestant clergymen, be it said to their honor, believe that "the laying on of hands" confers upon them any necromantic functions, or even endows them with hitherto unenjoyed qualities of mind or character; and yet great numbers of them feel in a vague sort of way that their ordination ought to affect their intellectual and moral status, and so they forthwith proceed to speak and act as if it actually had done so. This assumption, combined with the assurance that, having been made ministers of the gospel, they must now not only go into uniform, but generally adopt a style of utterance and deportment suited to their position, leads to unnaturalness. This unnaturalness exhibits itself in a great variety of forms, but in general it may be described as a failure to furnish normal and healthful reactions to the ordinary stimuli of social environment. "One rarely feels," wrote a friend of mine a few weeks ago, "that a clerk in holy orders is absolutely spontaneous and frank." "The clergyman," wrote another, "is always made up. He knows that he is expected to be a model, and so he endeavors to be one."

Now there can be no question that the compulsion to be an ensample unto the flock is a good influence in the clergyman's life so long as this compulsion is moral, but when it is chiefly official,—when, in other words, the cleric feels himself obliged to be an example to others rather by virtue of his office than because of the world's crying need of righteousness,—then the evil effects of office are likely to display themselves in assumed airs of wisdom or sanctity. I remember once being present when a clerical friend of mine, with the assistance of a humble parishioner, was busily engaged in packing up his library. During a pause in the operations the parishioner glanced about the room and seeing that there were still many volumes remaining upon the shelves, exclaimed, "Gracious me! It must have taken an awful long

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time to read all these books." Instead of frankly admitting that he had not looked inside half of them, the clergyman promptly replied, "Oh, these are not many." He was expected to be wise, and he did not disclaim the flattering impeachment. To show that I have not misinterpreted his words, I might add that he afterwards confessed to me it would never have done to let the man suppose he had not read the books of his own library. This, if one will, is but a mild form of deceit, and yet it shows the effect of trying to make people believe that we are either better or cleverer than we are. Moreover, the temptation to present an outward appearance which shall correspond with the current expectations of what a clergyman ought to be is one which is preeminently characteristic of the clerical office, and leads to those affectations of manner and hypocrisies of speech which we have classed under the general head of unnaturalness.

Then, too, the separateness of the clergyman's position helps to place him upon a pedestal. He is looked up to with a reverence and deferred to with a respect to which, often enough, neither the weight of his opinions nor the exceptionalness of his piety entitles him. The women, in particular, are prone to burn incense before him. They laugh immoderately at his poorest jokes, praise his emptiest sermons, and follow him about with looks of ill-concealed admiration. The men, it is true, are more reserved in their demonstrations of regard than the women, but even they can hardly be excused from granting that deference to "the cloth" which is only rightfully due to the virtues and abilities of the man. The effect upon poor human nature of this undue, and in most cases undeserved, exaltation, is that it forms the habit of thinking of itself more highly than it ought to think. Whatever may be the virtues of the clerical profession, it is certain that humility is not one of them. Accustomed to be listened to without rejoinder, they show a marked impatience of candid criticism; and when actually subjected to contradiction and put into a corner they evince a strong disinclination to fight fair, as well as a perverse desire to dodge the whole question at issue. The results, therefore, of the official elevation, which,

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be it remembered, falls to the lot of even the humblest clergyman, are likely, according to the nature of the man, to be dogmatism, effeminacy, arrogance, vanity, "a too great love of praise," priggishness. At any rate, prig and priest stand very close to each other in the dictionary.

A further effect of the office is that it serves to stifle originality and to produce automatism, not merely of manners, but of mind. It provides a livery for the intellect as well as the body. And hence, where the sense of official rather than of intellectual responsibility is very strong, it is tradition rather than personal experience which stocks alike the clerical mind and the clerical vocabulary. "I suppose there are certain phrases and expressions that you feel you must always use in preaching," said a layman to me several years ago, and therein avowed his recognition of the extent and obligation of clerical uniformity. Such official conformity to tradition, whether enforced by canon or required by the dictates of the priestly conscience, is the undoubted enemy of spontaneity of thought and feeling,—of inspiration,—prophecy. And when to this intellectual uniformity which the office tends to induce is added the daily round of clerical duties, together with the necessity of preaching several times a week, it can be seen how difficult it is in such an environment to avoid mechanicalness of mind, and to preserve the freshness of the well-springs of feeling. Even so fertile and spontaneous a soul as that of Frederick W. Robertson testifies to the effect of parochial routine and constant preaching in the following memorable words. "It reminds me," he says, "of the 'Song of the Shirt,'—'Work, work, work;' and the perpetual tread-mill necessity of being forever ready twice a week with earnest thoughts on solemn subjects is a task which is quite enough to break down all originality, and convert a race-horse into a dray."

Perhaps the most noticeable influence, however, which the clerical office exerts upon intellectual character is its tendency to dull, and even destroy, in certain most important directions, the powers of perception and observation. The clergy, in the main, regard themselves as the recipients of a sacred

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deposit of revelation which, in the form that has been given it by their particular branch of the church, is held to be final and complete. In their opinion, no increase of knowledge, no change in the point of view, no development of the mind, can impair the validity of those doctrinal statements which they have accepted as essential to the faith. For most of them the questions involved in these statements are forever closed. To examine the basis of belief is looked upon as treason. Hence the clergy, as a class, are not investigators, and have, as a rule, been found to be hostile to investigation. They are not seekers after truth, but the advocates of a system. They regard it as their mission to enforce belief rather than to promote research. Consequently, while they are addicted to what Carlyle calls "logicizing," their powers of insight or perception, except within a very narrow field, are untrained and undeveloped. When men are assured they know it all, it is not likely that they will make a good use of their eyes.

In confirmation of the foregoing statements we take great pleasure in calling the attention of our readers to a typical product of the clerical mind, in the shape of an article written by the Rt. Rev. Leighton Coleman, Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the State of Delaware, and published in the *North American Review* for January, 1893. The title of the article is "The Limits of Legitimate Religious Discussion," and in it the right reverend gentleman maintains that any one who questions that Christ is God, or who feels disposed to doubt the binding moral obligation of the two sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, is beyond the pale even of religious discussion. With a liberality of mind truly beautiful to behold, he adds, however, "I am quite prepared to admit that there are some points in regard to the sacraments which may be legitimately discussed,—*e. g.*, the mode of Baptism," and then goes on to say,—"But as to their necessity, there is no room for debate." . . . "It is not an open question. In fact, it has never been anything else but a closed question, except as those who are rebellious have dared to debate it." Whatever else may be said of the intel-

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lectual attitude revealed in the foregoing quotation, we can hardly be accused of exaggerating or distorting it when we affirm it to be hostile to investigation and the exercise of the perceptive powers. In the judgment of the Bishop, certain questions are forever closed, and he is a traitor who presumes to critically examine them. To show that the Bishop has given us not merely a fair sample of theological argument, but a vivid picture of the clerical intellect as well, we cannot forbear relating a story of a colored preacher, told by Mr. Edward Eggleston in one of the *Scribners* of 1878. The occasion of the story is a baptism. "Before leading the neophytes into the water, the negro preacher," says Mr. Eggleston, "improved the occasion to make a few very solemn and feeling remarks to his hearers. 'Now, my breddern,' he chanted in a doleful recitative, 'you all 'll want to know what's de reason dat immussion is de only mode ob babtism. Well, now, my breddern, bless de Laud, 'tain't none o' yoah business.'" "'Tain't none o' yoah business" was the negro preacher's way of announcing that the question was closed, and we have no doubt that upon the occasion just referred to the reverend gentleman was eminently successful in suppressing religious discussion.

But not only does the adoption of a fixed dogmatic system as a final statement of truth discourage the development of insight and observation, it also, together with what we may term the class apperceptions of the clergy, often blinds them to facts quite above ground, and visible to every normal eye. In proof of this we once more quote Dr. Coleman, whose article we believe deserves far more attention than it has actually received. Remembering that a Christian, according to Dr. Coleman, is not only one who must believe that Christ is God, but also one who insists upon the moral obligation of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, we are confronted on the fifteenth page of the review with the following remarkable declaration: "A man who is not a Christian cannot be accounted a moral man." To accept this is to deny the facts of moral vision. And yet in extenuation of the Bishop's blindness as well as in confirmation of our present contention that the

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effect of the clerical office is to dull the powers of perception, we feel ourselves bound to add that Dr. Coleman confesses in another part of his article to exceptionally bad eyesight. "Of what use are the eyes," he says, "without the telescope, except to see dimly and uncertainly?" The reason, therefore, that the Bishop is unable to recognize such men as Dr. James Martineau, Dr. Edward Everett Hale, and countless others as moral men, must be due to the fact that when he takes his walks abroad in the moral world he leaves his telescope at home. Adopting and adapting the dying words of the great William Tyndale, the devoutly ethical soul cannot but pray: "Lord, open the Bishop of Delaware's eyes."

And now let us turn to the effects of the office in so far as it procures for the holders of it certain legal and private privileges not extended to most other men. The legal privileges since the abolition of "Benefit of Clergy" are few in number, and need not detain us. That the clergy in a Christian community should nowadays be granted immunity from military service is almost inevitable, whereas exemption from duty in the jury-box has many and weighty arguments in its favor. It is the private or unwritten privileges of the clerical office whose effect upon character we wish to notice. The most prominent of these are what may fairly be called "pauper privileges," and take the forms of clerical discounts, donation parties, scholarships for clergymen's sons, and the like. Almost all papers and magazines offer special rates to the parson, while not a few stores and hotels successfully advertise themselves through systematic pauperization of the clergy. "Our experiment of advertising teas and coffees at very low rates to the clergy throughout the United States has met with great success"—such is the first sentence of a circular sent me not long ago by a firm of aspiring merchants. "We have given much earnest thought during the past two months to a consideration of just how to make a New Year's donation to the clergy of America," wrote a far too prominent company of booksellers and publishers at the close of 1892. Such are a few instances, and many more might be mentioned, of the modern survivals of "Benefit of Clergy."

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Their effect is to lessen the manliness and self-respect of many worthy men, who, because they are underpaid and have, not infrequently, large families to support, willingly grasp at almost any chance to eke out their miserable incomes.

But it is not the poor clergymen alone who avail themselves of such clerical privileges. I once heard a comparatively wealthy parson plead for a reduced fare at the ticket-office of a large railway station, and he went away greatly incensed because his plea was denied. Among the well-to-do clergy who are reluctant to lose a chance of saving a penny, these monetary privileges often develop phases of closeness and meanness sad to behold. "Perhaps if you are a good girl, Mrs. T. will give you two cents' worth of candy for a cent," said a minister of the Gospel to his little daughter whom he had just taken into a small confectioner's shop. This was said, of course, in the presence of Mrs. T., who, by the way, was one of his own parishioners, and hard put to it, besides, to make both ends meet. Now it is this desire of getting two cents' worth of anything for a cent which the privileges at present granted to the clergy serve to develop. This may be business, but it certainly is not Christianity.

Furthermore, the effect of privilege in general is to beget the belief among the clergy that the laws which govern other men do not hold good for them. Sometimes this belief betrays itself in naïve and amusing forms. Not long ago, while busily engaged in the reading-room of a large public library, I was greeted by a clergyman, who drew me into conversation. After the exchange of a few sentences, I pointed him to a placard whereon all conversation was emphatically forbidden. He turned and glanced at it for a moment, and then once more addressing himself to me, smilingly replied, "But that, of course, is not meant to apply to us clergymen." He was in earnest, too, for he went on talking.

But the sense of privilege has other and graver consequences. I have known clergymen unblushingly apply money to other objects than those specified by the donors. And yet they meant nothing wrong. They were simply availing themselves of a professional privilege. Among laymen,

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however, such an act would be called "misappropriation of funds." Exceptional privileges may, therefore, go so far as to dull the sense of honor and blunt the fine edge of moral judgments.

And now a final word upon the effects of the patronage to which, because of their official position, the clergy are exposed. It is to be admitted, of course, that patronage is not an unmixed evil, neither are the clergy the only ones who have been subjected to its influences. Poets and philosophers have had their patrons as well as the ministers of Christ. And yet it remains true that ever since Constantine took the church under his protection the evils of patronage in some form or other have been apparent among the clergy. It is not my purpose at present to follow the changes which patronage itself has undergone. Suffice it to say that while, in the Established Church of England, both individuals and corporations are the owners of "livings," and therefore the patrons of the incumbents, in these United States the patron, except in those parishes which are ruled by one or more wealthy men, is the public. Formerly men dangled at the heels of the powerful and great, now they are tempted, in the majority of cases, to pay their court to the people. This transference of patronage from the monarch or the nobleman to the public at large has had its far-reaching consequences for good, and yet he who supposes that in escaping the clutches of the individual tyrant we have, therefore, either in journalism or the pulpit, attained the estates of mental independence and moral courage is laboring under a grievous mistake. The public may be as exacting in its demands as the veriest despot of ancient times, and even more wilful in the bestowal of its favor. In the men who cater to this public we observe the recurrence of the self-same vices that disgraced the days of individual patronage. An undue deference to the demands of the people may display itself in the clever diplomacy of the "man of tact," as well as in the vulgar flattery of the common demagogue; in the timid reticence of the scholarly rector as well as in the cheap discourses of the popular preacher. And whatever may be the means by which men

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attempt to disguise the disagreeable fact, it remains unquestionably true that the people have a decided power over the parson, and are by no means indisposed, in many instances, to exercise it.

The power of the people, then, being such as it is, we confidently believe that certain crying evils which we have observed in some of the clergy are largely attributable to the public patronage they endeavor to secure. To do my brethren of the clergy justice, I do not believe them to be money-loving men, but in the matter of preferment they are, as the English say, exceedingly keen. The love of preferment, be it also observed, is a clerical vice of long standing. It was rife in the Middle Ages, and later on the famous and brilliant Rochester remarked in no very complimentary terms upon its widespread prevalence. At one time it was to be obtained by purchase; now it is for the most part in the gift of the people. To win the people is to obtain success; hence the sensationalism of many pulpits and the general commercialism of clerical thought and life. What can be the object of the men who advertise themselves to preach upon such subjects as the following: "A Troubled Woman's Anonymous Letter," "Trials and Triumphs of a Boston Boarder," "Is your Trolley on the Wire?" and so on *ad infinitum et ad nauseam?* To the same desire for patronage we attribute the widespread desertion of those religious questions with which the minds of intelligent men are busily occupied, for the discussion of "Town Talk" and "Current Topics." If the clergy could but give the world richer and more thoughtful expressions of the religious life, instead of second-hand discourses on socialism and economics, we believe the world would be greatly in their debt. But richer and more thoughtful expressions of the religious life have their dangers for ambitious men. They are not invariably popular, and have, in addition, a natural tendency to come into collision with the ecclesiastical authorities. And so the evils of the patronage to which the holders of the clerical office are exposed are abundantly manifest. Now, as always, they are self-seeking, time-serving, the destruction of mental integrity and moral courage, together with

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the loss of that pure and lofty spirit of unworldliness which is of the essence of the Kingdom of Heaven.

We have now pointed out in detail some of the more important and characteristic effects of the clerical office upon character. That this high office has other effects than those we have enumerated, we gladly acknowledge, but these last we believe to be most prominent where the claims of human brotherhood transcend the consciousness of class and privilege, and where the sense of official position is lost in the sacredness of human duty. The position of a clergyman gives him exceptional opportunities for high and holy thought as well as rare and innumerable chances for the doing of good. Many also are the men who are conscientiously availing themselves of these great *moral* privileges of their office, and to whom we may justly apply the words in which Chaucer described the parish priest of his own day:

> "Christē's love and hys Apostles twelve
> He taught, but first he followed it himselve."

LANGDON C. STEWARDSON.

WORCESTER, MASS.

RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT AND THE MORAL PROBLEM IN ITALY.

MY colleague at the University of Naples, Professor Raffaele Mariano, in his article in the January number of the JOURNAL, has dissented from an opinion of mine concerning the historic problem of the influence of the Church of Rome and of the Papacy on the spirit and life of the Italian people. I wrote on this subject in the Review *La Nuova Antologia*,* and Professor Mariano replied to me in a lengthy address, delivered before the Academy of Moral Sciences in Naples, entitled "Is Catholic Italy Christian or Pagan?"

The point at issue in the discussion † was this: What impor-

* June 10 and July 1, 1891.

† Several Italian and foreign Reviews took part in it: among others, *La Revue Chrétienne*, September, 1891; *La Revue Suisse*, July, 1892; London *Spectator*, November 21, 1891.

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tance does either of us attach to the value of that historic adaptation which has taken place in the religious and moral character of the people among whom the Papacy has arisen, and to the ethical quality of the social and political influences which it has exerted over them?

I cannot deny that the dominion of Rome, unquestioned for centuries, has had the effect of weakening the desire for an inward faith, such as the northern nations possess, and of dulling the conscience, and that it has given to the externals of religion an undue importance. Nor can it be forgotten that in proportion as the externals of faith and practice have grown in importance, and imaginative and theatrical forms and ceremonies have affected the deeper and more spiritual interpretations of Christianity, so in the life of the nation there has been a corresponding intellectual, moral, and social decay in the last two centuries, and the loss of those first original impulses by means of which, in the thirteenth century, it had obtained its place in history.

But, while I should recognize the Papacy as one of the factors in this decadence, I cannot, with Professor Mariano, consider it as the original and principal cause. For me "the chief cause of degeneracy of the Christian Spirit" is not to be found, as my colleague thinks, "in the Papal Church, in the nature of its maxims, of its dogmas, and in its method of regulating and governing the consciences of the people."* The religious and political tradition of the control of Catholic consciences, which for centuries has become more and more strengthened in the hands of the Roman Church, is to be considered a consequence rather than a cause,—a consequence of the trend of the entire history and life of the Italian people, a result of their manner of conceiving and understanding religious truths; just as the political structure and policy of the Papacy are both the work of our own minds and hands. In this respect our country has played the same part as it did in the history of intellectual development. The honor, which certainly belongs to it, of having been the vehicle by which,

* January number of this JOURNAL, p. 214.

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during the Renaissance, the spirit of antique thought and art came into the possession of the other European nations, has been more than outbalanced by the baneful influence on our literature, especially our prose, of the constant imitation of antique models. So, too, the fact that we have lived in the very centre of the moral and civil organism and administration of the Catholic Church,—which may well be defined as a dictatorship of the conscience; the fact that we have impressed upon the Church, from the earliest epoch of the Middle Ages, the mental imprint of the Latin form, and, as it were, made it the heir of Roman instincts and traditions; the fact that we have thus converted the Church into a sort of continuation of the Roman imperium in the spiritual world,—all this has led us to introduce into the circle of our history and into the equilibrium of the forces of our national life an institution which, though founded upon it, has gravitated toward the outside, and has not been able since to identify itself with our political and civil interests.

I.

Taine, in his "History of English Literature," mentions among the chief causes that for centuries have prevented Italian unity and a permanent political adjustment "the cosmopolitan position of the Pope" (*la situation cosmopolite de son pape*), thus accepting an opinion of Machiavelli's which since his time has been shared by most of our political writers. Catholic Rome has been since its very beginning and is at the present time a power more political than spiritual, but its methods and its aims are not and never will be national, Italian aims. The historic fate which made it an institution essentially Italian in its origin and character, which, especially since the sixteenth century, has given it the central position of initiative and protection, inspiring to art and to our entire civilization, has resulted in rendering the moral and civil development of the Papacy inseparable from that of Italian life as a whole; whence came that identification of our life with the traditional spirit of Catholic Rome which has proved to our great disad-

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vantage; to it being due our weakness, our internal conflicts and conquests by external foes.

Indeed, side by side with the splendors of the court of the humanistic and art-loving Popes of the seventeenth century, there appear, like dark shadows on a painting, all those historic causes which have sustained the hegemony of Catholicism solely by excluding us almost entirely from the current of secularization that is pervading modern thought and to which such an impulse was given by the Reformation. Humanism, with its return to Paganism (which did not in our case, as with the Germanic nations, find a corrective in a revival of Christianity), finds our minds and our culture in a very different position from that pure introspection of the human conscience to which Dante had returned, and by means of which the English drama and English lyrics and prose have attained their profoundly modern insight. The great reform of Trent, of which the Papacy was the animating spirit, and that reaction against Protestantism, whose vast historic proportions so astonished Macaulay, could not have been conceived and in great part completed by Italian minds without this result: that the force needed for repressing free inquiry and investigation should lead, as it actually did, to the stifling of the new philosophic thought that was just rising.

It may truly be said that the mind of the nation has been influenced by the menaces of the Inquisition in very much the same way as was Galileo. As in the case of Galileo—a prisoner and an abjurer—the philosopher became silenced, and only the scientist was allowed to speak; so in Italy also, since the burning of Bruno and the imprisoning of Campanella, we have, with the exception of Vico, heard only the experimentalist and the scholar. The moral sciences were stifled by the fatal atmosphere of the Roman reaction. It can be asserted that Italy has never had a modern philosophy of its own, as it has never had a philosophic prose. All its later literature during the past centuries reveals a lack of active, penetrating, original thought,—of thought that is truly modern and humane.

In this respect I am entirely in accord with the opinion of my friend Professor Mariano, namely, that the extreme

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repression practised by the Church of Rome during the later period of our civilization has been fatal to the thought and the religious conscience of the Italians. But I do not concede that this degeneration and this approach to Paganism have been entirely, or in great part, the work of the Papacy. Nor can I agree that the loss in spontaneity and vitality, both in substance and in form, of most of our prose writers since the time of Boccaccio, must be attributed solely to the prevalence of humanism. For this phenomenon—so noteworthy in our literature that it may be considered to be its controlling influence—has its origin in the Italian nature itself, in its original disposition, which from its first manifestation in art has been inclined to return to the cultivation and imitation of what is classical and antique.

The same holds true of Italian religiosity. In its original form, that is, in the manner in which the nation has always conceived and represented the things of the moral and supersensible world, it has reproduced those traits that were characteristic of the religious conscience of the classic nations, especially of the Latins. Instead of an ardent faith in the divine mystery of things and of life, this belief consisted in a complication of rites and practices representative of the social bonds and of the union of the citizen with his country; it was a function of public life, a habit consecrated by its legality.

And, in substance, such has remained the religion understood and practised by the majority of the Italians, especially those of the lower classes. It has always consisted principally in the ritual observance of that which constitutes the legal part of the religious code prescribed by the Roman Church; it has always laid and does still lay more stress in fact, if not in theory, on the merit and sanctification of acts and their public fulfilment, on the forms of social sanction, and hence on the office of the priest, than on the deep personal experience and inspirations of a faith which has its message for the soul alone. Of that austere spirituality, both moral and mystical, which was at the bottom of primitive Christianity, of its pessimistic conception of life and sin, and its expectation of a reign of God, the religious spirit of the Latins and Italians assim-

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ilated only that which was least repugnant to their habits and hereditary disposition of mind and to their classical atavism, which led them to conceive of life and conduct with serene equanimity and a harmony of thought and sentiment in accord with their nature and social instincts and highly satisfying to their artistic tendencies.

Italian Christianity from its beginning, and during the Middle Ages, was penetrated by the essentially Latin tendency to seek the highest expression of faith and its true value in the unity of the social consensus and in the strong authoritative discipline of the creeds sanctioned by the Church. It is constantly tending to interpret the recondite moral significance of the evangelic ideals in such forms as to moderate their primitive mysticism and bring them within the province of art. It is far less subject to the eccentric influences of individuals and the heresies that rebel against the authority of Rome, than the Christianity of the French, the Anglo-Saxons, and the Germans. The religious spirit of the Italians, of which Calvin remarked to one of his friends that it could not be trusted, appears to us more Catholic and ecclesiastic than Christian, in the meaning correctly given to this term by the Reformers, who interpreted and explained the innermost moral significance of Christianity and its conception of life and the divine in a manner entirely divergent from our own, inspired as they were by the religious instincts of the Germanic race.

II.

This divergence was already foreshadowed by the two opposing factions, which inclined in opposite directions under the external unity of the theological system of Scholasticism; one side leaning to the mystics and heretics (the majority of these were Celts and Teutons), the other side upholding the dominion and the decisions of the Church (these for the greater part, from Anselm of Aosta to Thomas Aquinas, were Italians). This division tended, on the one hand, to spread among those holding the popular beliefs and doctrines the recognition of the advent of a faith which every believer must

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make over to suit himself; or, on the other hand, to keep in check the multitude of minds and souls who were in powerful unanimity under the central authority of Rome.

Not that Italy did not also have its mystics and heretics. But they had only a small following, unless, like Arnold of Brescia, they became political agitators. They were the least mystical among the mystics, the most humanistic and most moderate of all the mediæval ascetics. The man who best represents the true type of mediæval Italian ascetics is Francis of Assisi. He was a great and holy artist, who carried out his reform in full accord with the Roman Church, who imparted to his propaganda a social impress of sympathy for the aspirations and the moral life of the multitude, and who, by his deeply poetic sentiment for nature, gave a powerful impulse to Italian art. The excesses of mysticism among the Franciscans, that for a moment during the thirteenth century seemed to have a following among the populace of Tuscany, did not affect the great mass of the Italian people. With their good common sense and with that fine perception for reality, which led them in their communal institutions, in advance of all other European nations, to the forms of modern life, the Italians appreciated that in the historical evolution of Christianity the central trend of the tradition of Roman rule, derived as it was from exclusively Latin origin, represented something more compatible with their own disposition and state of society than any other kind of civilization.

That is the reason why, notwithstanding all the errors and faults of the Papal Court, the popular party in most of our communes, and especially in the most illustrious and most Italian of all—Florence—belonged to the Guelf party. The Italians have always deplored the harm done to their country and to religion by the luxury, the abuse of temporal power, the nepotism and political ambition of so many of the Popes. No other literature has among its great writers such a chorus of censors and satiric writers against the habits of the clergy as ours, from the time of Dante. But, notwithstanding all this, there has been for centuries a state of tacit complicity between the Roman Church and the religious and civil conscience of our

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people, so that the Papacy has owed its permanence to a deeply-rooted hold over the conscience, having known instinctively how to meet its needs, having, in short, been able to understand and govern it in all particulars, even in its defects,—nay, rather by means of those very defects themselves.

III.

This is the true story of our religious history. It may be criticised with severity, but above all must it be studied and understood. Certain it is that as the spiritual ferment of charity and ardent faith—which through the efforts of the Franciscans had infused a new life into the Church—was destroyed, as the Church yielded and accommodated itself to whatever restricted idealism and sentiment among the people to a mechanical cult and an idolatry of pure forms, Rome lent its aid in bringing on that corruption by which the moral life of our country was exhausted while at the very height of its literary and artistic prosperity. But the influence of the Papacy is only one link in this chain of cause and effect, a link which presupposes many antecedents, of which the most important was this,—the historical and moral direction which the national character imparted to an institution growing out of it. We can, therefore, understand how closely connected are the acts of the Papacy with the entire development of this civilization, which, since the fourteenth century, has been gradually turning away from the moral basis of Christianity, and which has become an atavistic revival of classical pagan tradition and sensuality. The same historic necessity that at every critical moment in the development of art and letters called forth the protective support of Rome also induced the Papacy to take part in the humanistic movement, putting it morally and religiously in a direction widely diverging from that in which the reformers, already before Luther, had tended, in their desire to get their inspiration at the very fount of primitive Christianity.

That such a reform, initiated by some great effort of the people, would have been impossible with us, is demonstrated

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by the fact that the spirit of religiosity seemed to be entirely exhausted at the very moment when it awoke in the nations of the North and in France. Our nation, which even during the Middle Ages, says Burckhardt, had remained "half antique," and as such had entered the thirteenth century, anticipating by two hundred years the rest of Europe in the Renaissance, had spent all its rich vitality in a precocious blossoming that shone out in wonderful forms, but which remained mere forms without any moral content. The value of the growing civilization of the Anglo-Saxons, the Dutch, and the Germans, lay above all in the spiritual inwardness of a faith which appealed to the heart. But with us Latins and Italians this religiosity has never prevailed. The Roman Church could not give us this, nor revive it when it was spent. The Papacy achieved the only religious and moral reform after that of Trent which was then possible to it, and which was consistent with the tradition and the historic evolution of the Latin people, and particularly our own. Amidst the sensuality and the corruption of the last two centuries, Rome has been the only spiritual and civil power which still emphasized some great ideals, which still gave some living impulse to the consciousness and culture of Italy.

IV.

By these and other considerations, rather hinted at than developed in my essay "Mystic and Pagan Italy," I have endeavored to trace a psychological history of the religious life of the Italians. Such a study belongs to the category, so pertinent to the modern spirit, which the JOURNAL OF ETHICS, with praiseworthy enterprise, has established. I believe that no other country at the present time has so great a moral obligation before it as Italy in the task of taking up *sine ira et studio* the historic study of its religious development, in order to deduce from an objective understanding of its hereditary disposition, its habits of mind, its moral strength and deficiency, the sound judgment for the solution of its present and future problems. Never did these seem so serious and threatening as at the present moment. Never were they, as now, subordi-

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nate to a single dominant question,—namely, the direction and moral education of our people, in which religious sentiment and the Catholic Church may still take so large a part.

Except as a means of determining the importance of the Roman ecclesiastical question and our relations to the Papacy, the opinions of the leading classes of Italians are vague, uncertain, and negative, if not absolutely valueless. Never in the history of any political movement has the party that led and inspired the movement shown such profound indifference to the moral consequences affecting the spirit and life of an entire nation, and been so little prepared to measure and control them, and lead them to a high ideal of civil life.

Since the death of Cavour, whose watchword, "*libera Chiesa in libero Stato*," might be called a skilful expedient rather than a contribution toward a definite solution of the great problem of our relations with Rome, the entire ecclesiastical policy of the new *régime* has aimed at overturning the temporal authority of the Pope and combating and diminishing in every way its moral and religious power by revolutionary and sectarian means, always trying to destroy, without any high and true conception of what ought to be done for public morality and education. With the exception of some of our best statesmen, such as D'Azeglio, Ricasoli, and Minghetti, and two or three important authors, as Mamiani, Jacini, and Bonghi, the great majority of those who take part in Italian affairs have shown, in their attitude toward the Church and the Pope, but one disposition,—to live for the day only and let things take care of themselves. The great practical leaders of Parliamentarism have always put off for tomorrow the needs of a nation the traditional basis of whose moral and religious life they have completely undermined, without offering any new support to replace the old.

The evident impotence of all the political parties that have controlled the government, when brought face to face with the problem of a permanent economical and administrative adjustment, is now apparent to all, even the most sceptical. Besides, there is another difficulty conspicuous in our present problem: sooner or later, by the force of events, a traditional

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form of government falls into weakness and discredit, and is not able to administer the affairs of a great nation, or to retain any hold on its intellectual and moral life, when the fact is that it has never identified itself with its highest and truest ideals.*

Such a state of things has come to pass in Italy. The mass of the people know the government only through its fiscal control, which imposes the heaviest taxes and puts down insurrection, but they never feel its directing and educating power, which is entirely lacking in any lofty conception. This applies chiefly to public education. The dangerous activity of sects and of enemies to civil order—permitted by a dishonest and licentious press and uncontrolled by the government—spreads among the people; the schools give an instruction without educational value and create in many minds unsatisfied needs and desires, impatience and profound discontent. Furthermore, the condition of public education has been unsatisfactory since the beginning of the present government, because the financial position of the teachers has not been so provided for as to assure them proper respect and to allow them to devote themselves without anxiety to their noble calling. If the greater part of the millions which have been squandered on useless public works, imposed upon the government by intriguing deputies who wished to ingratiate themselves with their electors, had been expended on schools, then popular education would at least have had an assured foundation on which something solid could be built.

The moral education which the people most need should come to them as a directing impulse from the culture of the

* This was seen in the conduct of the government in 1878 in a case of no great importance in itself, but of great moral significance. In the religious movement initiated by the popular Tuscan prophet David Lazzaretti of Arcidosso, while at the head of a faithful band, among whom were many women and children, he, with some of his followers, ceased to be a carbineer and marched to Monte Labbro singing psalms and litanies. The government by its barbarous repression showed its inability to comprehend and deal with such a phenomenon. The writer has given a full account of it in his book "David Lazzaretti di Arcidosso, i suoi seguaci, la sua leggenda." Bologna: Zanichelli, 1885.

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highest classes of the country and by means of secondary and higher education. For, though we are not wanting in men equal in spirit and deep erudition to the best of any nation, we suffer from the lack of that high ideal view which, according to Goethe, is needed to render science living and real. In no other country are there so few men devoted to the moral and philosophic sciences, the study of ethical, pedagogical, and religious problems, and of all that is above purely material ends. And they encounter indifference and the contemptuous smile of those who believe (and there are many of them, especially among scientists, scholars, and economists) that the trend of modern thought is essentially materialistic and excludes as useless all considerations of the ultimate problems of the conscience. This sceptical and anti-philosophical attitude, which reduces natural science to the level of empiricism, and regards the moral sciences as an arid and fruitless erudition, solely for the search of material facts and historic dates, is common to almost all those who control reform and public education. Very few of them have succeeded in getting rid of the influence of the Jacobin and partisan views which pervaded their early education or of that rhetorical kind of thinking which half a century ago was, and which to a great degree still is, among the worst of the intellectual vices of the Italian liberal party, and which has hitherto prevented any conception of a social, moral, and political policy that looks to the true education and regeneration of the lower classes. This narrow view is particularly harmful to the literary and philosophical departments in our universities. Instead of inspiring the students with a desire for higher culture and ideal aims, it makes them only dry scholars who gather up critical minutiæ—mere philologists and grammarians, teachers in gymnasia and lyceums.

V.

In this condition of affairs, when the moral problem is the most imperative of all, there is forced upon all those who view it objectively, and who feel that the life of our country cannot afford to lose any vital force, a recognition of the part

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played by social action, which may be considered as within the province of the religious sentiment and hence of the Church and the Papacy. I believe with those who think that the regeneration of the popular conscience and of Italian life cannot be accomplished without harmonizing the modern spirit with the moral traditions of Christianity, existing in that historic form which has been adopted among the Latin-Catholic people, but which, indeed, must be purified and constantly elevated and enlarged by a high rational conception of all human duties.

Morality, to be sure, has a basis of its own in the conscience and sentiments of social man, and its evolution causes it gradually to cast aside the letter of religious tradition and dominion and to become one of the most potent factors in the development of this tradition. But, if it is true that such an independent morality, entirely without any positive forms of religion, can actually suffice to control the conduct of some men, it is nevertheless absurd and quixotic to believe that in the present condition of the most advanced nations, and especially in the case of the Italian conscience, there could be any true moral balance when morality is upheld by a support so different from and opposed to that which has been given by an old and still powerful religious tradition, which is so closely interwoven with the history of art and civilization.

On the other hand, the Gospel remains to-day, as Goethe has said, the most elevated and advanced product of the human conscience. Its precepts, inculcating charity and love of one's neighbor, can still be of greater social influence than any teaching inspired by the scientific conception of the struggle for existence. The only great power in Christian society that has been able to resist the dissolving spirit of criticism is Catholicism, which is daily gaining in strength, both in Europe and in America. Whether this is an evil or a gain may be discussed from an historical or a philosophic point of view, but the impartial observer, the political student above all, should recognize the fact. The Church and the Papacy are still, in spite of growing religious indifference, the most important political and moral factors with which the State has to deal, and which it must take into account, especially in

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view of any national danger. To believe, as many do in Italy, that one can afford to ignore this power and leave it out in calculating the possibilities of the future; not to understand that by injuring and diminishing it one weakens the available moral force of which the State has so little to spare; not to recognize that by its very origin and the spirit of the Gospel the Papacy enters into all social questions, while the Borghese State remains outside, is truly a deplorable lack of political wisdom. Such a method of governing has had the following result,—namely, while the reputation and moral power of the Italian State have been growing less during the last twenty to thirty years, the Papacy has been growing stronger. Only a few days ago, during the popular excitement produced by the rising of the agrarian community in Sicily, the *Tribuna* of Rome, a journal that cannot be called conservative, turned to the clergy, asking why they did not use their authority to control the people. The clergy, who until now have been called enemies of the country by politicians of all parties, might well shrug their shoulders and say, "As you have sown, so may you reap."

The remedy, if there be one, could come only from some great moral initiative, by which the State and our leading classes might have an opportunity of looking beyond the narrow boundary of parliamentary and partisan politics into the true life of the nation, and of coming to understand that they must not diminish nor antagonize any moral forces therein, but must support them all within the limit of the laws. Certainly it would be folly, or worse even, to admit the possibility of a restoration of the Pope's temporal power, as, indeed, it would be a mistake to believe that the State could ever give support to any religious movement hostile to Rome. But between reaction on the one hand and dangerous innovations on the other there always remains one way open, by which the moral interest of our political classes in the education of the people might be developed in a manner not favorable, but at the same time not hostile, to the religious traditions; by respecting that superior part of it which is still alive and progressive; by giving it liberty to develop in harmony with

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popular instruction and modern culture, and by more and more imbuing the power it possesses over the minds of the people with the moral basis and educative spirit of the Gospel.

GIACOMO BARZELLOTTI.

UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES.

THE LIMITS OF CASUISTRY.*

THERE is a school of moral philosophy which maintains that there is no way of scientifically determining what is the right thing to do. They are not intuitionists; they would resent the name. Strange to say, they are the very school which is most in the habit of appealing to reason as the source of moral judgments. The ordinary intuitionist one knows how to deal with. He condescends to argue. He tells us that moral rules are given us by intuition, and he is willing (though at times somewhat grudgingly) to tell us what these intuitions are. An opponent is then able to argue that the unconditional validity of these intuitions does not correspond with the actual moral judgments of a reasonable man, or that in so far as this validity is admissible it can be accounted for on some more general principle without the assumption of isolated and unconnected *a priori* deliverances of the moral consciousness.

But the neo-intuitional school represented by Mr. Bradley appears to maintain that moral judgments are so absolutely disconnected and unaccountable that they do not admit even of accurate statement or scientific analysis. There is no way of moralizing one's conduct except trusting to the spur of the moment, or (as Mr. Bradley would appear to suggest in his "Ethical Studies") asking an uneducated woman what she would advise. The effect of this new departure in ethics would appear to be to substitute what your President † has called unphilosophical for philosophical intuitionism. I call

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* A paper read before the Cambridge Ethical Society, November 6, 1893.

† Professor Sidgwick.

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this a new departure in ethics because it is important to notice that it represents a position quite different from that of the school in which Mr. Bradley at the date of his "Ethical Studies" would probably have sought his Masters. It is needless to say that it finds no support in those great English writers for whom, on account of their relative theological orthodoxy, Mr. Bradley would probably feel a double measure of that scorn of which he is so great a master. The older English Rationalists—Cudworth, Cumberland, and Clarke (at least the two last)—hold distinctly that the morality of actions is to be estimated by their consequences, though they do not hold that pleasure and pain are the only consequences to be taken into consideration. The typical "common-sense" intuitionist Reid, though he holds that there are other intuitively discovered duties besides benevolence, yet admits that in the last resort these weaker intuitions must give way to the supreme duty of promoting the general good. Kant no less emphatically attempts to reduce the Moral Law to a single principle, though it is a principle from which his most fervent modern admirers would probably admit that it is not really possible to deduce a single definite duty. So far from disparaging casuistry, Kant positively recommends exercises in casuistry as a means of moral instruction and discipline. He gives specimens, indeed, of a kind of catechism for the moral instruction of youth, beside the icy frigidity and formality of which, I am bound to say, the most repellent of theological catechisms become attractive and inspiring documents. The late Professor Green, while he undoubtedly represents the tendency to depreciate a scientific treatment of the details of conduct, and to make moral philosophy merely a branch of metaphysics, does nevertheless assert that the moral quality of an action depends upon its consequences, though it is only the moral consequences, or the consequences upon character, that he will admit to possess any ultimate value, pleasure and pain being treated as matters of absolute indifference. I look in vain among the recognized ethical schools for any precedent for such absolute condemnation of casuistry. But here, perhaps, it will be best to let Mr. Bradley speak for himself.

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"There is another false science more unlovely in life and more unpleasant in decay, from which I myself should be loath to divide it. Just as logic has been perverted into the art of reasoning, so ethics has been perverted into the art of morality. They are twin delusions we shall consign, if we are wise, to a common grave.

"But I would not grudge casuistry a Christian burial. I should be glad to see it dead and done with on any terms; and then, if all the truth must be spoken, in its later years it has suffered much wrong. That it became odious beyond parallel and in parts most filthy, is not to be denied; but it ill becomes the parents of a monster, who have begotten it and nourished it, to cry out when it follows the laws of its nature. And, if I am to say what I think, I must express my conviction that it is not only the Catholic priest, but it also is our utilitarian moralist, who embraces the delusion which has borne such a progeny. If you believe, as our utilitarian believes, that the philosopher should know the reason why each action is to be judged moral or immoral; if you believe that he at least should guide his action reflectively by an ethical code, which provides an universal rule and canon for every possible case, and should enlighten his more uninitiated fellows, then it seems to me you have wedded the mistake from which this offensive offspring has issued. It may be true that the office of professional confessor has made necessary a completer codification of offences, and has joined doctrinal vagaries to ethical blunders. We may allow that it was the lust for spiritual tyranny which choked the last whisper of the unsanctified conscience. It may be true that, in his effort theoretically to exhaust the possibilities of human depravity, the celibate priest dwelt with curious refinement on the morbid subject of sexual transgression. But unless his principle is wholly unsound, I confess that I can hardly find fault with his practice; for if there is to be an art and a code of morality, I do not see how we can narrow its scope beforehand. The field is not limited by our dislikes, and whoever works at the disgusting parts is surely deserving not of blame but of gratitude. Hence if the utilitarian has declined to follow the priest, he has also declined to follow his own principles; he has stopped short not from logical reasons but from psychological causes."*

Mr. Bradley is probably right in his brilliant attempt to show that the rules of the syllogism as formulated by Aristotle fail to exhaust the possible varieties of inference. He may even be right in maintaining that any effort at an exhaustive formulation of the processes of valid inference is necessarily foredoomed to failure. And he is unquestionably right in maintaining that there is no art of correct reasoning, and that we can give no reason why this inference from given premises is right and that wrong, except that we actually judge it so to be. But it is obvious that this logical position cannot compel us to hold that the procedure of the mind in judging of right

* "Principles of Logic," pages 247, 248.

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and wrong is equally arbitrary and unaccountable. The comparison between logic and ethics can be at best an illustration, not an argument. And after all, is there any real analogy between the two cases? Though we cannot give any reason why A. follows from B., while D. does not follow, yet the mind does actually see a connection between the two ideas which it pronounces to be thus connected. There is a movement from one idea to another. That is exactly what we understand by reasoning. But in the region of morals we are, it appears, absolutely forbidden to move from one idea to another. Moral judgments, we are explicitly told, are not discursive; and yet we are also told that moral judgments are an affair of the reason. Yet we are, it would seem, forbidden to argue that if A. is moral, B. must also be moral, unless we can point out some relevant difference between the two cases. To take a concrete instance. I might, it would appear, according to Mr. Bradley, reasonably maintain that to hunt a tame stag to death with dogs is lawful sport, while to do the same thing with a cat is cruelty to animals. I could not be convicted of an inconsistency or unreasonableness in so judging, even though I might be quite unable to specify any material difference between the two cases. Such, as far as I can understand, are the consequences of adopting the ethics of reason.

It would really, I think, be a waste of time to point out how utterly inconsistent this way of thinking is with the actual procedure of mankind or the actual history of moral ideas. As a matter of fact, men endowed with reason have always reasoned or argued about matters of conduct, and the accepted code of right and wrong has been evolved as the result of such moral reasonings. I do not, of course, maintain that all moral progress can be explained as the result of increasing intellectual discernment as to the interdependence of moral ideas or the application to particular cases of principles already admitted. I am not concerned even to argue that men have consistently applied, or do consistently apply, or ought to apply, chains of reasoning to the *whole* of their conduct. It is enough for my purpose to point out that they

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do thus apply reasoning to certain spheres and departments of conduct. For instance, it would, I think, be easy to show that the growth of humanity, the better treatment of oppressed classes and oppressed races, the growth of international morality, and the altered position of women have been largely due to a gradual perception that the reasons which make it wrong to treat A. in a certain manner must equally make it wrong to treat B. in that same manner, under the same circumstances. No doubt at one time people would have boldly maintained, for instance, that the life and happiness of an Irishman or a negro is of no value in the eye of reason, of no value in the sight of God or reasonable men, where the most trifling convenience of an Englishman was at stake. There was perhaps a time when high-minded and religious men would, with deliberate assent and full consciousness of what they meant, have maintained such propositions. So long as they did so, of course argument—argument of the precise kind which I am for the moment contemplating—would have been useless. But, long after any such propositions would have been deliberately and in cold blood assented to, men went on acting as if they did accept them, and from this time forward the process of moral development has been a gradual reasoning out of the logical consequences of an ethical principle already admitted. I do not, indeed, maintain that the causes which have led to this recognition of logical consequences have been entirely and primarily intellectual. The obstacles to the intellectual acceptance and application of unwelcome moral truth may often have been primarily emotional, and the forces by which these obstacles have been overcome may have been emotional also; but still a necessary and essential part of the process of moral development has surely been the simple recognition of logical consequences in the sphere of conduct.

And if that is once admitted, if inference is admitted in matters of conduct as well as in matters of speculation, it seems to me that Mr. Bradley's attitude towards casuistry is no longer defensible. Be the sphere within which argument is admissible wide or narrow, within those limits we have a cas-

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uistry. People are undoubtedly using casuistical arguments every day, and it is really difficult to see how they could escape doing so, unless they were to make efforts to derationalize their conduct as systematic as those which all previous moralists have urged them to make towards its rationalization. Mr. Bradley cannot, of course, mean seriously to maintain that the politician is no longer to argue in Parliament or on the platform, the preacher (assuming that Mr. Bradley would tolerate the survival of such an anachronism) to argue in the pulpit, the school-master to point out that such and such conduct is wrong because it leads to such and such consequences, the journalist no longer to urge reasons for or against such and such a social reform. It would be ludicrous to suppose that so extremely acute a thinker as Mr. Bradley intends anything so absurd. And yet what else can be meant by these sweeping diatribes against casuistry? Only one thing that I can see,—that whereas all other intellectual processes are performed best by those who have given special thought and attention to the matter in hand, yet in questions of conduct, study, thought, special preparation and attention to what has been thought by others on the same subject are wholly out of place. The man in the street is here completely on a level with the philosopher in his study. It may be urged, no doubt, that the very illustrations we have adopted tend to dispense with the need of our professional casuist. There are already (it may be urged) persons who do make it their business to study what is the right thing to do; and to such persons men do apply for advice in respect of the particular department of life which they have studied, instead of coming to the philosopher who, like the Sophist of old, professes to teach men about things in general while he is himself demonstrably ignorant of everything in particular. Hence as to our political conduct we listen to the persuasions of the politician or the political journalist. On questions of health we consult the physician, on matters of education the successful teacher or the teacher who has failed and set up as an educationalist, and so on. Why, it may be said, can we not be satisfied with the instructions of the people who have made a special study

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of the relation between ends and means in particular departments of conduct, without demanding of any single individual that he shall profess a science so comprehensive as that of ends and means in general, or attempting ourselves to acquire such a science in addition to the special studies to which we may be led by professional duty or private inclination?

The answer to this objection is twofold: First, all that we have hitherto been contemplating is the study of the relation between means and ends, or, from another point of view, between general principles and their particular applications. We have assumed that the ends or the general principles are known and admitted. But then, as we were reminded in meeting the argument of Mr. Bradley, though no moralist can help admitting that deductive reasoning has a place in morals, moralists are not agreed as to what that place is. Though in some departments of life, to some extent or on some occasions, there is admittedly room for the logical understanding to draw inferences from one moral judgment to another, there is in the estimation of moralists like Mr. Bradley a point at which such inferences become inadmissible. Hence, even if at this point the man in the street or the least educated of the female sex is to become our ultimate referee, some systematic study of moral philosophy would seem to be necessary to help us to know when to stop arguing and to fly for refuge to our own instinctive conscience or (if we have the misfortune to be educated men) to that of some less educated adviser. And then again, among those who do admit that it is not only in some arbitrarily selected sphere that it is lawful and obligatory to seek to rationalize conduct by tracing the bearing of means on ends, neither moral philosophers nor unphilosophical persons are agreed as to what is or are the end or ends by reference to which all actions are to be judged good or bad. And here it may be objected that I have already proved too much. The specialists in morals do not agree as to the first principles of their supposed science. How then will a man be in any better position for the knowledge of such a science or the advice of one who knows it? The objection is no doubt fatal to any

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attempt to claim for the judgment of the professional moralist the respect which wise men pay (though even here wise men have their reserves) to the advice of their physician or their engineer or their sanitary plumber. But the politicians are equally little agreed, and yet wise men do not on that account condemn study and reflection in politics. Nor, though few æsthetic canons of criticism will command universal acceptance, is the judgment of the plain man considered altogether on a level with that of the trained art critic. And (to come to my immediate point) the first reason why there is a demand, or ought to be a demand, for the specialist in conduct in general as well as the specialist in different departments in conduct, is that the specialist in departments of conduct has commonly given no thought or consideration to the principles upon which conduct in general is to be judged. And there do arise constant occasions upon which moral problems turn not upon the difficulty of seeing what is the right way to promote the end immediately proposed to the specialist in some department of life, but upon the relation which their special end has to the end or ends of human life in general The soldier will tell us how to fight, but the question is, "Are we to fight or not?" Or, if the politician steps in and says, "My science tells me that the way for a nation to be wealthy is to fight," the inquiring conscience may raise the question, "Ought we to be wealthy?" The physician says, "If you want to be well, go to the south of France, and give up your work;" but there is a previous question, "Ought I under these circumstances, and at such and such a cost, to be well?" If such questions arise, be the answer to them what it may, be the method of answering such questions what it may, it is a modest plea to urge on behalf, I will not yet say of casuistry but of a practical science of morality, that there is a likelihood of their being better answered by those who have thought about them than by those who have not. If it is possible to think about such questions at all, if the impulse of the moment or the man in the street is not under all circumstances the best resource, there may be such a thing as systematic thought about the principles of conduct, and systematic thought is science.

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Second, and the second answer to the objection that casuistry may be left to the professors of the particular practical sciences is this, that, though certain departments of life are treated of by special sciences and their professors, there is a large neutral zone of conduct which is entirely unappropriated. My duties as a teacher are no doubt dealt with by pedagogy (though I must confess to never having systematically studied a single work with that formidable title), my duties as a clergyman by pastoral theology, my duties as a wealth-producing animal by chrematistics or whatever be its modern equivalent, my duties as a citizen by politics; but what of my duties as a man? To deny that there may be a systematic treatment of that subject seems to me to amount to the denial of the proposition that one ought to think before one acts. Wherever it is possible to think, it is possible to think systematically. And systematic thought is science.

There is, then, a science of conduct, and, in a sense, an art of conduct, even according to those who will not admit that all actions are to be judged according to their foreseen consequences. From this point, however, I shall say no more of this, to me, unintelligible view of ethics, and consider the question of the possibility of a scientific determination of ethical problems from my own point of view. It would lead me too far from my subject were I to attempt here to argue the question of the ethical criterion; so I must be allowed merely to state that I am one of those who do hold that every action is right or wrong according as it tends or does not tend to produce general well-being, but that I do not assent to the hedonistic interpretation which is usually given to *ευδαιμονία* or well-being by avowed Utilitarians. I hold that pleasure is a part of the supremely desirable state of consciousness which the good man seeks to promote for all mankind, though it is not the only element in that supreme good. I hold that pleasures are not all equally desirable; that some pleasures are intrinsically better than others without being necessarily greater in amount, and (with Aristotle) I hold that some pleasures are bad. I quite recognize that this is a merely popular way of stating the case. In strictness of speech, pleasure (that is, the

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bare quality of pleasantness or pleasing) cannot differ from pleasure except in amount; and when I say that I judge one pleasure to be better than another, though not more intense, I mean that it is better to be pleased or get one's pleasure from one thing rather than another—*e.g.*, from knowledge rather than from good dinners, from sympathy rather than from the spectacle of other people's sufferings, even though it might chance that the suffering in which I delighted was on the whole socially beneficial. On the present occasion I shall only attempt to deal with one particular difficulty of this position. To many it will seem that this admission involves the abandonment of all possibility of scientifically ascertaining what is the right course of action under particular circumstances, and plunges us again into the uncertainty, the arbitrary caprice, the subjectivity and individualism of ordinary intuitional ethics. If this were so, I admit the objection would be a formidable one; for I am not one of those who believe that morality is necessarily unreflecting, and that (to quote once more our great Oxford metaphysician) a man who tries to be more moral than his neighbor is in a fair way to become less so. I believe that the science of ethics means the science of finding out what ought to be done. At the same time it is clear that there is nothing really scientific in seeking to make a problem more simple and less complicated than it really is, or in adopting a doctrine as true simply because it is more easy to formulate and apply than a contrary doctrine. The theory that the planets moved in perfect circles and that the moon was a sphere (with its inequalities filled up with crystal) no doubt saved a lot of trouble; but these theories have not permanently commended themselves to the scientific intellect. I desire, therefore, simply to ask how far the admission (which seems to me to be absolutely and imperatively demanded by the moral consciousness) that human well-being does not consist in pleasure alone makes impossible that scientific determination of conduct which, to many minds, probably constitutes the chief attraction of hedonistic utilitarianism.

I do not wish in any way to minimize the extent to which

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the abandonment of the pleasure-criterion involves the acceptance of intuitionism. The difference between my view and that of ordinary intuitionism is that the intuitions of the intuitionist relate to the morality of particular acts or classes of acts, while mine refer to the moral value of certain ends of action. Undoubtedly the judgment that it is better to know the truth than to acquiesce in pleasant falsehoods is an *a priori* judgment or intuition. It is incapable of proof. If another does not see it, I cannot make him see it. I may possibly try to persuade him that he really does assent to that judgment and acts upon it, though a mistaken intellectual analysis of his consciousness may have led him to believe that he does not. At the same time, though in many cases the denial of such a proposition may spring from a purely intellectual difference, I think it well to point out that I am not in any way concerned to maintain that this judgment is actually, even in some unconscious form, present to the consciousness of every individual. Many of the common objections to intuitionism arise from the mistaken assumption that, if an intuition is valid, it must exist in all minds alike. But nobody considers it necessary to maintain that the æsthetic judgments of the musician are a delusion, or even that they possess a merely subjective validity, because some people cannot distinguish between "Pop goes the Weasel" and "God save the Queen." Nor has it ever occurred to any one to deny the truth of the higher mathematics because there are said to be savages incapable of grasping the idea of ten, and there are certainly eminent classical scholars who are incapable of understanding the *a priori* principles upon which depends the proof of Euclid's fifth proposition of the first book. I admit, then, fully that the ultimate basis of a non-hedonistic system of ethics is an intuition or a series of intuitions, and of intuitions not found in all minds alike. No doubt there is a tendency towards a coincidence in the intuitions of humanity at large at a given stage of ethical development; but it is a mistake, I think, to ignore the fact that the higher and more delicate moral intuitions are actually found only in the higher moral natures; that they exist in full strength and complete inde-

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pendence in the few rather than in the many, or that the many really receive them on authority from the few. What we call the accepted moral standard of a community means the standard prescribed by the clear intuitions of a few morally gifted natures backed up and supported by the dimmer or derived intuitions of the more, and the passive acquiescence of the most. But here I am concerned only with the admission that on a non-hedonistic view of ethics the ultimate ends of conduct rest upon indemonstrable intuitions or *a priori* propositions. And at this stage I must say no more in defence of my position than to remind you that the proposition, "pleasure is the only good," is unquestionably in the same case. With that remark I proceed to ask within what limits a non-hedonistic utilitarianism can admit of a scientific casuistry?

In the first place, I contend that within a very large area of conduct the ordinary utilitarian calculus can be applied as much by the non-hedonistic as by the hedonistic utilitarian. For, (1) It is admitted that, though pleasure is not the only good, it is a large part of it; and that pleasure is in general the inseparable accompaniment of all those states of conscious being which the moral reason judges good, *e.g.*, of the pursuit of knowledge, the indulgence of sympathy, the contemplation of beauty, etc.

(2) Those kinds of pleasure which to the non-hedonist seem intrinsically better than others will be generally admitted to be also more productive of pleasure on the whole than those which he will pronounce lower. The pleasures of benevolence are obviously more "felicific" than those of cruelty, even though the latter should in some cases be more intense to the individual experiencing them. And it will be generally admitted that in various indirect ways the community gets more benefit from the indulgence on the part of individuals in intellectual and æsthetic pleasures than from the indulgence of purely animal appetites or desires.

(3) Though the non-hedonist will strongly contend that a logical application of the hedonistic test would frequently arrive at different results from his own, yet in practice this

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difference is likely to manifest itself comparatively seldom. For it is part of the anti-hedonist argument that high-minded hedonists are not logical; that their actual moral code does not flow logically from their professed principles; and that they mistake a judgment as to the rational value or moral worth of pleasures for a judgment as to their actual hedonistic intensity. Hence in many cases the anti-hedonist and the hedonist will practically agree as to the end to be pursued, while they will differ as to their theoretical definition of the end.

For these reasons there will, as it seems to me, be a large area over which the hedonistic method will practically coincide with what I will venture to call the idealistic. It is not possible to indicate with precision the limits of this field. I can best perhaps suggest them by glancing at some of those departments of morality in which the hedonist and the moral idealist must, as it appears to me, diverge most widely; though I hasten to say that even here many hedonists would wholly repudiate the consequences that I should draw from their system. In matters of sexual morality, in the treatment of suicide, and of all questions affecting the value of human life, and again in respect of the duty of truthfulness, I for my part should feel obliged to abandon a utilitarian defence of the received moral code, if the utilitarian end is to be conceived of as simple quantitative pleasure. Here, then, I frankly avow that I for one should distinctly fall back upon intuitions other than those which the hedonistic utilitarian can recognize. But let me briefly point out some of the differences between the ordinary intuitionism and the idealism which admits of intuitions only as regards ultimate ends. The differences may perhaps be best indicated by taking the duty of truthfulness—a duty which it is a great mistake to limit to mere negative veracity. Truthfulness includes the duty of pursuing and actively propagating the truth, and not merely of abstaining from falsehood. Thus conceived, the virtue is one which is often most strikingly illustrated by those who are most anxious to supply a hedonistic explanation of it. What may be called the scientific ἦθος is one which cannot possibly be explained, and can with extreme difficulty be justified, by

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the hedonistic calculus. It is clearly impossible to prove empirically that the discovery of truth always increases pleasure. And yet the case of truth-speaking has always been one of the great difficulties of the thorough-going intuitionist. Every one in practice admits that there are certain rare and fairly well recognized rare occasions on which it is right to lie; while as to the active propagation of truth, nobody but a madman really does go about proclaiming the truth on all subjects to all persons on all occasions. Once recognize that the intuition says merely, "Truth is a good and intrinsically valuable thing," or, to speak more exactly, "the consciousness that knows, reveres, pursues, and wills to make known the truth possesses intrinsic value,"—and no difficulty is experienced in reconciling the theory with the practice of good men. Truth is a good thing; but so is pleasure, and still more emphatically so is humanity. Hence, in a case of collision, I must choose which is most valuable. I cannot (with Dr. Martineau) assign to the love of truth a fixed and definite place in a hierarchy of motives or ends of action. For we all in practice judge that a little truth may have to be sacrificed to much humanity, while it may equally be right to sacrifice a little pleasure in others and a little benevolence in ourselves to truth.

Estimating the bearing of all this upon our immediate subject, we may, I think, lay down the following proposition: A scientific treatment of casuistical questions is possible as between persons agreed in their ultimate ideal or conception of human good. Where people hold different conceptions of human good, there will be certain departments of morality in which their results will differ, though there will remain a part —on the whole by far the larger part—of the whole sphere of conduct in which no such difference is practically likely to arise between well-meaning modern men.

And if any one is inclined to object to what may seem so large a surrender to subjective caprice, I should like to emphasize the fact that people's ideals of human life really do differ, and have differed even more. So long as that is the case, there can be no advantage either theoretical or practical

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in trying to persuade them to conceal their differences by the adoption of a utilitarian formula which really fails to express their working belief. That I ought to promote my neighbor's good, is a proposition which would be accepted, with whatever limitations, with whatever inconsistencies, and with whatever interpretation of "neighbor," by Aristotle, by a fourth century Father, by a seventeenth century Puritan, by a modern Christian, and by a modern, let us say, apostle of culture. Yet by my neighbor's good they would mean totally different things. Aristotle, for instance, might have held (for anything that he says to the contrary, or at least some not very unfaithful disciple of Aristotle might have held) that it was good to be moderately drunk on rare and fitting occasions. This the Puritan would have condemned, without on that account thinking with the Christian Father that it was good to be habitually half-starved. In his estimate of drunkenness the modern Christian would, as a rule, agree with the Puritan (though I have known quite serious and orthodox persons maintain the contrary), while he would fail to appreciate the Puritan's condemnation of the pleasure produced by an acted play of Shakespeare, and yet would equally fail to share Mr. Oscar Wilde's approval of a state of mind in which a man effaces from his mind all moral distinctions in pursuit of something which he calls art for art's sake. It is possible, of course, to exhibit these differences as mere differences about the means to an end about which all are greed. Probably each of these typical moralists would be prepared to contend that his course of action actually produces most good on the whole, even in this life, both for himself and for others. He might even be disposed to claim for his ideal a maximum intensity of pleasure. But he would not do so because he had ascertained by appeal to experience that so it is. If he thinks his ideal most conducive to pleasure, it is because he has already judged his ideal or τέλος, to be intrinsically the best. Here, of course, I am aware that I am sliding into pure dogmatism. I can only apologize, and will now return to my subject, pleading that I have after all been endeavoring to illustrate what casuistry can and what it cannot do.

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And now I must attempt some answer, hurried and brief though it must be, to what some will perhaps think ought to have been my subject all along—the question, what practical advantage, upon the view that has been taken as to the theoretical possibility of casuistry, is to be expected from the study of its principles. The greatest practical advantage is, I think, this: the study of moral philosophy helps a man to clear up his own moral ideal. It can hardly be expected that the study of moral theory, or even the elaborate study of detailed moral difficulties, will make any one much more expert than the same man would have been if trained by other studies in choosing the right means towards a given end. The value of his opinion on such questions will depend (in what may be called the unappropriative departments of conduct) upon his natural good judgment, upon his general intellectual training, upon his experience of life, and upon that delicacy of moral discrimination which depends upon character rather than upon intellect. In special departments of conduct it will, of course, depend upon his knowledge and experience of those special departments. Thus, if I want to know how to lay out a certain sum in charitable ways, I should not consult the moral philosopher as such, but the East-end clergyman or the political economist or the charity organizer. If I wanted advice as to the moral value of teetotalism, I should expect more help from the doctor, the practical clergyman, or the man who has made it his study, than from the teacher of moral philosophy who has spent his life in a university. But the difference between the moral philosopher and the empirical moralist or the professor of some specialized practical science is this: that the moral philosopher knows distinctly what he is aiming at, and the practical man often does not. It is not so much that the moral philosopher can answer moral questions better than other people, but that he knows how to put them better than other people. Take, for instance, the case of vivisection. As one reads the utterances of judges, physiologists, physicians, ecclesiastics, politicians, and journalists upon the question, one is struck by the fact that not one in fifty of them seems to know what he is trying to prove.

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The physiologist usually shows that he has not a glimmering of a notion what a moral question is. He labors to show that vivisection advances knowledge or saves pain without seeming to be aware that some people might quite intelligibly hold that knowledge ought not to be obtained or pain saved under such and such circumstances. On the other hand, the anti-vivisectionist rails at the immorality of doing evil that good may come, without asking how on such a principle he is to justify a surgical operation or a judicial punishment. In the present state of opinion, moralists are not likely to entirely agree about vivisection more than other people. Even among moralists of the same school there is still room for different applications of accepted principles. But if anybody doubts whether the conscious and deliberate application of theory to moral questions is capable of enormously reducing the debatable area, he should read the late Mr. Edmund Gurney's essay on the subject in "Tertium Quid." That very earnest and independent thinker argues the question on hedonistic-utilitarian grounds; but this is just one of the cases where the decision is not likely to be very much affected by the adoption of an idealistic in place of a hedonistic utilitarianism.

I may put what I have been saying in another form by saying that the function of the moral philosopher in the decision of ethical questions is rather that of the judge than that of the jury. Consulted as to what a man ought to do under such and such circumstances, he will not, *qua* moral philosopher, say, "You should do this or that," but rather he will explain the relevant principles of the Moral Law, apply them to the facts of the case, and then say, "If you think that this action will produce such and such results, then do so and so; if not, don't. If you think, for instance, that these experiments have such and such a chance of saving pain; if you think that the pain they may save is mathematically equivalent to what they must cost; if you think that the good to humanity which they may effect is morally more than equivalent to the hardening of the heart which they may possibly bring with them, then perform these experiments; if not, don't." Such is the way that the moral philosopher will sum up the case,

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whether to his own conscience or to somebody else. The moral philosopher is the judge, the conscience and judgment of the individual (whether the philosopher himself or his client) are the jury.

I may add one further remark. Most of the objections brought against casuistry, whether in its theological or its purely philosophical form, affect mainly the scientific consideration of individual, and especially of abnormal and exceptional, problems in conduct. The most, it seems to me, that moral philosophy can do for such cases is to produce, in conjunction with other studies and influences, a habit of mind favorable to their reasonable consideration. We may quite well deprecate the discussion of such abnormal cases by anticipation; and we may admit that when they do occur in actual practice a healthy instinct will decide them better than theoretical subtlety. Ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ χρίσις. But the assailant of casuistry usually talks as if on the general questions of conduct—on those general questions of which each man has to settle a good many for himself one way or another every day between the time he gets up in the morning and the time he goes to bed at night—he talks (I say) as if on such questions as these there was a general consensus, at least among sensible and well-meaning people. Such an assumption seems to me the very shallowest of delusions. Directly we leave words and come to things the consensus disappears. It is merely the vagueness of language that seems to sanction its existence. People are agreed, no doubt, as to the wrongness of murder. But that is only because murder means killing, except where killing is justifiable. As to the immorality of killing in war, or by means of punishment, or to reduce population, or by way of εὐθανασία, there is no consensus at all. No doubt, in these questions of merely negative morality there is a consensus among the great majority. But come to positive precepts. There, again, we find a consensus as to copy-book headings, such as, "Be truthful, be honest, be charitable, be temperate." There is a consensus (to borrow a distinction of your President) as to virtues; there is none as to duties. "Be temperate." Yes. But there are many ways of being temperate.

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It is possible to eat and drink wealth equivalent to one pound, or even five pounds, a day without positively injuring one's constitution; and it is possible also to live on one shilling a day, or with practice on a great deal less. Which course am I to adopt, my income and position being so and so? I ought to give money to charity; but how much? I ought to provide for the future; but how much? I ought to devote myself to my profession; but how much time should I give to my pupils? I ought to research; but how ought I to divide my time between research, teaching, and amusement, or more general social duties? It is no use to say that an exact determination of such questions is impossible. There is no consensus as to the barest outline of an answer. It is on these general questions of conduct, which can never be escaped, rather than in the discussion of abnormal complications of individual circumstances, that the practical application of clearly thought out ethical principles seems likely to be most fruitful.

Nay, more, I am prepared to contend that the study of the general principles of moral philosophy, in their application to practical questions such as these, is not only essential to intellectual clearness, but that (if conducted under what I may vaguely call constructive rather than destructive influences) it is likely to exert a positively stimulating and ethical influence. *πρὸς μὲν το τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν γνῶσις μίκρον ἢ οὐδεν ἰσχύει.* That is quite true; and it is no less true that knowledge puffeth up, but love edifieth. But it is true, also, that more harm is done from want of thought than want of will. After all, it would really be strange if the thinking about duty should be found, as a rule, to have a demoralizing tendency. No doubt moral philosophy will not make a good man any more than theology will make a religious man. But it has usually been considered that a certain amount of religious instruction is helpful in that direction, when conjoined with that personal influence by which alone, as your great Cambridge lay theologian has taught us, virtue is teachable. It is a modest plea to urge that good effects may, likewise, in due subordination to the living influence of personal character, spring from the thoughtful consideration of moral principles carried to whatever point of

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theoretical abstraction is demanded by the general level of the individual's education and culture.

And what is the practical outcome of all this? Are we all, it may be said, to become moral philosophers? or are we all to submit ourselves to an ethical director? Want of time must be my excuse, if my answer degenerates once more into dogmatism.

(*a*) I do think that a certain acquaintance with at least the non-metaphysical or less metaphysical aspects of moral philosophy ought to be looked upon as an essential element in higher education; and that those in whose education such a knowledge has not been included may reasonably, if anxious to do their duty, be urged to make some such an acquaintance for themselves,—not, indeed, as indispensable to moral life, but as one among many possible modes of ethical cultivation. Of course, I am thinking now of persons otherwise highly educated and of moderately intellectual habits and capacity. And, by way of illustration, the kind of books I am thinking of as suited for persons of that class, not otherwise interested in philosophic speculation, are such works as Lecky's "History of European Morals," Mill's "Utilitarianism," John Grote's "Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy," Butler's "Sermons," Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory," and a great work which I need not name in the presence of its author. And to these I need not, I hope, in this society, apologize for adding a book which does not profess to be a philosophical treatise at all, but which, as I personally cannot help feeling, is even, from the strictly ethical point of view, as important as any of the books I have mentioned: I mean "Ecce Homo." The works of writers like Kant and Green one would recommend only to persons of a more speculative bent.

(*b*) Especially may this duty be urged on all whose special studies or professional duties require them to express opinions upon ethical questions, if not actually to become instructors in ethics or special departments of ethics, such as political economists, or journalists, or writers on politics. I hope I shall not be accused of taking too Aristotelian a view either

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of politics or of education, if I venture to add to these the practical politician and the practical teacher.

(*c*) There is one remaining class for whom the importance of ethical study should surely need no demonstration. Whatever else the Church and the churches may be, it and they are unquestionably, and above all things else, ethical societies. Whatever else a clergyman may be, at least he is this,—an officer and an authorized teacher in a great society for the promotion of the good of life (τὸ εὖ ζῆν). And yet it is, I fear, a painful and lamentable fact that some eighty or ninety per cent. of the Anglican clergy, and probably the same might be said of all other religious bodies in this country except the Unitarians and the Roman Catholics, take holy orders without a single day's instruction in ethical science. Ludicrously inadequate as is the theological equipment of a large proportion of our English clergy, they have all read theology for at least some few weeks or months prior to their examination, and the continued study of theology is frequently preached and sometimes practised as a professional duty; whereas the presence of a purely ethical work upon the shelves of a clerical library may be taken as a tolerably safe indication that the owner took honors in Litt. Hum. at Oxford or in the Moral Sciences Tripos at Cambridge. I need not, perhaps, stop to argue that there can be no fruitful study of ethics on the theological side without a preparatory training in philosophical ethics; nor may I stay to point out what in my view is the true relation between the study of moral theology or Christian ethics and the study of moral philosophy; to the great majority of our clergy the one is almost as unknown as the other. And how barren must other theological studies be if they do not lead up to and include the study of the Christian ideal of life! The object of ethical study is (as the late Professor Green used to say) the clearing up of the moral ideal. Our ideal of what is the best sort of life to be promoted for ourselves and for others cannot be proved or demonstrated empirically. Yet it is, I believe, given by reason. If Christianity (in whatever sense accepted or interpreted) be true, then the ideal revealed by reason must coincide with the ideal historically presented to

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us by Christianity in its original and purest form and handed down (amid whatever corruptions and adventitious elements) by the Christian Church. While undoubtedly it would be for the Christian teacher unreal and unnatural to study or teach ethics entirely without reference to the forms in which as a matter of history the supreme ethical ideal has been, and is being, gradually revealed to man, it is surely no less one-sided and no less absurd to attempt to study the historical revelation in total divorce from the deliverances of what theologians sometimes call mere Natural Reason, though the very use of such a term may suggest how inadequately some of them have grasped that fundamental principle of their own creed which declares that the individual conscience of every human being and the historic personality of Christ are only manifestations of one and the same Reason, Logos, or *Sapientia Dei*, the one more or less imperfect, though progressive, the other (as some of us believe) perfect because containing in itself the germ of all future ethical development.

H. RASHDALL.

HERTFORD COLLEGE, OXFORD.

[NOTE.—In the last number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Mr. Bradley has published "Some Remarks on Punishment," which I did not see until the present essay was in type. Had I seen it earlier, I should not have attributed to him the view that actions are pronounced right or wrong without reference to social good. I can only plead in extenuation of my misunderstanding that I have found persons more decidedly in sympathy with Mr. Bradley's general philosophical position than myself equally unable to put any other construction upon his language than I have done. But if one difficulty of Mr. Bradley's readers is cleared up by his very interesting "Remarks," they will perhaps only increase in some minds the difficulty which they have felt in understanding his diatribes against casuistry in the "Principles of Logic." If it is admitted that actions are right or wrong according as they promote or hinder social good (however interpreted), a casuistry of some kind seems inevitable. Indeed, Mr. Bradley's article seems to me an admirable example of the kind of casuistry we want; at least it would be so if the conclusions to which it points (however distasteful some of them might possibly prove to me personally) were a little more clearly worked out instead of being merely hinted at. No one will wish to compel Mr. Bradley to descend further into details than he feels disposed to do; but if any one chooses to develop his suggestions, Mr. Bradley can hardly blame him; even though the resulting casuistry should (like other casuistries) turn out to be not altogether without its "disgusting parts."—H. R.]

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PRACTICAL ETHICS.*

THE Theory of Morals has the closest possible relation to the Conduct of Life, and the discovery of a speculative ground of action, or a theoretic ideal of duty, has no relevancy or meaning apart from its realization by the individual and by society. If our aim, in the Philosophy of Ethics, be the discovery of a true theory of practice, our main endeavor—after we have found it—should be the practice of the theory, because the possession of what Mr. Mill happily called "a moral nautical almanac" is of no use to any one, unless he can actually steer the vessel of his life according to the directions given in the almanac.

It need hardly be said that to act wisely in this world action must be the result of insight, and that insight must be wide, varied, and thorough; but there are various kinds of insight, and that which leads to inaction, or sits apart, "holding no form of creed, but contemplating all," may entail a greater loss than gain to the individual and to the world.

During the earlier years of life the practical side of experience is not usually esteemed so highly as the theoretical. This is natural and inevitable; but when these earlier years are passed, or are passing,—when a career has to be chosen and pursued,—more especially when one is at the "parting of the ways," where cross-roads meet, and it depends on the track he takes what the future of his life is to become,—the practical side begins to get its due. Again, when the intellectual defects of all the systems of belief are realized, and the vast number of *lacunæ* or unsolved problems is taken into account, —problems which remain to baffle us after our analytic investigations are closed, and our further syntheses are reached, —we are perhaps better able to estimate at their true value the conclusions we may come to in the verifiable sphere of conduct. It is a region over which our speculative theories

* An Address to the students of its Speculative Problems.

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must sweep, but with which they need never practically interfere; it is one upon which mists occasionally settle, but which they invariably leave to the clear sunshine and the light of day.

In giving a sample of some of the points which would be discussed in a full course of practical Ethics, a single prefatory remark may be made in reference to them as a whole,—viz., this, that every phase of practical virtue has the closest point of contact with every other. Man being a moral unity, they may all be interpreted, from different points of view, as the varying aspects of one and the same radical virtue, which undergoes constant transformation and redintegration.

In arranging these practical virtues, I follow no systematic order; but if we may roughly divide them, first, into duties towards self, or duties connected with the estimate of self and the regulation of the personal character, and, secondly, into duties towards others or the estimate of others, then the first five will belong to the former class and the remaining three to the latter.

The *first* in the list is that great and radical virtue of having a root in one's self, to which in various ways almost every moralist refers. At the outset it is most important that we see the intellectual ground whence this moral virtue springs. It is the conviction that the individual is something more than a mere link in the chain of Nature, that in virtue of his personality and personal identity each man is a centre, or focus, at which the scattered rays of moral relationship to others meet. If we are not mere waves rising out of the infinite sea of being at our birth, and sinking back into the ocean at our decease, if it is not true that we are "such stuff as dreams are made of, and our little life is rounded with a sleep," if we have natures above Nature, as well as within it, and if our *alter ego* is capable of being acted upon by the Infinite *from within*,—so that our highest self in its most exalted exercise is the action of the Divine within us,—if this be a fact, or series of facts, in the conscious life of the human race, it must impart a new sense of personal worth or value to the individual, of independence of the blows of fate, of superiority to the chance acci-

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dents of the hour, a sense (for we must speak figuratively) of rootedness and groundedness in what is at once durable and infinite.

The practical outcome of this is a certain self-sufficience, which is totally different from every phase of self-sufficingness, and which, when true and genuine, does not lead to pride in any of its phases, but only to self-reliance. The stupendous fact which gives rise to this self-reliance humbles the individual as much as it exalts him, and in the very act of exalting him. It is this: that the humanity of each member of the race is, at one and the same time, within Nature and above it; and that, although indissolubly involved in the sequences of the physical world, we are, as one of our poets puts it,—

> "A lasting link in Nature's chain
> From highest heaven sent down."

Now, to tell a young person that self-sufficience is a virtue, and that the cultivation of it is a duty, may seem like opening up a very superfluous pathway towards conceit, if not opinionativeness. Rightly understood, however, it is the very reverse; because the practical side of the truth just mentioned is not self-satisfaction but self-command, not self-elation but self-control, not self-gratification but self-superintendence. The virtue now spoken of arises out of a discernment of the true nature of man, as a being with faculties and affinities which link him with the Infinite, and within whom the Infinite may work. The recognition of that fact, if it be a fact, develops a consciousness which both elevates and humbles, and which leads at one and the same time to self-development and self-control. This virtue may also be connected with the nobler part of the teaching of all the Greek sages,—Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and even the Epicureans. The living according to Nature, and yet above Nature, the "following right reason," the pursuit of inward harmony, all take their rise in the recognition of what the moral self is, and of how it is open, on the one hand, to the world in which we live, and on the other to the Infinite whence we have come and by

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whom we may be inspired. So much for the first of the practical virtues.

What is set down as the *second* in the list may seem far removed from the first, but it is in reality very closely and akin to it. It is that of openness to all influence that is elevating, invigorating, and healthful. This from another point of view is the virtue of candor, of dispassionateness, or single-eyedness. It is that directness of soul that is free from prejudice, twist, or bias. It is a readiness to receive impressions which lift up our consciousness to higher levels, a willingness to be taught, and to be docile under the guidance of what is loftier than ourselves. It is a virtue which has many aspects or phases, which may perhaps be more apparent if we contrast it with its opposite vice,—viz., the arrogant assumption that one is much wiser than other people, that one does not need instruction from without, or that, if not sufficiently wise, it will not do to let others imagine that one is not so, and that they have anything very important to impart in the way of influence or teaching. This is the vice of inordinate self-esteem, and it is curious how inveterate it occasionally is, how it clings to some people who are otherwise excellent, and seems to grow stronger as they grow older. Sometimes, in proportion to the amount of intellectual power possessed, and the force of character which works on others, there is a want of openness to the views of other people, and even an arrogant air that is ready to impose favorite views with the strength and tenacity of the partisan. Some persons always have their shibboleth, whether of orthodoxy—of what alone it is right to believe—or of good manners—of what it is the correct social form to do; or it may be a political shibboleth —of what alone can lead a nation to prosperity, or of what is certainly leading it to destruction—and they test everything by their shibboleth, so that they never grow any wiser, but worship their fetish till they die. Some of them, moreover, have a very unlovely habit of obtruding their shibboleth on other people. They assume the hard style of the Roman infallibilist, or the doctrinaire style of the old-world parish dominie, and thrust their ideas upon their fellow-men. They

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sometimes even try to put others down by their self-assertion, preferring to brush them aside rather than be themselves examples of noble thought and generous feeling.

One cure for this very common tendency, which sometimes destroys a character, taking all loveliness out of it, and which also does much social mischief, is just the cultivation of that openness of soul, or candor towards new ideas and new influences, with the Socratic conviction all-dominant that what we chiefly know is our own ignorance, and our need of further knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, true wisdom lies midway between a perpetual openness to all impressions,—and a consequent pliability of spirit which can be twisted in any direction,—and the self-assertion, rigidity, and conceit, that will not admit the need of any modification of belief or any new practical influence from without.

The *third* virtue is that of an earnest purpose in life, the sense of having a serious function to fulfil and a duty to discharge in this world; in other words, the conviction that we are here not merely for the purposes of enjoyment, not born for pleasure only or for excitement, but for the accomplishment of great ends, which are up-bound with our existence as intellectual and moral agents, whatever our sphere of labor or pursuit may be. It will be seen that this item in practical ethics has a close relation to the theory of morals; and that, if it is explicitly borne witness to by our practical instincts, it modifies—if it does not contradict—the one-sided theory of utilitarian happiness so much in vogue.

The nobility and glory of fruitful work have been taught us by many strong voices lately silent, notably by Carlyle. We may also recall a sentence in "Aurora Leigh:"

> "Work, work, work,
> 'Tis better than what you work to get."

The same poet said, in a noble sonnet,—

> "What are we sent to earth for? Say to toil,
> Nor seek to leave the tending of thy vines
> For all the heat o' the day till it declines,
> And death's mild curfew shall from work assoil.
> God did anoint thee with His odorous oil
> To wrestle, not to reign."

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The precise point to be here realized is the extraordinary expansion which it gives to human character, and the consequent enlargement of all the aims of life, when we realize that, in virtue of our own personality and its relations to the Infinite, we are here to add a little to that great structure of noble human work to be definitely accomplished within the lives of other people, work which will survive when the workers have passed away and are forgotten; in other words, that we live to transmit influence (the influence of life on life), to be architects of character, by however slow a process and in however slight a degree. To go through life with that aim paramount, not chiefly ambitious of professional success or of outstripping others in the social race, but of taking a noiseless and unostentatious part in the building up of character, in the perpetuation of pure and elevating influence,—that is one of the noblest of all aims and one of the grandest of possible achievements. It is a moral result that is open to all of us, and its realization, even in a slight and partial manner, has a wonderful effect in tranquillizing human life, as well as making it fruitful. It subdues that restlessness which is the chief enemy of joy, as well as of attainment. So much for the third virtue in our list.

The *fourth*, which is in closest harmony with the third,—though some would think it far removed,—is one which Aristotle would have called an intellectual rather than a moral excellence. It is the effort to attain to some kind of unity or harmony in our personal life. By this is not meant an effort to reach ideal completeness, but such a practical harmony that, amid the diverse aims and interests which may be properly ours, we do not feel the sense of discord arising within us. The intellectual root on which this virtue reposes is the conviction that all our activities, whether directed towards the True, the Beautiful, or the Good, should meet at a focus and there be harmonized. This is much less frequently attained than many imagine. It is a real achievement, for example, when one, whose life is devoted to the pursuit of knowledge, finds that its pursuit blends quite harmoniously with all his social duties, without any hitch or jar, and unites his profes-

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sional toil in a natural manner with the humbler and commoner work which fills up the interspaces of life.

Perhaps there is no better safeguard than that which this virtue affords in preventing men from indulging in any one thing, or in any kind of effort, to excess. If a particular pursuit cannot be harmonized with other ends, which a rational being is called upon to accomplish, he or she may be sure that it ought to be restrained or discontinued. They may take it for granted that it is alien to that unity which is the one end both of individual and of social life.

Another result of the endeavor to reach unity and harmony, both amongst one's convictions and aims, is this: that it checks partisanship of every kind. Almost every one who enters on a practical pursuit with any ardor, enters it of necessity as a partisan. He therefore over-magnifies it, and sometimes comes to look on his particular line of effort as the very noblest in the world. It is a natural illusion, and it often does undoubted good, by giving energy and enthusiasm in work; but it leads to corresponding evils,—*e.g.*, the evils of coterieism, or sectarian views of life,—to class prejudices and the feelings of caste. It thus happens that the most earnest advocates of special lines of labor usually fail to see the good that is being achieved by thousands beyond their own department. The habit of striving after unity and harmony in all things (the virtue now under consideration) is more likely than any other to counteract, if not to checkmate it, and it is a virtue which should be specially cultivated before professional life is begun; because the discernment, at that stage, of the organic unity to which all genuine human labor tends —or may tend—should check the spirit of partisanship, and lessen the force of professional bias in after-life.

We now reach a virtue which seems to need special emphasis laid upon it in the nineteenth century. It is that of reverence, and of a reverential habit of mind. By this is not meant the practice of any act of religious observance. Such acts belong to another province than the ethical. What is now referred to is the characteristic of "high seriousness," to which Matthew Arnold referred as a distinctive feature in all

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the greatest literary work, as well as an integral element in all noble character. Its specialty will perhaps best be seen when we contrast it with its opposite, which is not merely a frivolous or surface way of looking at life's problems, and dealing with its interests; but also that arrogant attitude towards institutions or great national inheritances, as well as towards individuals, which has borne much bitter fruit in our century. The reverence now spoken of was one of the old Hebraic virtues which Arnold so happily signalized, and it is a virtue inseparable from every character that is really great. It is useless to assume the *rôle* of a censor, or complainant, towards the age in which one lives. The present has doubtless its manifold virtues—signal and characteristic ones—which posterity will be better able to appreciate than we are. But while an "increasing purpose" is running through it, and evolving results in individual and national character which we cannot as yet adequately compute, our *zeitgeist* may perhaps have some other less admirable tendencies pervading it, and the want of Reverence may be one of these. How is it, for example, that some have so little reverence for that which they have politically inherited that they would not hesitate to cut down the ladder by which they have ascended to the position they now occupy, that they would destroy institutions which are the fruit of millions of experiments, and of the conjoint working of the twin spirits of Law and Liberty "broadening slowly down from precedent to precedent," in the blind hope that *somehow* a better reconstruction will follow in the wake of their anarchic levellings? There is certainly too little reverence amongst us, both for the great National Legacies, and the great Characters of the past; very much as its best systems and its noblest treatises are forgotten by those who have an omnivorous appetite for sensational newspapers. They are passed over in the rush of ephemeral interests, they are ignored amid the trivial competitions of the hour. As a great poet put it,—

> "The world is too much with us, late or soon
> Gathering and spending we lay waste our powers."

In addition to this, the fundamental error in sectarian socialism, viz., that every man is as good as every other man,

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and that all have therefore an equal right to everything, —which is as untrue in ethics, sociology, and politics, as it is contradicted by all historic experience,—seems to be lessening the reverence of our age, both for the great Men of the past and for the Institutions of our ancestors. It sometimes looks as if those who are the heirs of all the ages of struggle for constitutional liberty were to be subjected to a worse tyranny of the demos than Athens or Sparta ever knew. Contemporary politics are referred to only to emphasize a moral lesson which is independent of party; and it is one of the saddest reflections to a spectator, who watches the strife of parties from outside that, amid all the achievements of the century and our progress in a thousand things, the development and discipline of character in the great virtue of reverence are so apt to be left out. We find it in the home, in the school, in the college, in scientific circles, and at political gatherings, amongst the young and the old, the rich and the poor, in the church and in the state. The old habit of reverence (of unselfish delight in what is above us, unenvious admiration for what is greater than ourselves, the willingness to defer to the teachings of experience, and to be led by the wisdom of age) is either far less common than it used to be, or it is assuming very strange and unfamiliar phases. In this assertion no complaint is made that "our times are very evil," or that they are wholly "out of joint," but it may surely be set down as a virtue, the practice of which is very much needed in our time,—and, indeed, in every age,—that the profoundest reverence should be cherished towards the wisdom of the past, and towards that which has made the present what it is. Everything else is surely worse than even "botanizing on a mother's grave." It is irreverence towards that mother herself,—the truest, the noblest, and the most beneficent *alma mater* in the world.

From the preceding five virtues—which are more specially individual—I pass to others which are social. Amongst them, as number *six* in the list, may be set down the habit of generous construction, or a chivalrous estimate of other people. This was a conspicuous virtue in the Zoroastrian

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ethic. It has no less prominent a place in the Christian. It is surely a clear practical duty never to put an evil or sinister construction upon the deed of another person, until we have it proved to demonstration that the act *was* evil or sinister; and even then, it should rather be accompanied by sympathetic sorrow for the offender, than by strong dislike or personal aversion. The practice of this may be partly a matter of temperament, because some persons look instinctively on the dark side of human nature, and suspect evil until good is proved; while others look on the bright side, and believe in the good till evil is proved. But the latter virtue may be cultivated, and very closely allied to it—if it be not a phase of it—is the habit of appreciating what others are doing and achieving, while we are not doing and achieving the same things, and can never expect to do so.

This virtue is radically akin to that which was placed second in the former list, viz., that of openness or candor of soul, and this will illustrate the unity of the virtues. There are some persons, however, so painfully self-engrossed "in narrowest working shut" that they cannot see—or can with the utmost difficulty see—that the good which is being achieved by others is quite as important to the world as anything which they themselves are doing. This applies to all the professions and pursuits of mankind, and in each profession to almost all the workers in it. It is curious that it should be so inveterate a tendency in otherwise noble natures, and it is a vice which grows by that on which it feeds; but it is one which may be largely counterworked and subdued. For example, take one of the great and admirable qualities in the public-school system, and in the college life which follows it, viz., that it gives scope for the generous recognition of the merits of others, while all are striving to excel—and if possible to out-distance others—in competitive work. To recognize, with no grudge or shadow of dislike, the somewhat humbling fact that we have been eclipsed by others, is what may be called a school or college virtue, of the first magnitude, and of the purest water. Whatever may be thought to the contrary, it is not an extinct virtue in our modern life, and it is quite

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possible that it may assume even finer phases as time goes on. Few things are more helpful to human progress than the ungrudged recognition of the merit and work of other people,—a cordial and genial delight in their achievements; while those who delight in them feel that the world is so much the richer by what they themselves could never possibly have done. In this connection we may recall the words of Aprile to Paracelsus in Browning's drama,—

> "let our God's praise
> Go bravely through the world at last,
> What care—through me or thee."

Closely allied to the foregoing virtue comes that of friendship in its highest and purest forms,—friendship developed into the habit of universal friendliness, and the constant effort to help other people. Many recognize this after a fashion, as it is one of the strongest social bonds; but the love of personal ease makes them shrink from the active offices of friendship, which demand constant sacrifice and self-surrender if thereby others can be helped. Nay, some friendship is at its root thoroughly selfish. There are those who wish to keep their friends to themselves. They are jealous lest *they* will lose something, if their friends get into a still closer relationship with other people. But a noble nature must acquiesce without a shadow of complaint in such a result as this. If his earliest, chiefest, strongest friend becomes another's newer, chiefer, stronger friend, *what of that?* It is presumably a gain to them; and to promote, develop, and multiply all the deep relationships of life is the very essence of noble, heroic, and unselfish friendship. There *is* such a thing as this in the world. There are those who live for the sake of others *continuously*, regarding it as a far higher thing to serve than to be served; glad, if opportunity occurs, not merely of lifting the burdens which others bear, and of carrying them a little way vicariously, but also of helping those whom they do not know to clearer thoughts, truer feelings, and more fruitful action; and there is perhaps no nobler virtue in the whole category of human achievement than this habit of incessant

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service, when one feels that "it is more blessed to give than to receive," and reckons it a *privilege* to be able to brighten the lives of other people.

In connection with this virtue another may be noted, which grows up under its shadow, so to speak, and flourishes alongside of it. It is that of indifference as to how one is treated *by* others in the course of this devotion to their interests,—indifference to dislike or even misrepresentation. The superiority which this virtue gives to one who practises it is marvellous. It creates an inner serenity of spirit. If one has large practical aims and ideals, if he is bent on adding something to the stock of human good that is in the world, what has he to do with taking umbrage or offence at the actions of other people? He has no time to think of these things, and is degraded by dwelling upon them.

There are other virtues besides these to be dealt with in Practical Ethics, but the foregoing are a sample of the rest; and a concluding remark—which has a certain reference to the whole of them—is specially relevant to student-life. It is this. Let the spirit of Chivalry be the animating spirit of the modern student, as much as it was of the mediæval soldier; and its later phases may be much finer than its earlier ones were. Never do an ungenerous or unkind thing to any of your fellows, by word, or by pen, or by deed; though others may think it clever of you to do so. Let your primary aim be *to find out the good* that is in others around you, to put yourselves into lines of sympathy with them, and to serve them by eliciting that good still further; for, until you do so, you cannot know how rich and wonderful a thing this Human Nature of ours is, which in its broken lineaments can mirror a Nature higher than itself, and in a finite way ever reflect the Infinite.

WILLIAM KNIGHT.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

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THE PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN.*

CONSCIENTIOUS parents can have no interest in life higher than the well-being of their children. Children furnish an opportunity to do for them what we wish we had done for ourselves. The perplexing problems of life will remain unsolved until we have learned how to educate the future men and women.

The home has been called a miniature moral empire, which suggests the idea of order. Order is born of authority and obedience. There can be no order without law, and a law must have a sanction, else it is void. Penalty or punishment suggests suffering. All punishment is painful. But pain and pleasure, however, are the two educators of life. The discipline of the one is negative, that of the other positive. The one attracts to virtue, the other repels from vice. This is not a capricious arrangement of man, but the method of nature. The hands that caress can also hurt, the voice that sings can also rebuke. The little child must know the mother that gives and the mother that denies.

There are those who would make education stand only on one foot. They argue against all punishment. Not authority without freedom, nor freedom without authority, but authority reconciled to freedom should be the aim of education. The instinct of liberty in the child accounts for its resistance to authority, the instinct of love explains its willingness to obey. The English philosopher, Locke, considered respect to be the basis of obedience, a respect which is at first hardly distinguishable from fear, but which gradually blossoms into love. According to Fenelon, authority is the basis of obedience,—an authority which never yields, but which by its fairness compels appreciation, and in the end wins regard and affection. According to Rousseau, obedience flows from the existence of relations. In his doctrine of natural consequences, Herbert Spencer endeavors to show that the necessity of obedience

* Extract from a lecture delivered before the Chicago Ethical Society.

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is impressed upon the child from the fact that nature associates certain effects with certain acts. He applies to the bringing up of children the doctrine of equal liberty, by which a man has the right to do as he pleases, provided he does not interfere with another's right to do as he pleases. In the doctrine of equal liberty he finds the principle of government, whether it be the government of a state or of a home. I do not understand, however, that this theory of education excludes the principle of authority, for if the authority is not exercised by the parent, it will be exercised by the child. We cannot live on equal terms with our children, for, as Perez has said, if we treat them as our equals, they will treat us as their inferiors. There is nothing more humiliating than the spectacle of a parent helpless in the presence of a child. The "let alone" policy cannot be accepted without definite qualifications. Reliance upon the principle of natural consequences will frequently lead us astray. Will Nature always adjust the effect to the act? Will the adjustment be always moral? It is a matter of experience that sometimes the natural consequence of an act comes so late that it is hardly recognized as having any relation to the act which provoked it. Then, again, it comes with such haste and suddenness that it leaves no time for reflection. It happens that Nature, after taking the child in hand, overleaps the limits of prudence and makes the punishment permanent in the form of a scar, or a cut, or a disease, when the fault was temporary and transient. It ought to be the aim of parents to prevent their children from being thus marred and maimed for life. For instance, the child is tempted to lean too far forward in looking out of a window. Shall Nature have its way and the law of gravitation avenge itself upon the child, by teaching it with a limb lost or an arm broken that it is forbidden to lean out too far? Or shall children in perspiration from play or work be permitted to remain in a draught, that Nature may teach them by sowing in their system the seeds of disease, by robbing them of sight or hearing, that it is against the laws of health thus to expose one's self? Is it not even more natural for the parent to snatch away the child from danger? In fact, this is the mission of the parent,

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—to stand between the child and danger, physical as well as moral. We must never let go the hands of our children; we must never deliver them up completely to the working of material laws; we must never leave them to fight the battle by themselves. It is our privilege to throw around our children the sheltering arms. The influence of the parent must be like the sky overhead, like the firm ground underneath, like the horizon all about them, from which they cannot escape. Children are impulsive; we must counteract this quality by our constancy. They are impatient; we must be calm. They are fickle; we must be firm. The parent must be to the child a kind of providence. Moreover, it is in this wise that each succeeding generation becomes wiser and stronger. If children were left to learn everything of their own accord by experiment and experience, then one generation would have no advantage over another, the experience of the past would be of no use to the unexperienced of to-day. Each generation would have to begin from the lowest level of barbarism and toil its way up. It does not follow from this that no room should be given to children for the free play of their faculties, that they should be "brought up like the young lion, born and bred in the cage, tamed and cowed." Children must grapple with the future; we must make the page of the past clear to them.

In order to be successful in the administration of discipline, two things must be understood: the child and the method of Nature. Every shortcoming in the child should be traced to its beginnings. Why is the child untruthful? Who teaches the child to dissimulate? Nature? There is a difference between the moral and the physical nature of man. We can treat the finger or the eye without very much affecting the entire body. There can be local physical treatment, but no local moral treatment. All moral weakness is organic. Moral education, therefore, must not be limited or local; it must be comprehensive. It must begin with the heart, out of which are the issues of life.

What does it mean to punish? It means to direct disobedience to its natural result,—pain. It is the words "to

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direct" which justify the interference of man, and make of education a co-operation with Nature. The purpose of punishment is to associate in the mind of the child sin with suffering. It is to intensify the hatred of wrong and to provoke repentance. Our aim should not be merely to make the child do right, but to make it love to do right. The desire to please us should not be confounded with the duty to love the right. Punishment, therefore, is repression on the one hand, and encouragement on the other. He who punishes must assume all the dignity and impartiality of an instrument of justice. He must act not from passion but from principle. Obedience to the right should not be a matter of compulsion but of persuasion. A moral law will not be respected by the child unless it is a law so expressed that it will be useless to protest against it.

The abuse of punishment is more dangerous than the greatest indulgence. Punishment is a poison which only in the most tender and prudent hands can become a remedy. At the present day we have outgrown the harsh methods of the past. Corporal punishment is almost entirely excluded from our schools. The arguments in favor of it were ingenious but not convincing. It was said that if corporal punishment be painful, so is all punishment painful. For instance, to single out a child and rebuke it before the whole class would certainly hurt the feelings of the child, and degrade it more or less. Have not children wept for hours and lost sleep and appetite because of a look or a word of displeasure from the teacher or parent? It is further argued that the mental torture, the punishment of the mind, is sometimes greater than any punishment that may be given to the body. Is it not more economical and moral to strike at the body than at the mind? We know the body; we see the effects of the blow upon the cheeks. It smarts, it brings the tear to the eye; but we do not see the "black and blue marks" our words leave on the invisible spirit, we do not see the "streaming of blood" on the soul. Others again have urged that the effects of corporal punishment are wholesome. It acts like a tonic and makes the blood tingle in the veins. It rouses the dormant, sluggish

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nature, and makes the heart beat quicker, kindling at the same time by reaction the sense of honor in the child. These points have the show of strength without the reality. The hurt occasioned by corporal punishment is not to the body but to the mind. The effect of the blow is not only what the face shows; the fingers sink deeper. It is after all the mind that is struck, not the face. Punishment of the body is always also punishment of the mind. But this is not all. In appealing to the mind, we treat the child as a rational creature. This is a claim of the child which we cannot ignore. Corporal punishment is one-sided. Besides, corporal punishment, as Herbert Spencer has shown, is associated with man in the childhood of the world. It is the savage, who has not patience to reason or explain, who strikes. Corporal punishment can seldom be administered without passion. When we show excitement, we give signs of weakness. Then the young boy or girl becomes conscious of a power over us. This is a temptation to youth. The danger of corporal punishment, therefore, is that we can seldom administer it without losing our head. On the other hand, we cannot appeal to the reason without becoming ourselves more reasonable. The very act of appealing to the spirit makes both the teacher and the method spiritual, and the finer the nature of a child, the more sensitive, the more delicate, the less material must be the punishment we inflict. The punishment must never tempt the child to doubt the dignity of its own nature. On the contrary, it must be so administered that it will add to its self-respect. This is the rock on which we must build, and into which we must hew for the foundations that shall last. All the virtues are born of honor. From the very cradle and with the mother's milk the idea of the divinity of human nature should be instilled into the mind of the child, and the parent should do nothing which would in any way imply disrespect to human nature. If we fail in this, our children are lost.

Besides corporal punishment, there are other punishments which are not justifiable. To shut up a child in a dark room is to spur its imagination into wild fancies. Darkness is a bad companion. It will contract and terrify the child. Denying

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children the necessary amount of sleep or food, exposing them to the inclemency of the weather, withholding from them for too long a time the tokens of affection, treating them as strangers, or as enemies, or ignoring them altogether,—these are measures which do more harm than good.

Punishment should be of such a nature that, if necessary, the parents can share it with the children. This is important. "I have a great pain in your heart," said the French mother to her daughter. The child must know that it cannot suffer alone, physically, much less morally. Its suffering brings suffering to others. This is the lesson which will develop the social element in the child. The members of a family are in the most intimate relations. They are like the branches of a tree; the frost that bites one is sure to hurt the others.

In the second place, we must correct the faults of the child by its virtues; that is to say, the strong qualities of the mind must spur the weak faculties into play. The relation between strength and weakness is not that the one should hide the other, but that it should lift the other to an equality with itself. If a child is physically strong, but morally weak, let the parent hold up to view the two sides of its nature, until the physically strong child shall be ashamed of its moral cowardice. Let the child look into the mirror and see first the robust, healthy, powerfully-built frame; let it look again into the mirror and see the small, selfish soul. To make the higher nature shrink from the lower nature and feel uncomfortable in its presence, to make the narrow and mean thoughts fly at the approach of the larger and purer thoughts, to strike at its faults through its virtues, to make the right in the child the judge of the wrong—in other words, to make the discipline self-administrative, the fault self-corrective,—this is the economic principle in education. Hence not only the duty, but also the beauty of obedience.

M. M. MANGASARIAN.

CHICAGO.

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DISCUSSIONS.

THE RELATIONS OF "OUGHT" AND "IS."

THE fact, as it is freely asserted to be, that metaphysics—including, we may suppose, the theoretical part of ethics—is "the most contentious of all the sciences," has not brought with it all the results that an observer of the effects of chronic war might have expected. Repelling, on the one hand, all those minds which value intellectual peace above intellectual conquest, it has not, on the other, given to the remainder those stern satisfactions of discipline and of definite victory or defeat which belong to a developed state of militancy. Philosophic dispute lingers in the guerilla stage of warfare. The infinite relief of seeing controversies decided is denied to us. "Definiteness," Cardinal Newman has said, "is the life of preaching." Definiteness is also the life of philosophic thinking; not, indeed, its bare vital spark (for, if only the definite in this sphere survived, the overcrowded condition of the theoretic world had been immensely relieved), but certainly its healthy life. Definite premises if not definite conclusions, definite ignorance if not definite knowledge,—these form the only sure preparative for progress. It is the misfortune of philosophy, not that like all true science it is contentious, but that it does not duly profit by its contention; that it is not sufficiently organized as a science to take stock of its advance and to prevent old controversies that have performed their appointed part in the historical development from living on in the midst of our proper present controversies to confuse and retard them. The need of demanding recognition for cogent argument, of extorting admission for established results, and of executing justice on condemned theories—the need, in a word, of discipline—may profitably at the present juncture be insisted on.

No topic of speculation suggests this need more forcibly than the rational basis of ethics. There is no common consciousness here either of tasks or of achievements. Yet the problems

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in themselves are both pressing and distinct. How can one moral end or moral order logically be proved supreme? If it cannot be so proved at all, if there is in the last resort no rational standard in ethics, then are we to say that ethical preferences are relative only to the mind that prefers, that they are due to the organization of that mind, and, save to other minds in this respect similarly organized, are without authority beyond it? In that case we have not, as it has been phrased, a single moral universe, but rather as many moral worlds as there are different minds. No one of these worlds can be esteemed superior to another, except by a standard of value itself relative to one world and invalid for the others.

These propositions strike at the root of every ethical system purporting to establish its universal validity by reasoning. They have often been asserted more or less completely, either explicitly or by implication, in one or other of their numerous forms, during the course of ethical thought. To recognize wholesale principles in general terms and to pass on is not necessarily a difficult or a significant performance. And the few thinkers, such as Hume and Schopenhauer, who have laid especial stress on the principle that reason of itself has no purchase on the will, have proceeded to fortify an ethical system in part at least by an appeal to reason.* Not, I think, until Mr. Arthur Balfour's "Note on the Idea of a Philosophy of Ethics," contained in his "Defense of Philosophic Doubt," has the principle at once been thoroughly stated and brought to bear on the mass of current moral controversy. That by no artifice can an ethical proposition, a proposition, that is, asserting obligation, be extracted from a proposition expressing matter of fact or existence—this is his thesis; and it is pressed to its final consequence in the logical relativity of ethical judgment in general. Since the appearance of this

* It is perhaps worth noting that the term "reason" is used by ethical writers in two widely different senses; in the sense, first (as above), of the faculty of reasoning, and second (as by Professors Windelband and Sidgwick, following the practice of Kant), of the consciousness of a universally valid moral standard, "das Normalbewusstsein." In the latter sense it may be said to involve a denial of the relativity of ethical judgments.

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piece of reasoning new ethical systems and new forms of the old have sprung up in their usual plenty; exhibiting the usual endeavor to prove the rational supremacy of this standard or of that; and exhibiting too, as a rule, the completest oblivion of the principle of relativity, thus recently set forth, which, if sound, would utterly discredit and supersede them.

It may be worth while, as a slight step towards defining the situation and eliciting discussion of it, to ask here what manner of answer could be given on behalf of ethical systems claiming to be universally valid, to the arguments for ethical relativity. These arguments are of the simplest. To say a thing ought to be is not to say that it or anything else is, was or will be. Obligation is thus something specifically different from existence, and a proposition asserting obligation can never follow by logical consequence from premises asserting nothing but existence. Hence a proposition asserting obligation, if capable of proof at all, can be proved only from some other proposition asserting obligation and that from another of the same sort, until a fundamental proposition in this kind is reached for which no proof is possible. But if the fundamental proposition of a moral code or system is in all cases indemonstrable, then there is no standard of decision between inconsistent codes or systems, and it follows that each has validity only for the mind that holds it.

In face of this demonstration there are three ways, broadly speaking, by which the universal validity of an ethical code may be defended. First, the logical relativity may be admitted, but it may be maintained that mankind, however divided against itself in the estimation of particular acts, is in its ultimate moral instincts at one; that nature thus has obviated the difficulty and left us in a real ethical unity. This seems to be the position of most utilitarians (though their expressions on this head are seldom free from obscurity), as also of certain determined foes of utilitarianism; a circumstance from which it appears that these ultimate and uniform moral instincts are extremely hard to identify. In this first form of the defense the logical argument for relativity is fully admitted. But the second form takes issue with the argument.

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According to it obligation is indeed concerned with matter of fact. To say that a given act or event ought to take place is to describe certain objective relations of the act or event, to assert its actual conduciveness to something,—let us say, to the greatest happiness. This is part of the actual meaning and definition of the word. Some utilitarians seem tempted to take this view, though they are apt to fall back upon the first without recognizing its distinctness. This view is allied with such psychological theories as that of James Mill, by which desire and (with some complications) approval are simply the discernment of a quality of the object in regard—namely, its pleasurableness. The view is, however, so hard to reconcile with the deliverance of consciousness when we use the words "ought" and "obligation," that I have mentioned it mainly for the sake of completeness.

The third possible mode of defense is of a very different kind, and to it, passing by the first two as irrelevant or improbable, I shall confine my remarks here. Like the second mode, it bases itself on the nature of the idea of obligation, asserting, however, not that that idea refers at bottom to matter of fact and is therefore in each case right or wrong independently of personal preference; but that, although referring to something essentially distinct from matter of fact, it purports in its nature to be "objective" and super-personal.

Putting ourselves for purposes of exposition at this point of view, we should comment on the theory of relativity as follows: We should say that it *takes for granted* precisely what most requires proof, that the object of moral conduct is merely an end personally preferred by the moral agent. It does, to be sure, point out that individuals may differ in such preferences; nay, undeniably do, and challenges the moralist to show how one such ideal can be proved superior to others. This makes a plausible case enough, but it in no wise touches the facts of the moral life. It neglects the import of the most significant symptom of that life, the idea of obligation. Thus, Mr. Balfour, after seeming to catch the real sense of the word "ought," proceeds to call it merely "an imperative," one of a class of

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"imperatives," and so clean forgets its distinct character. Consider the words he uses at the outset of his discussion. Contrasting an "ethical" with a "scientific" proposition, he says:

"An ethical proposition, on the other hand, though, like every other proposition, it states a relation, does not state a relation of space or time. 'I ought to speak the truth,' for instance, does not imply that I have spoken, do speak, or shall speak the truth; it asserts no bond of causation between subject and predicate, nor any coexistence, nor any sequence. It does not announce an event; and if some people would say that it stated a fact, it is not certainly a fact of the 'external' or 'internal' world."

In this passage (speaking as believers in a super-personal moral law, we should say,) Mr. Balfour grasps the unique character of moral obligation. Why, then, does he confound it with mere commands, and call it one of the class of statements which "prescribe an action with reference to an end"? How can he fail to see the error of asserting that no philosophical difference exists between propositions containing "ought," and non-moral or immoral imperatives which a man may address to himself or his fellows? An imperative is not a proposition at all. The words, "hand me my stick," for example, form no declarative sentence; they do not include a subject and a predicate (save by a fiction of grammarians); they do not even express a judgment; they are a combination of words uttered with the design of producing a certain useful motor effect in the hearer. Propositions do not "prescribe;" they assert.* "I ought to speak the truth," however, is incontestably a proposition. It is not merely to say "speak the truth;" that injunction, indeed, shares its form with all manner of evil and indifferent commands. "I ought to speak the truth" is assertive; it asserts *something*, though we may not be able to tell more analytically

* Though I am elaborating here a view that is not my own, this particular assertion that mere "imperatives" have no place in the logic of ethics seems to me both well founded and important. Compare Locke: "'Parents, preserve your children,' is so far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at all,—it being a command and not a proposition, and so not capable of truth or falsehood. To make it capable of being assented to as true, it must be reduced to some such proposition as this: 'It is the duty of parents to preserve their children.'" *Essay*, Bk. I., Chap. iii., § 12.

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what. It has a subject, and affirms of it a predicate. What is the essential quality of that predicate?

We cannot (the argument might go on) tell what? The reason is that we have touched bottom. All analysis must leave us in the end with irreducible elements. Obligation is such an element. What do you mean, one might as well ask, by existence; what is the analysis of that term? Existence is an ultimate, and so is obligation, duty, desert,—the conception we employ when we say "It ought to be." "It ought to be" has just as much standing-ground in the region of intelligibility as "It is." The two are separate but co-ordinate categories. The one can be resolved into component elements as little as the other.

If, now, you ask how we shall ascertain with assurance what ought to be; whether by the revelations of the faculty of conscience, or by reasoning from self-evident axioms like those of geometry, or by some other such direct informations; or whether we have now no means of assured knowledge, but, knowing that *some* truth there is, must await a future enlightenment;—if these questions are pressed, the answer is that, whichever be the true solution, the questions do not touch the present issue. That issue is, Does "ought" express a mere personal preference? We answer no. In the very first suggestion of its meaning, it is objective and independent of tastes. It implies an essentially valid standard which is no respecter of persons. Somewhat in this way, on grounds of introspection, the relativity of moral judgments might be denied.

Though I cannot cast the responsibility of the reply thus worded upon anybody but myself, it surely expresses in the main the more or less explicit views of many. Thus, Mr. Sidgwick, in the chapter on "Reason and Feeling" of his "Methods of Ethics," institutes an extended examination of the attempts to explain obligation, and concludes:

"It seems, then, that the notion of 'ought' or 'moral obligation,' as used in our common moral judgments, does not merely import (1) that there exists in the mind of the person judging a specific emotion (whether complicated or not by sympathetic representation of similar emotions in other minds); nor (2) that

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certain rules of conduct are supported by penalties which will follow on their violation (whether such penalties result from the general liking or aversion felt for the conduct prescribed or forbidden, or from some other source). What then, it may be asked, does it import? What definition can we give of 'ought,' 'right,' and other terms representing the same fundamental notion. To this it may be answered that the notion is too elementary to admit of any formal definition."

And again:

"This fundamental notion must, I conceive, be taken as ultimate and unanalyzable."

As against this position, I shall argue that the notion expressed by the word "ought," if sufficiently scrutinized, will appear to be neither ultimate nor unanalyzable; that, further, it will itself, when analyzed, supply the most conclusive evidence, and the final statement, of the relativity of ethical knowledge.

Perhaps, however, a certain method of analyzing it, which will to many appear obvious, and which is insufficiently treated, I think, by Mr. Sidgwick, should first for a moment be noticed. It will be said that the seeming objective character of obligation arises merely from the fact that our approval of the conduct in question is instinctively supposed by us to be shared by others. The super-personal "ought" is the social "ought." Man is a social animal; social elements are worked into the very structure of his mind. Moral rules, in especial, have been impressed upon him from infancy as things about which all are agreed. In consequence, his approvals and disapprovals bear with them in some sort a social reminder. Precisely as Mr. Shadworth Hodgson ascribes the objective and independent aspect of our sense-perceptions to our feeling that they or their copies are "objects for consciousness in general"—that other men do or can see the same things—so this analysis ascribes the "objective" character of our sense of obligation to our feeling that moral acts, colored with their appropriate praise or blame, are objects for ethical consciousness in general.

To this the answer is that introspection promptly discredits it. Whether our sense of obligation had its *origin* or its *antecedents* in a sense of the social judgment or not,—an indifferent

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matter to us in the present inquiry,—it does not now at all events necessarily contain a social reference. Quite the contrary. I do not here rely upon the fact that the feeling of a subtle moral pressure, of an exigent moral law, may be felt in the absence of social support, nay, in the teeth of it; that the mandate of duty may be hurled in rebuke by some intrepid prophet against the solid front of the people; for I cannot stop to discuss the obvious retort that the rebuker's conscience would draw sustenance from the thought of the ratifying judgment of deity or posterity. I can only call to witness what is to my perception the unambiguous fact of consciousness, that the idea of obligation may be present in full force without the smallest recognition of any one else's moral judgment whatever, without even, as I shall presently show, a self-conscious recognition of the thinker's own.

Another reply sometimes made to the view that the moral law is by its own evidence "objective" is equally beside the mark. It is said that the feeling of an obligation emanating from some source not dependent on our own natures is simply an illusion. But it has to be asked, How can the illusion be? How is such a super-personal moral law so much as conceivable? Where do we find a mental term for it? That is to say, we are confronted afresh with the question, What is the analysis of it? An absolute moral law that can be conceived, that can be intelligibly rendered in thought, is at least a supposable thing; and, this granted, it will go hard but some ethical philosopher will discover a proof for its existence.

I will now proceed to explain what suggests itself to me as the secret of the "objective" and "absolute" character of propositions containing the term "ought." What is the most conspicuous fact of my mental state when I am insisting that a certain deed *ought* to be done? First, there is the notion of a system, more or less complex, which needs the deed in question to be perfect. If this particular deed is not in place, is out of line, is not performed, the system is broken. There is a certain feeling of pressure upon the deed, that it may be performed and the system thus be perfect. There is always, I assert with some confidence, a reference to what may loosely be

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called a system, when the word "ought" is used otherwise than mechanically. "You ought not to think of such things," —I quickly and perhaps vaguely picture a certain consistent purity of mind upon which such thoughts are a blot. "You ought to lift your hat,"—I see in a flash an orderly and polite world, or some dim fragment thereof, uniformly uncovering its head at the proper moment; and so on to the end of the chapter. A thousand cases of the use of "ought" apart from men and morals attest the presence of this element in the conception. "This tree ought not to be placed here;"—it spoils a certain imagined effect. "That fruit-dish ought to go in the middle of the table,"—otherwise it shatters the housewifely ideal of a neat symmetry. "That piece ought to go here,"—when the children are putting together their puzzle-mosaic of blocks. In moral cases, the conceived system may consist simply of a certain ideal arrangement of things, acts, and lives, or of these viewed as subserving some dominant end. For the common run of men and also for philosophers in their irreflective moments, it is the former; no Highest Good is conceived. In the more premeditated philosophical usage it is apt to be the latter; the system is crowned and sanctioned by a supreme end. Thus the utilitarian holds that we ought punctually to perform our duties as citizens, because thus only does our conduct subserve the greatest possible happiness; for in his mind a system in which all hands contribute as much as possible to the greatest happiness is the ascendant thought. The like may be said of those who make self-realization the greatest good, and of those who prefer the harmonious fulfilment of all demands. Each and all of these moralists have in mind a system, consisting of an end and of acts subservient to that end. We may then interpret the proposition, "*A.* ought to tell the truth," thus: only by telling the truth can *A.* perform his part in the true system of the world.

"The *true* system;" at this objectors will not be slow to protest. How *true*, and why true? Which system is true? And how does this definition consist with the relativity of ethical judgment? The answer is at hand. I have chosen the word "true" because it seems least inadequately to express the atti-

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tude of each mind towards the system to which it cleaves. Instead of "the true system," I might have written "*the* system,"—that is, the system which is dominant and undisputed in the subject's mind, to which he looks with a single eye. Those who would urge that since the "ought" appears as "absolute" it cannot refer merely to the chosen ends of individuals, forget that one does not always contemplate the furniture of one's mind as that of an individual,—of one in a multitude. Our attention is often absorbed by its primary objects. When the thing before the mind is a conceived supreme end or normal order of action, it may command our full and instant heed and deference, and so far and so long as it is present hold uncontested sway in thought. When this is so, the thinker does not take stock of himself as desiring or approving; rather he simply sees the object in what is for him its native and natural attractiveness or commendability. What the psychologist calls his desire or approval is for him the fact that the object is in itself commanding, its achievement self-evidently the true course.* For he absolutely desires it. He absolutely favors its attainment. It is for him *the* object, and its attainment *the* advisable conduct. This conduct as subserving this end is, within his purview, *the* system. Whatever mars the system *ought* not to be done. The absoluteness of the "ought" is a measure of the exclusiveness of the desire or approval.

This grows abundantly clear when we consider again that it is not only moral ends so-called that beget an "ought." "I *ought* to take greater pains," for my aim is to dazzle the room with the brilliancy of my playing. The thief *ought* to have brought his tools, or to have walked more softly; for the ascendent aim with him was to effect his theft. These illustrations might be multiplied at pleasure.

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* The psychology of desire and of those admirations and approvals which are allied though not identical with it, is not sufficiently advanced to supply us with an unquestioned account of the light in which the moral order or the moral end appears to the mind. To use definite descriptive terms in the absence of a definite consensus would involve an argument for which I have no space; and I therefore confine myself to general and untechnical terms throughout.

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It will, I know, be said by some of those who have followed this analysis, that it still leaves a gap. Try as I could, they will say, to translate the statement, "*A.* ought to tell the truth," into an equally categorical statement in more elementary terms, not involving rectitude or obligation over again, I was unsuccessful. My paraphrase contained the words "the true system," thus making an almost undisguised use of the notion of rectitude in the attempt to define its next of kin, obligation. If the analysis were correct, it will be insisted, an unambiguous equivalent, not containing the term to be defined, would be producible.

To meet this criticism, which I admit to be a fair one, the general nature of propositions must be considered. Propositions may for our purposes be divided into two classes, which we may distinguish as specificatory and indicative propositions. By specificatory propositions, or propositions at large, I mean those which reveal the identity of their terms by referring to their qualities. Indicative propositions or propositions of standpoint are those in which the identity of the terms is assumed to be known,—the objects are, as it were, merely pointed to. As an instance of the latter, suppose I look out of my window and say, "The lake is unruffled by the wind." The lake? What lake? *This* lake. If I were to transform my sentence into a specificatory proposition, I should say, not "this lake," but "a lake of such and such dimensions and character, situated in mountains of such and such character and locality," etc. "This," "that," "the other," "to-morrow," "next week," "you," "I," are all indicative terms; terms, that is, that have meaning only *from a standpoint*,—to wit, to a person particularly circumstanced. It was a confusion between indicative and specificatory terms that led to Plato's interminable puzzles about "the one" and "the other."

The most obvious remark to make about indicative terms and propositions is, that they are "relative." "This lake" might mean a dozen different bodies of water, according as one was situated in Geneva, in Westmoreland, in Chicago, etc. The content of "this" changes with the speaker. But in another sense the term is especially "absolute." Nothing could

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signify a more absolute identity than "this lake," "this house," "this mountain." A generally descriptive term might fail to hit the mark; another object might in some cases duplicate the assigned qualities. But I could pitch upon no more absolutely designating term than "this" or "that." There is precisely one particular thing in the wide world to which I am referring. We may say, then, that, *to the speaker*, no terms have more of absoluteness than indicative terms.

A further peculiarity of indicative propositions is that they are untranslatable. They cannot be turned into specificatory propositions without altering their content. To say "This lake is calm" is not equivalent to saying "A lake of such and such a description," or "a lake perceived at such and such a moment by such and such a person, is calm," for in uttering the first sentence I had not all these circumstances in mind; I had in mind "*this* lake," the lake I might point to, the lake in its immediacy, in its unmistakable identity. The proposition, if cast into a genuinely specificatory form, would indeed refer to the same lake, but it would not embody the same content; the connotation would be different. And this is a typical case. "I shall do so-and-so to-morrow" can never be transformed into "I shall do so-and-so on the 30th of March, 1894," without introducing the thought of relations not previously conceived, and dropping the thought of some that were. That propositions of standpoint can never, without violence, be translated into propositions at large is thus seen to be an invariable law.

The bearing of these facts upon our problem is plain. "*A.* ought to speak the truth" is an indicative proposition. It means, "Only by speaking the truth can *A.* perform his part in *the* system of the world,"—in *this* system; in the system upon which my attention is riveted, which exclusively possesses my approbation. Its absoluteness consists in the absolutely exclusive tenure of my mind, or at least of my approbation by the truthful system. It cannot be translated into a specificatory proposition without the loss of some of its essential traits. The specificatory proposition would run, "Only by speaking the truth can *A.* perform his part in the world

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which such and such an individual [namely, the speaker] approves?" In this the "ought" has let go its absoluteness; just as the phrase "this lake" loses its absoluteness when transformed into "the lake now seen by so-and-so."*

"So you admit, after all, that obligation is an illusion?" it will be said. "As soon as the individual gets out of the circle of his own petty likes and dislikes, he sees the 'ought' to be baseless." The admission is not necessary. In its own sphere, the personal sphere, the "ought" has force and is no illusion. Where we know that others cherish the same ultimate ends as we, it has force between different persons. Where we are assured that the ultimate likes and dislikes of another are irreconcilably diverse from our own, the "ought" still has significance to ourselves as describing for us the other's proper conduct; as addressed to him, except for impressive purposes it is a mere *flatus vocis.*

We have here reached, it might seem, the ultimate statement of the relativity of ethical knowledge. If this be so, every moral system is, speaking at large, relative to the individual that holds it; and yet, from his standpoint, absolute; for indicative propositions can never be translated into specificatory propositions without the loss of an essential part of their significance. Because indicative propositions are incommunicable, except by a coincidence in the point of view, ethical

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* The distinction here dwelt upon is ignored, I think, in the important argument by which Professor Windelband (*Präludien*, essays on Kant and on "Normen und Naturgesetze") and Dr. Heinrich Rickert ("Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss") seek to prove that obligation (*das Sollen*) is not merely co-ordinate with but ulterior to reality (*das Sein*). Reality, I understand them to say, is for me the mode in which I *ought* to arrange my ideas or form my judgments; it is in the last resort a rule for the mind's thought. Hence reality involves obligation. Is there not here a confusion between psychologic self-knowledge and the original outlook of simple consciousness? Is it not an instance of "the psychologist's fancy"? In arriving at a belief I am not consciously arranging my ideas; rather the objects are arranging themselves to my mental vision. Professor Windelband and Dr. Rickert would say that the objects thus arranging themselves are really my ideas; to which I should agree: but they are not *classed* as my ideas, not thought of as subject to the active "I" of which obligation may be asserted.

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statements are forever relative, and derive their authority from no source but the breast of the speaker or hearer. And it is this view I have wished to develop.

DICKINSON S. MILLER.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE METHODS OF ETHICS. By Henry Sidgwick, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. Fifth edition. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893.

The continued popularity of this great work is shown by the appearance of a fifth edition after an interval of little more than three years from the appearance of the fourth. The dates of the various editions—1874, 1877, 1884, 1890, 1893—seem to indicate that the demand for the book is steadily increasing.

The changes that have been made in this edition are not of great importance. They affect chiefly the treatment of two points—Free Will and Ultimate Good.

In the chapter on Free Will (Book I., chap. v.) the arrangement of the sections has been slightly altered, and some modifications have been introduced into the statements, the effect of which seems to be, on the whole, that of making the case for Determinism more effective. The one argument in favor of Indeterminism does, indeed, still remain; but there is an omission of the passage in which it was stated that "I must use, in thinking about action, the only conception of human volition that is now possible to me; and this is strictly incompatible with the conception of my choice between rational judgment and irrational inclination as predetermined." An interesting passage has also been added (p. 71) about *remorse*, in which it is argued that this experience is quite compatible with a determinist view of action. The passage about punishment, which occurs at this point, has been slightly modified —the point about *quantity* being omitted. The chief argument against the retributive view of punishment now appears in a note, in which it is urged that rebellion is punished even when the rebel was "prompted by a sincere desire to serve God or to benefit mankind," and that this is incompatible with the view that punishment is a retribution for ill-desert. But it may be answered that the ill-

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desert of which account is taken in such a case, is only ill-desert with reference to the State. The State can only take account of men's actions so far as they concern its special province; but the fact that its view is thus limited, does not seem incompatible with the theory that the punishment which it inflicts has reference to desert within these limits.

In the chapter on the Summum Bonum (Book III., chap. xiv.), some modifications have been introduced in the arguments leading up to the Hedonistic position, which is finally adopted. The arguments on pp. 395, 396 against Virtue as the Ultimate Good are no longer held to establish the truth that, "however prominent Virtue may properly be made in a popular description of the good or desirable life, we cannot introduce it into an exact statement of the nature of Ultimate Good;" but only that "neither subjective rightness . . . nor virtuous character . . . can be regarded as constituting Ultimate Good." It is thus admitted, so far, that Virtue may be an element in Ultimate Good. It may be partly a means and partly an end. Dr. Sidgwick goes on to argue, however (p. 397), that "so far as we judge virtuous activity to be a part of Ultimate Good, it is . . . because the consciousness attending it is judged to be in itself desirable for the virtuous agent; though, at the same time, this consideration does not adequately represent the importance of Virtue to human well-being, since we have to consider its value as a means as well as its value as an end. We may make the distinction clearer by considering whether virtuous life would remain, on the whole, good for the virtuous agent, if we suppose it combined with extreme pain. The affirmative answer to this question was strongly supported in Greek philosophical discussion; but it is a paradox from which a modern thinker would recoil; he would hardly venture to assert that the portion of life* spent by a martyr in tortures was in itself desirable, —though it might be his duty to suffer the pain with a view to the good of others, and even his interest to suffer it with a view to his own ultimate happiness." The remainder of the argument then proceeds pretty much as before. Dr. Sidgwick still does not appear to have adequately considered the question whether, in the

* I may remark here in passing that Dr. Sidgwick appears to assume throughout his work that it is possible to divide life into separate portions; and to estimate the value of one portion, in abstraction from the rest. Such an assumption seems quite unjustifiable.

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definition of the Ultimate Good, abstraction can be made of the concrete content of life, any more than of the pleasant consciousness. He has made it tolerably clear, I think, that one side of the abstraction cannot be carried out: * it remains for him to show that the other is equally unreasonable.

The other changes in this edition do not seem to call for special notice. The Index at the end (the work of Miss Jones, of Girton), which formed so valuable an improvement in the fourth edition, has been adapted to the new material. I may observe, however, that it contains no reference to Remorse or Responsibility. I have not observed any other defects. In the Preface to the fifth edition, line 6, "Book III., chap. iv." should evidently be altered to "Book III., chap. xiv."

J. S. MACKENZIE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS. By J. H. Muirhead, M.A. Second Edition, University Extension Series. London: John Murray, 1894.

All who are interested in good thinking on ethical questions will welcome the reappearance, in a second edition, of Mr. J. H. Muirhead's excellent manual on the "Elements of Ethics" (*University Extension Series*, Murray). The book has been revised throughout and somewhat enlarged, mainly by the addition of many new footnotes, referring to the history and literature of ethics and dealing with criticisms upon the earlier edition. An index has also been added and the bibliography has been brought up to date; so that, while the volume retains substantially its original form and structure, its value as a text-book has been considerably increased. The chief additions to the text of the book are new sections, one of which deals with the principal "Objection to the Study of Ethics," and another briefly explains, with historical references, "Intuitionalism as an Ethical Theory;" while the chapter on "The Standard as Progressive" has been considerably amplified and improved by further historical illustration. To the objection against the study of ethics on the ground that it is practically "unsettling," Mr. Muirhead replies by pointing out that "the wound in the moral peace

* It should be remembered that very few of the opponents of Hedonism in modern times affirm that this side of the abstraction can be carried out. See, for instance, Mr. Bradley's "Personal Explanation" in the April number of this JOURNAL.

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of the age has been inflicted by the scientific reason, and it is scientific reason which, like the spear of Ithuriel, must heal the wound which it has itself made;" and in answer to similar objections he draws a clear distinction between the "reflective effort to understand the significance of our actions" and the "casuistical spirit, which seeks in the difficulty of estimating the results an escape from the duty of action." In his chapter on the classification of the virtues ("Forms of the Good"), Mr. Muirhead has also (partly in view of a discussion in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. III.) extended with advantage the statement of his objection to the distinction between "determinate" and "indeterminate" duties, "between things which we blame a man for not doing, though we are not so ready to praise him for doing, and things which we praise him for doing, but refuse to blame him for not doing" (p. 193). "Morality," says Mr. Muirhead, "requires not only that a man should be good enough to elude the policeman or to be considered tolerable as a fellow-citizen, but that he should be as good as he can; or, in other words, live up to his highest ideal." And if he "confines his efforts to the elementary duty of keeping out of gaol," even society, as well as morality, shows that it demands more of him by regarding him as "a suspicious character" and recognizing the duty of "keeping an eye on him" (pp. 194, 195). Of the new Notes the most important are one (p. 41) in which the "recognized mode of treating" ethics apart from politics is shown to be unsatisfactory and explained as "the result of temporary circumstances," (the dominance hitherto of a special kind of ethical theory), and another (p. 121) in which is discussed the practical application of Hedonism in moral education. Mr. Muirhead's book well deserves the success it has achieved as an able, careful, and interesting introduction to the study of ethics, and the changes he has made in it should insure for this new edition a still greater popularity.

ROBERT LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

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MANUAL OF ETHICS. By J. S. Mackenzie, M. A. Second edition. London: W. B. Clive & Co., 1894.

Mr. Mackenzie's "Manual of Ethics" appears in a second edition with some supplementary notes, which are added in a second appendix. The most important are those which deal with "Ethics as a Science" and "Self-assertion and Self-denial." In the former, Mr. Mackenzie had perhaps in view the criticisms of some previous reviewers. As one of them, I should find nothing to object to in this further statement of his position if we were allowed to amend the sentence in which he says that it is the function of Ethics to enlighten us "with respect to the principles of which common sense *is to be* guided in its practical judgments," by reading "*is* guided." It is true, as Mr. Mackenzie observes, that common sense is not an oracle, but neither is Ethics, and if we had to select between them as our guide and enlightener in practical judgments most of us know which we should choose. The note on "Self-assertion and Self-denial" calls in Professor James's distinction between the "I," or microcosm, which includes my whole world, and the "Me," which is merely one of the many objects or persons within that world to explain how the "assertion" of the former may involve the "denial" of the latter. This is a valuable distinction in psychology. I am not so sure as Mr. Mackenzie that it is equally valuable in Ethics. Here the point is, that the moral life is a continual progress from a narrower to a wider "I." The latter is not something different from the former. It is already contained in it. To release or realize the true I, the false I must be broken up and its elements recombined. On the other hand, the only justification for breaking into the old self is the development of the new out of the same elements. All this, however, is implied by Mr. Mackenzie, and I have no real quarrel with him over this admirable section. He does not seem to me to be so clear when he goes on to deal with these two formulæ as different ways of expressing the ideal of moral conduct. "Self-assertion means devotion to that circle of interests with which we have specially identified ourselves. Self-denial means the renunciation of this with a view to some other circle in which our interest is less keen." This, to begin with, suggests a difficulty. In view of the analysis of the preceding paragraph, how (we are inclined to ask) is this renunciation possible? Unless I am in some way *more* interested in the other circle, unless, in other words, the other circle is more attractive to

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me, how can I renounce my present circle for it? The difference surely between the act which we call self-denying and that which we call self-assertive cannot depend merely on the relative keenness of interest in the selves that are asserted or denied. But passing this over, the "real distinction," and we may add the real difficulty, appears when we consider the apparently contradictory ideals corresponding respectively to the two formulæ which, in our ordinary moral judgment, we seem to approve, and ask in respect to them which of them is supreme? Are we to "make the best of ourselves," or are we, at the expense of our best selves, to make for the best world for others? Mr. Mackenzie's answer seems to be that this is a difficulty affecting practice in which Ethics has nothing to say. Ethics has done its part when it defines the ideal as "the realization of a completely rational universe." Perhaps he is right; but had he been less pressed for space, we might have expected from him some hints as to the considerations which under modern conditions may help us in its practical solution. Thus it seems obvious that, as a rule, the man of greater social utility in these times is not the man who at an early stage has exercised strict self-restraint in the matter of his predominating interests, but the man who has made the best use of his opportunities to acquire knowledge and experience in the field in which his talents lie, and to which therefore presumably inclination points. This, however, is the one (unavoidable) defect of this excellent manual: that it does not give more.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

DER ENTWICKELUNGSGANG DER KANTISCHEN ETHIK BIS ZUR KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT. Von Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, D.Ph. Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1894. Pp. 106.

The author of the present treatise is a son of the founder and leader of the German Society for Ethical Culture (the Berlin astronomer, Professor William Foerster), and a pupil of the Freiburg philosopher, Professor Aloys Riehl. His acute, laborious, and thorough work is a valuable contribution to the better understanding of Kant. With the data heretofore existing, one could hardly form an idea of the continuity in the development of the Kantian ethics, and it rather seemed as if Kant's practical philosophy were divided into two sharply-marked periods, the first of which was ruled by eudemonism, whilst the second rejected this principle as the opposite of morality. Dr. Foerster has made use

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not only of all the precritical (*vorkritischen*) ethical utterances of Kant that have been hitherto known, but of a fragment on moral philosophy from his Literary Remains, which has been published in the twenty-fourth volume of Rudolf Reicke's *Altpreussiche Monatsschrift*, and, also, of a manuscript collection of hitherto unpublished ethical reflections by Kant, in the possession of Professor Benno Erdmann, who placed it at Dr. Foerster's disposal. In this way the author has succeeded in reconstructing in its essential outlines the historical preparation for the moral system of Kant. For good reasons he puts the date of the important fragment of Reicke at about the year 1774, whilst Reicke assigned it to the eighties. Reicke's fragment entirely differs from the later system of strict duty, in proposing as the moral principle a form of eudemonism,—viz., self-satisfaction; and as to method, it contradicts the principles, which Kant, in part in the "Critique of Pure Reason," and definitively in the "Critique of Practical Reason," indicated as alone applicable to investigations in moral philosophy. It must have originated not only before the elaboration of the doctrine of the Categorical Imperative, but also before the discovery of Transcendental Freedom. It represents the transitional stage from material to formal principles in the Kantian ethics.

To the same transitional period (between 1770 and 1772), Dr. Foerster assigns Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics, published by Politz (placed by Emil Arnoldt after 1781), which contain some remarkable ethical reflections. And in this same period the author puts, also, some remarks of Kant from Erdmann's collection, which he uses.

From these utterances of Kant, first given to the world in Dr. Foerster's treatise, I should like to quote this: "The feeling of life is increased in sensation, but I feel a greater life in voluntary movement, and I feel the greatest principle of life in Morality." (*Das Gefühl des Lebens ist in der Empfindung grösser, aber ich fühle ein grösseres Leben in der willkürlichen Belebung, und ich fühle das grösste Principium des Lebens in der Moralität.*) Kant's effort in this last precritical period was to win the highest approval for morality, which can be known independently of experience, and can be designated therefore as universally valid,—an approval, which, according to him, attaches itself to the good, since the latter brings freedom with it, and this signifies the highest ascent of life. But Kant was not able to maintain this stand-point long, and passed over to the self-legislation of the Pure Practical Reason.

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Dr. Foerster's treatise gives not only an excellent account of the precritical ethics of Kant, but it contains, also, well-considered judgments on Kant's ethical system. Quite correct is his remark, that the idea of the moral law as a means for freeing man from the dominion of sense, governs more or less the entire Kantian Ethics, and allows the social origin and the social mission of morality to retreat into the background, just as the doctrine of the salvation of the soul has done in many periods of Christian ethics.

Among the factors that helped to form Kant's view of life, Dr. Foerster justly makes prominent the pietistical education which he received (something which, in my opinion, he might have still more emphasized), as well as the influence of Wolff, of Rousseau, and the English philosophers. Rousseau's influence was—as the author rightly maintains—far more powerful than that of the Englishmen.

This excellent treatise will undoubtedly meet with the recognition among specialists which it deserves.

G. VON GIZYCKI.

UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN.

THE CHRISTIAN ETHIC. By William Knight, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews. London: John Murray, 1893.

This little book reproduces in a clear and pleasant style the current estimate of the contrast between Christian and Pagan Ethics. It seems true, as the author maintains, that there is no impossibility in ascertaining the general or fundamental features of Christian Morality. In an interesting section of the Prolegomena to Ethics, the late Professor Green furnished some aids to such an estimate, and to bring together the essence of this and other representations in a popular form would have been a task worth attempting. Professor Knight's work, however, is more direct, indeed, than such a study would have been, but is also less profound and less precise. In laying principal stress on the universal mission of Christianity as prescribed by its doctrine of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, I imagine that he is on safe ground. When he further proceeds to approve the common-place estimate, according to which individual immortality is a central Christian doctrine, and one of the most powerful of moral levers, we are in more debatable territory. The virtue of "self-sufficience"—though its alleged relation to a Greek virtue of *autarkeia* seems to cover

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something which would demand criticism in a fuller notice—and the virtue of humility may fairly be taken as distinctively Christian, and so to a great extent may the recognition of woman as man's equal, and the general regard for humanity. So long as we keep to generalities, indeed, we find little in the book that might not have its truth; but it seems difficult to imagine that a reader, who should need instruction of this kind, would not be seriously puzzled or misled by the more definite statements to which Professor Knight commits himself. Can it be true that before the introduction of Christianity the poor and the rich hardly ever met on equal terms? And is it not terrible, if true, that "Christianity has proved to the rich that the poor are as necessary to them to give them a sphere for work and well-doing, as the rich are needed by the poor to aid them in difficulty or distress?" The thought seems throughout, after this fashion, to play on the surface; and it would hardly be possible to regard the work as a thorough study of the question with which it deals, though its gentleness of tone and liberality of spirit make it pleasant reading.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT. By L. T. Hobhouse, M.A., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. With preface by R. B. Haldane, M.P. London: Fisher Unwin. Pp. xii., 98.

It would not be too much to say that this is a book which no "Reformer's Library" should be without, and what is more, it is a book which no one who desires to take up an intelligent attitude towards the labor movement can afford to neglect. And this, after all, ought to mean every one; for at a time when "things are in the saddle, and ride mankind," no one can form an ideal of duty without some guidance on industrial questions. Mr. Hobhouse's brochure will add not only strength, but substance, to those who dream dreams, and it will rouse out of their "dogmatic slumber" those who are content to acquiesce in a world of commercial competition as the best of all possible worlds. I cannot hope to do more than indicate the general outline of Mr. Hobhouse's argument, which is as skilful and suggestive in execution as it is resolute and vigorous in conception.

Mr. Hobhouse may be said to start from the direct antithesis to the point of view summed up in the declaration of Gambetta, that "there is no social movement, but only social movements." That

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would mean that trade unionism, co-operation, municipal and state socialism, are merely empirical and disconnected movements, seeking merely partial objects by partial methods, with no consciousness of being parts of a whole, of being "greater than they know." So long as this is so, their significance and range of action are proportionately lowered: their aims appear to be narrow and material, not only to those who judge them from the outside, but, what is much worse, to those who are directly engaged in them. A deeper understanding of them, apart from its importance to the intelligent citizen, will not only bring the movements themselves into a closer alliance, but raise them through fruitful interaction to a higher power. Such an understanding will be found in the organic idea which underlies them all, and this idea is nothing less than a new spirit and a new conception of industry,—"a feeling for the common good, a readiness to forego personal advantage for the general gain, a recognition of mutual dependence." But an idea cannot work without machinery, and the machinery by which "the new spirit can make its mark upon the economic world" is provided by trade unionism, co-operation, and state and municipal socialism.

The primary requisite of any economic reform is, "that the means of livelihood should be shared by all [working?] members of society, and this in such a way that all should have a chance, not merely of living, but of making the best of themselves and their lives." This elementary requirement—the substructure of any sound economic system—is met by trade unionism. The significance of trade unions lies in the substitution of collective for individual bargaining, and, quite generally, in securing a standard remuneration and standard conditions of labor for the worker, whether by the compulsion of the law or of the trade. The nearest policy of trade unionism is to extend and perfect itself upon its own lines: and it would appear that it cannot discharge its elementary function in an industrial system without becoming ultimately coextensive with the whole body of wage-earners. Mr. Hobhouse finds "grounds of hope" in the "signs" of federation, national and international, and also in the increasing tendency of co-operative and public bodies to fix wages by a standard of life rather than by "the higgling of the market."

But, however perfect their organization, there is a limit to the work of trade unions. They cannot control the fluctuations of industry, arising out of the precarious and wasteful adjustment of

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production to consumption under a *régime* of individual competition, and they cannot, therefore, provide against the problem of the unemployed. Now, demand and supply can be only "correlated" through the organization of production by consumers. Mr. Hobhouse, following closely upon the lines of Mrs. Webb's "Co-operative Movement," finds an adumbration of the solution of this problem in workmen's co-operative stores. And here, again, "consumptive co-operation" must endeavor by means of federation to become a national organization.

But we must go further: there are many things which cannot be left to voluntary co-operation, things that all members of the community require, and in which there is not much room for variety or idiosyncrasy of taste. There is the appropriate sphere for the compulsory co-operation of the municipality, or of the state, according to the nature and extent of the commodity. Under such a system the whole body of consumers, formed into a co-operative group or groups, would supply its own wants, use the profits of production in relief of taxation or prosecution of public purposes, and control the remunerations and conditions of labor. But, however far this principle of the control of production by consumption may be carried (and Mr. Hobhouse would admit that it would be difficult to apply it to foreign trade), trade unions will be just as much needed to represent the interest of the body of producers.

But the main function of the State is, after all, not so much to administer as to control: to be the supreme regulative authority over all that is most vital to society as a whole, balancing and harmonizing sectional interests, and exercising that kind of regulation which cannot be appropriately left to the control of any particular set of producers.

There, then, are the main forms of "collective control at work," —trade unionism, co-operative consumption,—voluntary, municipal, and national,—and the state as "architectonic."

But this is not all: the full remuneration of labor implies the diminution and final disappearance of a class living on the surplus produce of labor,—of the unemployed receivers of rent and interest. The existence of such a class and of such a body of wealth is plainly at variance with the idea of an industrial democracy, in which all are workers and wage-earners, and is equally incompatible with the essentials of a thoroughly economical system of production, which requires "that only good and useful commodities

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should be produced, and that all the producers of such commodities should be remunerated at a suitable rate." Here Mr. Hobhouse most ingeniously hoists the competitive system with the "classical economist's" own petard. He uses the conception of "the producer's surplus" in order to show that its distribution among producers, as effected by commercial competition, is as economically wasteful to the community as it is morally degrading to the producers themselves. What is needed is to "communize" the surplus products of industry, and for this purpose the machinery is provided by the extension of public ownership, and by taxation, adjusted in such a manner as "to fall exclusively on the surplus of industry."

"We have now considered all the main elements in the disposition of the national dividend, and we have tried to show that the various forms of the 'labor movement,' previously discussed, would deal far better with them, in the interests of society, than the forces of private enterprise and free competition. The remuneration of the workers (of every kind) being fixed by the trade unions in agreement with the public at large, the surplus remaining would pass to the community for common purposes, the profits of enterprise going to communities of consumers, whether in the form of co-operative societies, municipal bodies, or the State, while rent and interest would go directly to the municipality or the nation. Thus each branch of the labor movement has its appropriate part of the general problem to work out, and united they give hope of complete solution."

Mr. Hobhouse is too sincere to shirk difficulties, but I am not sure that, within the limits he has imposed upon himself, he would not have done better to confine himself to a justification and definition of the "labor movement," and of the function of the different movements within it. He has certainly raised more difficulties than were strictly relevant to his purpose, still more difficulties than he could satisfactorily discuss within the scope of his argument. His discussion of "the survival of the fittest" objection is, indeed, admirable; but his treatment of the difficulties connected with the sensitiveness of capital, with foreign competition, with the existence of a foreign trade at all, with State and municipal enterprise generally, with population, is so summary as almost to amount (in the eyes of a reader who is not convinced) to flippancy: while his proposal to "appropriate" rent and interest (and apparently profits) is not qualified by the enormously important consideration that the adjustment of taxation involves other more difficult "adjustments," and that,

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unless it rested to some degree upon a widely-recognized moral sentiment, it is likely to lose much even of its material value. Mr. Hobhouse, indeed, guards against the idea that machinery can avail without morality, but he is so much more interested in enforcing and illustrating the converse, that the moral presupposition seems to "drop out of his reasoning."

Taxation is an instrument of which much can be made, not only in the redress, but in the organization of the distribution of wealth; but it cannot go beyond a certain point without the concurrence of a profound change in moral ideas, as well as of collective control in other directions. It implies that society is permeated by the sentiment of a democratic standard of life, to which a life that is much above or much below a level that is within the reach of all is equally abhorrent. The significance of the demand for a "living" wage is, that it puts a material demand upon a moral basis. The assumption of such a demand is, that a certain standard of life should be secured to all who contribute to the service of society. It implies a society in which all are equally means and ends; in which no one is a mere "means" or a mere "end." In view of such an ideal, the difficulties of socialism are indeed great, but the difficulties of individualism are, as Mr. Hobhouse shows, infinitely greater. And in proportion as the idea embodied in this demand becomes an active social sentiment, in proportion as it finds expression in the collective control of industry, progress by taxation will be one of many means by which ethical advance can be marked and secured. Apart from this general progress, an appeal to taxation as a means of extinguishing rent, profits, and interest is likely to be self-defeating. "We can adjust taxation as we please." Can we? Certainly not in a community which is still mainly individualistic, both in sentiment and in methods of industry, and in a world which still provides many places of refuge to fugitive capital. As Mr. Hobhouse himself suggests, the more excellent way of communizing rent and interest lies in the gradual extension of public industry, "at each step of which some fragment of land and capital passes to the community," and (we may add) in taxing such incomes as are a mere tribute levied on society, and can be really distinguished as "unearned." Not that the importance of modifying the actual distribution of wealth can be well exaggerated; it is a very real part of the general problem of collective control. Mr. Hobhouse might have shown not only that the extension of public industry is blocked by "unearned increment,"

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but that the indefinite, and, for the most part, useless and uncultivated variety of consumption that arises out of the possession of large and idle incomes is one of the greatest obstacles to the extension of the organization of production by consumers. On the whole, Mr. Hobhouse's treatment of taxation is slighter and vaguer, less practical and convincing, than that of the other forms of "collective control."

And, indeed, the general tendency of the argument, as is, perhaps, only natural, is to become more and more abstract, in spite of its generally positive character. For instance, I am not sure that Mr. Hobhouse and other collectivists, who speak so easily of "the organization of production by consumers," do not allow themselves to become victims of an abstraction. Although I admit that the conception is in itself fruitful and suggestive, its applicability to facts is not so clear on closer inspection. It is a far cry from workmen's co-operative stores to the co-operative community. Collectivism in the provision of personal wants presupposes not only a high collective spirit and intelligence, and a general simplification of life, but a much greater uniformity of conditions and of wants than seems within measurable distance. And, further, I cannot but think that latter-day Socialists are ridden by an idea when they treat co-operative production with indifference or, much more frequently, with contempt. They speak as if the idea of co-operation in production meant nothing more than the self-governing workshop, the substitution of competitive groups for the competition of individuals. The objection would apply equally to the self-governing municipality, so far as it went beyond the provision of local services; but, at any rate, it fails to recognize that the principle which the co-operative workshop envisages is conceived as applicable to any form of employment. It is the principle that, in the interest of the development and character of the worker as much as in that of faithfulness and perfection in work, the workman should be made to feel that, even if he does not own the means of production, he has a definitely-recognized interest in the direction of the work. It is, in fact, the principle of the realization of democratic self-government in industry. Difficult as the application of this principle may be (and it is, after all, the basis of William Morris's demand for a free and popular industry, as the condition of artisans rising again into artists), the principle itself is not less essential to free and democratic industry than the protection of the workman as simple wage-earner, to say nothing of the

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education of the workman it implies. There is just a tendency in the new school of Socialists to become mechanical and pedantic. One does not quite see what provision is made for the instinct of perfection, which can only be born again in men whose work gives play to all their faculties. The "control of industry by the body of producers" must mean more than the control of the wage, and "the control of production by the consumers" must include a representation of the workers who quite conceivably might not be the consumers of that particular produce. Control by the consumers is not quite so democratic in principle as it sounds, and something of the old "co-operative faith" might be said (in Mr. Hobhouse's language) to "fill a gap" left by the modern collectivist. The trade unionist is reputed (rightly or wrongly) to be much more interested in raising the standard of wages than the standard of work: and it does not follow the mere fact of his passing into the employment of a community of consumers (however democratic in form) would give him a greater sense of honor and responsibility. "The honor of the craft" is just the motive from below that is wanting to the organization from above, and it is just the motive which "co-operative production" is endeavoring to recreate. There is something rather hard and pragmatical in the doctrinaire categories into which the modern Socialist would compress the industrial life, and I am not at all sure that the most formative element in the new system of industry may not come from such humble efforts as "rural industries," "arts and crafts guilds," and other revivals of popular industry.

But I have rather forced myself into the position of an outside critic: the main principle which Mr. Hobhouse succeeds most eminently in establishing is "simple" enough.

"It assumes that intelligence is better than blind force, and reaches its end more speedily and surely. It holds that the economic well-being of society is the true end of industry, and that this end will therefore be reached better than by the haphazard interaction of unintelligent forces. It holds that self-interest acts intelligently enough for self; but, inasmuch as it totally disregards the welfare of others, it is to be regarded, relatively to that welfare, as a blind and often destructive force. It holds that, apart from the control of industry by the community for its own ends, there is no force but that of self-interest to impel and guide production, and that therefore the withdrawal of collective control leaves industry to the interaction of blind forces, producing mixed good and evil, with no necessary tendency to progress, no pre-established 'economic harmony' between self-interest and the common weal. Accordingly, on the ground that intelligence is more effective than brute matter, and that the control of the com-

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munity is the only possible intelligent agency which can direct the course of economic progress, it advocates the substitution of such control for the present chaos of the economic world."

It is difficult to praise too much the luminousness, the vigor, and the skill with which Mr. Hobhouse works out this idea, as it is difficult to admire too much his seriousness of purpose, his sincerity of feeling, and his uncompromising idealism. The distinction of his method as a Socialist lies in its being at once ideal and positive. "What concerns us to-day is, not the possibility of a complete ideal, but the practical value and immediate promise of certain existing tendencies." This is the language of the true idealist, who does not simply develop a scheme logical in itself and yet out of relation to any facts or tendencies, but analyzes facts and tendencies more deeply than most men, in order to discover the direction in which they lead; who cannot only outline an ideal which fires and stimulates the imagination, but can discern its promise and potency in the gropings of the present. And the constructiveness of Collectivism as a theory lies, not so much in its adaptability to immediate application, as in its furnishing us with a guide as to what to accept, and what to reject, in the conflicting offers of social reformers. If, as it ought, it encourages "experiment," it has also—and that is its distinction in modern politics—a criterion and touch-stone to apply to this and that "reform." Does it, or does it not, make for such an organization of industry as shall secure to the community the greatest amount and the widest extension of good and noble life?

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

SOCIALISM; ITS GROWTH AND OUTCOME. By William Morris and E. Belfort Bax. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1893. Pp. vi., 335.

The announcement a few months ago in the columns of the press devoted to "forthcoming publications" of what purported to be an *édition de luxe* of a history of Socialism may have called forth a smile on the faces of readers who had not associated the advocacy of such opinions with the issue of handsome volumes. But the smile would have died away when they recognized the name of one of the joint authors. Even in its cheaper form, the typographical excellence of the book, and the width of its margins, attest the regard for nicety with which the productions of

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Mr. William Morris, whether in literature or in house-decoration, are generally and justly associated. But, apart from the care bestowed on the material shape in which the doctrines are set forth and the story narrated, we do not know that there is anything in the book which may not be found in what the authors themselves describe as the "many treatises on Socialism, large and small, hostile and friendly, that have appeared of late years." The very appearance of such treatises is indeed one of those signs, which Mr. Morris and Mr. Bax are eager to note,—and perhaps it is more deserving of remark than many others,—of the interest taken in the subject; and no candid observer of the drift of opinion can deny that, mingled with some amount of vague sentimentalism, there are now in operation eager yearnings for an improvement in the condition of the more unfortunate classes of society and persistent and reasoned aspirations for what has been called the moralizing of economic relations. Socialist writers have also, as the authors of the volume before us contend, this strong point to urge in favor of their speculations, that society has undergone remarkable changes in the past, and that, given sufficient lapse of time, it is impossible to determine what further changes may ensue in the future. But the argument, their opponents may retort, is capable of a double application; and they may urge that, despite of the sweeping nature of some of these changes, certain elements in human character have manifested an obstinate persistency which may continue to disappoint cherished hopes and fond ideas. In this book, however, Mr. Morris and Mr. Bax dwell on the past rather than the future; and they are in accordance with the chief exponents of that scientific Socialism, of which, as propounded by the subtle dialectic of Marx, they furnish a summary in one of their chapters, in following this course. In the details of the historical narrative they also adhere, with few, if any, exceptions, to the traditions of those exponents, and endeavor to trace an "irresistible evolution," which is to issue in the ultimate "emancipation" of labor from the "bondage" to capitalism in which it is now "enslaved." From Ancient Society to the Classical and then to the Mediæval Period, from that through the Renaissance and Reformation to Modern Society, and from that again through Socialism Militant to Socialism Triumphant, the tale is unfolded, with the same emphasis laid on certain features, and the same interpretation given to certain incidents, as are to be met with in any recent statement of the socialistic articles of belief. Sometimes, no doubt, the observations are just and the

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criticism deserved; but throughout the bias is unmistakable and the epithets are not seldom as extravagant as they are freely lavished. If this is history, it is history written with a purpose, and the judge is merged in the advocate. But it is frequently a mere repetition of what we have seen elsewhere; and we cannot honestly say that the failings of the book, as they seem to us, are redeemed by any novelty of treatment or freshness of illustration.

L. L. PRICE.

ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

LABOUR AND THE POPULAR WELFARE. By W. H. Mallock. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1893. Pp. vii., 336.

Mr. Mallock's gifts as an attractive and forcible writer find ample scope in this interesting book. He has succeeded in bringing together and emphasizing some important economic truths which may well cause rash reformers to ponder and despondent prophets to hesitate. The truths may indeed be found in their essence in some recent economic treatises; and perhaps Mr. Mallock is inclined to claim too large a measure of originality for many of his points. But he may fairly appropriate the distinction of presenting them in a guise in which they are calculated to arrest the attention of those who might otherwise leave them unheeded. The main tendency of his argument can hardly fail to carry conviction to an open mind, although each particular stage may not command entire adherence, and it is difficult to place absolute reliance on all his statistics in the lack of quoted authority for each. His contention is that the chief factor in the production of the national income is not land or labor but ability, which he identifies with capital as a living, active force. The immense growth in the national income during the last century has been due, he contends, to this ability, and labor has been able to secure so large a share of the results that, broadly speaking, it has divided among its numbers a sum which would amount to the whole of the income of the nation in times not long gone by. By natural means, aided by such weapons as combination, it has achieved as great an object as the most illimitable ambition of the socialist could command, or his most extravagant hopes anticipate. Ability, however,—and this is the moral of the book,—is a factor which may easily disappear before mischievous influence, and it is intangible in character and incapable of general diffusion. This is Mr. Mallock's main thesis, and it is presented with persuasive

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ability. It is accompanied by many suggestive and acute reflections on side issues which arise in the course of his argument.

L. L. PRICE.

SOCIAL PEACE. By Dr. G. Von Schulze-Gaevernitz, translated by C. M. Wickstead, B.A., and edited by Graham Wallas, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschien & Co., 1893. Pp. xx., 300.

This book constitutes a double volume in the "Social Science" Series being issued by the publishers. It is an abridged translation of the author's larger work in two volumes ("Zum Socialen Frieden"), published at Leipzig in 1890, and it forms a very careful and well-informed account of the Great Industrial Revolution in England, of the phases through which it has passed, and of the phenomena, political and social, that have accompanied its progress. The author is neither a pessimist nor an enthusiast, but a historian dealing with the history of a most important social movement after the manner of one who understands the peculiar features it presents in England and who certainly has got a firm grasp of some of its underlying principles. He regards the economic situation and the social question as being in a stage half a century more advanced in England than in Germany. The former country he considers has lived through the violent and revolutionary phases of the process of expansion and is now on the road to social peace. The frank and unconditional recognition by the employers of the aims and methods of unionism among the workers has almost come about in England, and the change in the relationship is being accompanied by an increasingly sympathetic attitude towards the workers on the part of the classes. The transition of power from the latter to the former will, in fact, go on peacefully in England. "No Englishman doubts it, be he on the right or the left, employer or employed. Nowhere do we meet the social pessimism so familiar in Germany, nowhere the belief among the lower classes that salvation can only come through the overthrow and destruction of the existing order." A marked feature of the change which is in progress he finds to be the gradual rise in the position of the workers which is taking place. There are no signs of that growing degradation of the class predicted by Marx. The goal of the English labor movement may be still far off, but, as the author foresees, efforts made to reach it will be along the lines of the existing organization of society.

BENJAMIN KIDD.

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COLLECTED ESSAYS. By T. H. Huxley, Vol. I. METHOD AND RESULTS. London: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. viii., 430.

This first volume of Professor Huxley's collected essays opens with a brief but very interesting autobiographical sketch of his earlier years. Its other contents are as follows: I. A lecture "On the Advisableness of Improving Natural Knowledge," the phrase "improvement of natural knowledge" being suggested by the professed aim of the Royal Society; II. An account of "The Progress of Science from 1837–1887," which was contributed to a volume published in the Jubilee Year of Queen Victoria's reign; III. The famous Edinburgh discourse of 1868, "On the Physical Basis of Life;" IV. A lecture on Descartes' *Discourse on Method*, delivered, as appears from internal evidence, before a Young Men's Christian Association (it is much to be regretted that the original occasion or form of publication is not stated in every case); V. A paper "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata and its History;" VI. A lecture on "Administrative Nihilism" (1871)—the well known criticism of *laissez-faire;* three political essays of much later date (1890):—VII. "On the Natural Inequality of Men;" VIII. "Natural and Political Rights;" IX. "Government: Anarchy or Regimentation."

At the close of his autobiographical sketch, Professor Huxley puts down in notable words what has been his chief aim in life: "To promote the increase of natural knowledge and to forward the application of scientific methods of investigation to all the problems of life to the best of my ability, in the conviction, which has grown with my growth and strengthened with my strength, that there is no alleviation for the sufferings of mankind except veracity of thought and of action, and the resolute facing of the world as it is when the garment of make-believe by which pious hands have hidden its uglier features is stripped off. It is with this intent that I have subordinated any reasonable, or unreasonable, ambition for scientific fame which I may have permitted myself to entertain to other ends; to the popularisation of science; to the development and organisation of scientific education; to the endless series of battles and skirmishes over evolution; and to untiring opposition to that ecclesiastical spirit, that clericalism, which in England, as everywhere else, and to whatever denomination it may belong, is the deadly enemy of science." Opinions may indeed differ as to whether Mr. Huxley's recent polemics about Gadarene swine and

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such topics, evidencing as they do his versatility and dexterity in the new region of historical criticism, have always been helping on the "New Reformation" as much as the quieter work of promoting "the increase of natural knowledge." But no unprejudiced person can question the sincerity, the intellectual honesty, and the consciousness of moral responsibility which have distinguished the whole of his long and brilliant career as one of the pioneers of his age; and if there is less courage required nowadays in combating the "ecclesiastical spirit" in England than was required twenty or thirty years ago, the change in England and in the ecclesiastical spirit itself is in no small part due to Mr. Huxley's own courage in the past.

To the student of modern thought Mr. Huxley's writings have, however, a far greater significance than belongs to the merely negative work of breaking down barriers of prejudice. Among scientific men he has always been conspicuously free from the narrowness of specialism; much as he may enjoy an occasional kick at "metaphysics," he is himself a metaphysician in the same sense as Descartes and Berkeley and Kant. And, against the authority of many revered names among our philosophical thinkers, I will even venture to say that he has done better work in laying the foundations of a defensible idealism in metaphysics and in ethics than many of those who have denounced "Materialism" most loudly. The essence of Mr. Huxley's philosophy I take to be his clear recognition of the truth which has been so admirably expressed by Mr. W. M. Salter in these words: "The only charge against materialism is, that it can be finally stated only in terms of idealism" ("First Steps in Philosophy," p. 70). It is true that Mr. Huxley often seems to put idealism and materialism on the same level; but a careful study of his language shows that he really gives the idealist the last word, though, quite rightly I think, he prefers "the materialistic terminology" in the special sciences (p. 164). It is true also that Mr. Huxley stops at the starting-point of idealism; and for those who remain there such idealism may mean little more than sensationalism. But, when matter and force have been dethroned from the place in which the ordinary materialistic metaphysics of scientific men sets them up and resolved into "forms of consciousness" (p. 193), the way is open for those to go further who are prepared to do so.

In another way Mr. Huxley shows his kinship to the philosophers whom the enthusiasts of the special sciences of nature are too apt

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to revile in ignorance. He appreciates the scientific services of "the sages of antiquity from Thales to Galen" (p. 43), and, as Sir Frederick Pollock says should be done at the beginning of every scientific study, he in effect takes off his hat to the great "Master of those that know," who after centuries of half-blind worship and a long period of cheap contempt is at length in our age coming to be known and valued aright. And along with this appreciation of the Greeks goes a due emancipation from the foolish English notion that Bacon was the father of modern science. Fortunately, as Mr. Huxley points out, scientific men praised Bacon but did not follow his advice. "Even the eloquent advocacy of the Chancellor brought no unmixed good to physical sciences." It is not the searching for "fruits," the desire to increase the comforts and conveniences of life, but the desire for knowledge which has led to the progress of science (p. 56). In Descartes and not in Bacon Mr. Huxley finds the true initiation of modern thought,—scientific and philosophical. Mr. Huxley's history of philosophy—though he might not like to have it put in that way—seems more Hegelian than Comtist.

In turning to the political essays, we find the same war against "abstract thinking" which is characteristic of the great German Idealist, and the same striving to recognize the elements of truth in opposing and one-sided theories. Thus Mr. Huxley can appreciate the value of the idea of organism as applied to society without ignoring the value of the notion of "Social contract" (p. 272). The criticisms of Anarchy and of State-Socialism in the essays of 1890 may seem at first sight to imply too contented an acceptance of the *status quo*,—another link of sympathy with Hegel,—but in his closing paragraphs Mr. Huxley says what should correct that impression and even falls back on Fichte's "Closed Industrial State" as an ideal (p. 429). I think that Mr. Huxley has hardly done justice to the full significance of Rousseau, though unlike most people who attack that epoch-making writer, he does recognize the inconsistency of the theories of the "Contract Social" with the too fruitful paradoxes of the earlier "Discourses" (p. 298). But in his diagnosis of recent cases of conscious or unconscious Rousseauism Mr. Huxley lays his finger on the diseased parts with unfailing promptness and precision. Thus Mr. Henry George's notion that every man has an equal "natural right" to the soil of the country is shown to be quite incompatible with the nationalization of any particular land by the section of the human race that happens to be

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living on it at the time. This gap between the political rights of the citizen, which admit of historical explanation (and, therefore, as is sometimes forgotten, of modification by legislation) and any alleged natural rights of the whole human race was pointed out long ago by Bentham in his "Anarchical Fallacies," but as anarchical fallacies live long after they have been scientifically vivisected, what Mr. Huxley has written on this matter is "most wholesome doctrine and necessary for these times." As he says himself, "We shall never think rightly in politics until we have cleared our minds of delusions; and more especially of the philosophical delusions which have infested political thought for centuries" (p. 424). Similarly, he more than once calls attention to the population difficulty which all socialistic schemes either ignore or evade by too great a trust in the beneficence of Nature in all her works,—except the production of the present system of society. On the other hand, Mr. Huxley understands the conceptions of biological evolution too well to accept the mere struggle for existence due to pressure of population as any ethical or political solution whatever. "The creature that survives a free-fight only demonstrates his superior fitness for coping with free-fighters,—not any other kind of superiority" (p. 428).

Adopting from Locke the maxim that "the end of government is the good of mankind," Mr. Huxley defines this ethical and political end, in terms suggested by Spinoza, as "the attainment by every man of all the happiness which he can enjoy without diminishing the happiness of his fellow-men" (p. 281). Here again, as in his metaphysics, Mr. Huxley only takes us to the beginning of the ethical problem; but what he practically means is evidently the same as T. H. Green's conception of a "common good." Even Green, it may be necessary to remind the more vehement of anti-hedonists, defined positive freedom as "a power or capacity of doing or *enjoying* something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something that we do or enjoy in common with others." Mr. Huxley does not leave "happiness" quite unanalyzed. "If we inquire," he says, "what kinds of happiness come under this definition, we find those derived from the sense of security or peace; from wealth or commodity, obtained by commerce; from art,—whether it be architecture, sculpture, painting, music, or literature; from knowledge or science; and, finally, from sympathy or friendship." There are, indeed, problems lurking under these phrases more difficult perhaps than Mr. Huxley fully realizes. "No man is any

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worse off because another acquires wealth by trade, or by the exercise of a profession." Not necessarily, perhaps, but the sentence (written in 1871) seems to imply a rather fuller belief in the universal beneficence of economic competition than would be accepted now even by fairly orthodox economists. Even with regard to the enjoyment of art, does not the *kind* of picture, the *kind* of music, etc., make a good deal of difference in the possibility of its enjoyment by many? And should we be obliged to say that that was always ethically the best which could be enjoyed by most? Even friendship, as Aristotle warns us, cannot be extended indefinitely without becoming "watery." Mr. Huxley's conception of the ethical end is, like Bentham's, intended only as a rough guide in legislation; but, like Bentham's, it seems to involve that very dogma of the natural equality of mankind against which both protest.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

JESUS COLLEGE, OXFORD.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BEAUTIFUL. Vol. II. Being a Contribution to its Theory and to a Discussion of the Arts. By William Knight, Professor of Philosophy in St. Andrews. London: John Murray, 1893.

Professor Knight contributes two volumes on the "Philosophy of the Beautiful" to the series of University Extension Manuals issued by Mr. John Murray, of London. The first, which appeared a year ago, contained a "History of Æsthetic," of which Professor Knight himself says, "It was not my aim to trace the organic evolution of dogma from school to school. My purpose was to give an impartial account of the greater theories *seriatim*, along with an outline of the more important treatises on the Beautiful." In the second volume the author devotes eighty-four of his two hundred and eighty-one pages to a discussion of the theory of æsthetic, being occupied throughout the remainder of the book with a discussion of the several arts and with short sketches of Russian and Danish æsthetic.

Professor Knight cannot be congratulated either on the arrangement or the treatment of his subject-matter. The most essential characteristics of University Extension Manuals—brevity, lucidity, and the presentation of the most salient and essential features of the subject dealt with—have been sacrificed. By refusing to trace the organic evolution of thought in this matter, Professor Knight has given us, in his first volume, a chronicle rather than a

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history, and, in his second, a meagre abstract statement of æsthetic theories detached from the illuminating considerations of time, place, and circumstance. The result in the mind of the student will be, it is to be feared, a confused mass of ideas about Beauty, without order or organic connection either logical or historical. Time and space are wasted in both volumes over matter not strictly relevant, while the main issues are not satisfactorily worked out. Professor Knight's own point of view is not quite readily ascertainable. His apparent indefiniteness in æsthetic seems to belong to an apparent indefiniteness in his theory of Reality. We are told of an "underlying *ding-an-sich*," to which Beauty leads us, and of an "Archetype of Beauty," after which Art is the endeavor, without any clear idea being given us of what these terms imply for Professor Knight. We hear of "Beauty which cannot appear or disappear, but which always is, always was, and always will be at the very core of things, and at the centre of the universe;" we hear that art conducts us to "the sphere of the One, which is also the realm of the infinitely vague, a realm where Truth, Goodness, and Beauty reside in their elements, and which we are only able to interpret by analogy, while we see it 'through a glass darkly.'" Perhaps this means something which would be most illuminating if one could understand it, but it is not easily understood. To the present writer, at least, it does not appear that Professor Knight has made any real contribution to the theory of æsthetic.

M. S. GILLILAND.

LONDON.

ALBERT BRISBANE. A Mental Biography. With a Character Study. By his Wife, Redelia Brisbane. Boston, Mass.: Arena Publishing Company, 1893.

Albert Brisbane (born 1809, died 1890) was an independent representative of the social side of the Transcendental movement, with whose best-known leaders he had at one time a relation of a certain sympathy in views and of some personal friendship, although never of any closer discipleship. He himself was known as a disciple of Fourier, for whose social theories he during a considerable period attempted to win a hearing in this country. He was rather a man of personal experience than a scholar, rather a maker of humane projects than a consecutive or constructive thinker, and rather a wanderer than anything else. It is in his character as wanderer that this book, the product of the devotion of the wife

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who cared for him in his old age, chiefly presents him to us. The writer was married to him in 1877. Taking a deep interest in his thoughts as the product of his career, she persuaded him at one time to dictate to her a series of confessions, which she was able to guide into autobiographical channels. The result is a somewhat fragmentary account of his youth and early maturity.

Such a book attracts not from any value as an exposition of doctrine (for to such a value it makes no claim) but from its simplicity as a confession, and as a revelation of a type that has now passed away. This natural Transcendentalist (for such, in our vague American sense of the word, our subject was, despite his unwillingness to accept metaphysical formulas) was born in Batavia, New York, "within hearing of the roar of the cataract of Niagara." His father was of Scotch, his mother of English descent. From the former, Brisbane acquired a scepticism in matters of religion; from the latter's varied home-teaching he gained a wide curiosity as to the things of the world and of life. A great love of nature attracted him to early meditations on universal problems. At fifteen years of age he was visited by a mighty "intuition," as to the problem of his life, which was henceforth to find "What is the work of man [*i.e.*, of humanity as an organic whole] on this earth?" This intuition was from the start, as he later remembered it, at once universal and fairly definite. It was distinct from mere personal ambition for political success of any sort. It was a vast desire to know the place and business of the human race viewed in its wholeness. In the light of this intuition, Brisbane, as a youth, devoted some time, under his father's general supervision, to study in New York city. The study resulted in a good knowledge of modern languages; but there was little systematic general education at this stage of his career, or, for that matter, later, although in time, through his extensive curiosity, he plainly acquired much information. In 1828, in pursuit of the now ardently desired solution of the "mystery of man's destiny," Brisbane went abroad, listened in Paris to Cousin's lectures, and then, in 1829, proceeding to Berlin, heard Hegel, and took personal instruction in the Hegelian philosophy from Michelet. Both in Paris and in Berlin, and later everywhere in the journeys here recorded, Brisbane appears as both skilful and fortunate in his social relations, however busy he might be in study. The result of the study of Hegel's doctrine, in view of the crabbedness of the Berlin teachers, and the hopeless unpreparedness of Brisbane's enthusiastic young mind,

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was very naturally an utter disappointment. With characteristic longing for novelty, the disillusioned student felt that he "had seen enough of Christian civilization for awhile, and that it would be a relief to make an excursion east to Turkey, and look at barbaric civilization." The Turks proved more suggestive than Hegel, and, though painful to look upon, were after all not so disappointing as the Berlin circle, since one knew in advance what to expect of them. The contrast of the two civilizations, Eastern and Western, was seen to turn upon the place of woman in the social order, and Brisbane returned with a mind full of vague but ardent thoughts concerning the social ideal. Henceforth one finds in him essentially the sensitive scrutinizer of society,—a man altogether too unsystematic to work out any one theoretical plan suited to his own ideals, and altogether too critical, meanwhile, to be satisfied permanently with the doctrine of anybody else (even Fourier's system, which he later for awhile adopted, failed in the end wholly to content him). His value as an individual apparently lay, so far as this book presents him, precisely in this his sensitiveness to social conditions, whose variations he loved to watch, whose crises he often, as interested foreign observer, studied at very close quarters, whose every color he examined with all the love of a naturalist, but whose symptoms he never learned, as leader or reformer, practically to control or even deeply to affect. For he plainly lacked the leader's ruthlessness and the reformer's dogged perseverance. It is indeed a pity that so open-eyed an observer, who feared nothing, who was absolutely free from religious and other similar traditional prejudices, who loved the flavor of danger, and knew and was fond of all sorts and conditions of men, did not take fuller contemporary notes of his wanderings and of the great events that he later witnessed. The period of Brisbane's personal relations with Fourier, which are here sketched at some length, closed his first stay abroad. He returned in 1834.

The later periods of Brisbane's career are narrated with greater inequality. There are many decidedly attractive moments and episodes, but once for all it is rather the personality than the doctrines which excite the present reviewer's interest in this volume; and one can only wish that Brisbane's personal reminiscences had been even more fully, and certainly more consecutively, recorded. One gets some noteworthy glimpses of the Transcendental movement. Brisbane's own efforts at practical reform in this country do not, however, appear in a very dramatic light. Later visits to

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Europe show us something of the days of 1848. The closing chapters of the volume are devoted to some of Brisbane's theories, first upon his social ideals, of which the present reviewer has no expert judgment, and then of his speculations upon more or less general and cosmical topics. It is a pity that the notes upon these matters were not submitted, in advance of publication, to some student of the physical sciences, who might have counselled the omission of certain quite unnecessary and elementary errors, without the presence of which Brisbane's more speculative views would have been no less attractive. The work, as a whole, will interest a good many lovers of uncommon types of humane experience.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

EVOLUTION AND RELIGION. By A. J. Dadson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1893. Pp. 348.

The impression left on the mind after reading this book is one of regret that it should have been written, or that, having been written, the title which it bears should have been chosen for it. Its principal fault is perhaps that the author does not possess the range of knowledge necessary to the proper handling of the subject he has undertaken. The writer's acquaintance with biological subjects is not extensive. For his science he has apparently drawn on the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, a volume or two of the International Scientific Series, Haeckel's "History of Creation," and a few similar books. The facts collected from these sources are set forth in the first part of the book under the title of "Evolution," and they are made the basis of much bitter language in the second part of the book under the head of "Religion." The Christian religion and "the Christian's god" are in particular subjected to a style of criticism which reminds one of the debates at the Hall of Science, Islington, in the early days of the late Mr. Bradlaugh. The time has gone by for the treatment of so large a subject in this narrow partisan spirit. From those who, in dealing with religious systems, profess to approach in a scientific spirit the largest and most imposing class of phenomena connected with our social evolution, we expect something more nowadays. To profess, as the writer does, to see nothing more in these systems than a set of baleful influences constituting "a curse so great that the aggregate of all the evils that have afflicted man is small in comparison," is but to admit that he does not possess essential qualifications for treating his sub-

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ject scientifically. Even though he might lack qualities necessary to the proper treatment of the question from its ethical side, he should at least have known that a first principle of evolutionary science is that no class of phenomena peculiar to life under any of its aspects is without its utilitarian history, or could have been evolved at all if its influence was merely hurtful.

BENJAMIN KIDD.

THEOSOPHY, OR PSYCHOLOGICAL RELIGION. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Glasgow in 1892. By F. Max Müller, K.M. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1893. Pp. xxiii., 585.

The curious, almost self-contradictory, title given by Professor Max Müller to his concluding course of Gifford Lectures is readily explained when regarded in the light of the three preceding series. It may therefore be advisable to recall the lecturer's general plan. The initial course, which bore the title "Natural Religion," was in the main devoted to an exposition of the author's own standpoint. His aim was to show that the only fruitful method applicable to the elucidation of religious phenomena must necessarily be historical. Proceeding on the lines thus indicated, the investigator is brought face to face with an endless array of facts which, even after some reflection, do not appear to supply any very definite principles. Accordingly, Professor Müller introduced certain deductions of his own, warranted, as he contended, by inspection of the evidence. As the historical sequence unfolds itself, religious effort is observed to have progressed in two marked directions. Human aspiration takes form either in the belief in an absolute power permeating things in the finite world, or in a conviction that man has a soul peculiar to himself and infinite, because destined to deathlessness. Of these tendencies the former was discussed in the second course under the title of "Physical Religion;" the latter in the third series as "Anthropological Religion." Here the infinite in the physical universe and the corresponding spirit in man are abstracted from one another, and are regarded as if they were capable of free treatment in isolation. Two infinites, if such a meaningless phrase be permissible, are thus set over against one another, or, at least, come to be conceived as parallel forces. The object of the final course, now before us, is to exhibit the attempts which have been made to bridge over the chasm that must remain.

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The inquiry is "theosophical" in the original sense of this term. It deals, as the author himself says, with "The highest knowledge of God within the reach of the human soul." It is "psychological," because it seeks to unify the soul with God, to find out, that is, an inner psychical element common to both.

The plan of this series is entirely historical. The varied attempts to account for the relation between the human soul and deity are passed in review, and the gradual growth of conviction on the subject, especially after the advent of Christianity, is traced. The first four lectures are introductory. Then follow seven discourses on immortality, the future state, and kindred topics, as illustrated by the "Sacred Books of the East," by Plato, and by Sufiism. The religion of Persia, the philosophical systems of the Hindus, and some characteristics of Greek mythology receive consideration. The twelfth lecture, on the Logos, marks the passage to Christianity; while the three concluding discourses are devoted to an exhibition of Platonic influence,—the source of the Logos,—throughout the progress of Christian doctrine. As is natural, the earlier lectures, although somewhat overweighted by too free quotation, are the more original. Indeed, it is matter for no little regret that Professor Max Müller did not bring his historical method to bear more exhaustively and more seriously upon the evolution of the Logos idea in mediæval theology. For the subject is one of first importance, especially when it is remembered that mystic elements, akin to neo-platonism, played a large part in preparing opinion within the church for the tenets distinctive of the Reformation.

Apart from the defect just noted, a single further criticism may be ventured. The impression which the lectures leave upon the mind is that the soul of man and the divine spirit are two disconnected entities which it is necessary to relate by some more or less mechanical process. So far as I am able to understand him, Professor Max Müller has been dominated by a doctrine of this kind from the very beginning. And, as a result, religion, according to his historical interpretation, appears still to be balked of that immanent unity which, on another view of it, is the presupposition of its very possibility. The ultimate defect of our author's entire scheme seems to me to lie in a radical misconception of the connotation of the term infinite. This cannot be built up historically, but must be from the first apprehended speculatively. But, whatever our differences from him on primary philosophical questions, we cannot keep back full tribute of admiration from Professor Max

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Müller for the enormous mass of pertinent facts garnered in his four volumes, for the brilliant suggestions which frequently flash forth, and for the sweet, tolerant spirit that enriches the whole. Those who have attempted to raise a heresy-hunt after some of his deductions would have been better employed in trying to participate in his learned kindliness.

R. M. WENLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

THE RIDDLE OF THE UNIVERSE. By Edward Douglas Fawcett. London: Edward Arnold, 1893. Pp. xvi., 436.

This book is essentially an essay in metaphysical monism. Part I. is a critical and historical survey of the leading modern metaphysical systems. Part II. is a constructive development, although incidentally critical of what the author conceives to be one-sided philosophies, materialism, agnosticism, dialectic philosophy, theology and all ethic subservient to theology, and defective modern mysticism. It is easy to see that the author has —as he admits—been most influenced by Leibnitz, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, and Renan. There is little ethic in the book, and the metaphysical writing, while facile, is somewhat highly colored, the author treating eloquently all the time of the wrecks of systems, and finding refuge in a universe of persons as the only reality, these persons being subject to the biological phenomenon of palingenesis. The background of the system is the metaconscious from which the deity of persons is evolved. The individual is the only concrete, and should dwarf everything else. The persistence of the individual is said to be the only serious problem for ethics, and the author deprecates the idea of the individual living to too great an extent for others. Still, individuals, he thinks, can help each other in the march to the common goal,—a community of *interpenetrative* individuals who are all real, and who together constitute the sole reality. Of course, while this evolution of personalities is an evolution for the absolute of something which it at one time had not, in another, a metaphysical sense, it is only an evolution of what the absolute potentially was. His system thus begins as does that of Von Hartmann; and ends, as does that of Leibnitz, in a monadology, with the exception that the individual person is the only real concrete. The author triumphantly exclaims that he is an atheist, a pantheist, a theist, and an agnostic all at once. He might have known that most students of systems

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profess to be able to reconcile all these things. To those who have not the ability to correlate philosophical systems for themselves, the book will doubtless furnish much reflective reading. Is the author, though, not confused between historical evolution (whatever that is) and metaphysical evolution? The subconscious may be, for example, a necessary phase in the evolution of the individual, without being so for the absolute.

WILLIAM CALDWELL.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP. A Collection of Essays. By Professor John MacCunn, M.A. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons, 1894.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. By Thomas Fowler, D.D., and John Matthias Wilson, B.D. (New edition in one volume.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.

CONSCIENCE. An Essay towards a New Analysis, Deduction, and Development of Conscience. By Rev. J. D. Robertson, M.A., D.Sc. Vol. I. *New Analysis of Conscience.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1894.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. Translated from the Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences. With Five Introductory Essays. By Prof. William Wallace, LL.D. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.

THE LOGIC OF HEGEL. By William Wallace, M.A., LL.D. Second Edition, revised and augmented. Two vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1892 and 1894.

ETHIC. From the Latin of Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by W. Hale White, and revised by Amelia Hutchinson Stirling, M.A. (Edin.). Second Edition (revised and corrected, with new Preface). London: T. Fisher Unwin; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

ENTWURF EINER ONTOLOGISCHEN BEGRÜNDUNG DES SEINSOLLENDEN. Von Gustav Engel. Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1894.

LA FUNZIONE PRATICA DELLA FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO. By Icilio Vanni. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1894.

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ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. By David Hume. Reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777. Edited, with an introduction, etc., by L. A. Selby-Bigge M.A. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894.

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DISCIPLESHIP: The Scheme of Christianity. By the Author of "The King and the Kingdom: A Study of the Four Gospels." London: Williams & Norgate. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1894.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. Being a Study of the Doctrine of Jesus as developed from Judaism and converted into Dogma. By W. Mackintosh, D.D. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons, 1894.

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Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.
Prof. G. von Gizycki, Nettelbeckstrasse 24, Berlin, Germany.
J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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